BEYOND IDENTITY:

The Socio-Economic Impacts of Archaeology on a Non-Descendant Community in Sudan

Rebecca Bradshaw

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 2017

Thesis examined in September 2017, by

Paul Lane

Professor of Global Archaeology, Uppsala University

and

Paul Basu

Professor of Anthropology, SOAS University of London

To my beloved parents,

For my friends in Sudan.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Like most others, this thesis has been many years in the making. And, like the product of any endeavour, it is not the result of one person alone.

First to be acknowledged must be my Mum and Dad, Jilly and David Bradshaw, whose never-ending love, support, encouragement and dedication has gone far beyond the duty of any parent. This thesis would never have been started, let alone finished, without them by my side.

My gratitude to the many Sudanese men and women that took their time to talk to me and welcome me into their homes cannot be adequately expressed, but they are the backbone of this thesis. While I can only hope to have made a positive contribution to their lives, they have certainly altered mine for the better.

For their permissions, and for their help setting up my fieldwork, often over long distances and time periods, a big thank you is owed to the employees of the National Corporation of Antiquities and Museums, particularly its Director-General, Dr Abdelrahman Ali, and to Dr Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Dr Salah eldin Mohammed Ahmed and, in particular, to Mr El Hassan Ahmed.

Hana Ahmed, my translator and cultural guide in Sudan, deserves the next mention for her significant contributions to the project, her boundless energy and enthusiasm, for her sense of humour and for her kind tolerance of me during many weeks of stressful fieldwork in close quarters.

A great debt is of course owed to the archaeological project directors who hosted me over the fieldwork seasons in Sudan: Jane Humphris, Julie Anderson and Julia Budka. Dr Humphris is owed a particular debt of thanks for her openness and understanding.

Significant thanks are also due to my SOAS supervisors, Tania Tribe and Lutz Oette for their support over the years. I hasten to add that without the full scholarship awarded to me by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, via SOAS' Department of History of Art and Archaeology, this project would not have happened, and I am grateful to those who awarded it to me.

I will no doubt have forgotten to mention people, but endless thanks are also due to Basil Kamal Bushra, Omer Sharif, Sayed al-Mokhtar and Rayan Elamin for patiently translating and transcribing hours of recorded transcripts and history books; to my Sudanese friends and colleagues, in particular to Amel Gismallah Hassan, Abdelhai Abdelsawy, Tag Elkhazin, Souhaila Elyass; to the Pagoulatos family at the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum; and to the many people who have known and supported me: Derek Welsby and Isabella Welsby-Sjöström, Pam Rose, Kate Spence, Paul Cartledge, John MacGinnis, Fatma Keshk, Piet Collet, Sebastian Meyer, Paul Cartledge, Mike Summerfield, and Thomas Scheibner.

Apart from my dedicated godmother, Sue, and ever-loving family friends like Jenny, Margaret, Pam and Suzie, final words of gratitude should go to my family – to my grandfather, John, my brothers, Richard and Edward, and my sister-in-law, Jennifer, and my nieces Alice and Gabriella; to the dozens of Hayman family members who have supported me; as well as to loved ones that are not around to see the end of this journey: my darling grandmother, Jane, my great aunt, Mary, and my grandparents Charles and Mary – and to the friends who have stuck with me: Collette, Roheet, Steve, Helene, Tim, Si, Theo, Luke, Elena, Lucy, Sam, Johann, and of course to Mohammad.

ABSTRACT

The impact of 'global' archaeology on 'local' communities that live upon or beside archaeological sites is a question of great importance and an emerging topic in archaeological discourse. The studies that have taken place so far have focused mostly on how archaeology is used in the construction of identity in 'descendant' communities, that is, communities which claim an ancestral link to the ancient inhabitants of the archaeological sites. However, these studies have tended to sideline the many 'non-descendant' communities that exist across the world and who are equally subject to the archaeological phenomenon; they have also largely neglected to consider archaeology's not inconsiderable socio-economic impacts.

Using a range of investigatory models and analytical frameworks, this study therefore seeks to go 'beyond identity' to illuminate the impacts of archaeology on local communities through an ethnographic case-study of a non-descendant community living amid ancient 'Nubian' archaeological sites in Sudan's Nile Valley. In doing so it contributes to the relatively new field of archaeological ethnography, as spearheaded by scholars such as Meskell (2005) and Hamilakis (2011).

The study finds that although the residents living in the case-study community do not identify with ancient Nubia, let alone ancient Nubians, both of which the archaeological sites officially represent, the sites are nevertheless endowed with significant cultural and historical meaning. This meaning is, however, being eroded: a mixture of increasing religious orthodoxy and the alienating effects of archaeological site management plans are both contributing to this decline.

In addition to, or perhaps now in place of, cultural and historical connections, this study finds that the community residents frame archaeology's impact, or lack thereof, in economic terms. And, although most scholars have assumed that archaeology's main economic impact comes through its ability to stimulate tourism, in the case-study area it is archaeological employment that has the most important economic impact. Indeed, such is the scale of its importance, it has a tangible knock-on effect on social and political relationships between the community residents. Once again, the study finds that archaeological site management in the case-study area is part of this issue, as it has been experienced as a slow process of economic dispossession. Among other things, this study therefore concludes that site management plans cannot be separated from economic, or cultural, concerns.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

This research follows the transliteration guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle East Studies[1] and the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,[2] with corresponding transliteration standards.

This work incorporates a transliteration style in which all Arabic words are transliterated with diacritical marks and italicized except with reference to personal names, tribal names, place names, names of political parties and titles of books/newspapers/magazines. In the cases of the aforementioned, transliteration is used albeit without diacriticals, with the exception of ‘ayn and hamza (although not initial hamza).

Common terms found in standard English dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster, e.g. ‘Hadith’, ‘Quran’ are neither transliterated nor italicized, again with the exception of the use of ‘ayn and hamza (although not initial hamza). In keeping with abovementioned guidelines, care has also been taken to avoid Anglicized plurals of transliterated words, with the exception of words commonly found in standard English dictionaries.

Of note, given the focus of this research on Sudan and its people, transliteration has been adapted in the sense that emphasis is placed on colloquial, oral, Sudanese Arabic (*darajiya*) and its pronunciation rather than spelling of the term in the script of the original language, e.g. Modern Standard Arabic.

Definitions for Sudanese and Arabic terms have been incorporated into the main body of the text rather than listed separately.

Lastly, any translated materials within this research has been translated by one set of translators and then verified by a second set of translators, for optimal accuracy.

1 See the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies’ website.
2 See the International Journal of Middle East Studies’ website.

COMMON ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BIEA	British Institute in Eastern Africa
CBS	[Sudan] Central Bureau of Statistics
CPA	[Sudan Government-Sudan People's Liberation Movement] Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005
CPI	Central Pivot Irrigation
DAI	German Archaeological Institute [Deutsches Archäologisches Institut]
DDPD	Doha Document For Peace In Darfur
DIU	Dams Implementation Unit [of Sudan]
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GPR	Ground-Penetrating Radar
HAC	Federal Humanitarian Aid Commission [of Sudan]
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
ICOM	International Council of Museums
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISNS	International Society for Nubian Studies
JAM	[UNHCR] Joint Assessment Mission, 2008
NADO	Nubian Archaeological Development Organization [funded by Qatar Museums]
NBHS	[The CBS] National Baseline Household Survey, 2009
NCAM	National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums [of Sudan]
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service

OPA	Ordinance for the Protection of Antiquities [of Sudan]
QM	Qatar Museums
QMPS	Qatari Mission to the Pyramids of Sudan
QNRF	Qatar National Research Fund
QSAP	Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project
SARS	Sudan Archaeological Research Society
SAS	Sudan Antiquities Service
SAfA	Society for Africanist Archaeologists
SCA	Supreme Council of Antiquities [of Egypt]
UCLQ	University College London, Qatar
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTWO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHS	[UNESCO] World Heritage Site

1. INTRODUCTION

This study aims to shed light on the impacts of archaeology on communities located on or beside archaeological sites. The question of archaeology's impact on such 'local' communities nagged at me during the many seasons I worked as a field archaeologist in Sudan, Egypt and Iraq. I was curious about three questions in particular: how official archaeological history of the site(s) are perceived by the residents; how the residents experience and connect with the physicality of the site(s); and what impact the archaeologists who work on the site(s) have upon the residents' lives. It seemed to me that answering questions such as these should be of central interest and importance to archaeologists. However, although archaeologists frequently ruminate upon such issues in private, few have attempted to examine them in a systematic way.

Of these few, the work of Lynn Meskell in South Africa (e.g. 2005), and Yannis Hamilakis in Greece (e.g. 2011), stand out as paradigmatic examples. Theoretically, these projects cut across the interlocking traditions of social archaeology and archaeological ethnography, both of which place emphasis on establishing how archaeology functions in and what it means to modern society. Methodologically, they advocate the use of ethnographic interviews and observations as tools to gain such understandings. Crucially, projects such as these represent a key research stage between recognising that archaeological materials exist in what Soja (1996) calls a 'third space', but before the results can be utilized to effect changes in archaeological practice.

Therefore, using a range of investigatory models and analytical frameworks, this thesis seeks to illuminate the impacts of archaeology on local communities through an ethnographic case-study of one particular community in Sudan's Nile Valley. In this way, this study hopes to provide insights into the question of archaeology's impact more generally. As an innovative and ground-breaking study based upon considerable ethnographic field research, it also demonstrates the value of embracing several approaches to data analysis ranging from the empirical to the phenomenological.

*

Sudan's physical landscapes are diverse. They range from the Bayuda Desert in the north to the savannah of Dinder National Park in the south, and from the Jebel Marra massif in the west to the hills of Kassala and the Red Sea littoral in the east. The Nile winds from south to north roughly bisecting the country and is punctuated by six cataracts, sets of rapids where the Nile crosses hard granite outcrops, which disrupt the river's navigability. Sudan's cultural landscapes are, if anything, even more diverse than its physical ones; they are mosaics of social and cultural groups that reflect Sudan's complex history and its location at the junction of the Arab and African worlds.

Archaeological sites are significant elements of both the physical and cultural landscape. In the east is the abandoned Red Sea port of Suakin, sometimes known as the 'Coral City', an important trading centre from the 15th Century;[3] in northern Darfur in the west is the 18th Century mosque and palace associated with Sultan Mohammed Tayrub at Old Shoba in northern Darfur.[4] However, most of Sudan's best-known archaeological sites are in the Nile Valley, where archaeologists have found sites dating back to the fourth millennium BCE that include 14th Century BCE Pharaonic Egyptian temples near the Second Cataract;[5] ruined cities at Dongola at the Third Cataract; pyramid-fields at Napata near the Fourth Cataract and at Meroe near the Fifth Cataract (both from the so-called Kingdom of Kush, 8th Century BCE to 4th Century CE); and 5th Century CE Christian churches at Soba above the Sixth Cataract.[6] Indeed, Sudan's Nile Valley has well over 10,000 archaeological sites of varying dimensions and more are discovered every year. Archaeological sites thus contextualize the lives of millions of Sudanese people. But how do the Sudanese relate to these sites, in particular those who live upon or close to them? Are they interested in the archaeological sites? What social or historical significance do they attach to them? Do they see them as meaningful to their day-to-day experience? And what role do archaeologists play in the phenomenon? Have the histories they write had an impact on how the local residents construct their identity?

Explorers and antiquarians first investigated archaeological sites in Sudan in the 18th Century and since that time interest in Sudan's archaeology has grown. The number of archaeological expeditions

3 Greenlaw 1995.
4 Edwards 2004; Tesch 2007; McGregor 2011.
5 For example Soleb (Schiff-Giorgini 1958) and Sedeinga (Rilly and Francigny 2013).
6 Welsby and Daniels 1991.

at work has fluctuated over the years, going from over 60 between 1960 and 1969[7] to 18 in 1980[8] to 40 in 2015.[9] The archaeological teams are typically eight to 15 archaeologists strong, although the numbers can be much higher, and each team can spend from one to six months in the field each year, usually between November and March to avoid the oppressive summer heat. In many Nile Valley communities, therefore, archaeologists are a bigger population than NGO workers or health workers, or any other 'foreign' or 'imported' group, and live in close physical proximity to the local communities when they are in the field. So how do residents of these communities perceive the archaeologists both inside and outside the archaeological sites? How do their interactions with the archaeologists affect them? Does the archaeologists' presence change their communities' socio-economic dynamics, especially in a context where most households live at or close to the poverty line? And, if all politics are local,[10] do the archaeologists affect political relationships within these communities? These, and those listed above, are some of the questions that this study seeks to address.

*

This study is cross-disciplinary, taking themes, questions, perspectives and methods from different fields of scholarship, from archaeology to anthropology to economics, each of which is framed by a research tradition. Cross-disciplinary research such as this is becoming increasingly common, gaining popularity because of the potential it provides to glimpse the world through a variety of lenses to produce richer and more meaningful results. Cross-disciplinary research encourages the exchange of knowledge and productive discourse between scholars of different specializations. Consequently disciplines that were previously taxonomized and rigidly bounded by their practitioners are now re-emerging as interlinked areas of enquiry. In this view, academic disciplines interact with each another in the same matrix-like way that characterizes the relationship between people, materials and landscapes.[11] The wealth of the ethnographic data collected for this project required a variety of insights to develop a range of understandings of archaeology. Each chapter uses different ethnographic data to give answers to the question of archaeology's impact. Each data set brings a light with which to illuminate the phenomenon of archaeology in Sudan, reinforcing Lyotard's (1977) idea that no single approach can explain 'culture' or 'humanity' and that a wide range of investigatory and interpretative traditions can be valued as legitimate ways of viewing the world. It is proposed that the data collected for the study, the analytical frameworks used to understand that data and the conclusions reached together represent an original contribution to knowledge and understanding of how archaeology functions and impacts modern society and has the potential to radically affect archaeological practice in Sudan and elsewhere.

7 Jakob and Ali 2011: 516.
8 Shinnie 1981.
9 See the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website, page named 'QSAP Sites'.
10 Kervliet 2009; Boyte 2010.
11 Meskell 1999, 2002a, 2005b; Tilley 1994; 2010.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Reaching an 'Interpretive Time and Space'

2.1.1 Colonial archaeology

In addressing archaeology's impact on local communities in Sudan, this study is distinct from traditional archaeological scholarship, which is rooted in "antiquarianism, history, philology, ethnology, geology and natural history".[12] Its use of ethnographic methods also departs from the methods of excavation and material analysis with which archaeology has historically been associated. This study thus reflects the growing dimensions of archaeology as a discipline.

Many scholars have traced archaeology's development from its emergence in the late 18th Century.[13] Rising nationalism and post-Enlightenment thought reinforced European interest in cultural antecedents in Classical Greece and Rome, and encouraged relevant archaeological exploration there. Meanwhile, the desire to verify Biblical history drove development of archaeology in Palestine, Egypt and Mesopotamia. These developments are reflected in the sub-fields of Classical Archaeology, Egyptology and Assyriology. 19th-Century archaeology was closely linked to European empire-building across Africa and the Middle East and in those parts of Asia and the Americas that were colonized by European powers. As Meskell and others have shown, Europeans often used the archaeological record as evidence of cultural superiority over colonized peoples;[14] "to know and control the 'Other', by investigating and dividing the different identities."[15] As such, archaeology is commonly seen to be part of the tapestry of European political, economic and cultural dominance of

12 Murray and Evans 2008: 1.
13 Trigger 1984, 1989; Anderson 1991; Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1995; Graves-Brown et al. 1996; Murray and Evans 2008; Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012.
14 Meskell 1998, 2002c.
15 Gillot 2010: 6.

the non-West, a heritage now recognized by most archaeologists as ethically dubious and even 'structurally violent'.[16]

Scholars such as Wait and Altschul (2014) show that the early focus of archaeology was manifested in the imperative to collect and preserve objects and monuments, which forms part of a material-centred 'authorized heritage discourse' that Smith (2006) has argued persists to the present.[17] The authorized heritage discourse sees archaeology as a practice that upholds hegemonic ideas and furthers global imbalances as well as reinforces and reflects a Western hierarchy of values (the term is also echoed in proximate phrases such as Kusimba's "sacred colonial paradigms"[18]). This hierarchy determines which knowledges are sought by archaeologists (scientific, verifiable) and which are not; and thus whose constructions of 'place' are acknowledged ('world heritage', 'global property'), and whose are not.[19] For Mydland and Grahn, authorized heritage discourse is,

> …an 'official' way of understanding heritage…a particular way of understanding heritage which stresses the importance of expert knowledge, and privileges the cultural recollection of a limited social stratum, which tends to belong to the upper middle or upper class. It usually focuses upon the tangible aspects of the object, such as aesthetics, architectonic styles, technical aspects, age and grandness.[20]

Such discourse clearly comes with concomitant 'authorized heritage actors', a group in which archaeologists have been placed, along with their "authorized heritage management processes,"[21] which "often fail to provide opportunities for professionals to ask people how they understand heritage…"[22] According to Belford "[i]t has been widely accepted that elements of the historic environment have been displayed to create an [authorized heritage discourse] which supports top-down reinforcement of particular identities."[23] Such a concept has naturally been compared with Spivak's notion of the "subaltern",[24] often synonymous with the 'local', 'oral', 'intangible' or perhaps '*un*authorized heritage discourse'. Mydland and Grahn hold a similar view, and show it by demonstrating the lack of take-up of decolonized archaeological paradigms by the Norwegian Cultural Heritage Fund. Studying the applications for funding conservation work at one-room schoolhouses, they show that the Norwegian authorized heritage discourse seems above all to be concentrated on the material aspects of heritage, privileging sites and monuments. Even though these values at times touch upon the social impact of archaeology upon contemporary society, its material and physical aspects are prioritized. As Mydland and Grahn put it, "The privileged concepts

16 Bernbeck 2004; Starzman 2012.
17 Also see Mire (2006) as well as Waterton and Smith (2010).
18 Kusimba 2009. Lane 2011: 14. Lane notes that historians such as Jewsiewicki 1989, Lonsdale 1989 and Ranger 1976 have also voiced these concerns.
19 Herzfeld 2012.
20 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 565. Smith 2006: pg; Belford 2014; Meskell 2007: 390.
21 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 579.
22 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 567 using Waterton and Smith 2010: 11.
23 Belford 2014: pg.
24 Lane 2011. See Spivak 1988.

crystallized in this discourse are above all the 'antiquarian approach', 'documentation', 'authenticity', and 'inherent values', aspects that should be proven by a certificate from a cultural heritage expert."[25]

Meanwhile in the 19th Century, the archaeological mandate began to broaden to include establishing detailed narratives and chronological sequences to piece together human history through systematic collection and scientific interpretation of material evidence.[26] For many scholars, this shift in the discipline's central purpose marks a break with its early history and a move towards modern archaeology.[27] Lane (2011) describes the link between archaeology and modernity as largely one of Western self-construction; living in a 'Now' separate from the 'Past', differentiating Occident from Orient. The emphasis on self, difference and spatio-temporal distance in the construction of these 'Other' Worlds[28] appears to have eroticized the archaeological mandate and, as Lane notes, furnished archaeological sites with a layer of economic, political and cultural value from their designation as windows into 'alien' life.[29]

Gillot posits that archaeology's development in Syria "constitutes a case study, both specific and representative, of the history of archaeology."[30] The same may also be said of the development of archaeology in Sudan, where the earliest modern reports about archaeological remains emanated from Western explorers, travellers and collectors of antiquities, some of whom also carried out rudimentary excavations. The first of these reports was written in the 1770s by a Scottish explorer named Bruce.[31] A Swiss explorer, Burckhardt, came to Sudan in the early 1800s;[32] Waddington and Hanbury, both English, in 1820;[33] Cailliaud and Letorzec, both French, in 1821 and 1822 respectively;[34] English, an American, in 1821;[35] Linant de Bellefonds and Ricci, French and Italian, and their English patron, Bankes, came in 1821,[36] Prudoe, Felix and Burton, all English, arrived in 1828;[37] Ferlini, an Italian doctor-turned-treasure-hunter, in the 1830s;[38] Hoskins, an Englishman, in 1833;[39] Lowell and Gleyre, American and Swiss respectively, in September 1835;[40] Trémaux, French, in 1847; [41] the Prussian,

25 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 580.
26 Trigger 1989.
27 See Appadurai 1996 and Thomas 2012, both of whom argue that archaeology and its link to the question of 'who we are' is a thoroughly modern preoccupation. See Giddens (1991) for a broader study of identity and modernity.
28 Fabian (1983) makes similar arguments about the ways in which anthropologists distance themselves from their object of study.
29 Lane 2011: 10-11. Lowenthal (1985) famously argues that this distancing device turns the past into a 'foreign country'.
30 Gillot 2010: 5.
31 Bruce 1790.
32 Burckhardt 1819.
33 Waddington and Hanbury 1822.
34 Cailliaud 1826.
35 English 1822.
36 Usick 2002 regarding Bankes; see M. Shinnie 1958 regarding Linant de Bellefonds (and Shinnie 1967: 172, Note 2).
37 Griffith 1929.
38 Ferlini 1838, also noted in Budge 1907.
39 Hoskins 1835.
40 Opdycke 2010. The Lowell Diaries are now stored in the Boston Athenaeum with early copies in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, US.
41 Trémaux 1858.

Lepsius, in 1844;[42] Wilkinson, an Englishman, from 1848-9 and again in the 1850s[43] at the same time as Taylor, an American.[44] The Englishmen Budge,[45] Crowfoot,[46] Garstang,[47] and the Americans Breasted[48] and Reisner[49] worked in Sudan in the first decades of the 20th Century and all of them carried out scientific investigations recognizable as modern archaeology.

The nationalities of these men, and the contexts in which they operated, are significant because they help demonstrate how archaeology in Sudan was largely a European colonial construction. Indeed there is now recognition of the impossibility of data collection being truly "objective" and that "scientific practice is guided socially and politically."[50] This point is further evidence by the fact that several of these early 'archaeological' investigators in Sudan arrived on the back of imperial adventures: Cailliaud and Letorzec, as well as English, entered with a Turco-Egyptian army; Lepsius with a Royal Prussian Expedition; and Budge with Lord Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian army sent to re-conquer Sudan in 1897, after the Mahdist rebellion against Turco-Egyptian rule.

Many of the men listed above were, by contemporary standards, akin to treasure hunters principally aiming to verify their own civilised identity, clarify the inferiority of the 'Other', and enrich themselves by collecting 'antiquities' for collectors or museums. Ferlini, for example, is notorious for raiding and vandalizing the royal pyramids at Meroe. Indeed, early archaeologists in Sudan showed little interest in the communities amongst which they worked, let alone archaeology's impact upon them. H. C. Jackson, the Governor of the Provinces of Berber and Halfa in the Anglo-Egyptian government of Sudan in the 1920s, was like many of his peers a 'scholar official'[51] with a deep interest in Sudan's ancient past. His views, typical of early-20th Century attitudes, are worth quoting:

> Omdas [regional leaders] and shaykhs could not understand my progressively increasing interest in scraps of broken brick or dilapidated pottery…Furthermore [they said nothing about the] ruins not more than a mile or two away from where I was camped. In many instances, too, the people were woefully ignorant of, and completely uninterested in, a conglomeration of ancient materials that was only of value in so far as it supplied top dressing for their irrigated land.[52]

Jackson's observations betray an almost contemptuous attitude towards Sudanese who lived among the ruins, who, in his mind, *should* have had an interest in for the monuments of past civlizations.

---

42 Lepsius 1853.
43 Wilkinson's unpublished journals are now in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, UK.
44 Taylor 1854.
45 Budge 1907. Budge had returned to Sudan to continue his archaeological work in 1905.
46 Crowfoot and Griffith 1911.
47 Garstang, Sayce and Griffith 1911, Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997.
48 Breasted 1908.
49 Reisner 1918, 1923.
50 Gomes 2006: 156.
51 Anderson 1991.
52 Jackson 1926: 1.

Recent trends

Although attitudes such as these have not vanished, they have certainly diminished over time and with the removal of colonialism's formal institutions. Today, "individuals are recognised as having 'needs' and 'rights' which must be understood and protected by society,"[53] as well as having their own knowledges and cultures, which have intrinsic and equal value. As attitudes have changed, so have the questions asked by archaeologists.[54] For instance, Meskell suggests that identity, defined as "the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other[s],"[55] has received academic interest because of the angst and uncertainty created by the homogenizing and disrupting effects of globalization.[56] Meskell also shows how, as concern for the integrity of human rights, experiences, lives and bodies has developed, scholars have sought to pursue Feminist and/or Marxist agendas that look for the 'faceless' (unrepresented) within the material record.[57] As Reid and Lane note, one of archaeology's most important contributions to the search for the past is that it "…allows us to access the "voiceless" elements in society…which are not represented by written text or remembered in oral accounts."[58] In this schema of values, women, workers, slaves, minorities and their domestic and industrial architectures are the objects of archaeological investigation as much as kings, queens, high priests and their palaces and temples. For Meskell, these developments have helped pull archaeology away from its colonial roots to make it "socially relevant again."[59] This is partly, she suggests, because most archaeologists have become 'reflexive', a quality they previously lacked as they were under "the illusion that the subject of [archaeological] research is dead and buried, literally."[60] Such shifts are always ongoing, but can only take place when "the interpretive time and space make it possible."[61] Though Gillot notes that some scholars lack concern about "their impact on local settings", the question is unquestionably important.

Since the 1970s, two theoretical trends have emerged within archaeology that are particularly relevant to the above; this research uses the umbrella terms of 'social archaeology' and 'archaeological ethnography' for these trends. 'Social archaeology' emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and 'archaeological ethnography' sprang from the latter in the 2000s and 2010s. 'Social archaeology' reflects archaeology's move towards its own socially-produced dimensions; its interest in how archaeology is used in the social world; and its status as offering interpretation rather than fact. 'Archaeological ethnography' places the entire phenomenon of archaeology under the microscope. Using the tools of 'social archaeology' to understand the interpretations ('histories') that archaeology

53 Foucault 1977.
54 Trigger 1989.
55 Jenkins 1996: 4.
56 Meskell 2002c.
57 Meskell 2002c, 2010.
58 Reid and Lane 2003: 10.
59 Meskell 2002c: 282-3. Also see Jewsiewicki 1989 and Lane 2011 for the idea of history and archaeology's potential to be 'useable'.
60 Meskell 2002c: 282.
61 Meskell 2002c: 282.

produces, ‘archaeological ethnography’ also queries the way in which archaeology operates as an industry and practice: “the ways in which archaeology works in the world”.[62] Both approaches have emerged out of what Collier and Mahon (1993) would call the ‘conceptual stretching’ of the archaeological discipline, and enabled studies such as this to gain currency, even though research questions and methods deviate from traditional practice.

2.1.2 Social archaeology

‘Social archaeology’ has come to mean different things to different scholars, but is generally understood to reflect a movement away from the ‘material’ towards the ‘social’.[63] Scholars were concerned with the subtleties of interpretation within the construction and production of archaeological knowledge,[64] the active role of material culture in producing social worlds,[65] and the experience (phenomenology) of archaeological sites as part of the landscape.[66] Such hermeneutic considerations have been dubbed archaeology’s move towards reflexivity[67] and, amongst other things, have led to further questions namely how other groups in society might interpret or attribute value to archaeological sites.

During fieldwork, such scholars began to use ‘multi-sited’ ethnographic methodologies,[68] including participant observation and interviews, sometimes in collaboration with anthropologists, to discover how consumers (e.g. tourists) and stakeholders (e.g. local communities) perceive archaeological sites and their histories. What they found was that while a site might occupy one physical space, it is a place of multiple cultural, historical, political and economic meanings.[69] For example, Shankland (1996) demonstrated that while the Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük was being used as ‘symbolic capital’ in the identity constructions of local Turkish secular civil society, such capital was largely irrelevant for the nearest local community, Küçükköy, whose residents identified as Muslim. Later, Bartu showed that Çatalhöyük has meaning for the identities of multiple groups, from “New Age goddess worshippers to government officials, as well as local people and archaeologists themselves” and is thus “at the intersection of local and global processes.”[70] Through such studies,

62 Meskell 2005a: 83.
63 Hodder 2008b. Also see Patterson 1994.
64 Hodder 1991; Hodder and Hutson 2003.
65 Meskell 1999, 2005b. Also see Tilley 2006.
66 Tilley 1994, 2010.
67 Castañeda 2008.
68 Bartu 2000. Also see Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009, below.
69 Hodder 1998.
70 Edgeworth’s (2006c: 8) description of Bartu 2000. Also see Rountree (2007) also at Çatalhöyük, and Yalouri (2010) regarding the Athenian Acropolis.

archaeology has been repositioned as an exercise in multivocal interpretation,[71] with the archaeologist's reading rebranded as one of many.

Of course, recognizing such plurality also means acknowledging that interpretations do not always align. As Meskell explains, identity and self-definition "revolve around genealogy, heritage, citizenship and sameness…but also disenfranchisement and difference."[72] Misalignment can, in turn, produce negative contestation and even conflict around the physical site itself, something that was recognised after the Second World War by the Hague Convention (1954), which stipulated that archaeological sites should be immune from political upheaval and conflict.[73] Yet in the most extreme cases of ideological opposition, archaeological sites have continued to be used as weapons of war, most recently in Syria and Iraq.[74]

Nevertheless, given their understanding of the site's potency and (at least a normative) belief in that all interpretations are of equal value,[75] these scholars inserted reflexive interpretations and multi-sited ethnographies into ethical archaeological practice under a new, post-processual, interpretive and, ultimately, social archaeology. Issues of sites as places of multiple pasts, presents and futures, the influence of the archaeologist's person in the construction of knowledge and the epistemological and ethical consequences of such actions were thus addressed via a practice in which ethnography and archaeology go hand in hand, as will be discussed below.

This 'interpretive space' has had a significant impact on archaeology. This brief overview cannot do justice to the scale of the output produced by scholars whose works, in the words of Renfrew and Bahn, led archaeology to begin to recognise "the variety of perspectives of different social groups, and [accepting] the consequent 'multivocality' of the post-modern world."[76]

2.1.3 Archaeological ethnography

'Archaeological ethnography', which became popular in the 2000s, may be understood as an endeavour to understand the mechanics of archaeology beyond what Gnecco would call merely "expanded archaeological hermeneutics".[77] While 'social archaeology' studied site interpretations, the

71 Hodder 2008a.
72 Meskell 2002c: 280.
73 Hladik 1999a and 1999b, specifically regarding its two Protocols on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
74 Turku 2017. The great mosque at Ayodhya in India was destroyed by Hindu fundamentalists in 1992; and the Taliban destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan in 2001, not to mention the destruction done in Kosovo and Mali (Renfrew and Bahn 2008). Such action has now been declared a war crime by the International Criminal Court.
75 Burtenshaw 2014.
76 Renfrew and Bahn 2008: 17.
77 Gnecco 2015: 4.

meanings attributed to them and their use and abuse in nationalist projects and for indigenous peoples, 'archaeological ethnographers' also foreground activities in the field, such as excavations, as objects of study in themselves. Other practices, such as post-season work and desk-based assessments, are also conceptualised as important places of social production, each riddled with ethical implications. For Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos, the former having done much to popularize the term, 'archaeological ethnography' stems from synergy between ethno-archaeology, post-processual archaeology and anthropology.[78] It is used by scholars who wish to give their work a 'thick' or 'textured' character,[79] and thus includes:

> the introduction of ethnographic methods into archaeological projects…the merging of ethnographic and archaeological practices in order to explore the contemporary relevance and meaning of the material past for diverse publics…the politics of archaeological practice…and the claims and contestations involving past material traces and landscapes...[80]

Meskell, for whom archaeological ethnography is a "holistic anthropology",[81] asked the local Venda communities around Kruger National Park in South Africa about the histories of excavations; their assessment of a new museum; their view of recent reconstructions of ancient sites; the current benefits, tourist potential and future development of sites; "what else could be done;" and what "could have been done better."[82] Finally, she asked what "impact all these vectors [has] on the forging of identity."[83]

Others, including Robin and Rothschild (2002) as well as Lane (2011), also undertake this work, though it is unclear if they identify as scholars belonging to a distinct field of 'archaeological ethnography'. Suffice it to note that there are differences across scholarly perspectives and that the term is subject to heterogeneous usage and definition, and even modification. For instance, 'archaeological ethnography' is conceptually close to what is referred to by its key scholar, Edgeworth, as 'ethnography of archaeology'.[84] In Edgeworth's view, the latter is largely, though not exclusively, undertaken by archaeologists to make "the cultural processes of archaeological practice a subject of ethnographic investigation."[85] It asks questions such as how "might archaeological activities be interpreted from an ethnographic perspective?", and, what effect "[d]oes the presence of visiting archaeologists have in ethnographic contexts?"[86] Edgeworth suggests that the turning point for these studies, including his own, was in the 1980s, when the influence of social archaeology was

78 Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 65 point to the work of scholars such as Watson 1979 (ethnoarchaeology) and Verhoeven 1999 (post-processual archaeology). Also see Hamilakis 2011.
79 Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 66.
80 Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 66.
81 Meskell 2005a: 83. Also see Meskell 2007 and 2012.
82 Meskell 2005a: 85, 93.
83 Meskell 2007: 386.
84 Edgeworth 2006a, 2006b, 2006c.
85 Edgeworth 2006b: xi.
86 Edgeworth 2006b: xii.

gaining traction.[87] Indeed Shanks, a key scholar of 'social archaeology', sums up the need for 'archaeological ethnography':

> While we continue to give credit to a focus on broad social or political processes that intersect archaeology…we need a richer, more nuanced, more human account of archaeology. We need to engage the human face of archaeology—what archaeologists get up to, and not just academics, not just publication, and the quite artificial accounts of debate in journals and professional discourse.[88]

Shared by the present research, this approach is drawn from a volume of dialogues in which Shanks and contributors including Rathje, Witmore, Buchli and McGuire conceptualise archaeology as alive and ripe to become a central subject of enquiry. 'Social archaeology' has thus grown to enquire about how archaeology works as a cultural and material phenomenon as well as about how histories, or rather interpretations, are generated and how they should be managed. It also echoes Shankland's observation that in "informal conversation" with archaeologists, archaeology reveals itself to be a

> complex juggling of academic renown and influence, financial strictures, local political prestige, national economic and political considerations, strikes, good and bad cooks, and struggles with local labour forces.[89]

Under the title of 'anthropology of archaeology', this partly led Shankland to generate substantive data on "the socially intrusive aspects of the archaeological enterprise" at Çatalhöyük and "the side-effects of excavating"[90] upon the community of Küçükköy,[91] all of which "is unrecorded and unexplained…streamlined into concise explanation accompanied by slides showing neat trenches and labelled artefacts".[92] To Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos, Meskell, Shankland, Shanks and, indeed, for the present author, "the circumstances in which archaeological research is conducted are shrouded in obscurity"[93]—even though they lie at the heart of archaeology.

In a further semantic twist, 'archaeological ethnography' is also conceptually close to the work spearheaded by anthropologists such as Castañeda (2008) namely 'ethnographic archaeology'.[94] This refers to work in which archaeology is the subject matter with ethnography as the method, an endeavour that scholars like Hodder, Shankland, Bartu and others have often undertaken with archaeologists. Though their interest in studying archaeology from an anthropological perspective was independently conceived, Castañeda nevertheless notes that it is a form of inquiry into archaeological dilemmas. Conscious of their role in (first) interrupting (and later) co-producing any given social

87 See Edgeworth 2006c: 3.
88 Shanks 2012: 3.
89 Shankland 1996: 352.
90 Shankland 1996: 356.
91 Shankland 1996, 1999; Gosden (2002) has also used the phrase 'anthropology of archaeology'.
92 Shankland 1996: 352.
93 Shankland 1996: 352.
94 Castañeda 2008.

situation, scholars such as Castañeda, like Shankland, see anthropology as allowing study of the gulf between what archaeology "actually does" and what researchers "think it is doing":

> [w]hether the economic circumstances of the local people have been radically altered, whether they wished for the excavation to take place at all, whether political battles have been fought over the heritage being explored, how the knowledge from the site has been used, who has benefited from excavation…[95]

*

Despite considerable heterogeneity, 'archaeological ethnography', 'ethnography of archaeology', 'anthropology of archaeology' and 'ethnographic archaeology' have common aims: to qualify and quantify the impact of sites, histories and archaeologists on local communities and to generate more thematic data on archaeology's historical, economic, social and political impact, or lack thereof, usually with the aim of improving or even 'decolonizing' archaeological practice. Yet, a term is needed to more firmly locate the present thesis within the extant literature. While having reservations about some of their arguments, the present research utilizes an adaptation of Meskell's 'archaeological ethnography'.

The broad question of archaeology's impact on local communities has over the past 40-30 years arguably reached its 'interpretive time and space'. The space has emerged alongside, and as a consequence of, the archaeological and anthropological pursuits outlined above, which are themselves responses to the changing perceptions that human populations have had about one another. Such is the urgency of these issues that the topic is now also being explored by historians, economists, sociologists and psychologists, all of whom increasingly recognise the links between archaeology, history, identity, materiality, development, land ownership, nation-statehood and citizenship, slavery, colonialism and post-colonialism, ethics, politics, economics and warfare. It is thus possible to see the emerging status of the question of archaeology's impacts in contemporary studies, some of which are analyzed and evaluated in this review.

2.2 Defining Terms

Before evaluating the current literature, a number of key terms must first be defined. While concepts such as 'archaeology', 'local communities' and 'impact' have vastly different meanings, it is nevertheless possible to provide working definitions to act as benchmarks.

95 Shankland 1996: 352.

2.2.1 'Archaeology'

As Lane notes, "defining archaeology has always been problematic."[96] In simple terms, it is study of the past via material remains, and is thus a composite term that incorporates (1) the academic discipline and (2) the source material. Burtenshaw's definition of archaeology as "sites, materials, and knowledge"[97] also incorporates (3) the history or "knowledge" that is created for consumption. We may also add to this that archaeology is commonly defined by (4) the methods (e.g. excavation) used to reveal the source material and (5) the specialist expertise of the archaeologists.

However, this five-point definition belies considerable variation of opinion. As noted by Wait and Altschul, this is due, in part, to scholars' different disciplinary emphases (1): some professionals "limit their work to archaeology, others to historic buildings…giv[ing] rise to very different ways of looking…and working."[98] Thus, 'material remains' (2) might be conceptualized as "archaeological sites", or as defined by Matero et al., "clusters" of "artefacts, ecofacts and features in any combination", geographically placed at "[t]he location of a significant event, a prehistoric occupation or activity or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined or vanished, subterranean or underwater…"[99]

Equally, echoing Plenderleith, 'material remains' might be further divided into "unexcavated, underground antiquities" and "excavated archaeological sites."[100] In this definition, Matero et al.'s focus on the site's original environment is given less emphasis, and "archaeological materials" may thus include:

> "a) known and unknown, unexcavated, underground antiquities; b) exposed or excavated immoveable monuments of architecture, art or history, and archaeological sites; c) moveable objects in museums and collections of archaeological origin, books, manuscripts etc."[101]

'Material remains' therefore includes everything from botanical remains of household waste to graves and long-buried bodies, monumental royal palaces and temples as well as the broader landscape and ecosystem, whether still *in situ* or not.

The more controversial question of what kind of knowledge archaeology creates (3), if indeed it creates 'knowledge' at all, is also subject of debate and affects how different people define archaeology, as was noted above. In contrast to social archaeologists, Courbin suggests that the

96 Lane 2011: 9.
97 Burtenshaw 2014: 53.
98 Wait and Altschul 2014: 152.
99 Matero et al. 1998: 141.
100 Plenderleith distinguishes between "exposed monuments", "sheltered monuments" and "monuments protected in museums" (Plenderleith 1968: 125 in Hinkel 1992: 148).
101 Hinkel 1992: 148.

mandate of the archaeologist is to establish 'facts' from the material record via fieldwork.[102] This search for 'facts' is often contrasted with the other "cognate disciplines"[103] of anthropology, the study of human societies, and history, narratives built from written sources. Courbin suggests that writing archaeological history — assimilating and interpreting the archaeological data — involves a change in identity towards that of an historian.[104] Although the idea of producing facts has now changed, the production of 'archaeological histories', narratives of past events in human societies by archaeologists who are at the "trowel's edge",[105] continues to justify investment in the discipline.

Archaeology is also subject to differing definitions because of the diversity of the methods it uses (4). As public and private investment in archaeology has grown, archaeologists have developed a range of methods for investigation that go far beyond excavation, including use of complex technological tools such as ground-penetrating radar (GPR) or geographic information systems (GIS). 'Archaeological science' has developed as a vast sub-discipline concerned with extracting information not readily available through visual and contextual analysis. Indeed archaeology continues to develop new specializations and sub-fields, expanding its boundaries as a discipline, methods such as biogenetic and forensic analysis produce data that add significantly to understanding of the past but nevertheless complicate any one definition of archaeology.

Finally, as many different practitioners now work within the archaeological realm (5) 'field archaeologists' may be distinguished from abstract 'archaeological theorists', laboratory-based 'archaeological scientists' or even 'salvage archaeologists'[106] as their work focuses upon on-site excavation and often involves spending months on the same site per year.

*

On aggregate, archaeology is a dynamic discipline. However for the purposes of this study, 'archaeology' is conceptualized as an academic discipline that aims to create historical knowledge (1), which involves the investigation of physical archaeological materials (2) by archaeologists and other professionals (5) who use specialized methods to examine, record, interpret, protect or conserve data (4) and who are thus the creators of archaeological history (3). More specifically, this study addresses the impact on local communities of a) immoveable and *in situ* archaeological sites in their original environment (2); b) seasonal field archaeologists (5) (whatever stage of career or research they are at and whatever methods they use, from excavation to site management (4)); and c) archaeological narratives about the sites.

102 Courbin 1988 (trans. P. Bahn).
103 Murray and Evans 2008: 5.
104 Courbin 1988 (trans. Bahn).
105 Hodder and Berggren 2005.
106 Archaeologists who work during those times when "…damage or destruction cannot be prevented, in which case one adopts a policy of salvage archaeology, partially excavating or recording the site before it goes" (Renfrew and Bahn 2008: 558)

2.2.2 'Local Communities'

Many scholars define the communities they study on the basis of a key characteristic that unites them; an 'affected' community, namely people affected by the same issue or event, or a 'speech' community, namely people who speak the same language. This study is concerned with archaeology's impact on 'local communities', which, although a widely used term, lacks a common scholarly definition due to the considerable heterogeneity of such communities.[107] Two broad characteristics of what makes a 'local community' for this study may nevertheless be noted.

First, scholars tend to use the term 'community' to signify both a set of physical components (buildings, landscape; often small in scale such as a village) and to the people or residents who live amongst them. Second, scholars use the term 'local' to denote any community in the locale of an archaeological site or sites. For example, in Shankland's (1996, 1999) studies, the 'local community' is the agricultural village of Küçükköy situated next to the Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük (7,400 BCE) in Tukey's Konya plain; to Rodriguez (2006), it is a Maya farming village known as the Kochol who live near the pre-Columbian Maya site of Chunchucmil (400-650 CE), in Yucatán, Mexico; and for Gomes (2006), it is the Parauá riverside community (*caboclos*) based in a largely unexplored part of Brazil's Amazon rainforest, on the periphery of the pre-colonial Indian chiefdom of Santarém (1000-1500 CE). Site proximity is important, since those living near a site are commonly most affected by it; however, this is not always the case: Gomes notes that the Parauá community lives 100km south of Santarém.

This term is far from unproblematic. For scholars such as Smith and Waterton (2009), and Starzman (2012), who are concerned with how hegemony is established discursively via discourse, 'local community' is a belittling term used largely to describe the developing world in contrast to the conception of Western communities as 'publics'. In this vein, the term might even be said to suggest people's lack of agency in the face of stronger and more powerful global forces. Yet, as Meskell reminds us, whether in Britain or Sudan, 'local communities',

> …are not passive constituencies there for our intellectual mining, nor are they there awaiting our theoretical insights into their situations or histories. They are directly enmeshed in their own critical reformulations, political negotiations, and constitutions of theory and interpretation.[108]

No 'local community' is monolithic. Most scholars stress the importance of including disparate opinions and identifying 'community dissonance' as a means of understanding society and its groups, no matter their size (see Chapter 3).[109] Meskell again notes that:

---

107 Waterton and Smith 2010.
108 Meskell 2005a: 82.
109 Smith and Waterton 2009.

> …as we all know, there are so many locals, and it very much depends on the conversation: whether you are talking to the chief (in the case of South Africa), an elder, a woman, people of different generations, or people belonging to different socioeconomic groups.[110]

Despite its shortcomings, including the danger of reducing the 'local community' to a static unit upon which external forces act without resistance, the term remains current as it aids communication and facilitates cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural comparisons. Indeed Gillot concludes that 'local community' is a less controversial term than other potential designations and generally "refers to the current localization of people who live nearby archaeological sites."[111]

A further semantic note is required, however. Throughout this thesis, the primary analytical unit is conceptualised and referred to as a 'site-community'. It is a useful signifier for a village or cluster of villages that are situated in close proximity to an archaeological site. The term itself is not strictly a pre-existing concept—although Lane (2011) and others have used it less self-consciously—but one that has emerged from the research. It seems preferable to the endemic designation of 'local community' and centralizes the archaeological site as the 'common denominator' for the community residents, without, of course, presupposing that it is important to any, let alone all, of them. Indeed this term may even be a useful concept to archaeologists and ethnographers alike.

2.2.3 'Impact'

Like 'archaeology' and 'local community', the term 'impact' may be conceptualized in many ways. In its simplest definition, it describes the effect of one force upon another. In such a broad reading, an impact may occur regardless of whether relevant forces collide suddenly or over time (short-term vs. long-term impacts), or whether one force is stronger than another. Indeed while this research addresses archaeology's impact on site-communities, it would be equally intriguing to examine the reverse (see Further Lines of Enquiry). 'Impact' may also be used synonymously with 'effect', 'influence' or 'impression'; the 'change' engendered and its 'consequences'. These words appear in most of the scholarly literature under review. Shankland (1999) writes about the 'side-effects' of archaeological activities; Douglas (2014) about the 'impact' of Çatalhöyük-as-cultural heritage; and Burtenshaw (2014) and Klamer (2014) about archaeology's 'capital', and especially its 'ability' or 'capacity' to effect change. These impacts are often grouped into themes, such as the impact of archaeology, or of archaeology's different components—sites, histories, or archaeologists—upon a site-community's history, identity, economy, political processes, social life or cultural landscapes.

110 Meskell 2005a: 90. Also Gillot 2010: 11.
111 Gillot 2010: 11.

Some studies seek to evaluate the (relative) *value* of archaeology; e.g. its value for site-communities compared with state governments or official archaeological histories;[112] its value in cross-cultural perspectives in relation to Europe and the Middle East;[113] or the value of materials for conservation.[114] As Burtenshaw notes, 'cultural economics' has produced frameworks whereby the economic value of non-market goods, such as ecosystems and, theoretically, archaeological sites, are quantitatively evaluated:

> 'Value' in these methodologies is often expressed in monetary measures as this is the 'language' of decision-making and so offers the opportunity to be directly compared to the value of other goods and opportunities.[115]

However, as Burtenshaw also notes, the "application of the valuation methodologies to cultural heritage and archaeology has been marginal",[116] perhaps because of continued separation between archaeologists and economists. Indeed, for these and other reasons, Miller (2008) is correct to describe value, with its financial (economic) and moral (cultural) meanings, as a difficult quality to assess.

Scholars often make value judgments in their evaluations of archaeology's impacts, casting them in binary terms; e.g. reviewing whether they can provide or remove opportunities for a better quality of life, including "less poverty, better education and healthcare, a more sustainable approach to the use of physical resources."[117] As Joyce asks, "archaeologists have long offered examples of how our research will benefit descendant communities [defined below]; how often do we ask what harm we might do?"[118] Thus, the implication is that archaeology *should* seek to produce as many good impacts and as few bad impacts as possible; indeed, it is the move from substantive results to moral evaluations that inform recommendations for the future.

Ultimately, then, the term 'impact' is preferred in this study because, while it is not free from bias, it encourages a more objective assessment of how archaeology works and allows for moral judgments to be suspended until later in the analytical process. In this review, therefore, the present researcher has grouped the extant literature into six inevitably overlapping themes—archaeology's ideational impact on nationalist groups and states; upon indigenous descendant communities; and upon indigenous non-descendant communities; and archaeology's economic impact upon site-communities via tourism, employment and site management—which are then followed by a discussion of what elements of archaeology's impact are 'missing' and are consequently addressed by the study.

112 Smith and Waterton 2009.
113 Darvill 1994; Loosley 2005.
114 McClanahan 2006.
115 Burtenshaw 2014: 49.
116 Burtenshaw 2014: 49.
117 Wait and Altschul 2014: 152.
118 Joyce 2002.

2.3 The Impacts of Archaeology

The books and articles reviewed below were selected for presentation as they raise questions similar to those posed in this study, and also because, by and large, the authors are archaeologists who, like the present researcher, utilize ethnographic methods. The sources thus not only offer a conceptual and methodological framework appropriate for and comparable with this study, but have also contributed to the choices made during this research.

2.3.1 The Impacts of Archaeology on Identity Formation

As Burtenshaw notes, archaeology appears to be most commonly valued for its impact on history and culture, for its ideational output, for the "emotional power" it has in "linking the present to a particular golden age",[119] "for the formation of identity…and for inspiration."[120] It is therefore these impacts that will be considered first.

2.3.1.1 Nationalist Groups and States

One key predicament of scholars operating in the milieu of 'social archaeology' in the 1990s was how archaeology was used by post-colonial nationalist movements to help cement national identity. Scholars sought to understand the mechanisms by which narratives from archaeological history and iconic images of sites, typically representing apex moments of cultural achievement or sophistication, were 'logoized' by many burgeoning post-colonial states in Africa, Asia and South America,[121] similar to how European states in the preceding century utilized archaeological symbolism in their construction of national identity.[122] These states often used carefully calculated re-interpretations of archaeology, 'inventing traditions'[123] and 'imagining communities'[124] to legitimize their power as much as cementing nationhood.

For instance, Colla (2007) shows that when nationalist groups began to emerge in 1920s Egypt, they asserted pre- and non-Islamic traditions as a rallying point against British colonial rule. The umbrella term 'pharaonism' refers to the phenomenon of elite intellectuals and secular nationalists

119 Shnirelman 1995: 12.
120 Burtenshaw 2014: 48.
121 Anderson 19991; see also Silberman 1989; Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Kohl 1998.
122 Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1995.
123 Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012.
124 Anderson 1991.

identifying themselves as descendants of the Pharaohs, based on the premise that Ancient Egypt was the foundation of modern Egyptian identity.[125] And as Grigor (2005) shows, Reza Khan, a former officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade who crowned himself Shah in 1925, after the collapse of the Qajar dynasty, also turned to the pre-Islamic era to portray his rule as a continuation of a monarchical tradition that began with the Achaemenids of 550-330 BCE, the founders of the Persian Empire. Reza Khan changed his surname to Pahlavi, after the language of the Parthians who ruled Iran for five hundred years from the 3rd Century BCE. The history of ancient Persia was granted a prominent place in school curricula, and the Iranian calendar was changed to date not from the Hijra, the flight of Islam's Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE, but from the reign of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty.

The deliberate linking of the identity of modern nation-states to ancient pasts occurs across the globe, with mixed results. Archaeology has arguably played an influential role in helping create lasting national identities, such as in Peru and Guatemala.[126] 'Pharaonism' has also become naturalized in Egypt as a popular sentiment as well as aesthetic style; the use of symbols and motifs from Ancient Egypt is clear in the murals painted by young artists on Mohammed Mahmoud Street in downtown Cairo during, and after, the 'Arab Spring' protests in 2011 (author's own observations). These murals, which have since been destroyed, depicted killed protesters surrounded by replicas of mourning scenes from ancient Egyptian funerary reliefs in the Book of the Dead; seeking to highlight grief felt by Egyptians. Visual elements of ancient Egyptian Pharaonic culture have therefore survived into the present, showing how sites and archaeological histories can provide contemporary societies with symbols to help construct identity, community, history and origins.

On the other hand, when authoritarian regimes have been deposed, their archaeological narratives have sometimes been discarded, too. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution saw a backlash against the glorification of the imperial past and a revived emphasis on Iran's Islamic character. However, as Arenas has shown of post-colonial Latin American states, official state histories are not always easy to dislodge. Ideology is entrenched within schools, universities, and training courses; libraries and museums are all controlled by the state bureaucracy,[127] thus reproducing what Arenas and others now consider to be "deformed perceptions…about themselves, their national identity and their nation."[128]

It may thus be posited that abstracted forms of archaeology have impacted national groups and those who identify with it, but that they have often been abused by authoritarian states seeking to consolidate their rule. Indeed, if a 'nation' is a concept that must be built upon consensus and an

125 Colla 2007. Also see Reid 1997, 2002 and Hassan 1998.
126 Higueras 1995; Chinchilla 1998.
127 Arenas 1995: 48-49.
128 Arenas 1995: 55.

active remembering, an idea hailed by Smith (1991), then the impact of archaeological history upon states, and the myriad site-communities that make up a nation, has at best had mixed results.

Some of the (ab)uses of archaeology "in the service of [both the colonial and post-colonial] state",[129] namely to search for and help create 'alternative histories', are being resolved by a process of de-colonization.[130] Referred to by Lane as "revisionist" histories,[131] the archaeological record as well as other cultural and historical evidence, both tangible and intangible, is used to show the other stories of the nation's citizens to counter the hegemony of official state histories.

2.3.1.2 Indigenous Descendant Communities

Archaeological sites and history have had a significant impact upon the perceived identity of 'indigenous descendant communities'. Although it is impossible to generalize, indigenous descendant communities generally claim a direct or 'lineal' link with the subjects of archaeological endeavours; they choose to view the sites as their 'heritage' and in need of their stewardship.[132] The impact of archaeological sites and history upon site-communities that claim indigenous descent has thus to do with the conscious formation of genealogical and cultural identity and inheritance, Meskell's "cultural affiliation and cultural patrimony",[133] rather than national affinity.[134]

Indigenous descendant communities have used evidence produced by archaeology to reinforce senses of historic identity; claims to land and other rights; and to legitimize their demands for recognition of nationhood. Indeed Straight et al. (2015) have pointed out how ethnographic methods have long been used to evaluate how specific archaeological materials are used within peoples' histories and identities, in order to improve the ethics of archaeological site management and protection. Yet as Meskell notes, it was not archaeologists but the contestation by citizen activists about what archaeologists should do with excavated human remains ("reburial, repatriations, representation") and other "…problems related to archaeological intervention" that initially brought archaeological attention to this issue.[135] The aforementioned citizens were members of groups such as the Native Americans in the United States, many of whom had been active since the 1970s[136] (e.g. Cherokee, Navajho); the First Nations in Canada (e.g. Inuit, Métis, Indian); the Māori in New Zealand

129 Fowler 1987. Also see Kohl and Fawcett 1995.
130 Arenas 1995. Also see Trigger 1984 and Schmidt 1995.
131 Lane 2011: 16.
132 McDavid 1997, 2002. Also see Colwell 2016.
133 Meskell 2002c: 292.
134 Gertel et al. 2014: 20.
135 Meskell 2002c: 291. The issue nonetheless reached its critical moment during social archaeology's second decade and, as an exercise in 'multivocality', may thus be seen to make up part of that intellectual fabric.
136 As noted by Watkins 2000 and Wylie 2015, the American Indian Movement was highly mobilized by the early 1970s.

(e.g. Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Porou); and the Native Australians (e.g. Pitjantjatjara, Arrernte) who initially challenged archaeologists based on their identity as 'indigenous descendant' communities.[137] In these instances the problematic issue was (is) not that archaeology had a negative impact *per se*, but rather that the practices of excavation, publication and display of bodies transgressed the values the indigenous descendant communities attach to their ancestors after death. Indeed, it is because archaeological sites and history are vital to the identity formation of descendant communities that the issue arose in the first place.

After much lobbying some success was forthcoming: for example in 1990, Native American groups persuaded the United States' government to recognize the "rights of lineal descendants, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations to Native American cultural items, including human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony"[138] and to agree that such remains should be returned to the descendant communities and interred rather than be stored in a museum. These wishes were enshrined in law via the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in the same year, and have continued to influence the passing of legislation for Cultural Resource Management in the United States.[139] Native Australians were also successful in changing the law around cultural material, for example in the Aboriginal Heritage Act (1988, for South Australia). In short, the "compromise" reached by Native Australians and archaeologists was much like those of the Native Americans, namely that all human skeletal remains (and sometimes cultural artifacts) should be returned to them as the living inheritors and stewards of such material.[140] Later in 1991 a code of ethics was adopted by the Australian Archaeological Association that require displays of skeletal material to be replaced by casts and obliges its members' to consult with the living people whose ancestors' lives are being studied on a case-by-case basis. Similar statements were made and laws enacted in New Zealand,[141] and although Canada does not seem to have passed such laws, professional bodies and cultural institutions such as the Canadian Archaeological Association have written documents such as the Statement of Principles for Ethical Conduct Pertaining to Aboriginal Peoples (1997). Indeed most archaeologists, if not their governments also, now see it as their duty to conserve and protect archaeological sites according to the wishes of indigenous descendant communities.

As Lane (2011) has pointed out, archaeology's impact has thus gone further than merely being a source of historic capital for contemporary identities among indigenous descendant communities. The process of negotiation for the rights of indigenous descendant communities has also a) induced international acknowledgment of their existence as their identities, names, territories, histories and

137 Smith 1999.
138 McManahon 2000, cited in National Park Service (US Department of the Interior) website.
139 Renfrew and Bahn 1996: 558.
140 Renfrew and Bahn 1996: 551.
141 Sullivan 2008. Also see Lane 2011: 15; Watkins 2003; Straight et al. 2015.

rights have become legally recognized,[142] along with awareness of their "marginalization within a culturally or ethnically different wider society; and often, a history of colonization":[143]

> …in southern Africa where Khoisan populations have become increasingly conscious of their 'indigenous' status from the perspective of international bodies such as the UN and ILO and relative to 'non-Khoisan' [and Bantu] peoples…[which] has been given considerable prominence as a human rights issue, pitting the global benefits of conservation against local community rights of access and resource use.[144]

Consequently, because 'indigeneity' suggests marginalization, it has b) served to counteract the hegemonic historical discourse of the US, British, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian states. Indeed, as scholars point out, the development of these laws and the increasing amount of scholarly work on the link between indigenous descendant communities and the archaeological past have been very effective foils to colonial legacies and then the abuses of post-colonial nationalisms. Although the extent to which archaeologists abide by laws and guidelines varies, such studies are nevertheless heralded as models for how archaeologists should conceptualize the link between archaeology, history and identity in real terms, and work in tandem with people that claim indigenous descent to establish the meaning they give to archaeological remains.[145] These evaluations have also led to the development of what scholars refer to as 'indigenous archaeology',[146] which essentially aims to institute an archaeological practice in which Western scientists collaborate with indigenous descendant communities to produce archaeological knowledge.

*

However, with the passage of time, the concept of and focus on indigenous descent has been critiqued, not least as the recognition has grown that claims to 'descent' are heuristic and motivated by a host of contemporary factors, and hence such claims should not be taken at face value. Findings such as Gillot's, that site-communities "*could* be, but are not *necessarily*…'[d]escendant' communities"[147] (author's italics), have also been prominent in such discussions. In short, scholars have found that to identify or be identified as an 'indigenous descendant' community is not necessarily the same as to identify or be identified as an 'indigenous' community, or a 'descendant' community. For example, a 'descendant' community or person may claim a cultural or genealogical link between themselves and the ancient inhabitants of archaeological sites, whether the descendent group or individual inhabits the 'original' land or not.[148] One can thus be part of a descendant community and not an indigenous community, as expatriates and diasporic communities often find themselves to be. In contrast, an

142 Renfrew and Bahn 2008.
143 Yeh 2007: 69.
144 Lane 2011: 16 referencing Lane 1998 and Segobye 2009.
145 Sullivan 2008; Lane 2011; Straight et al. 2015.
146 Lane 1998; Eze-Uzomaka 2000; Watkins 2003; Atalay 2006, 2012.
147 Gillot 2010: 11.
148 Smith 1999.

'indigenous' community or person ('native') may be seen as any group or individual born and living in the locale in question and that claims a historic link with the land, rather than with the people who occupied it; the fundamental component of belonging to or inheriting the land is so important to the formation of these identities that the discourse surrounding them is often known as 'autochthonous identity politics'.[149] It is therefore possible to claim to be 'indigenous' but not part of an archaeology-focused 'descendant' community.[150] (The application of these terms are discussed in Chapter 5.)

Of course, as Lane notes about, "there are also multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions used by archaeologists":[151] 'indigenous descent', 'descent' and 'indigeneity' are fluid concepts that considerably overlap. However, the relationships signified by these terms are usually those claimed between a) people and the *land* (indigeneity), b) people's relationship to other *people* (descendant), or both (indigenous descendant). The common thread is that those who adopt these titles identify as, and are often recognized by outsiders to be, either a) 'original to' the ancient *land* which archaeologists study and/or b) the lineal descendants of the ancient *people* who inhabited the land which archaeologists study. What they share, and thus what remains as a bone of contention, is what Yeh implies about claiming indigeneity, namely "firstness, nativeness or original or prior occupancy of a place; attachment to a particular territory or homeland."[152] In other words: a claim to *authenticity*.[153]

Another prominent critique may be found in studies such as Lilli's (2000), which, using the example of Australia, show that claims by indigenous descendant communities can be wrongly granted first priority, including above those of the resident non-descendant community. Critiques such as these may be based on three premeis:

1. It is scientifically incorrect: Meskell (following Jameson 1997) notes that identifying indigenous descent (deemed 'ethnicity') through materials and symbols is dangerous because experience (commonly the foundation of identity) is often materially invisible: "it is pretty much impossible to isolate vectors of identity from the archaeological record";[154]

2. It is open to abuse: Just like archaeology and nationalism, indigenous archaeology can be used to instantiate claims of legitimacy, superiority and territoriality.[155] For example, at the site of Thulamela in South Africa's Kruger National Park, Meskell found that even though:

149 Gertel et al. 2014. Also see Lane 1998.
150 Oland 2012.
151 Lane 2011: 15.
152 Yeh 2007: 69.
153 While the definitions given here are suitable for the current study, the extent to which 'authenticity' is synonymous with 'naturalness' and 'firstness' and so on is of course subject to considerable debate. Many scholars have written about the criteria of or membership rules surrounding 'indigeneity' and have highlighted the ways in which it cuts across belonging to land as well as involvement in politics, so see Niezan 2003, Asch 2004, Merlan 2009 for further discussion.
154 Meskell 2002c: 286.
155 Meskell 2002c: 287.

> the use of monoliths find more resonance in historic Venda culture, this should not preclude [rival and non-descendent but indigenous] Tsonga-speakers of their rights as stakeholders. The notion of direct lineage and ancestry, as espoused by some archaeologists, is potentially dangerous and divisive[156]

Meskell further notes that by:

> favour[ing] Venda claims to the site [and] reminding Shangaan people that their own origins are lodged firmly in what is now Mozambique… archaeologists have only exacerbated these tensions over ascribing modern ethnic identities to the ancient inhabitants of Thulamela..[157]

3. It is contingent on pre-existing sentiment: as Zimmermann (2008) notes in a brief critique of his own 'ethnocritical archaeology,' which he openly equates to 'indigenous archaeology', its scope is limited to peoples and groups who are somehow already unified; it is dependent upon pre-existing communities which possess significant degrees of collective solidarity.

Thus, Meskell posits that it is important to "address multiple understandings of the site—now and in the past—without privileging one 'ethnic' group"[158] because "the danger is always that the politics of recognition, if conceived too literally, can promote the telescoping and hardening of cultural and political identities".[159] Burtenshaw—for whom archaeology can "support political agendas which enhance the position of some groups and cut out others"[160]—notes the same thing in Jordan.

What these endeavours have shown, essentially, is that archaeological sites and history (or interpretations of history) in some cases are used in the construction of individual and collective identities for indigenous descendant communities. However, the late 1990s and 2000s seem to have been a turning point thereafter scholars became concerned not only about whether people *do* identify with the archaeological history and sites but also whether they *do not*. In this schema of values, people's choice not to claim or want 'descent', or even their "indifference"[161] or "ambivalence"[162] towards archaeology, becomes equally important to explore. Indeed, scholars are slowly becoming aware that precious insights can also be gained if sites are viewed as places of experiential importance independently of their official archaeological meaning.

What the following section clarifies, then, is that contrary to popular archaeological philosophy, the meanings of histories and sites for people who do *not* claim 'descent' ('non-descendant communities'), but who are nonetheless exposed to the same archaeology, are not restricted to what they are able to contribute to indigenous history and identity, and certainly not to 'World Heritage'.

---

156 Meskell 2007: 397.
157 Meskell 2007: 398.
158 Meskell 2005a: 83.
159 Meskell 2005a: 91.
160 Burtenshaw 2014: 54.
161 Herzfeld 1996; Fotiadis 2010.
162 Breglia 2006; Yalouri 2010.

2.3.1.3 Indigenous Non-Descendant Communities

While archaeology has had a significant impact upon the formation of identities adopted by indigenous descendant communities, its impact upon indigenous non-descendant communities—broadly conceived here as people who place a high cultural value on their land but do not necessarily choose to adhere to the idea of being descended from ancient people in the archaeological past—is more complicated.

Rodriguez conducted a multi-sited ethnographic study in Yucatán, Mexico, with the Maya farming community known as the Kochol who live near the pre-Columbian Maya site of Chunchucmil. Taking a Casey-esque (1997) and Bordieu-influenced (1993) perspective of sites as 'spaces' constructed "by the engaging gaze of a social actor"[163] and the performance of multiple activities and onto which multiple perceptions of 'place' are inscribed,[164] Rodriguez notes that "archaeologists conduct research on this landscape"[165] and see it as "promising a tremendous yield of knowledge from which to produce academic capital" about the ancient Maya.[166] Simultaneously, "the local communities use the same land—to raise cattle, hunt and farm—often directly over the ruins."[167] Despite this "disparity of dependence"[168] it is still the same land and thus, echoing Bartu (2000), Chunchucmil is "multiple places in a local space".[169]

Nevertheless, misaligned conceptions of archaeological 'space', as 'heritage' on the one hand and 'landscape' on the other, seem to have gone largely unchallenged and alternatives unsought until 2002, when a North American archaeological team declared their desire to build a Chunchucmil museum directly on the Kochol's communal farmland (*ejido*). According to Rodriguez, this was an idea that the archaeologists thought would augment the positive economic impact of archaeology for the Kochol, but that "once rumours spread about land being taken away"[170] concerns about fencing off the site crystallized and the archaeologists were prevented from working for over two months",[171] until a contract was signed outlining their ownership rights. Indeed, with hindsight, Rodriguez regrets not realizing that, when viewed through what Joyce (2002) calls the 'global economy of knowledge production', the proposal of a museum on the *ejido* essentially required the disempowerment of the Kochol and the appropriation of their land:

163 Rodriguez 2006: 161.
164 This has similarities with Appadurai's (2003) idea of the 'production of locality', whereby activities and performances constitute the 'work' that connects people to their place.
165 Rodriguez 2006: 161.
166 Rodriguez 2006: 162.
167 Rodriguez 2006: 161.
168 Rodriguez 2006: 163.
169 Rodriguez 2006: 162.
170 Rodriguez 2006: 165.
171 Rodriguez 2006: 167.

> …[first] because it entailed the privileging of archaeological and thus a Westernized conceptual framework and second because it would have set into motion a series of events that would have created very different kinds of relations between farmers and their land.[172]

While noting the range of opinions within the community, including some positivity about a museum, Rodriguez' overwhelming impression was that archaeology, and the desire to effect economic results for the local community, actually had a negative impact upon the Kochol's agricultural economy. However, Rodriguez' argument goes further in two inter-related ways. First, Rodriguez found that *ejido* is not only an economic but also a cultural asset that reinforces the farmers' historic identity—that of being *ejido* owners. Second, he found that the Kochol primarily identify as possessing Mestizo lineage, "not that of a descendant of the ancient Maya",[173] and they therefore told Rodriguez that "the builders of the [Chunchucmil archaeological sites] were a different generation, a different race and of a different epoch."[174]

Ejido is thus economically and historically impactful for the Kochol, and part of their cultural patrimony, but in ways wholly independent of the meanings ascribed to it by archaeologists. Rodriguez notes that the archaeologists had made the erroneous assumption that the Kochol would choose to identify as indigenous descendant communities and would thus also choose to view the ruins as their 'ancestral heritage', thereby welcoming a museum and preserving the site rather than understanding how sites function as important parts of the indigenous landscape.

Similar findings have been made at Çatalhöyük in Turkey. There, Shankland found that residents of the modern settlement of Küçükköy saw themselves as descendants of those who built part of the site, referring to it as "old village" (Eskiköy).[175] Yet, they did not perceive a historic, genealogical or cultural connection with the Neolithic people who built the first settlements there. Instead, Shankland found that over time, alternative rationalizations had been cultivated to make historic sense of the mound that covers the site's remains, one of which was that it was created by pre-Küçükköy Greek (*Rum*) populations who, although having left in the 1920s, were nonetheless likelier to be the "true descendants" of those who used to live there.[176] Just like the findings of other authors above, the site-community residents are indigenous to the land and place a high cultural value on the archaeological site, but not because of its partial status as an archaeological site, which is merely incidental.

Shankland suggests that by using participant observation and interviews it is possible to see, as Malinowksi suggested, "the difference between what people say goes on, what people say should go

172 Rodriguez 2006: 169.
173 Rodriguez 2006: 167. The same thing has been found in southern Belize's ethnic Maya but non-descendant communities (see Parks 2010; Oland 2012).
174 Rodriguez 2006: 164-5.
175 Shankland 1996: 355.
176 Shankland 1996: 355.

on, and what is actually found on the ground."[177] In this vein, he lists the ways in which archaeology and the archaeological site seem—at first sight—not to have had an impact on Küçükköy's residents. However, in a later research season, Shankland moved onto mapping the places of importance within the landscape according to Küçükköy residents and found it as a far more effective way of addressing the importance of Çatalhöyük to local representations of the past. He is careful to point out that it would be wrong to fix any one quality to any one object, but that "[s]ome objects do appear to hold a fairly constant position in the collective representation of the village."[178] In looking at these constants, Shankland suggests that "the archaeological landscape acts as a number of mnemonic points" for people in Küçükköy. For example, the mounds are simultaneously seen as a source of buried treasure; a picnic place at festival times (particularly valued by women as a location they may frequent without men); a source of fodder for grazing; a source of earth; and sometimes as field boundaries.[179] He calls this a "complex but subtle and tolerant interaction between the villages and the heritage…"[180]

However, Shankland finds that for residents of Küçükköy, Çatalhöyük's most compelling physical characteristic was related to its partial status as a modern-day cemetery that thus contained "the souls ('arūah, s. rūh) of those who used to inhabit [the land] and are now buried there, as well as being a locus of "other supernatural sanction" and host of "the devil."[181] He suggests that beliefs about these metaphysical beings and forces were attached and reinforced by the presence of human bones, which were often visible on the surface due to natural ground erosion or truncation.[182] And, despite his limited access to them, Shankland suggests that this physical-metaphysical but non-archaeological connection to Çatalhöyük may be even stronger among the local Muslim women than with the men. Against the background of women's general exclusion from public Islamic praxis, they are "much more prominent in just those areas of the faith which the believing politically active men regard as being unacceptable and far from central orthodoxy."[183] For people in Küçükköy, then:

> the mounds [of Çatalhöyük] occupy a position in the village cosmology somewhere between what is usually regarded as the 'folklore' of the region (that is, the activities of supernatural mythical archetypical beings) and the Islamic faith.[184]

Shankland thus hypothesizes that "plotting those parts of the landscape which may be said to play a part in [Küçükköy's] religious life…against the visible archaeological remains would reveal a

177 Shankland 1996: 349.
178 Shankland 1999: 145.
179 Shankland 1999: 145.
180 Shankland 1999: 145.
181 Shankland 1999: 145. Other scholars have also noted this. In the Parauá *caboclos* in the Brazilian Amazon, Gomes also noted that archaeological sites are connected to cosmological beliefs, especially those about supernatural beings both 'good' and 'bad' who act as guardians to natural resources like the forests (*igapó*), the streams (*igarapés*) and other sacred spaces (Gomes 2006: 156).
182 Shankland 1999: 150.
183 Shankland 1999: 154.
184 Shankland 1999: 148.

high degree of correlation."[185] Shankland reports that although "ideologically" there was potential for disruption—the villagers are Muslim but many people outside Küçükköy see Çatalhöyük's figurative art as symbolic of a pre-Islamic female 'Goddess' religion—this was not apparent.[186] Indeed, to Shankland, the Küçükköy residents:

> …are already aware of the multiplicity of past civilizations in their land and have linked these already in a coherent way with their sense of being Islamic. Answers are already in place which cope well with the challenge bought by the presence of archaeologists in their midsts.[187]

Indeed, this is the problem that arises when 'heritage' is conflated with 'archaeology', a mistake made even by the most attentive anthropologists such as Shankland (see above). Useful here is Gillot's observation that in Syria the closest Arabic terms for archaeology, 'antiquities' (*athâr*) and 'heritage' (*turâth*), have several meanings, depending on who is using them.[188] Formally-educated and often Western-influenced Syrian civil society, for example, has come to conceptualize the archaeological objects as material evidence of their own heritage: something they have inherited and must protect.[189] And, although the Syrian government does not use the word *turâth* in its Antiquities Law and formal title, Gillot shows that it too has chosen to visualize *athâr* as 'national heritage'.[190]

One important dimension revealed by the analysis of language in this manner is that, in Arabic at least, the leap from *athâr* to *turâth* reflects a different level of connection; referring to something as 'heritage' requires some sort of conscious acceptance or belief that the objects or histories are one's to inherit. Archaeologists may assign people a heritage (as Rodriguez did) but it does not necessarily follow that the people themselves will choose to follow suit. To demonstrate this, Gillot moves to archaeology's historical impact upon indigenous site-communities in Syria, noting that:

> They…do recognise the cultural values of archaeological remains, considering them as part of their history and formation of their identity, even in the case of the remains from a distant past or a different culture. What differs is the criteria of recognition of archaeological remains as heritage (turâth), which may diverge from the more widely accepted or nationalist aesthetic, historical and national values recognized by Syrian Antiquities Law.[191]

Jacobs and Porter (2009) make similar findings in their study of site-communities in Jordan, but further noted that, in legal terms, *athâr* and *turâth* are still seen as separate. For these and other reasons, scholars such as Loosley (2005) have suggested that there is an epistemological gulf between Western ideas of archaeology and heritage are incompatible with Arab Muslim senses of history.

185 Shankland 1999: 153.
186 Shankland 1999: 143.
187 Shankland 1996: 355.
188 Gillot 2010: 14.
189 Gillot 2010: 11.
190 Gillot 2010: 6.
191 Gillot 2010: 14.

However, as Gillot notes, the situation is "more complex"[192]—and examples can be drawn from elsewhere. For instance, while conducting archaeological research in Nigeria, Eze-Uzomaka found that some indigenous Igbo communities do not regard themselves as descendants of the ancient peoples that occupied the land, and therefore do not make a direct connection with the 'heritage' that archaeologists assign to them. Instead, Nigerians "have a concept of their past which is divergent from the past presented by archaeologists."[193]

Gomes also found a clash in worldview and conceptions of identity whilst investigating the social interactions between an archaeological project focused on the periphery of the pre-colonial Indian chiefdom of Santarém and the contemporary Parauá riverside community (*caboclos*) in the Brazilian Amazon. According to the official archaeological history of the Amazon, Santarém society was paradigmatic of sophisticated pre-European societies. Yet the Parauá *caboclos* are "mixed-blood populations resulting from marriages between Indians and Portuguese colonizers…between 1615 and 1800, which homogenized the existing diversity of former indigenous groups." [194] Although "historically and culturally related" to indigenous Indian populations, *caboclos*, such as the Parauá, "do not consider themselves to be Indians and vehemently refuse to be classified" as such.[195] However, Gomes finds that two neighbouring and rival Parauá groups have reacted differently to the reception of official archaeological history; the political leadership of one group appropriated aspects of it into their identity and began recreating 'Indian' traditions (although Gomes does not specify which traditions these were). In contrast, the Parauá near Gomes' site tried to undermine this claim by filing a report to the authorities "linking the archaeological research to biopiracy activities" which resulted in the suspension of Gomes' research and her "physical removal" from the *caboclos*.[196]

Although the theoretical framework is not explicitly noted by her, it is clear that Gomes sees the construction of Parauá identity from a strongly Wendt-ian (1992) constructivist viewpoint; that is, identities are adopted strategically in relation to interests (see Chapter 3). This being the case, she suggests that the marginalized residents of Parauá *caboclos* have two options:

> the first option is to state that they are modern citizens, denying any connection with the past. The second option is to identify with an indigenous heritage…[a]nd th[e group nearest her site]…has chosen the first alternative—that is, they have chosen to use the result of the archaeological work to help support the statement that they are modern citizens.[197]

Archaeology thus *provides* "alternative political option[s]", even if it is not *used* as such.[198]

192 Gillot 2010: 11.
193 Eze-Uzomaka 2000: 153.
194 Gomes 2006: 151.
195 Gomes 2006: 151.
196 Gomes 2006: 152.
197 Gomes 2006: 157.
198 Gomes 2006: 154.

2.3.2 The Impacts of Archaeology on Local Economies

Extant literature on archaeology's economic impact upon site-communities is scant, perhaps because of the separation of 'economists' and 'culturalists',[199] the fracture line between whom Burtenshaw calls a "gap"[200] (see below). However where it has been studied, a number of perspectives have been chosen, from the dividends provided by archaeo-tourism and the dimensions of the commercial antiquities market and 'looting' pratices; the non-commercial uses of excavated materials, such as the reuse and recycling of archaeological material for construction;[201] to questions about how site management plans that change the landscape can affect agricultural practices and yields.[202] What these studies have shown is that the impact can be considerable: mercantile practices such as the sale of antiquities found through 'subsistence digging' (Staley 1993), 'commercial archaeology' (Heath 1973) or other 'undocumented excavation' (Hollowell 2006)[203] are a case in point. For example Rose and Burke (2004) have estimated that if all the Roman-Byzantine tomb artefacts in northern Jordan were to be sold they would generate US$10-18 million, which, as Brodie (2010) notes is equivalent to US$1-2 million per year for 10 years. Hollowell finds similarly vast numbers in her research in St. Lawrence Island in Alaska's Bering Straight, which generates something like "U.S.$1.5 million per year for the island, or about U.S.$1,000 per person"[204] through the sale of artifacts they find and sell "at prices from [US]$40 per pound for bulk scraps and fragments up to asking prices of [US]$175,000 for one exceptional piece".[205] Across the world, then, trade in archaeological materials can generate such amounts as to enable the digger "to start a business, attend college or medical school or start a new life after fleeing a war-torn country by selling excavated goods".[206] Hollowell further notes that scholars have found that "one major find can provide the equivalent of a family's annual income";[207] a considerable amount considering that most subsistence diggers usually receive a comparatively small cut of the object's final sale price.

199 Klamer 2014.
200 Burtenshaw 2014.
201 Padgett 1989.
202 Because of the specific focus on the economic impact of archaeology on site-communities, this review naturally does not take into account the work of scholars such as Hamilakis and Duke (2016) on archaeology's links with capitalism or Throsby's seminal work on economics and culture (2000).
203 'Subsistence digging' is defined as situations "where people dig to find archaeological goods to sell and use the proceeds to support a subsistence lifestyle" (Hollowell 2006: 72; see also Matsuda 1998). Heath's (1973) 'commercial archaeology' has a similar definition, and while some might say these are euphemized terms for what is essentially 'artifact looting', these authors would argue that the application of the verb 'to loot' communicates a Western-conceived value judgement about such practices, degrading them to being 'illicit', 'shameful' and morally outrageous (McIntosh 1996) even though subsistence digging is not always illegal (as in Alaska) and despite the misalignment of the term with how the diggers see themselves. For the moral arguments 'for' and 'against' subsistence digging see Hollowell (2006) and Brodie (2010) as well as Hardy (2004), who argues that site-community residents have the 'right to loot' in contexts of great 'economic injustice': "that under certain conditions of poverty or lack of other means of livelihood, people are justified in using archaeological goods as an economic resource" (Hollowell 2006: 74).
204 Hollowell 2006: 105.
205 Hollowell-Zimmer 2002: 16.
206 Hollowell 2006: 77.
207 Hollowell 2006: 75.

Heath (1973) provides another such example. In his study of *huaqueros* (translated by him as 'commercial archaeologists') and the associated livelihood (*huaquerismo*) in Costa Rica, Heath found that,

> [t]he illicit trade in artifacts probably totaled at least U.S.$500,000 in 1968-69; only 10% of the country's manufacturing establishments produced as much! The roughly 4400 people involved are almost exactly 1% of the total economically active population and more than twice the number of medical personnel in the country…It is, in crass economic terms, a profitable kind of industry for a predominantly agrarian nation…[208]

Indeed he continues to note that income from commercial archaeology is substantial when,

> [w]e are speaking of a region where a family of 5 can meet the rent on a tiny hut and eat rice and beans (the staple foods) on about U.S.$34 a month, but where an unskilled laborer must be both industrious and lucky to earn much more than that, and where the highest paid teacher earned U.S.$102 a month.[209]

Of course this study is 45 years old, so the monetary returns might well be very different today: such practices may not still be current in Costa Rica as there has been a significant rise in environmental protection in the country since the 1970s, which may have had a knock-on effect on heritage protection. More importantly, some archaeologists view subsistence digging as a practice that it inherently at odds with their own principles (see footnote, above). Nevertheless, it taps into the broader debate surrounding the economic nature of archaeological materials and the extent to which, morally speaking, archaeology can and should be a tool of economic development, particularly in developing countries where many people live below the poverty line.[210] For example regarding field schools, Boytner calculates that:

> Between 2009 and 2012, over $5.8 million was directed towards [field schools] in Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, and the UK captured 47 per cent of these funds) and $2.3 million towards North American field schools. But $1.6 million reported/$2.4 million weighted was spent in the Middle East and over $1.5 reported/$2.2 million weighted in Latin America.[211]

Boytner argues that this money goes directly to local economies via payments made for accommodation, food, local labour, equipment and supplies from local businesses and payments for the use of services such as transport, laundry, Internet cafes, etc.[212] Less quantifiably, Boytner notes that the cross-cultural partnerships forged during archaeological seasons also have significant economic effects upon the local community, noting, "[w]hether through development work, the creation of service-learning projects, or through the (rare) cases of marriage, migration, and

208 Heath 1973: 260.
209 Heath 1973: 262.
210 Boytner 2014.
211 Boytner 2014: 270.
212 Boytner 2014: 263.

remittance, these relationships yield lasting and profound impact on local communities."[213] Moreover, he notes that the partial data available "produced conservative results. It is likely that actual funding and therefore spending in and impact on local communities, is higher."[214] Of course, Boytner acknowledges that some field schools have only a negligible economic impact upon site-communities, "especially if they are a single season project." Yet Boytner nonetheless concludes that archaeologists have a significantly positive economic impact upon site-communities simply by "doing archaeological research."[215]

ICOMOS clearly belives archaeologists have a responsibility to use their work to produce economic dividends, declaring that "tourism should bring benefits to host communities".[216] Even regarding developed Europe, Wait and Altschul have remarked that "the notion of heritage and economic development as [being] equally necessary…for a sustainable future is shared by all the major participants."[217] Indeed, a number of organizations promote the use of archaeology as a development tool, including the Global Heritage Fund, the Sustainable Preservation Initiative, the World Heritage Fund, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, all of which "focus on archaeological sites as leverage for broader economic development…"[218]

Of course, that archaeology should produce economic benefits is not universally agreed. As Burtenshaw notes, some laws and codes of ethics "de-emphasize" or "exclude" the aforementioned entirely, such as in Australia's amendments to the Venice Charter (1964), known as the Burra Charter (1979).[219] Scholars such as Carmen (2005) also argue that economic thinking has had a negative impact on archaeologists' views of archaeology. Nevertheless, as Carmen also acknowledges:

> There is sometimes a tendency among archaeologists to be scornful of the 'dismal science' of economics, based upon the misconception that all that economists care about is money. This is not necessarily true, as economists take a sophisticated approach to question of value, grounded in the recognition of the environment as a scarce (that is, finite) resource.[220]

For such reasons, as Gould and Burtenshaw have noted, interest in "the use of archaeology and heritage as resources for economic and social development"[221] has been growing for some years.

213 Boytner 2014: 264.
214 Boytner 2014: 274.
215 Boytner 2014: 274.
216 ICOMOS 1999, '8th Draft of the International Cultural Tourism Charter, Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance'. Also see ICOM 2000, 'Proposal for a Charter of Principles for Museums and Cultural Tourism'.
217 Wait and Altschul 2014: 151.
218 Boytner 2014: 262.
219 Burtenshaw 2014: 50. Also see Lafrenz Samuels 2008.
220 Carmen 2005: 49.
221 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014: 3.

2.3.2.1 Tourism

While Boynter's list of the ways in which archaeological field schools can generate economic dividends is useful, most scholars assume that archaeology's economic impact upon site-communities comes primarily through its contribution to tourism.[222] Indeed, archaeologists seeking to explain what they give back to site-communities often cite tourism as a prime example. Walker and Carr note that "while tourism and archaeology are without a doubt separate disciplines, they share a significant number of interests."[223] Such is tourism's perceived value to local economies that Gould and Burtenshaw argue that "efforts to turn heritage into a tourism asset [should be] a primary focus of archaeologists' efforts related to economic development."[224]

According to this literature, archaeological tourism can provide a range of economic benefits, visible not least in the net sums that a country receives annually. In Alaska, 1.2 million "visitors" spent close to one billion US dollars in the state in 1999 (a significant percent of which must have also gone into the legal trade in antiquities, above).[225] Using figures provided by Goodwin and Nizette (2001), Brodie (2010) has also shown that in the north-eastern area of Peru, 69,000 foreign tourists (spending c.US$119 per day) provided something like USD$40 million in 2003, with the domestic market 1.2 million Peruvians (spending c.US$19 per day) adding more. In 1999, it was estimated that just one of these towns, Chiclayo, was receiving US$14 million per year (Watson 1999). Boytner further notes that "if a[n archaeological] site is selected for further development for tourism or as regional or national symbol", it may be possible to "produce lucrative micro-economic niches" by reproducing "archaeological artefacts using traditional designs and/or methods."[226] As Coben shows, the Sustainable Preservation Initiative at the site-scommunity of San José de Morro in northern Peru is based on the reproduction of Moche ceramics found in the burials there, and has proven popular with tourists, directly producing $50,000 in revenue for the community, one full-time job, and 22 other part-time jobs.[227] The importance of tourism revenue to site-community economies is evident. In interviews conducted in Jordan's Wadi Feynan, Burtenshaw found that:

> over 90 per cent [of the respondents] agreed that the archaeological remains [which date from Neolithic to Roman] were 'important' to them…Two-thirds of these respondents said this was due to the economic contribution from the archaeology through tourism…and through employment in archaeological projects.[228]

222 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014, using English Heritage as a key example because they "include it in their material on what heritage offers society."
223 Walker and Carr 2013: 15.
224 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014: 4-5.
225 Hollowell-Zimmer 2002: 15: n.7.
226 Boytner 2014: 263.
227 Coben 2014; see the Sustainable Preservation Initiative website.
228 Burtenshaw 2014: 55. See Oland 2012 who similarly shows that in non-descendant communities in Belize, archaeology's value is expressed in economic terms.

However, current literature also shows that for most site-communities, tourism is either non-existent or does not generate revenues which trickle down in any significant way. In his study of the Kochol in Yucatán, Rodriguez concludes that there have been few benefits from tourism and that even at other important Mexican archaeological sites, such as Tulum and Uxmal, economic benefits for site-communities have been minimal—despite improvements to the local infrastructure.[229]

Moreover, intrusive archaeological site-management plans, usually designed with tourism in mind, "may diminish cultural meanings and access for some populations, reducing cultural and social capital."[230] Lastly, tourism may actually become a source of social conflict within site-communities. During fieldwork in Wadi Feynan, where tourism has been successful, Burtenshaw found that:

> disputes about how to organize tourism as well as access to economic opportunities offered by archaeological projects caused significant tension between tribes, and between tribes and national organizations in the area.[231]

In a paper published in 1996, Shankland reported that there was no significant tourism industry in the immediate area of Küçükköy and that he "suspect[ed] that [its] effect on the community is…rather small."[232] In another paper, published in 1999, Shankland noted that "the success of the site reopening is clearly attracting important people to the area" and that tourism had become ubiquitous.[233] However, rather than heralding an economic bonanza, Shankland suggested that the impact of tourism was not entirely positive, noting that people were "resigned" to the idea of selling their houses and their lands to make way for developments that did not include them. Shankland attributed this to the fact that "many people do not feel powerful enough to enter into a complicated procedural battle, one which would involve both the local authorities and various different government departments."[234]

2.3.2.2 Employment

Archaeology has an economic impact on site-communities through the seasonal wages earned by locals working for archaeological teams, although this has barely been studied. An historic perspective on this is provided by Agatha Christie (1946), who describes the day-to-day life of the archaeological projects she worked on in northern Syria and Turkey with her husband Max Mallowan. Recounting her conversation with their Armenian cook, Dmitri, Christie writes:

229 Rodriguez 2006: 164, also Castañeda 1996.
230 Burtenshaw 2014: 54.
231 Burtenshaw 2014: 55.
232 Shankland 1996: 354.
233 Shankland 1999: 144.
234 Shankland 1999: 144.

> He has come all the way from the coast to be ready for us. 'How did you know we were coming?' 'It is known that there is to be digging again this year. […] It is very welcome. I have now the family of two of my brothers to support; there are eight children in one and ten in the other. They eat much. It is good to earn money. […] I said to my brother's wife, 'God is good. We shall not starve this year – we are saved – the Khwajas [foreigners] are coming to dig!'[235]

Christie's descriptions strongly suggest that archaeology's economic impact upon such employees, who were otherwise "desperately poor" and "next door to starvation", was significant.[236]

Gillot, who worked in the same area as Christie and Mallowan 70 years later, agrees that archaeological employment is economically beneficial to site-communities. In a case-study of Afamia in north-west Syria, he notes that "[s]alaries paid to the workers are two or three times higher than those paid in the Syrian public sector, industry and agriculture."[237] More specifically, Gillot observes that the archaeological mission he studied employed between 30 and 50 people for an average of six weeks per season. By working out the daily salary (200–250 Syrian pounds, equivalent to €3 at the exchange rate in 2008), the addition of a sixth paid day of work (paid at double the daily rate), the consequent weekly salary (some €33), and salary over the typical six-week season (some €200), Gillot is able to positively conclude that, "In monthly terms, a worker [who works continuously] thus earns…approximately €130. As a comparison, the legal minimum wage is at present…€87 [per month]."[238]

Gillot is of course aware of the shortcomings of archaeological employment as a source of income. Its "temporary character", for example, means that it is primarily regarded as an appendage to a primary occupation: a "person will therefore share their working day between the excavation and its exploitation or business or [their] post in the administration."[239] Overall, however, Gillot concludes that archaeology provides "secure well-paid seasonal and temporary employment and as the number of posts is limited they are subject to fierce competition between local people"[240] and that while "[w]orking conditions can vary from one mission to another…generally, the appreciation of the workers is positive."[241]

Boytner, too, finds that archaeological field schools have a significantly positive economic impact upon local communities.[242] Utilizing his long experience as an archaeologist who runs field schools, Boytner concludes that while limited in terms of total financial investment, the latter "make a local impact that is economically broader, deeper, and longer lasting [than tourism]", particularly

235 Christie 1946: 174.
236 Mallowan 1977: 42-43.
237 Gillot 2010: 13.
238 Gillot 2010: 13.
239 Gillot 2010: 13.
240 Gillot 2010: 11.
241 Gillot 2010: 13.
242 Boytner 2014: 263.

when archaeologists return to the same site and region over several years and operate in poor regions of the world where "[t]ourists do not stay long."[243]

Like Gillot and Boytner, Rodriguez argues that while the Kochol living near the archaeological site of Chunchucmil in Yucatán had not benefited from tourism, wages paid by archaeologists had brought positive benefits. He notes that:

> …most locals agreed that the relatively high wages paid by the [archaeological] project for labor are truly beneficial. An elderly *ejidatario* [landowner] stated, 'We pray to God that the project gets funds to return next year so we can work because the community really benefit in this time when things are very difficult.'[244]

Shankland makes similar remarks at Çatalhöyük. Shankland noted how, although the first archaeological teams that worked sporadically at Çatalhöyük in the 1960s lived within Küçükköy village, and although the villagers were "acutely sensitive to any opportunities that such direct contact with the outside world offer[ed]", archaeology at that time produced few economic impacts for Küçükköy.[245] Of the much later archaeological team that worked at Çatalhöyük from 1993-5, Shankland notes that they hired an average of 15 workmen per six-week season.[246] Shankland does not specify how many seasons the archaeologists worked per year, who the employees were, or who might have lost out on economic opportunity when the archaeologists changed their accommodation. However, his assessment that archaeological employment's impact upon Küçükköy is "negligible" does not change, and that even "after the site…opened up [in 1993,] the effect on the local community [wa]s still economically rather small",[247] because the 15 workers:

> represent almost the sole extent of [Küçükköy's] surplus labour; the remainder of men of suitable age being either busy in their fields or having emigrated. Whilst the prospect of cash is always welcome, and there are always a few poor folk, the village's comparative wealth means that the money coming in through the workmen's wages is of little significance in the village economy as a whole.[248]

Shankland's reaches similar conclusions in his 1999 paper. He writes that "it is certain that the money paid to [Küçükköy residents] from the site represents only a tiny proportion of [Küçükköy's] overall economy."[249] However, he adds that residents were concerned by the fencing of the site because it could no longer be used as a pasture for sheep; and that the only person who received

243 Boytner 2014: 263.
244 Rodriguez 2006: 168.
245 Shankland 1996: 351.
246 Shankland 1996: 351.
247 Shankland 1996: 351.
248 Shankland 1999: 354.
249 Shankland 1999: 143.

regular wages was a watchman employed by the local museum.[250] He thus suggests that instead of a general economic impact archaeology had "highly specific effects":[251]

> the villagers who have worked for the site are often those who have the least property. Just as did the first watchman, after a number of years (particularly if more than one person from the same family works there regularly) a family may succeed in moving up the village social hierarchy by buying a house or land. The[refore the] money going into the community may be important in its selective influence on the village order, but much less so in its total economy.[252]

2.3.2.3 Site Management

Regardless of any positive economic impacts archaeology might bring, many scholars have reported that relationships between archaeologists and site-communities are not always free from conflict. In great part this seems to be attributable to the archaeologist's interventions in the land and the impact it has, or could have, on local livelihoods and thus site-community economies: Rodriguez notes the downside of archaeology for those whose land had been integrated into the Chunchucmil archaeological zone, quoting one of them as saying, "What good is the pay if it ultimately leads to our land being closed to us?"[253] Gomes describes two related clashes between the archaeologists and the local Parauá community in the Amazon. About the first, Gomes notes "political opposition"[254] to the archaeological project. In part she attributes this to the lack of familiarity of some members of the Parauá with the purpose of archaeological activities and in particular with surveys, "which involves the opening of transects across the territory".[255] Gomes also points to the pervading feeling of land insecurity in the *caboclos*; the same land had, only recently, been turned into an "Extractivist Reserve" and to the pervading feeling that archaeologists seem analogous with other "seek[ers of] mineral riches" who sold artifacts for financial advantage (see the comment about biopiracy, above).[256] Similar parallels between archaeology and commercial processes are said to be drawn by Canadian Inuits (Bielawski 1994). However, Gillot writes that the archaeologists are often equally suspicious of local community members, who are often thought of

> as a threat to the knowledge and protection of archaeological sites. Therefore, local populations are usually excluded, or access is limited by private ownership. These measures can lead, in some cases, to

250 Shankland 1999: 143.
251 Shankland 1999: 144.
252 Shankland 1999: 144.
253 Rodriguez 2006: 168.
254 Shankland 1999: 149.
255 Shankland 1999: 148-9.
256 Shankland 1999: 152.

> misunderstanding and strong opposition towards archaeological research and conservation procedures.[257]

This shows just a few of the apparent subtleties of how archaeology's impact on local economies might be conceived. Beyond creating economic complications, Shankland also strongly suggests that site management activities erode the residents' organic connections with the Çatalhöyük mounds (that is the connections that have emerged independently of archaeology or archaeologists): the links between archaeology's ideational and economic impacts are, in many cases, direct. For example in describing the process by which archaeological sites are formally made in Turkey (site identification—visit by the authorities—arrival of archaeologists—beginning of excavations—creation of the dig-house—installation of a site guard—establishment of a museum—the rumours of tourism—the construction of hotels and concomitant infrastructure—the interest of outside organisations—the attention of the press—the involvement of politicians and the sponsorship by private investors and businessmen), Shankland comments that the meanings given to the mounds have not been transplanted or revitalized elsewhere: "[n]ow Çatalhöyük is cordoned off…[and] the villagers have not sought a direct replacement."[258] Far more than just the erection of borders, then, site management plans may therefore be said to erode these organic connections and may very well be quietly playing a role in the broader "polarization of gender practices" that Shankland forecasts will continue concomitantly with the increasing trend towards Islamic orthodoxy.[259] He predicts that,

> unorthodox aspects of the faith will decline…[and a]s this shift occurs, there is a possibility that the mounds will become increasingly viewed as archaeological sites with a distinct place in the past and perhaps excluded from the incorporation into the sacred that the lack of periodicisation currently permits.[260]

Importantly, Shankland also suggests that, if this connection is broken, the archaeological sites of Çatalhöyük would be forced to confront the even bigger question, which is about "the place of prehistoric archaeology in a predominantly Islamic nation."[261]

257 Gillot 2010: 11.
258 Shankland 1999: 155. See similar narratives in Whitt 1998, regarding Native America and Mehari and Ryano 2016 re. Kenya.
259 Shankland 1999: 155.
260 Shankland 1999: 155.
261 Shankland 1999: 155.

2.4 Gaps in the Academic Literature

2.4.1 Identity

As shown above, most of the scholarship relating to the impact of archaeology addresses how official archaeological history—what we might call archaeology's ideational output—is used to build a sense of identity by three different groups: nationalist groups and states; indigenous descendant communities; and indigenous non-descendant communities. Scholarly examples were drawn from Africa, South America and the Middle East, demonstrating that although there are great variations in the way these groups use or reject archaeological history, cross-cultural trends can nonetheless be identified. Transposing the question of archaeological history and identity to Sudan, it is clear that archaeology's impact upon, and use by, these three groups have been only partially addressed in the available literature.

First, Sudan's official state histories and its endeavours to forge a national identity have received attention from scholars such as Deng (1994, 1995). These scholars have looked at the Sudanese state's identification with Arabism and Islam as well as its dogged pursuit of a narrowly-defined national vision, which has contributed to internal conflict in Sudan and, indeed, to a long running civil war that drew to a close in 2005 and finally ended with the secession of South Sudan in 2011. However, few studies look specifically at the impact on Sudanese site-communities of the dichotomy between the Sudanese state's identification with Arabism and Islam vis-à-vis Sudan's official archaeological history, which centres upon the ancient pre-Islamic civilisations of Nubia. Scholars such Leturcq (2011) have provided some insights into this topic in the course of their work, and along with the literature on national identity, will be drawn upon in the first part of Chapter 5, where this dichotomy is examined.

Second, and in contrast, the impact of archaeological history on Sudan's main indigenous descendant community, the Nubians, has been studied more closely. Scholars such as Poeschke (1996) and Edwards (2003) have shown how archaeological history has been used by Nubian groups to construct direct lineal descent to the ancient past, and that this has been vital to the Nubians' emergence as an internationally-recognized, if nationally-marginalized, people during the 20th Century. However, there has been little discussion about what broader implications this might have for Sudanese society, even though scholars such as Meskell have shown that over-privileging the narratives of indigenous descendant communities can threaten social cohesion and undermine the equally valuable rights held by other indigenous groups and site-communities. The second part of Chapter 5 is therefore dedicated to such a discussion, and will utilize Poeschke, Edwards and other's work in doing so.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the impact of archaeological history upon indigenous non-descendant communities, and how it might (not) have meaning or contribute to their sense of identity, has not been addressed at all in the Sudanese context. The one study that purports to do so was carried out by Kurt Beck (Bayreuth University) at the Meroitic site of Musawwarat es-Sufra in early 2015, at the same time as this study, and has not yet been published. This is a major oversight considering that most archaeological sites in Sudan are outside Nubia and that archaeologists are most likely to encounter indigenous non-descendant communities. How do the latter perceive Sudan's archaeological history? Do they feel any cultural affiliation or historic connection with sites? Again, aside from Osman's (1992) study on folklore, there has been little published research into these questions in Sudan, even though elsewhere, archaeological sites are significant phenomena and have meaning to site-communities independently of archaeological history. Addressing these questions thus makes up the third part of Chapter 5.

2.4.2 Economics

The brief presentation of literature above notwithstanding, few scholars have sought to evaluate archaeology's economic impact, let alone its economic impact upon site-communities; this is one of the main gaps in the extant literature, regardless of region. Gould and Burtenshaw, whose study on archaeology and economics is arguably the most significant so far, argue that there is a need for "more and better quantitative and statistical data about the [economic] impact of archaeology"[262] but that, according to Burtenshaw, "enthusiasm to do so seems slim."[263] This is certainly the state of research in Sudan, where even research on the links between archaeology and tourism is scant, although this is likely due to the fact that tourism remains more of an aspiration than a reality. Whatever the reason for such a dearth, the first part of Chapter 6 will address the lack of scholarship regarding tourism.

The second part of Chapter 6 will address an even more obvious gap in the literature, this time regarding archaeologists' employment of members of site-communities to work on excavations. For such a long-standing practice across the globe,[264] it is extraordinary that there have been so few scholarly studies about its economic impact. As Boytner notes, the financial returns "that [archaeological] research activities *per se* actually generate are neglected and poorly understood."[265] Moreover, of the few articles written about it (presented above), there are some glaring shortcomings.

262 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014: 3.
263 Burtenshaw 2014: 51.
264 Elsewhere, the success of non-penetrative methods such as geophysical surveys means that excavation is no longer archaeology's sole tool, but it remains a core practice for the teams in the case-study areas and across Sudan because the results from the former can often be disappointing (Grzymski 2005).
265 Boytner 2014: 263.

Boytner's own study on site-communities in Egypt concludes that the money made from archaeology by site-community residents makes a significant contribution to the local economy, even though during field-school seasons, "[American and European] student labour is used as an alternative to hiring local workers."[266] Similarly, Gillot shows the impact of archaeological employment on the site-community of Afamia in Syria but only provides simple calculations of the daily, weekly and monthly wages paid by archaeologists to local employees; he does not note the conditions of the wider labour market nor the status of archaeological employment as an option for those who take such jobs—both of which are vital contextual data needed to gauge archaeology's real economic impact on site-communities.

The economic impact of archaeological site management plans is also little-studied. Yet, again, Sudan has two multi-period UNESCO World Heritage sites, 'Jebel Barkal and the Sites of the Napatan Region' and the 'Island of Meroe'. Both sites cover large geographical areas and have helped to precipitate major changes to the landscape. The economic effect of 'World Heritage' in the Sudanese context. Chapter 7 will therefore present the results of an examination of precisely this phenomenon.

2.4.3 Society?

The impact of archaeology on power structures and social dynamics has been briefly addressed above, in relation to how colonial and post-colonial administrations have utilized archaeological history for their own interests. However, three key aspects of archaeology's impact on site-community power structures and social relationships are poorly addressed by the extant literature both generally and with regard to Sudan. The first aspect relates to the social consequences of archaeological employment. As noted above, several authors argue that archaeological employment has a positive economic impact, but only Shankland notes that the economic benefit is limited to key members of the site-community. Yet not even he takes the investigation further to consider how this might have significant social ramifications. Burtenshaw (2014) hints that this might be the case, noting that archaeology's social, cultural, and economic impacts are interrelated and that positive socio-economic impacts for some likely means negative socio-economic impacts for others. But, again, Burtenshaw fails to fully examine what broader implications this might have for the social and political status quo.

266 Boytner 2014: 264.

The second aspect, which is even less studied, is that archaeological employment, and other relationships fostered by the seasonal presence of archaeologists, create unique social groups[267] as well as social networks of service and exchange. Such groups and networks are often controlled by one or two local families that occupy official positions on the archaeological site. Although not explicitly studied, the existence of these networks is hinted at throughout the extant literature. For instance, referring to the men who worked on excavations at Chagar Bazar, a Neolithic site in present-day northern Syria, Mallowan records that they:

> were controlled by our foreman…Hamoudi Ibn Sheikh Ibrahim from Jerablus…who had worked for Woolley for many years at Carcemish before coming to Ur, and brought with him three sons.[268]

Mallowan's wife, Christie, noted in 1946 that Shaykh Ibrahim's "elderly cousin, Abd el-Salaam, is also a foreman."[269] Many archaeological teams repeatedly employ a few 'key men' who pass on their roles to their families, often enjoying a largely unapprised monopoly on job allocations at sites. These men often enjoy significant power at the local level. Gillot's describes how, in Syria:

> The project's field director will ask the foreman to propose workers for the site, based on his recruitment list that he has established, based on the qualifications of the workers or their interpersonal affinities. The foreman is someone the field director can trust, who looks after the site and the house and who is the link between foreign archaeologists and local workers. He generally enjoys a higher position in the community due to his authority. Foremen are selected at the beginning of a dig and usually stay in the role as long as the excavation lasts. The function is generally passed on from father to son.[270]

Gillot's description broadly aligns with the present author's observations of archaeological employment in large parts of the Middle East and Africa, and is a reminder that, in this context, the site guards, foremen and their families are powerful entities who derive their authority from their role in deciding who is and is not employed at the site; their responsibility for the site as well as the dig-house; and, their role as mediators between the foreign archaeologists and the site-communities. In particular, this latter ability transforms them into precious channels of information between archaeologists, site-communities and government officials.

With some important exceptions, such as Meskell (2005), most scholars who have studied this question are dealing with ethnically homogeneous populations: the case-study communities referenced above: the residents of Shankland's (1996, 1999) site-community, Küçükköy in Turkey, self-identify as Turkish; residents of Rodriguez' (2006) site-community in Yucatán, Mexico, self-

267 Edgeworth notes Dupree's (1955) observation that archaeologists and their employees enter each fieldwork season as an "artificial small group", but over time, become a "natural" group that "builds up its own set of rules, its own internal equilibrium and its own structure" (Edgeworth 2006c: 1).
268 Mallowan 1977: 42-43.
269 Christie 1946: 86.
270 Gillot 2010: 11.

identify as Mestizo; and, residents of Gomes' (2006) site-community in Parauá in the Brazilian Amazon self-identify as Indo-Portuguese (a contentious term but the one Gomes uses). Yet none of the site-communities the present author has worked with have been ethnically homogenous; even if they were, no community is likely to stay homogenous in future. This is a significant third aspect because competition between different local groups for limited archaeological work can lead to tensions and even conflict. During a season at Chagar Bazaar, Christie (1946) records that her team hired Arabs from the foreman's hometown and Armenians, Kurds and Yezidis from the surrounding area. According to Christie's diaries, this had violent consequences; she describes ferocious fights and Arab systematic bullying of Yezidi team members.

Other glimpses of the social ramifications of archaeological employment are found in the letters written by the archaeologist John Goodwin (1900–1959), published in Shepherd (2003). Goodwin was excavating in Nigeria in the 1950s, and in correspondence to his wife notes (as have many archaeologists in different parts of the world) the existence of itinerant labourers who travel around the region working as seasonal archaeological employees:

> Two of my labourers, Gáruba and Adámu, I had at Ife, both very nice men, not very hard workers, but willing, a third is Enobi…who is new to me. Then by some curious chance another man (known as Conjo) has drifted up from the Kongo tribe at the north of the Conjo.[271]

Two years later, Goodwin wrote to his wife that considerable trouble had been caused by traders in the local communities who had purposely increased their prices for the non-local archaeological employees, thereby challenging the net worth of the archaeological wage:

> The real trouble is my men get from 2/8 to 3/- per day and are 'foreigners', while the local minimum is 5/- a day. The results are that everyone puts prices up to outside people, and my men can't meet it out of their pay…Rooms run from 12/6 to £1–10–0 a month, but they have only been offered a room between them for £1–10–0.[272]

Some archaeologists are clearly aware of these kinds of potential problems and have taken steps to minimize them. For example in apparent response to a local monopoly on archaeological jobs (which she does not describe), Oland says that she instituted 'equitable hiring practices' by giving all members of the community "equal opportunity to apply for work" hiring men and women "in the other in which they applied."[273] However, it is unlear how she managed to give a large community equal opportunity, nor the number of jobs that were actually on offer. Similarly, and although she is not speaking explicitly about employment, Gomes reports that "in relation to social inequalities" in the Parauá community, she tried to "minimize existing differences by offering democratic access to

271 Shepherd 2003: 341. Re. Goodwin's letter dated '5.1.1955'.
272 Shepherd 2003: 341. Re. Goodwin's letter dated '1.1.1957'.
273 Oland 2012: 470.

information and strengthening social ties with the workers."[274] She suggests that "this may have helped to develop the team spirit and group cohesion manifested on many different occasions, especially in situations involving conflict."[275] However, her description remains a supposition rather than evidenced interpretation and she does not say what the social inequalities were, how she strengthened ties, or whom the conflict involved, preventing the latter from becoming a more substantive element of her work. The third part of Chapter 6 is thus based around addressing this obvious line of enquiry, which is essentially the question of archaeological employment's impact upon power and social relations within small site-community units, what Boyte (2010) and others call 'everyday politics'.

2.5 Research Questions and Thesis Structure

The review of the scholarly literature has shown that the impact of archaeology, in its broadest sense, on site-communities, that is communities which live upon or alongside archaeological sites, has been little, and unevenly, studied. Those studies that have taken place have almost invariably focused mostly on the how archaeology's ideational output ('history') is used in the construction of identity by modern indigenous 'descendant communities', site-communities that claim an ancestral link to the ancient inhabitants of the archaeological sites. The literature review has also shown that there has been virtually no research on the impact of archaeological history upon 'non-descendant communities', site-communities that claim no such ancestral link. The economic impacts of archaeology on site-communities—whether regarding tourism, employment or site management—has been even more neglected by scholars; nor has there been any significant research into the social impacts of the economic impacts. Using Sudan as a case-study, this thesis therefore seeks to shed light on these three overlooked (and overlapping) areas by seeking answers to three groups of questions, specifically:

1. What is the ideational impact of archaeology, archaeological history and archaeological sites on non-descendant communities; and how does this compare with its impact on descendant communities, in this case Sudan's Nubian population, and on the Sudanese state?

2. What is the economic impact of archaeology on site-communities? Does the tourism industry have any significant impact, or are the practices of employment and site management more relevant to site-community economies? And are these impacts enough to be classed as 'positive'?

274 Gomes 2006: 155-6.
275 Gomes 2006: 156.

3. Does archaeology affect social relationships and ‘everyday politics’ within site-communities? How? And are these impacts precipitated by archaeology’s economic or ideational impacts?

As noted briefly in the preceding section, Chapter 5 will aim to address questions outlined in ‘1’; the first two thirds of Chapters 6 and Chapter 7 will address the questions in ‘2’; and the third part of Chapter 6 will address the questions in ‘3’. The next chapter, Chapter 3, will outline the methods used for data collection and analysis, the justifications for their selection and the decision to focus on a single case study based on c.5-month period of fieldwork in the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya (defined as ‘site communities’ of the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe, being investigated by a team from UCL Qatar). Chapter 4 will provide a general historical and socio-political overview of contemporary Sudan so as to place the study sites in broader context. Extended discussions of the findings, cross-cultural comparisons and further lines of enquiry are presented in Chapter 8. Throughout these chapters, the thesis will contribute to and extend the literature on archaeology’s historical and ideational impact, and perhaps most importantly it will make a very unique and original argument about archaeology’s economic impact, how it relates to both archaeology’s ideational and social impacts, as well as providing a new framework with which to gauge said impacts in other site-communities across the globe.

2.6 Rationale

That there are glaring gaps in the academic literature has thus been shown. That these gaps need addressing in the Sudanese context, where nothing like this has been done before, has also been emphasized as part of the rationale for undertaking this project. However there is also a particular urgency to examine such questions because of the context in which archaeologists currently operate in Sudan. In short, the Sudan government has built at least one major multi-purpose dam along the Nile in the past decade, at Merowe in the Fourth Cataract region, and the perceived role of archaeologists within or alongside its construction has made relationships between local communities and archaeologists somewhat more than fraught. The dam’s reservoir extends 175km upstream, submerged over 2,500 archaeological sites and over 400 villages and caused the displacement of 50,000-70,000 people. It was opposed by all main local groups that inhabit the Fourth Cataract region: the Manāsīr, the Shagiyya and the Rubātāb; the farming Manāsīr were the most affected as the reservoir submerged much of their Nile-side home- and farm-land, but nomads and farmers came together to establish the Manāsīr Association and its Executive Committee, which coordinated

resistance. There was also diaspora support, from the UK-based Hamdab Affected People.[276] In 2002, and in response to the imminent construction of the Merowe dam, Sudan's National Corporation of Antiquities and Museums (NCAM) appealed for practitioners to 'rescue a piece of man's cultural heritage';[277] a number of Sudanese and foreign teams thus went to the region in the succeeding years to conduct salvage archaeology. However, in 2007, Manāsīr communities near the Fourth Cataract used the threat of violence to ban archaeologists from working in the region and to expel the teams already in the area. For the Manāsīr, whose customarily owned land had been drowned and their people permanently displaced, and whose date-palms were grossly inadequately compensated by the government (if at all),[278] the situation had come to a head earlier that same year when governmental forces had killed at least three people taking part in anti-dam protests, and severely wounded others.[279] Indeed, according to news reports and archaeologists who were there at the time, the archaeologists' expulsion was because the Manāsīr Executive Committee "considered the[m]…to be ignorant of the sufferings of the local people under a suppressive regime and saw them as contributing to the legitimization of the dam project."[280]

Since then, there has been heated debate about the rights and wrongs of salvage archaeology in Sudan (although as dam construction has stalled, this debate has cooled somewhat), and, because of the ongoing popularity of dam building, across the globe.[281] Yet naturally there is no one agreed-upon response for how archaeologists should react. One camp have decided how to respond on a small-group basis (such as the Committees to Preserve the Middle Nile[282]) and/or taken it upon themselves

276 Interview with Ali Askouri, August 2013.

277 The Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project (MDASP) organised by NCAM, issued the appeal in 2002. See the MDASP website and its 'Appeal for rescuing a piece of man's cultural heritage'.

278 For the compensation of the people in the affected area, see the Dams Implementation Unit website. "For instance, the Joint Committee had agreed on a compensation for a fruit-yielding date palm at a sum of 2000 SDG; as an absolute minimum, compensation was not to fall below the value of 1000 SDG per palm. However, by-law no. 2 of 2003 fixed the compensation value of a date palm at 500 SDG. With this sum, the payment of which was to be spread over six years, the annual payment rate for a date palm would be barely equal to the price of a single sack of dates, as the Manâsîr pointed out" (Hänsch 2012: 212). There are also reports that some households have still not received any compensation.

279 Sudan Tribune, 'Sudanese militia kill three people in Merowe Dam area', 23 April 2007.

280 Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011: 60. Agence France Presse reported that "the Manāsīr tribe…has recently expelled foreign archaeologists, whom they accuse of helping the Khartoum regime put an acceptable face on the dam project" (Sudan Tribune, 'Sudan archeology flourishes before the flood', 19 March 2007. Also see Sudan Tribune, 'Sudan's Merowe requests to stop excavating reservoir area', 27 February 2007).

281 Salvage archaeology now accounts for more than half of all the excavations carried out in the world and probably 80% to 90% of those in America and other developed countries (Adams 2007). See also Kankpeyeng, Insoll and MacLean 2009 and Ronayne 2006, 2008 for the discussions about archaeological practice in development contexts in Ghana and Turkey respectively.

282 See the Preserve the Middle Nile website and its petition to 'Stop the Dams in Sudan'. The American Committee for Preserving the Middle Nile is made up of five high-ranking academics from the universities of Yale, Brown, California and Chicago. The European Committee for Preserving the Middle Nile is made up of six distinguished academics from Norway, England, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The European Committee of Preserve the Middle Nile wrote: "[j]oin us in contacting anyone who may be able to influence the Sudan Government. Circulate this to friends and colleagues. Share your ideas how we may further pursue this work. Contact us to be listed as a supporter of the committee's work and for further information" (European Committee for Preserving the Middle Nile 2012: 3).

to confront the situation individually within specific local contexts.[283] Others have lobbied for the application of universal policies to provide ethical guidelines for development processes, or indeed a cease to dam building entirely, so that the problem might be 'cut off at the source'. One of the former is the World Commission on Dams (1998-2000), and it notes that dams should only be built if the local communities agree.[284] Some institutions, such as the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), have issued statements threatening the removal of their support in the case of non-compliance with the World Commission on Dams, thereby showing solidarity with the communities under threat.[285]

However, generally speaking there has been a limited commitment to dialogue about archaeological behaviour and practice. When the Society for Africanist Archaeologists (SAfA) and the BIEA wrote to the two most prominent Sudanese archaeological societies—the International Society for Nubian Studies (ISNS) and the British Museum's Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS)—expressing their desire to be supported in their motions, neither society responded or published their own motion on the situation.[286] Many individual practitioners and stakeholder institutions have been heavily involved in critiquing these archaeologists' apparent lack of empathy with affected communities when the government of Sudan does not comply with international standards with regards to human rights and ecological standards.[287]

Deep divisions have thus appeared within the global archaeological community based on whether practitioners should conduct salvage archaeology, with the belief that relics need to be saved in the

283 Bruce Williams, whose 'Appeal to Stop the Destruction of Nubia' sets out his personal view, states that while archaeologists have traditionally had little influence in political or economic spheres, and that 'ethnography and archaeology alone will not halt or delay an ugly project hell-bent on completion', argued that archaeologists could not do salvage work without appearing to support dam construction (Williams n/d). Writers at Preserve the Middle Nile were also present at the British Museum meeting to discuss the dams in May 2012 also note the stance of other individuals, for example that Dietrich Wildung, director of the Egyptian Museum in Berlin, and Matthieu Honegger, of Neuchatel University, are proponents of the idea of protesting dam building as a developmental method (see post on 22 May 2012 on the Preserve the Middle Nile website).

284 See the World Commission on Dams (2000) and their website.

285 The BIEA, who make the following remark: "[t]he BIEA has decided that it will only support archaeological or other research in the affected areas if it is satisfied that the construction of these dams adheres to the principles laid down by the World Commission on Dams, including the carrying out of a comprehensive and publicly accessible environmental impact assessment and, in particular, the consent of the local community" (BIEA website, May 2012). The Society for Africanist Archaeologists (SAfA) also stated that: "[r]eaffirming its commitment to an African archaeology that is both socially engaged and socially responsible, and mindful of its own code of ethics, SAfA calls on its members to refrain from participating in fieldwork in areas to be affected by the proposed dams on the Middle Nile (Sudan) until and unless those projects enjoy the support of the resident local population and have been the subject of independently conducted publically available Environmental Impact Assessments' (SAfA website, June 2012).

286 More specifically Dr. Vincent Rondot, president of ISNS and Dr Derek Welsby, president of SARS. The latter's view, that 'stalling' archaeological work is pointless and irresponsible, is well known.

287 Nicholas Hildyard, CEO of Corner House (UK), has been particularly critical of what he sees as the British Museum's criticism of the Manāsīr Executive Committee. He notes that "[a]lthough the British Museum undertook an archaeological survey, it was too late to affect the siting or planning of the project, a key requirement of best practice standards. Despite international recognition amongst archaeologists of the importance of consulting with local people in order to assess the cultural significance of sites, no systematic consultation has taken place." (Hildyard 2008: 8). He goes on to say that, "[g]iven th[e] limited demands [of the Manāsīr Executive Committee], the reluctance of the companies involved and the British Museum to respond positively to the communities' requests might be interpreted as arising less from a reluctant "neutrality" born of powerlessness ("we are simply contractors") as from a deliberate decision to turn a blind eye to the impacts of the project, even at the cost of the communities' lives and livelihoods" (Hildyard 2008: 10).

largely inevitable context of development or protest against the government plans by refusing to answer international rescue appeals, particularly if they have been asked to by the local communities in which they work. Furthermore these are only two (and the footnotes only a small sample) of the many stances taken by those involved. In the absence of a mutually respected policy document outlining ethical strategies to deal with such problems, cohesion in the archaeological community has deteriorated and the silence about the ethics of practice has grown. And yet discussion and critique has never been more urgently needed: at the current time there are at least three major dam projects in the Sudan, at Dal on the Second Cataract, Kajbar on the Third, Shereik on the Fifth, as well as a potential dam planned at Sabaloka on the Sixth and other, smaller, dams at Dagash, Mograt and on the Upper Atbara. Indeed, historically, the Nubian region in north Sudan has been most affected by dam building schemes, and Nubians have therefore been the most vocal when protesting against them (see below, Chapter 5). However news that the government plans to build a dam at each of the four remaining Nile cataracts, on the Atbara River and elsewhere has turned this complex and *regional* issue into a *national* social problem.

Unsurprisingly, then, the question of archaeology's impact on the identity, economics and society of contemporary site-communities has been ignored, albeit with some important exceptions.[288] Time pressures in archaeological and anthropological salvage contexts have required archaeologists to focus upon excavating, interpreting and presenting archaeological material, which has left them little time to investigate this question. Similarly, anthropologists working in salvage contexts have concentrated on clarifying people's interaction with the natural landscape and addressing the problems of relocating and losing their homeland.[289] More recently, archaeologists at the British Museum in partnership with the Royal Anthropological Institute sponsored two research fellowships to conduct 'urgent anthropology' at the site of Amara West, where museum staff are excavating and which are under threat from dam-building.[290] However, once again that research took place concurrently with the present study and is not yet published. In short, therefore, despite the urgency with which such questions should be pursued, scholarly work in salvage contexts focuses either upon traditional archaeological or anthropological research and ignores local communities' historic identification with the archaeological sites or their interaction with archaeologists, whose presence in their landscape is also historic. This project was therefore designed to not only to create a pragmatic framework for other social scientists to understand such (dis)connections, but to genuinely evaluate and improve our understanding of archaeological practices in the context of a national social problem. The timing of this study—undertaken *before* the next series of dams are constructed—is therefore extremely significant.

288 Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011, Kleinitz and Näser 2011, 2013.
289 Kennedy 1997 and Hopkins and Mehanna 2010 in response to the case of the Aswan dam; papers in Kleinitz and Näser (eds., 2012) in response to the case of the Merowe dam.
290 Both are well-known anthropologists of Sudan, Karin Willemse (2015-16) and Enrico Ille (2016-17).

3. THE PRESENT STUDY AND ITS METHODS

3.1 Ethnographic Theory

The present research is not a conventional archaeological study. It does not use excavations, laboratory-based examinations or linguistic analyses to gather knowledge about past peoples or to address gaps in archaeological history. Instead, the study is more akin to what Gibbons et al. (1994) call 'curiosity-driven' research, whose initial questions about archaeology's impact upon site-communities in Sudan were formed from the author's professional engagements with the discipline and with Sudan (Chapter 1). The study was designed so that the question of archaeology's impact could be answered, first and foremost, from the perspective of site-community residents themselves. While this author did not seek to identify with the community residents—given that this research is an academic study—there can be no doubt that like many scholars cited in Chapter 2, there was an inherent motivation to bring as the focus of this research their points of view, given the lesser power and thus perhaps priority of the latter relative to other stakeholders (e.g. archaeologists, the Sudanese state, tourists). Yet, this author is aware, as Silverman (2001) makes clear, that speaking on behalf of people from whom one is so different is not a solution to imbalances of power, whether local or global. Indeed, presuming to do so would also presuppose a lack of agency on the part of the site-community residents and suggest that they cannot adequately express themselves or adapt to changing conditions in the face of hegemonic political structures.

Therefore, although this study foregrounds the site-community residents' opinions and experiences of archaeology and draws conclusions about its impact primarily from their testimonies, it is written explicitly from the author's personal point of view, within the framework of the principles of academic research.[291] Echoing Rodriguez, this author neither wishes nor intends to "…to pretend to be a voice for the people of the study…instead I position my voice in conversation with others."[292] Indeed, the interpretations contained in this study are based not only upon ethnographic evidence but also upon other 'naturally-occurring'[293] data, which are analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively to build a fuller and more critical understanding of the impact of archaeology. Such a methodology thus adopts the frameworks of the many social archaeologists and archaeological ethnographers who use qualitative methods including ethnography as the backbone of a mixed-methods approach (Chapter 2).

Ethnography is a set of data collection tools typically used by anthropologists to investigate other people's perceptions, opinions, "subjective experiences" and their "situational meanings."[294] Such tools include, but are not limited to, participant observation, interviews, conversations, focus group meetings and other dialogues, ethno-historical and archival research, "events in schools…performative and art installations in various media…and sites which can also generate further ethnographic research [such as] exhibitions, blogs, photo-essays [and] other performances…"[295] Of these, long-term and immersive participant observation, Meskell's "hanging out", in one cultural, social, economic or political setting is usually chosen in preference to other data collection methods because it "involve[s] witnessing or critically viewing the values, dynamics, internal relationships, structures, and conflicts as they play out in communities."[296] The use of such methods follows Geertz's (1973) principle of 'thick description' and thus what one might call 'thick understanding' of contextual nuances and ways of life, which Liamputtung (2010) terms 'culturally competent knowledge', an understanding of which cannot be gained without such immersion. Un- or semi-structured interviews, as well as surveys and questionnaires, often form additional parts of the process of participant observation of everyday life because they enable "respondents to move beyond answering the questions asked, to raising other issues and concerns which the researcher may not have considered or seen as relevant".[297]

Some scholars make a sharp distinction between what Nilan (2002) calls the 'empirical' and 'formal' methods of qualitative social science research, and ethnography, which is usually seen as anthropology's preferred method. Such a strict line recalls Edgeworth's description of the gulf

291 About Amazonia, Gomes says she writes from a "personal point of view" but notes, nonetheless, that "an ethnography of archaeology emerges" (Gomes 2006: 148).
292 Rodriguez 2006: 162.
293 Silverman 1989.
294 Davies, Hughes and Gudmundsdottir 2008: 352.
295 Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 67.
296 Meskell 2005: 83. Heath also says he "hung around" in Costa Rica (Heath 1973: 260).
297 Mirza 1998: 82.

between archaeology and anthropology as "policed boundaries"[298] and Silverman's argument that qualitative and quantitative researchers act as "rival 'armed camps'"[299] and does not seem worth retaining. Indeed the mixing of methods has become popular because, as Meskell notes, "[p]ersonal observation often counters the normative statements given in interviews, and the two can operate successfully in a dialogic relationship."[300]

Related to this issue are the hurdles presented by being both an 'insider' and an 'outsider' in the ethnographic context. The projection of etic 'outsider' ideas on to research participants' emic 'insider' concepts has been highlighted by scholars such as Liamputtung as a particular risk of ethnography as a one-size-fits-all method. Potential bias towards this author's own discipline and colleagues may be noted as another. Indeed, if participant observation and interviews can be analytically recast as producing 'naturally-occurring' data and 'researcher-provoked' data respectively, they can aid rather than obstruct the analyses. For example, Silverman has a rule of thumb that emic ideas are most visible in naturally-occurring phenomena that come into being "primarily from the intentions and actions of local participants".[301] It is more likely that etic and potentially artificial data surfaces when researchers set up highly structured and inflexible (etically-conceived) interviews, surveys and questionnaires with which to investigate lived experience. According to Silverman, data produced from such events may be classed as 'researcher-provoked' or "data that are an artifact of a research setting"[302] and should be handled with care. In practical terms, and for the purpose of this research, this meant that during the coding of the collected data (a key analytical step discussed below), there

298 Edgeworth 2006: 62. Scholars have spent much time theorizing the relationship between archaeology and anthropology, outlining the contours and discussing how the two may or may not fit together. The first thing to note is that, as Meskell (2012) notes, "disciplinary boundaries are constituted differently in different national traditions of social science." To Shankland, a British anthropologist commenting upon the British system of which the present author is also a part, the "two disciplines…have grown sadly apart." Having identified a "divorce", Shankland nevertheless goes on to urge a "reconciliation." (Shankland 1999: 156). In contrast, in the United States, archaeology is not located as a peer of anthropology but one of its sub-disciplines and from the results of a survey, Hollowell and Nicholas (2008) show that practitioners of both archaeology and anthropology see the two disciplines as having been historically intertwined. While set in a hierarchy—Yarrow and Garrow (2010) describe this relationship as "asymmetrical"; Ingold (2010) as "co-dependent"—the two disciplines are also, by default, less divisible. Studies in which archaeologists become ethnographers are thus less likely to cause a controversy. In the British system, the disciplines' relationship is not hierarchical but collaboration is likely to trigger more contestation. However, in both cases, the increasing collaboration between archaeology and anthropology is now seen as inevitable; as Edgeworth points out, "[t]he site of archaeological knowledge is becoming…the site of the production of ethnographic knowledge too, with ethnographers and archaeologists operating in the same space." (Edgeworth 2006: 12). The opinions above are changing, too: both in terms of archaeology and anthropology's perceived hierarchy (in the United States) and their perceived distance (in the UK). Because, as Thomas argues, archaeology and anthropology can only ever provide a partial understanding of the whole (Thomas 2010: 183), most, if not all, authors cited in this review now see the increased interdisciplinary exchange between archaeology and anthropology to be beneficial, whether they envision a disciplinary 'reintegration' (Feuchtwang and Rowlands (2010) echoing Shankland's 'reconciliation'); an intersection that creates 'hybrid methodologies' (Meskell 2012) and 'interdisciplinarity' (Souvatzi 2012). Finally, while the relationship between archaeology and anthropology is highly complex, the present study conceptualizes their joining as productive and even necessary if they are to emerge from the colonial backdrop which hinders them both. Studying one discipline, archaeology, using the tools of another, anthropology, is not easy. But to echo Edgeworth, scholars need to view these studies as being at an intersection of "cross-field dialogues" which, while lying "on the disciplinary boundary", are nonetheless spaces of "great potential." (Edgeworth 2006: 15; also see Meskell 2008).

299 Silverman 1989: 222.

300 Meskell 2005: 83.

301 Silverman 1989.

302 Silverman 1989: 226.

was a need to systematically distinguish between researcher-provoked and naturally occurring data, and check the context in which information was given to ensure that descriptive fieldwork notes were distinguished from interpretations.

Of course, as Silverman concedes, to think that even naturally-occurring data are wholly unmediated "is, self-evidently, a fiction."[303] However, there can be no doubt that researchers have different degrees of closeness with the ethnographic context. In this instance the author is both an insider and an outsider. To the world of archaeology, this author is an 'insider' and as such simultaneously her own object of study. Indeed, there is an advantage in knowing about archaeology's social life abroad, and especially in Sudan; how it works in the field; how its theories and principles are applied; and, when its idiosyncratic habits emerge. Meskell agrees that for studies such as these, "we [archaeologists] have the requisite "insider" expertise; we benefit from our knowledge of the craft and its results…[as well as] a deep experiential understanding" of the field.[304] But for this study, this author has also had to act as an outsider to archaeology and take on the role of anthropological observer. Thus, "[t]he seemingly discrete positions of insider and outsider become more permeable…"[305]

However, this researcher's relationship to the site-community remained that of an outsider, despite gaining increasing degrees of familiarity with it. This author is self-consciously aware that as a female British archaeologist with a background in Egyptology, there is an almost-insurmountable challenge in attempting to answer questions about archaeology's impact upon site-communities in Sudan from the perspective of the residents. Of course, not everyone agrees that 'outsider' status is final, including Silverman and Meskell; the latter argues that long-term participation and immersion is a transformative process that takes researchers such as herself from a worldview that looks from the outside to one that looks "from within".[306] However, "[n]o one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life" and "no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism";[307] 'outsider' status is therefore never truly reconciled.

The present author's status as an outsider also affected the responses given in conversations and interviews. Indeed this research is persuaded by the constructivist perspectives of Baker (1984) and others, who argue that when people meet, they respond to one another based upon what they take to be self-evident about the other person in the context of the encounter. As interactions such as dialogue are two-way, each person changes depending upon the desires, motives, and allegiances they attribute to one another; both parties 'present' themselves. The author of this study has thus attempted to

303 Silverman 1989: 227.
304 Meskell 2005: 85.
305 Meskell 2005: 85.
306 Meskell 2005: 83.
307 Said 1978: 3.

understand how the site-community residents' vision of her as an outsider might affect their responses. For most people in the site-community, this researcher would have been identified as no more than a female foreigner (*khwāja* pl. *khwajāt*),[308] although the site-community residents who work with the archaeologists would often identify this author as one of 'them' until receiving explanations about this research. There is no doubt that this author was seen to a greater or lesser extent by all site-community residents as someone with authority and wealth, which, in their eyes, was proved by her very presence in Sudan; on many occasions, this author was asked for money, computers, phones and jobs. Whenever the local, Sudanese translator felt that this perception affected the participant's response, that is, beyond the obvious artifice of formal interview settings, this was noted in the Post-Interview Notes (see below) and taken into account in later analysis and interpretation of collected data (see Coding, below). There were many occasions in which the expectations generated by this author's identity or gender clearly affected the outcome of an encounter with respondents. Indeed, this author's person and behaviour, and that of the translator, underscored the entire process of data collection. To paraphrase Meskell, as we are 'reading' them, we too are being 'read'.

Of course, the importance of context to outcome means that it was not merely this author's presence that dictated the tone of an encounter; there was, of course, also the factors related to the presence or absence of other individuals and their relative roles and statuses. (Self-)construction of this kind does not necessarily imply negative manipulation, artifice or lack of authenticity but rather the importance of understanding context and emphasis. In relation to international relations, for instance, Wendt has through his realist-constructivist approach sought to argue that "identities are the basis of interests";[309] that in any given situation, a state will rationally choose to present itself, or adopt a certain identity, in ways that best suit its interests, whether they be economic, social or political. The rationality behind the fluidity and even momentary nature of identity is also noted by Moerman (1974) at the local level, when writing about the Lue tribe in Thailand. Moerman argued that the Lue self-characterize and self-define in an almost infinite variety of ways and that the most telling element was the context in which each element of their identity was revealed. This has proved important for this thesis not only with regard to forms of self-identification but also the identification of Others. For example, inter-subjective terms used within the discourse of social relations seemed to change depending upon the level of (in)security the respondent felt. Respondents tended to use their neighbours' first names when describing forms of cooperation between them, but stereotyped signifiers when they felt threatened. Of course many scholars have noted this tendancy, not least Hall (1991), and its relevance for this study is expanded upon on the national level in Chapter 4 and the local level in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

308 The word comes from New Persian, *khāje* (lit. 'master', 'lord'). In Egypt and Sudan, it is commonly used to refer to 'white' Europeans, or, less commonly, any of those with foreign heritage.

309 Wendt 1992: 392.

Silverman sees these findings as the result of analyzing dialogic data "in the context of the rules of sequencing conversation".[310] The interpretive method adopted by this research takes into account the (constructed) interview context when interpreting the collected data so as to be able to suggest prudent meaning. This author thus analyzed a) who was present; b) the point in the interview at which a subject arises; and c) what was said thereafter (see Coding, below). To maintain clarity between etic and emic ideas, this author further distinguished between who raised a topic or theme—whether it was this author, the translator or the respondent(s). For example, the theme of land and territory came up frequently in conversation and was always raised by the respondent rather than by the interviewer. Land ownership is a potentially dangerous topic in Sudan for many reasons and at no time, barring one occasion in November 2013, did this author or the present translator deliberately bring up the topic with any of the respondents. However, if a respondent raised the topic of land, there was engagement in conversation on the subject matter. Indeed, the frequency with which this happened encouraged thoughts on archaeology's relationship with the land, which over the span of time grew to become an ever more salient feature of this research.

A consequence of their situated and co-produced quality means that ethnographic responses cannot necessarily be re-produced, repeated or replicated exactly by other researchers. As Nilan has suggested, such "…quasi-scientific 'control' is the very thing which must be set aside for effective participant observation to take place".[311] Indeed "ethnography can no longer concern itself with discovering truths which are unmediated by the situated use of forms of representation."[312] Although ethnographic methods are widely contested, not least because ethnography is itself a product of colonial practice,[313] such methods "provide deeper and more nuanced understandings of a range of relationships between cultural groups, the sites themselves, and those who manage them."[314]

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Basic Logistics

In late 2012, this author was granted permission to conduct ethnographic research at and around archaeological sites in Sudan by the Director-General of the National Corporation of Antiquities and

310 Silverman 1989: 216.
311 Nilan 2002: 364.
312 Silverman 1989: 216.
313 Marcus and Fischer 1986.
314 McClanahan 2006: 126.

Museums (NCAM). Subsequently, more than six and a half months over a three-year period (2013-15) were spent in Sudan's Nile Valley gathering data for this study. Another 18 months were spent in Sudan or Egypt completing post-fieldwork tasks and writing up results. During the six and a half month period, this researcher lived in three different site-communities, accompanied by a Sudanese translator. Two separate three-week periods in November 2013 and November 2014 were spent in the village of Dangeil, River Nile State, with the archaeological team from NCAM that was then co-directed by Salah Eldin Mohammed Ahmed and Julie Anderson. Under the same arrangement, two weeks were spent in January 2014 on Sai Island, Northern State, with the team directed by Julia Budka from the Austrian Academy of Sciences. From January to April 2015, this author stayed in the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya (henceforth conceptualized as one site-community called 'Hamadab-Bejrawiya'), also in River Nile State, with the team directed by Jane Humphris of UCL Qatar (henceforth 'UCLQ'). [315] Later, November to December 2015 were spent in Hamadab-Bejrawiya working for UCLQ, which allowed the collection of any outstanding data.

Apart from the last season in late 2015, each period of fieldwork was based upon a three-stage strategy (see below). Roughly one third of the time was spent living with and observing the archaeologists while two-thirds were spent with the local community. Observations were made and conversations were had simply by walking around, visiting houses, schools, and events as well as talking to willing respondents. Apart from relying on the goodwill and hospitality of the Sudanese residents, the archaeological project directors helped with the costs of accommodation, food and transport. The bulk of the expenses were paid from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) Studentship granted for the purpose of this study, or from personal funds.

Due to previous professional experience of working in Sudan as an archaeologist, this author already had a network of support before starting the fieldwork for this study. This network included Western and Sudanese archaeologists, the latter from both NCAM and Sudanese universities; community residents; translators; university students; and fixers, such as the Pagoulatos family, the owners of the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum. However it was important to work with archaeological project directors who would be willing and able to host this author: Gillot notes that some scholars lack concern about "their impact on local settings", [316] and it was important to ensure that collaborating project directors shared my conceptual and moral approach. Although not the direct subject of enquiries, their teams, themselves, and indeed their whole mission, would inevitably come under scrutiny. When project directors were approached, all offered to act as hosts without seeking to

315 This author is grateful to be able to add that invitations were also extended to the author to conduct the research at the site of el-Khandaq by the project director Intisar el-Zein (University of Khartoum), the site of Abu Erteila by project director Richard Lobban (Rhode Island College), and Jebel Barkal by project co-directors Tim Kendall and El-Hassan Ahmed (NCAM). This suggested to the author that while not commonly undertaken, studies such as this are of increasing interest to archaeologists.

316 Gillot suggests that "British archaeologists are particularly concerned with their impact on local settings…while French [and German] archaeologists do not generally express any views about it" (2010: 13).

influence the work in any way, although given their palpable anxiety about my research (partly explicable by the context of wider scrutiny of archaeologists working practices (above, 'Rationale')), this was not always possible: the project directors in Dangeil and Sai Island were particularly concered about the impact of my work and unwilling to discuss their practices in-depth. This led, in part, to my decision to focus exclusively upon the data collected in Hamadab-Bejrawiya (see below) as well as to my decision to largely avoid an examination of the interests and motivations of the archaeologists and focus exclusively on the experiences of the site-community residents. Of course, as Edgeworth (2006) has noted, the 'ethnographized' archaeologists, not to mention the community residents, will eventually be able to read the study and to challenge its findings. More than this, though, the informed cooperation of all research participants (whether this author, the translators, the project directors and the local residents) was needed to ensure one another's mutual safety. The Sudanese state is highly authoritarian, unsympathetic to the West and suspicious of foreign motivations; it is also notoriously harsh when it comes to punishing political opponents. There are state informers in every village; if research participants were to be suspected of having overly-familiar encounters with this author, or were suspected of speaking against the state, their safety would undoubtedly be at risk. Observation has shown that Western lawyers, NGO workers, anthropologists and sociologists face even more severe challenges than archaeologists when working in Sudan. A Sudanese human-rights advocate based at Columbia University who was consulted for this study in September 2016, emphasised on the strict controls imposed by the Sudanese state's Federal Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to monitor and control outsiders. Salmon (2003) and others have written from experience about the potential hazards of doing research in Sudan; for instance, Salmon was detained for two weeks in Khober, Khartoum's most notorious prison, for having transcribed a popular joke about Osama bin Laden in his fieldwork journal.

Thorough preparation was especially important as social unrest was growing in the Nile Valley at the time of the initial fieldwork in 2013. Almost two years after the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, the Khartoum government was struggling to cope with the loss of over 50% of its oil revenues. It had implemented a strict policy of austerity, removed subsidies on fuel and other basic goods, leased unprecedented tracts of land to foreign investors and revived plans for more dam construction. Inflation rates soared and life for many citizens was getting harder, with many finding it hard to afford basic commodities. Upon this author's arrival in Khartoum in late September 2013, the towns and cities of the Nile Valley were witnessing some of the "largest and most intense public protests in years".[317]

317 Human Rights Watch 2014: 7. Also see Omar al-Bashir's speech on austerity measures on September 22, 2013; P. Kingsley, "Death and dissent in Sudan as anger spreads to middle classes", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2013.

The rising tensions between state and society added to the ethical responsibilities of this author. It was important not to inadvertently incriminate or jeopardize the safety of site-community residents or to do something that might label oneself as a 'trouble maker' in the eyes of the authorities and thereby complicate the archaeologists' work. Indeed, archaeologists have an easier time than most foreigners in gaining supervision-free permission to work, and are anxious not to compromise that privilege (see Chapter 8). In any event, there was little political and social unrest in the site-communities whilst fieldwork for this study was conducted. This author has been in touch with the archaeologists and residents in all three locations since the conclusion of data collection and this study does not appear to have had negative repercussions, although it is hard to be absolutely certain. The anonymization of respondents and secure data management means that there should be no future risk to any participant or interviewee, but the uncertain political context justifies this author's decision to give logistical and security needs—permissions, transparent working models, collaborations—precedence over theoretical ones when preparing for fieldwork and choosing which project directors to work with and thus which site-communities to use for case-studies.

3.2.2 The Case-Study Area

This thesis uses a case-study approach to enable in-depth exploration of the impact of archaeology on site-communities in Sudan. This approach is generally used in ethnography, which deals with the situated and textured production of meaning by "a particular society or case."[318] A very large volume of data was collected from each of the three locations in which research for this study was carried out. However, a decision has been made to present data collected from just one of the three locations, namely the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. While a comparative study of all three sites would have allowed for a degree of generalization that a single case-study cannot provide, there were good reasons for not doing so. First and most importantly was the clear anxiety felt by the project directors at Dangeil and Sai Island (mentioned above). This undoubtedly affected my confidence and the freedom I felt I had to fully investigate the impact of archaeology in these areas. In comparison, the project director in Hamadab-Bejrawiya was eager to hear about the local reception of her practices, whether positive or negative, and was even keen to hear suggestions from the present author on how negative impacts might be ameliorated. Second, longer time was spent in Hamadab-Bejrawiya relative to Dangeil and Sai Island because of the short seasons of the latter, and thus the data set for the former is more expansive. Third, Hamadab-Bejrawiya was the last site of fieldwork, in 2015, at which point this researcher was far more experienced. As a result, the dynamics at Hamadab-Bejrawiya relevant to this research are better understood by this author relative to the other sites. Therefore while the

318 Hopkins and Mehanna 2010: 15.

epistemological gulf with the site-community residents can never be completely bridged, this author can make a credible claim of possessing a deeper, less superficial understanding of life in Hamadab-Bejrawiya than in the other two site-communities which suits the ethnographic approach taken and the need for 'thick description'. The later section in Chapter 8, 'Further Lines of Enquiry', will nevertheless attempt to posit some ideas for where such a comparison might lead.

The site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya is situated 250km to the north-east of Sudan's capital, Khartoum (Figure 1). It sits on the east bank of the Nile, directly north of the Wadi al-Hawad delta and some 75km below the junction with the Atbara River. As separate but neighbouring villages, Hamadab and Bejrawiya each have one major archaeological site, both sandwiched between the cultivated strip and the villages. The main archaeological site in Hamadab is known as Domat al-Hamadab. The main archaeological site in Bejrawiya, three km to the north, is known as Meroe Royal City (hereafter 'Meroe'). Both archaeological sites belong to the Kushite-Meroitic period of Sudanese history (350 BCE-350 CE). Meroe was the capital of the Kushite kingdom; that is, it was the royal residence and administrative centre of the ruling dynasty. Domat al-Hamadab was a residential area, but for non-royals. Both sites have had archaeologists working on them periodically for over 100 years. At the time of the fieldwork conducted for the present study, there were three teams at work, one of which was a UCLQ team studying ancient iron production at both Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe. This author was associated with the UCLQ team. The three teams live in houses next to each other in Hamadab, and this was also the present author's accommodation for the duration of the fieldwork for this research.

Although the sites within them have received more archaeological attention than most, Hamadab and Bejrawiya are typical examples of sedentary agricultural villages in Sudan's Nile Valley, most of which are located between the fertile strip of cultivation along the Nile and the desert hinterland, and therefore of site-communities in Sudan more generally, because archaeology is a predominantly Nile-based rural phenomenon. This is important for considerations of applicability (Chapter 8). Full details of the case-study location are provided in Chapter 4, and further particulars of the sites are given in Chapter 5.



Figure 1. The Case-Study Area (outline in red dots) (Source: Graphics added to Welsby 2002, Fig. 9 (L) and to ESRI (R)).

3.2.3 Primary Sources

Ethnographic data collected in Sudan, such as observational notes, interviews and conversations, are here classed as 'primary data' and the respondents as 'primary sources'. Echoing a number of scholars mentioned above, this study adapts the framework set out by Hopkins and Mehanna (2010, attributed originally to their colleague, Robert Fernea) of 'nets and anchors'. In short, this concept advises the researcher to get a broad perspective of life in the case-study area through everyday observations and conversations with their residents (the 'nets') before attempting an in-depth perspective of life as it is narrated by 'key respondents' of community groups (the 'anchors'). This allows the researcher to gain exposure to diversity to before considering how particular groups might assemble themselves with respect to the phenomenon of interest. In other words, the issues surrounding any phenomenon—even

one such as widespread food insecurity—do not pertain in a critical sense to all social groups in the area of interest although they may be related. Rather, each phenomenon has more critical 'impact' for some groups than for others, and a 'net' approach to participant observation allows these groups—and their spokespeople ('anchors')—to emerge. Such a method finds analogies in multi-sited ethnography (interviews with several different groups of people) and theoretical sampling (testing a hypothesis) both of which are also methods used to hone in on a phenomenon's key actors and people of interest to complement the more random and unstructured approach of participant observation.

A common charge leveled by quantitative researchers against qualitative research is that the latter rely too much on anecdotal responses and 'key quotes', both of which preclude them from being able to produce statistically representative results. Factors such as the dominance of adult respondents leave this study without much claim to statistical validity. This was partly out of this author's control; foreigners' interaction with children in Sudan is restricted by the HAC so this thesis would never have been able to produce anything more than a very limited window into the perspective of under-19s, even though they make up the majority of Sudan's population.[319] It is thus almost impossible to truly circumvent the tension between evaluating how phenomena affect large groups of people on the one hand and understanding the subjectivity of experience on the other. As Lane observed, "the deconstructionist/postmodernist debate has highlighted the partial and contextually dependent nature of all theories, including those of 'general scientific procedure'".[320] Qualitative methods provide more than just a foil to accusations of inadequacy because the depth needed to respond to this studies' lines of enquiry regarding archaeology's impact from the perspective of site-community residents could only be attained through using qualitative methods.[321]

Because they are used in the present study, the nature of ethnographic data deserves further comment. Quite specifically, this comment is about the challenges it poses for the archaeologist-as-ethnographer, which essentially revolve around the archaeologist's natural predisposition for scientific neutrality and verifiable (re-testable) results and the messy, emotional and ultimately situated results of ethnography. Such a tension has been noted before: from his observations of archaeologists, Shankland notes that they "…seem often split between politically-correct post-modernist relativists, and empiricists, oblivious that there is such a thing as social theory at all."[322] Shankland has noticed further that, for archaeologists, this can give "rise to an over-emphasis on the social creation of reality".[323] This is a charge of which the present author is guilty, which leads me to support the view of Shankland, which aligns with those of Strathern (1995), that archaeologists should,

319 According to the CBS' 5th Population Census, under-19s made up 53% of the population (CBS 2009: 3, Table T01).
320 Lane 2011: 11.
321 McClanahan 2006: 126.
322 Shankland 1996: 349.
323 Shankland 1996: 349.

> accept the need to face these problems [posed by ethnographic data] without losing faith in the empirical basis of their results…to sit on the fence; to accept both that the world is real and that knowledge is invariably context bound.[324]

For example, the concept of dissonance ("that different information will be provided by the same source depending on the context or setting of the source at the time of the interview"[325]) is analytically daunting. However, if "the disparities between the two (or more) accounts and the consideration of the contextual setting at the time of generation of the account provide information on the key issues and debates within the society",[326] then clearly such concepts can be used systematically to create order from what are usually chaotic fieldwork journals, recorded interviews, observations and reflexive notes.

3.2.3.1 Nets: Participant Observation

The fieldwork schedule was divided equally between three stages. The first two stages were dedicated to two levels of participant observation in order to cast a wide 'net' across the site-community. The third stage was dedicated to targeted interviews with the chosen 'anchors': those individuals whose experience and/or narrative acts as an example through which to view the impact of archaeology.

The first stage of the fieldwork for this research was a familiarization period for this author and the translator with the site-communities. The present author and the translator, Hana Ahmed, had already spent time at the start of the 2014 season spent in Dangeil getting to know each other and discussing the research project, its aims and objectives, its data-collection methods, and about the dimensions of the translator's involvement, including going through the fieldwork plan with the translator, as suggested by Liamputtung (2010). This author and the translator were therefore able to spend the whole first two weeks of fieldwork in Hamadab and Bejrawiya becoming familiarized with the site-community by walking around, taking in the general surroundings and "hanging out", as Meskell (2005) advised. The aim was not to exclusively study any one person or family but to speak with people who were willing to talk to us; to visit homes, farms and places of work; and, to attend social events, as randomly as possible. Early on, there was also a formal introduction to the archaeologists during which this author and the project director described and explained the study to the UCLQ team and in exchange learned about theirs.

Data collection started immediately. In accordance with the guidelines provided by Poulin (2007), the day's experiences were each evening noted in a fieldwork journal and then discussed with the

---

324 Shankland 1996: 349.
325 Reid and Lane 2003: 10.
326 Reid and Lane 2003: 10.

translator, making notes in black and adding the translator's comments in red to keep the sources of information clear. Notes were immediately elaborated upon with reflexive musings—whether it related to personal responses, or this author or the translator's impact upon contexts—and photographs were logged. These notes were also used to fill in a standardised 'Community Profile Sheet' (Appendix 1), which was drawn up using examples from the extant literature (mostly Silverman 2001), which included prompting points such as the distinct geographical setting, the services available, social organisation and hierarchy, the total population, the village's position in the trade network, its role in state administration and, of course, how the archaeological sites relate to houses, local residents and farmers.

The second stage of fieldwork, which lasted for a further two weeks, was semi-structured. Approximately one-third of this time was spent observing the archaeologists and two-thirds in the site-communities. In Hamadab and Bejrawiya, this author and the translator spoke with adult men and women of most ages and from varied socio-economic backgrounds: from the Governor of River Nile State to the honey sellers in Hamadab. Speeches and public statements, books, magazines and newspapers, newsletters, school textbooks, posters, songs and poems were heard and read; festivals, weddings and funerals were attended; and, discussions were held with people about their jobs, their homes and families, their love lives, the outside world, their aspirations, disappointments and anxieties. In keeping with the guidelines provided by Liamputtung, conversations were had with whomever possible about topics of which there was a sense of propriety, depending on the context such as the gender of the respondents and of course guided by intuition. Perhaps more importantly, issues that were raised by the respondents themselves were discussed. Like Salmon, there were open statement of the purpose of the research, with the intention to "to use my openness as a foil against suspicion and make myself rather than any of my contacts the focus of security officials".[327] Of course, and despite the efforts to participate with as wide a cross-section of the community as possible, more was certainly heard from the more outgoing members of the community. Routine conversations often led to recommendations of who to speak with—often a male group leader who knows about local history (see Chapter 5)—but such cases were recognised and only followed up in a few cases to avoid limiting the diversity of respondents. Most residents were eager to talk and were curious about the author and the translator, and encounters snowballed; over the first month in Hamadab and Bejrawiya in 2015, there were meetings and interactions with hundreds of people.

327 Salmon 2003: 4.

3.2.3.2 Anchors: Key Respondents

The first month of participant observation helped forge understanding of how different groups of people in Hamadab and Bejrawiya are positioned in relation to archaeology, which eventually led to the identification and selection of the study's 'anchors'. These individuals are representative of those engaged in issues that pertain to archaeology and they are presented in this study as 'key respondents' (Table 1, a-f). The key respondents from the case-study area are community leaders (including the heads of leading families and representatives of farmers and pastoralists); archaeological site guards; UCLQ's excavation employees; randomly-met men and women; and charcoal traders. Non-site-community members also classed as key respondents are Hana Ahmed, my translator,[328] John Robertson, who sheds light on archaeology in the case-study area in the 1970s, and Ali Askouri, who has provided insights into the protest movements surrounding dam-building. With the exception of the archaeological site guards, whose identity it would never be possible to obscure, the respondents from the case-study area have been anonymized. Formal consent was sought from all participant(s); every person whose voice appears in this study was given an in-depth explanation of what the project is about, and gave their verbal consent to be included.[329]

It is important to emphasise that many people have shared their views with the present author but have not been listed here. These include many more people within the site-community as well as the (few) traders at the archaeological sites, the Tourism Police, the village leaders and residents of other Bejrawiya villages of Old Deraqab, Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South and other UCLQ employees. The same goes even for those outside the case-study area: the input received from NCAM employees has been de-personalized, as has the information received from a human rights lawyer, a Western anthropologist and a University of Shendi lecturer.

328 Edwards (1998) argues that researchers should treat interpreters/translators as 'key informants' rather than as 'neutral transmitters of messages'.

329 Informed consent was acquired verbally. Paper forms had been used to ill effect in Dangeil and Sai Island (i.e. 2013-14) and were abandoned by 2015. Hennings et al.'s (1996: 15) note, that "in a culture where the spoken word is taken as a binding legal contract, to ask for signed consent would be to imply mistrust" is important here.

a. Community Leaders

Pseudonym	*Gabila*, Livelihood, Residence	Description	Material drawn from
Hamza al-Ja'ali	Ja'ali Farmer Hamadab	Patriarch of a Ja'aliyin Household in Hamadab; Former Head of the Hamadab Local Committee	Audio-recorded interview in Feb 2015; public lecture, Nov. 2015.
Ali al-Hassani	Hassani Pastoralist Bejrawiya	Patriarch of a Hassaniya Household in Bejrawiya	Conversations throughout 2015, recorded in fieldwork journals
Medowi al-Mansouri	Mansouri Pastoralist Bejrawiya	Patriarch of a Manasir Household in Bejrawiya	
Mohammed al-Fadni	Fadni, Agro-pastoralist, Hamadab	Patriarch of a Fadniya Household in Hamadab	

b. Archaeological Site Guards

Names	*Gabila*, Livelihood, Residence	Description	Material drawn from
Mua'awia Osman	Jowabri, Farmer, Bejrawiya	Archaeological Site Guard at Meroe	Conversations throughout 2015, recorded in fieldwork journals
Mohammed Ahmed	Fadni, Agro-pastoralist, Hamadab	Archaeological Site Guard at Domat al-Hamadab	

c. Charcoal Traders

Pseudonym	*Gabila*, Livelihood, Residence	Description	Material drawn from
Amadi Farran	Hassani Pastoralist Bejrawiya	Also UCL Qatar employee	Conversations in Nov. 2015
Jaffar Hussein	Mansouri Pastoralist Hamadab	Also a *faki* (religious man)	

d. UCL Qatar Excavation Employees

Pseudonym	*Gabila*, Livelihood, Residence	Description	Material drawn from
Jabir Malik	Hassani, Pastoralist Upper Bej./Deraqab		
Kalil Karim	Mansouri Pastoralist Wadi Tarabil		
Jahid Latif	Hassani Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya		
Bashir Kamal	Ja'ali Farmer Kejeik-Bejrawiya		
Nasir Muawad	Hassani Pastoralist Upper Bej./ Wadi Sukkara/Rojbab		Private one-on-one semi-structured interviews in Feb-March. 2015, recorded in fieldwork journal; conversations throughout the year, recorded in fieldwork journal
Faisal Kazim	Mansouri Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya	UCL Qatar Employee	
Abdel Hakim	Ja'ali Farmer Kejeik-Bejrawiya		
Halil Masoud	Hassani Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya		
Azim Rafiq	Mansouri Pastoralist Upper Bej./Deraqab		
Hamid al-Harun	Mansouri Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya		
Zubeir Rahma	Ja'ali Farmer Kejeik-Bejrawiya		

e. Men and Women

	Pseudonym	*Gabila*, Livelihood, Residence	Material drawn from
Women	**Adira al-Sikina**	Ja'ali Farmer Kejeik-Bejrawiya	Audio recorded interview, Feb. 2015; conversations throughout 2015, recorded in fieldwork journal
	Mariam al-Pasha	Ja'ali Farmer Hamadab	
	Awadiya Nassim	Ja'ali Farmer Deraqab-Bejrawiya	
	Amna Suliman	Ja'ali Farmer Bejrawiya South	
	Fadiya Mohammed	Mansouri Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya	
	Manāra al-Fadl	Fadni Pastoralist Mataris	Conversations throughout 2015, recorded in fieldwork journal
	Layla Ahmed	Hassani Pastoralist Upper Bejrawiya	
Men	**Amir Walid**	Ja'ali Farmer Deraqab-Bejrawiya	
	Rashad Dabir	Ja'ali Farmer Kejeik-Bejrawiya	
	Abbas Saad	Ja'ali Farmer Bejrawiya South	
	Adil Moukib	Ja'ali Farmer Hamadab	Audio recorded interview, Feb. 2015.

f. Other

Name		Description	Material drawn from
Hana Abdelhalim	Kawahla Engineer Khartoum	University of Khartoum graduate in Engineering	Ongoing conversations, note-taking etc. since Nov 2014.
John Robertson	Canadian Calgary, CA	Prof., Mount Royal University, Canada. Colleague of Prof. Peter Shinnie, Director of the University of Calgary mission to Meroe (July 1971-March 1972; Dec. 1974-March 1975; Dec. 1975-April 1976.	Interviews by email, Sept. to Oct. 2016
Ali Askouri	Shagiya Activist London, UK	Prominent diaspora activist against the Merowe dam	Interview in London, August 2013.

Table 1. Key Respondents.

Most of those listed in Table 1 occupy roles that would be important for any study of the impact of archaeology; for instance, the site guards, employees, traders and policemen. They are the people whose views or 'narratives' are most likely to represent the social groups that are most obviously affected by archaeology in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and are thus key to understanding it. The site guards are a paradigmatic example of local prime movers in relation to archaeology. Seeking out such people is a technique akin to what Neuman (2007) calls 'purposive sampling' and while it does not produce a statistically relevant number of respondents, the individuals were selected for their social relevance to the phenomenon, whether in their abstract status as gatekeepers (such as site guards) or as spokespeople for the community and groups within it (such as Local Committee members). Other key respondents, for example, the charcoal makers, emerged because they have a stake in the issues raised by this study and could not have been identified in advance.

Encounters with 'key respondents', or 'anchors,' and witnessing key events, such as the public payment of employees, made up the third stage of the fieldwork. Inevitably, the nature of each of these encounters was different. Some conversations were private and one-on-one while others were held in open, public settings with a number of people present; some were formal and audio-recorded interviews, but most were simply long conversations recorded by hand.[330] Although a short list of general questions were kept at hand in the event that they would be deemed necessary, they were not used to structure any encounters. The experience of fieldwork in 2013-14 had shown that the

330 Hand-written notes were used in Hamadab and Bejrawiya since during the fieldwork in Dangeil and Sai Island in 2013-14 it had taken on average eight hours for this author and the translator to translate and transcribe 45 minutes of recorded interview material from Arabic to English.

questions that had been written beforehand were largely unhelpful; essentially they were abstract research questions and designed to avoid topics such as land and politics. Indeed, by the time of arrival in Hamadab and Bejrawiya for fieldwork in 2015, it was clear that if people did want to talk about archaeology it was usually in reference to how it impacted these exact subjects, hence their inclusion in this study.

There has only been one exception to this rule and that was to conduct semi-structured interviews with the UCLQ employees to systematically gather wage and employment data because project directors commonly keep the finer financial details of their employment records private (see Chapter 6). The interviews took place in February 2015, and included the present author, the translator (Hana Ahmed) and the employee. Each employee was informed about the study and the purpose of the interview and consented to give information. The interviews were held individually, or in one case, in a pair, and always privately. The questions were structured around demographic questions (the employee's age, *gabīla*,[331] household size, number of dependents etc.); questions about their employment (other jobs, wages received from other jobs, destination of wages etc.); and finally questions about archaeological employment (earnings from UCLQ, previous seasons worked) and their opinion of the job (see Appendix 2). For lack of other means, wage data for 2016 was collected by telephone.

These interviews aside, structured questioning was largely abandoned after 2014; this change in strategy, and the rich results it produced, further supported the decision to present the data from Hamadab-Bejrawiya, rather than that from Dangeil and Sai Island, in this study. Following Salmon (2003), there was a desire for interviewees to lead the research towards topics they wished to speak about and to allow for them to choose the limits of what they wish to say. While always entering each encounter mindful of which themes that were sought for exploration, the technique shifted to "face-to-face interview situations that are conversational and do not narrowly prescribe possible answers as is the case with standardized questionnaires."[332] Echoing Starzman, such approaches anticipate the "complexities and…messiness…" of life[333] and, echoing McClanahan, reject the "over-arching answers that lack specific detail about why people respond as they do"[334] that are generated by surveys. To compensate for such an open approach, this author was keen to systematise the data collection in other ways. A degree of standardization was achieved through the use of Respondent Profile sheets (Appendix 3) and Post-Interview Notes sheets (Appendix 4), adapted from Liamputtung

331 The Arabic word *gabīla* (pl. *gabâīl*) is most commonly translated in English as 'tribe' (such as in Shankland 1999, Maliński 2014 and Burtenshaw 2014). However, the word 'tribe', etymologically derived from Latin, is problematic, mainly on account of its use by colonial administrations, in which it signified collectives belonging to 'primitive' societies with 'unchanged' cultures who were seen at the time to be in need of Western civilizing influences. Therefore, this study prefers to use the terms *gabīla*/*gabâīl* where possible because these terms stress kinship and brotherhood rather than subjugated units of political administration.

332 Starzman 2012: 405.

333 Starzman 2012: 405.

334 McClanahan 2006: 126.

(2010) and Silverman (2001), both of which were compiled after each encounter. The Respondent Profile sheet included prompts to help the present author to collect the demographic and personal details of a respondent's life, such as their ages or approximate dates of birth; their *gabīla*; the names of their parents, spouse and children; their livelihoods and basic economic situations; their places of residence (past and present); and the number of years they have spent in education, including what they studied. Although that level of detail was only usually obtained after several—sometimes half a dozen or more—visits to the same person, it provided a solid basis of demographic data relevant to how archaeology affects ethnically heterogeneous site-communities; how archaeology impacts the site-community economy; and how the state may have pre-determined their consumption of archaeological history through their control of Sudan's educational syllabus. The Post-Interview Notes sheet prompted this author's further attention to interview arrangements such as the time of day; whether or not it was arranged through a contact and, if so, which one; the interview location; the setting and dynamic (e.g. the way in which the individual behaves; who else was present); sensory impressions (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, textures); the activities going on in the background and who is doing them; reflections on the methods used (e.g. what questions worked and which did not work, and why); and summarization of the content (e.g. specific words, phrases, insider language, problems and ideas that arise) and to log the associated pictures (if any). These notes were followed by personal reflections on the account as well as that of the translator, and finally questions were noted for future encounters. These questions were chosen for inclusion during the fieldwork process because they foreground the hybrid nature of data collection as well as because they highlight the way in which settings affect outcomes.

3.2.3.3 Translation

Another hurdle that had to be overcome, and one directly related to the question of insider/outsider status (above), was the language gap. This author has a command of basic conversational Arabic while most of the Sudanese respondents spoke only Arabic. Surprisingly, despite being limited, the present researcher's command of Arabic proved useful and as time went on, there was less reliance upon translation. However, to be clear, the study could not have been undertaken without a translator, as it was deemed by NCAM to a legal as well as a logistical requirement. In total, three translators were used. The first translator accompanied this author to Dangeil in November 2013 and the second translator traveled along to Sai Island in January 2014. Both women were assigned through NCAM. The third translator, Hana Ahmed, was initially recommended to the author by a friend and subsequently 'approved' by NCAM. Hana accompanied the author to Dangeil in November 2014 and also stayed in Hamadab and Bejrawiya from January to April 2015. Translators 1 and 2 were in their

early 20s while Hana was in her mid-30s. All three women were single, university-educated and from Khartoum. Each read and signed the 'Informed Consent Form' that instructed them to keep private all the information they heard during the course of the project.

Using translators raises a number of issues. "The social world is a pervasively conversational one in which an overwhelming proportion of the world's business is conducted through the medium of spoken interaction",[335] and the use of translators creates a dependency whereby researchers rely upon them to explain everything that they are seeing and hearing; in Liamputtung's words, researchers use translators "not just for words but also for perspective".[336] Certainly, the translators were vital links between this author and the site-communities. While NCAM and the archaeological teams provided official access, the translators were the media through which communication with respondents was conducted and through which experiences were given further meaning.

Mindful of the criticisms of operating in a language of which one does not have complete command, vigorous (and expensive) steps were taken to address such concerns. For example, this study has made use of double translation to ensure the accuracy of the data. In practical terms, this entailed Hana and this author translating and transcribing all the fieldwork notes, audio recorded interviews and texts from the many pieces of naturally occurring data that were collected (such as school textbooks, brochures from the Ministry of Tourism, signs) while still present in the case-study area—a demanding task. Upon the return of this author to Khartoum in April 2015, three other translators, Basil Kamal Bushra, Omer Sharif and Rayan Alamin, translated the materials a second time and helped this author understand specific Arabic terms. Double translation ensured a high standard of translation and thus a reliable data set. Indeed with such measures in place, language became less of a barrier and more useful as a means of interpretation. On a conceptual level, then, this author has attempted to follow Temple, who suggests that the relationship between researcher and translator be a "productive methodological exercise".[337]

As mentioned above, the long time spent working with Hana was insightful to the author and provided yet another reason to present data collected with her in Hamadab and Bejrawiya in this research, rather than that collected from Dangeil or Sai Island. Because of the close nature of the relationship with Hana, the present researcher also feels fully able to account for the occasions in which an interpretation belongs to Hana and when it belongs to the researcher; this was achieved, at least in part, by colour-coding the notes. More importantly, it is possible to identify the instances in which this author has incorporated the translator's suggestions into the conclusions in this study. For instance, it was Hana that drew this author's attention to the patronage of local schools by religious orders based in the Arab states of the Gulf, an observation that helped to clarify how the site-

335 Heritage 1984: 239.
336 Liamputtung 2010: 143.
337 Temple 1997: 608.

community economy was driven in the absence of a fully functioning state (Chapter 4). It was also her knowledge of the rich, powerful and well-organized Nubian-dominated Sufi sects, such as the Burhānīyya, that encouraged this author to look further into the hybrid but ultimately contradictory elements of Nubian identity as simultaneously 'victim' and 'victor' (Chapter 5).

An introduction to Hana is therefore necessary and respectful. Hana was 32, and comes from a marginalized *gabīla* from Kordofan called the Kawāhla whose family have long since migrated to Khartoum. By training, Hana is an engineer and currently works in a freelance capacity installing and maintaining CCTV cameras for a handful of businesses in Khartoum. As her family's eldest and only unmarried daughter, Hana is a tough and determined career woman, as she needs to be in a male-dominated world. She loves learning, is a keen gardener (she planted trees at both Dangeil and Hamadab), has a cheerful disposition and is deeply empathetic. During the time spent in Dangeil and Hamadab-Bejrawiya, there was a sense on the part of this author that the residents had a particular liking for Hana. In part, this was because she can be very forthright in her opinions: empathy makes her no less of a humorous and interesting conversationalist. Hana also cares sincerely about Sudan. However, and perhaps because of this, in many private discussions with this author, she showed sadness that Sudanese society does not value the same things as she does, particularly freedom of expression and the acceptance of social differences. Hana's English is very good if somewhat old-fashioned as she learned it from the Longman English language books (such as those by Corbluth (1979) and Bates and Palmer (1981)), and she enjoys English aphorisms such as "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," a saying that she used frequently when an opportunity was presented to either seize a spontaneous chance for a conversation or try and fit two shorter encounters into the same time space. The present researcher enjoyed a productive and honest rapport with Hana; especially after having lived, worked and slept in the same room together for a month in Dangeil, ten weeks in Hamadab followed consecutively by another month in Khartoum. It would not be too much to state that she became a true friend, co-researcher and highly capable "culture broker"[338] who enhanced this author's knowledge and understanding of Sudan.

338 Eide and Allen 2005: 6.

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Coding

In total, over 400 pages of fieldwork journal notes and 80 hours of recorded interview data as well as hundreds of photographs, recordings of poems and songs, copies of posters and documents, and other objects and gifts were collected by this author. Appropriate techniques were therefore sought to aid analysis of this sprawling data set, and 'coding' was the method eventually chosen.

Coding is "...the process of identifying categories and meanings in text, creating and applying a code to each, and systematically marking similar strings of text with the same code name"[339] and represents a practical way of organizing the data and generating concepts and identifying the connections between them. Coding is used as a method in many analytical traditions (including thematic analysis, content analysis, conversation analysis and narrative analysis) because it can incorporate diverse data sets (photographs and non-textual data can also be coded) and be conducted in several discrete rounds. Four coding rounds were undertaken for this study and are described here.

As noted above, a key distinction needed to be made between researcher-provoked and naturally occurring data, and coding the data according to its status made up the first coding round. While naturally-occurring data have not necessarily been analyzed as 'more authentic' than conversational data, the context in which information was given was taken into account (see above regarding analysis of who was present; the point in the interview at which a subject arises; and what was said thereafter). The detailed hand-written notes aside, the Respondent Profile sheets and Post-Interview Notes sheets (above) were vital to this stage of analysis.

The second round of coding categorized these data according to theme. "A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set."[340] This author's initial codes were archaeology's a) historical, b) economic and c) social impact on the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. These themes overlap so in some cases a passage of text or object was coded several times. Equally, much data could not be coded using these themes, which required the generation of additional coding categories. For example later, as the rough, broader argument of this research became clearer, additional coding rounds included searching for specific themes like 'the pastoralist-farmer relationship' and 'the lack of access to resources'. Nevertheless, these four thematic codes remained the core categories throughout analyses and were elaborated upon with other rounds of coding; they have also roughly provided the thematic structure for the thesis.

339 Silverman 2001: 236.
340 Braun and Clarke 2006: 82.

The third round of coding was an adaptation of what Silverman calls 'quantitative coding', which in essence is counting the frequency of themes; the number of times certain coded topics came up in conversations and interviews. A coding round was added to this, which was counting the number of times themes come up most unprompted.[341] To give one fundamental example, and discounting the few occasions when it could be interpreted as having been 'researcher-provoked', the topic of 'land' was mentioned by most of the respondents (this should be evident in all forthcoming chapters). In comparison, discounting the occasions when it could be interpreted as having been 'researcher-provoked', the topic of 'archaeology' only came up a handful of times in some hundreds of conversations. In seeking to explain the reasons for a theme's content, coding rounds also included searching for occasions in which the present author's presence affected the participant's response (see above). Given the amount of data collected, this coding round was extremely useful to highlight the themes that needed concentrating on, and those that could, or sometimes should, be discarded.

The fourth round of coding interrogated the remaining data according to Sacks et al.'s (1995) theory of language as providing crucial insights into worldview. Linguistic coding thus searched for commonly used words whose repetition may indicate so-called emic (insider) categories and *in vivo* codes as well as such key words in context (studying the range of uses of key terms in the phrases and sentences in which they occur). With the help of the translators, extensive notes had been made on the language used by participants, and depending upon their relative importance to the argument, Sackian 'ethnomethodological' version of conversation analysis and the meaning of important conceptual words in Arabic have been expanded upon, such *athâr*, meaning 'antiquities' and the closest word for 'archaeology' in Chapter 5, and *fāida*, the word for 'benefit', in Chapter 6.

In the initial stages of post-fieldwork analysis, coding proved to be a useful organizational and analytical tool. However, after the four rounds were complete and writing up commenced, the present author found that the best method of analysis was simply to write and compare with the data as ideas developed; indeed while it was not always the case, many issues that seemed overwhelmingly complex and fractured by dissonance became less problematic when explained on paper.

3.3.2 Supplementary Sources

Ethnographic material gathered first hand from the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya provides the primary data for this study, but supplementary sources are also used to add depth to the picture. A 'supplementary source' is here defined as information that exists independently of the present author and in many cases were generated outside the case-study area, outside Sudan, or sometimes in

341 Paraphrased from Silverman 2001: 236-249; Silverman uses Becker and Geer 1960.

altogether different contexts. These sources include but are not limited to visual images, blogs, tweets, emails, and statistical records. Most often, supplementary sources have been used to support the interpretation of the primary sources. For example, Chapter 5 of this study is greatly augmented by materials kindly given to this author in 2013 by Tim Kendall, which consist of interviews and observational notes he made over his 25 years as archaeological project director at the royal Kushite-Napatan site of Jebel Barkal; to evaluate the economic impact of archaeology in Hamadab-Bejrawiya in Chapter 6, public documents including local and national demographic data from the Sudan government as well as country-wide reports from the World Bank and the IMF have been used; and in Chapter 7 heavy use is made of the UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File for the Island of Meroe as well as ICOMOS' evaluation report. Via Appendices 6 and 7, Chapters 4 and 6 also use sources such as Holt (1961) and Warburg (1992), which are indispensable for understanding the 18th-Century origins of contemporary Sudanese social relations in Hamadab-Bejrawiya and the impact of archaeology upon them.

Despite Mason's (2006) comments about the 'easy' rhetorical logic of mixing methods, using such supplementary sources has not always been straightforward; in many ways they are just as analytically tricky as primary ethnographic sources. For example, the supplementary socio-economic data used in Chapter 6 proved particularly challenging because of its unreliability, especially at the local level.[342] Official data from government sources is weak and inconsistent particularly with regard to pastoral and nomadic populations.[343] Salmon (2003) also writes that official data is not always to be trusted; he notes that "the Bank of Sudan's economic report had been 'tidied'…"[344] Much government data pre-dates the secession of South Sudan in 2011 when the government in Khartoum lost 10 million people, "75 per cent of its oil resources [and] 90 per cent of its export earnings".[345] This makes pre-2012 government data problematic for purposes of comparison. Reports by international organizations including the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations also have shortcomings. Many of them use pre-2012 government data, which reduces their usefulness for a study of current economic conditions;[346] the IMF's 2013 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, for example, uses data from 2009 or earlier. Moreover, "[t]he tools of poverty measurement designed by the western institutions…[are] inconvenient to use in measuring poverty in a society in which a considerable part of its economy operates through reciprocity and redistribution."[347] Reliable data on the financial inputs of archaeology into the economies of site-communities is also difficult to acquire because it is usually confidential to the archaeologists, their institutions or funders and their employees. Primary economic data have therefore been gathered through observations, conversations and interviews with

342 A source of frustration shared by Salih 1999 and Ahmed et al. 2012.
343 The 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (CBS 2010) does not mention nomads at all. Indeed, it is one of the aims of the UN in Sudan to "build and/or strengthen capacities in population analysis" (UNDP 2015a).
344 Salmon 2003: 6.
345 UNDP 2015b.
346 IMF 2013.
347 Salih 1999: 42.

the employees, residents of the site-communities and people in the broader locale. This material has been evaluated alongside material gathered by agricultural economists and others, using a cross-disciplinary approach. Of course "not all relevant phenomena are easily cast in mathematical terms"[348] and useful insights into the economic impact of archaeology can emerge from the qualitative conversational data, even if the hard numbers are limited.

348 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001: 15.

4. SUDAN

To evaluate the impact of archaeology on site-communities in Sudan it is necessary to develop a critical understanding of the day-to-day lives of the Sudanese. In most of the conversations and interviews carried out for this study, respondents returned at some point to the hardships and vicissitudes of daily life. This chapter is thus written with their testimonies in mind and thus sets out the context for the entire study; it will be referred to frequently in subsequent chapters.

4.1 Rural Sudan in 2015

4.1.1 Nation and Gabīla

In political science, a 'nation' is typically defined as a large group of people who perceive themselves to share a common social identity and vision, and for many scholars of nationalism, also shared characteristics such as language and mythology.[349] In contrast, a 'state' is understood as an operational structure which has authority (or sovereignty) over a defined territory and people.[350] A 'nation-state' is thus the aggregate of these two phenomena: a nation with a state structure whose laws and trappings echo its vision of collective 'self', or as Newton and Van Deth describe it as, "acceptance of a common culture, history and fate, irrespective of socio-economic or political

349 Anderson 1991, Smith 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012.
350 Newton and Van Deth 2010: 19-22.

differences".[351] Using these terms as benchmarks, Sudanese scholars such as Malwal (1981, 1991) have long since posited that Sudan is not a nation-state, but rather a failed nation (*umma*) and a weak state (*dawla*; *hukūma*) organised largely along discriminatory lines and dominated by elite members of the Ja'aliyīn and Shaygiyya, two Nile-based Muslim *gabâīl* that claim Arab descent and whose hegemony has been reinforced by their long-standing control of the military. Elsewhere, such societal circumstances have been described as 'tribal',[352] and on the basis of the ethnographic research carried out for this study, it seems reasonable to follow earlier scholars in using this term to describe Sudanese society.

With regards to nation-building, most scholars agree that neither Sudan's nationalist movements nor its governments, and in particular the various administrations since independence in 1956, have succeeded in constructing a nation out of Sudan's heterogeneous population (see Appendix 6). In the early 1880s, the "proto-nationalist"[353] revolution against Sudan's Turco-Egyptian rulers, led by a charismatic Islamist visionary known as the Mahdi, was a movement whose vision of religious, social and economic freedom brought together many disparate groups, from the Hadendoa in the east to the Baqqāra in the west. This was particularly impressive because the previously self-governing states of Darfur in the west, Nubia in the northern Nile Valley and Sennar on the Blue Nile to the south-east, had only recently been merged into one territory by a decree (*firmān*) of the Turco-Egyptian government. However, any 'nation-wide' consensus forged by the Mahdi dissipated during the rule of his successor (*khalifa*), Abdullahi ibn Muhammad of the Ta'aishī clan of the Baqqāra, who provoked

351 Newton and Van Deth 2010: 23. Similarly a nation state may be defined as a population that purportedly has a right to a state of its own (Roeder 2007).

352 To be clear: the adjective 'tribal' and the associated noun, 'tribalism', do not always refer to a society based around 'the tribe' (*gabīla*) or other ethnic stratifiations—in urban areas, it may be the community that is the most critical collective. Nor do these terms relate to a country or people being 'pre-modern' or 'homogeneous', nor is do they presuppose high levels of 'conformity'. Instead, the terms refer to how society is ordered; a state of being wherein action and identification are organized around smaller sub-national socio-political units (see James (2006) and Gluckman (2007) for a more nuanced discussion).

353 Warburg 1992: 37, also Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005. There is a debate surrounding the date at which 'nationalism' emerged. Predominantly split into two camps, one defines nationalism as a product of 18th Century Europe (e.g. Diachenko 2016); the other argues that nationalist sentiment and unionistic movements that share characteristics with European nationalism had been around for a lot longer (see works by Smith 1991 and Hobsbawm 1992); the term 'proto-nationalism' is often used to describe such a movement and, as Warburg suggests, seems apt here because if successful nationalisms are, as Smith (1991) argues, built around a shared feeling of unity across a group of people, then hatred of the corrupt and avaricious Turco-Egyptian state (Shibeika 1959, Beshir 1974) and discontent at the suppression of the slave trade (Holt 1958), rather than a sense of common nationhood or territory, seems to have been the most powerful unifying factors for those who joined the Mahdi's cause. Of course some scholars believe the religious and tribal aspects of the Mahdi's movement to have been the most important factors in rallying support (e.g. by Mohammed Ahmed al-Hajj, cited in Warburg 1992: 49). Indeed the Mahdi himself described his movement as being "against the Turks who changed religion and replaced it by *kufr* (infidels)" (Manshurat Vol. 2 1963). The biography of the Mahdi, the Sira, also includes statements such as this (see Shaked 1978). This is somewhat ironic as Ottoman interest had been largely secular: letters from Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Turco-Egyptian ruler to his sons, Ismail and Ibrahim, detail Egypt's foremost interest in "slaves, gold and other precious metals" and reference a letter from the governor of Kordofan to the governor (*defterdār*) not to annex Sudan "on Islamic grounds" because it was already Muslim (Warburg 1992: 39). Even so, the Islamic element was still not enough to keep the Mahdist 'nation' from collapsing.

opposition through his nepotism.[354] Weakened by famine as well as rebellion, the Mahdist state was toppled by British forces in 1898.

The Mahdist movement was nevertheless an important precursor to Sudanese nationalisms in the 20th Century and was, in fact, more inclusive than many of its proverbial successors. The first half of the 20th Century was a period of empowerment for the northern, Nile-based Arab-Muslim elite, whom the Anglo-Egyptian system had primed with the aim of producing an educated class to fill the ranks of the bureaucracy. Helped by the Anglo-Egyptian policy of not only recruiting from these groups but also segregating the south (the latter known as the 'Southern Policy'[355]), this elite monopolized the nationalist platform, side-lined alternative visions of the Sudanese 'nation', repressed minorities believed to harbour separatist tendencies, including Nubians, and thus inherited power upon independence from the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration in 1956. In the succeeding decades, various Arab-Muslim elites dominated the state, commonly staffing it through nepotism rather than a merit-based system of recruitment (a policy that has roots far back into the 16th Century[356]). This approach was compounded by 'ethnic stratification' whereby non-Arabs and non-Muslims from the south, west and east were excluded from government posts and jobs; resources and opportunities were allocated to families, communities and *gabāīl* who shared 'ethno'-religious[357]—namely Arab-Muslim—characteristics. The simultaneous marginalization of some and patrimony of others has continued till the present: from the late 1970s the Islamist and Arab-nationalist party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), founded by Hassan Turabi, influenced government policy and helped President Omar Bashir come to power through one of Sudan's periodic military coups. An ardent Islamist with the Muslim Brotherhood, Turabi argued that "[Without Islam] Sudan has no identity, no direction."[358] From 1989 to 1999, the NIF oversaw a comprehensive top-down Islamization of the state administration, army, educational system and economy, and allowed "legally reinforced discrimination"[359] through the imposition of Islamic law (*shari'a*[360]) and strict dress codes. Since then, Islamization and Arabization policies have been aggressively enforced with widespread human-rights abuses.[361] Radical jihadists, including Osama bin Laden, were given refuge, leading to the imposition

354 Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005.
355 Mayo 1994.
356 Safwat 1991.
357 Adar 2001.
358 Hassan al-Turabi quoted in Viorst 1995: 46.
359 Idris 2005: 12.
360 *Shari'a* had first been imposed in Sudan in 1983 by Jafaar Nimeiri through the 'September Laws' (Willis 2011); Sudan is to this day one of few states where *shari'a* is formally incorporated into the constitution.
361 Terms such as 'Arabization' and 'Islamization' must be used with caution when approaching empirical evidence because they act as benchmarks with which to measure people and the historical record (this has certainly been the case in the ancient world: Luther and Panayotis 2004; Mattingly 2011). However, the terms are used here to refer to "myriad social, religious and political processes that integrate individuals and groups into the cultural value system of Muslims and Arabs" (Adar 2001). In Sudan, these terms have also been used to refer to the gradual influx of Arab settlers into the region since the 7th Century CE, and to the interaction they had with pre-existing populations through intermarriage, trade and warfare and to the impact of the emergence in the 16th Century of Muslim states such as the Fūnj Sultanate of Sennar and the Sultanate of Darfur (Hasan 1971). These terms are therefore useful in the study of modern Sudan as they effectively communicate the key fact demonstrated above

of international sanctions that were only removed at the time of editing (September 2017), two decades after they were first imposed.

Of course, there is no single vision of Arabism or Islamism in Sudan; Islamist groups differ on how Islam should function in a modern state.[362] Indeed, by 1999, Bashir came to view Turabi's policies as excessive and expelled him from the NIF, which was renamed the National Congress Party (NCP). Although its methods have arguably become less brutal, the Sudanese state's emphasis on Arab-Muslim identity has remained the same under the NCP.

The development and characteristics of the modern Sudanese state is an important aspect of the context for this study and will thus be addressed more in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, based on the above distinctions between nation and state, it appears that Sudan has a state but has not become a nation; no proto-nationalist or nationalist movement has so far succeeded in producing a unifying vision of nationhood, rather perpetuating tribalism and disunity. This lays the foundation for one of the key arguments of this study, namely that the failure of Sudanese nationalisms has contributed to the continuing identification of most modern Sudanese with their *gabāīl*: not with the archaeology of 'ancient Nubia' or its 'World Heritage' archaeological sites (Chapter 5).

*

Gabīla (pl. *gabāīl*) is one of the most common forms of self-identification in Sudan (Figure 2). The south of post-2011 Sudan is home to the Nūba *gabāīl* and the *gabāīl* of the White Nile, such as the Hassaniyya, as well as the Shūkriyya of the Blue Nile. In the centre, using Khartoum as a point of reference, the Baqqāra, Kabābish and Fūr *gabāīl* inhabit the west and far west of the country; the Fadniyya, Shūkriyya and Kawāhla *gabāīl* are based to the east, on the Butana plain; the Bijā, Hadendoa and Rashāida *gabāīl* can be found in the north east.[363] North of these groups are the two largest and most powerful of Sudan's *gabāīl*, the Ja'aliyīn and the Shaygiyya, with the smaller Manāsīr and Rubātāb between them. Finally, in the far north, the Nile's Second and Third Cataract regions are home to the Nubian *gabāīl* namely, in order from north to south, the Halfāwīn, Sukōt, Mahās and Danaglā. Of course this description is a rather rigid taxonimization of *gabāīl* and their homelands, representing something of an early 20th-Century 'tribal map' of Sudan that belies great complexity and wholly ignores the movement undertaken by many *gabāīl*, it nonetheless still represents the way in which many rural Sudanese see territorial divisions. Indeed the vitality of *gabīla* as a signifier of identity is visible in the way Sudanese address one another: the present researcher observed on numerous occasions that "*gabīla shenū*?" or "*jinsu shenu*?" (what is your *gabīla*? What it

---

that Arabization and Islamization are not only social and cultural processes, but also policies that have been ardently promoted by every Sudanese government since independence.

362 For instance, in the early 20th Century, the Umma Party, which advocated independence from Egypt, often clashed with the Khatmiya Party, which favoured unification with Egypt; a conflict that persists till the present. Also see Adar 2001.

363 Ryle 2011a.

your race/ethnicity?) is asked of strangers upon first encounter; some even pride themselves on being able to guess a stranger's *gabīla*.



Figure 2. Sudanese *gabāīl* (Source: Al-Shahi and Moore 1978).

The members of these *gabāīl* perceive themselves to share a common and distinctive ancestry, language, religion, homeland (*dār*) and livelihood (with an associated set of characteristics or skills—some groups, for example, define themselves in part by the breeds of animals they rear or by their members' involvement in particular professions). Together, these attributes constitute something approaching 'ethnicity', but which might more accurately be termed 'cultural group', as identifying an individual's *gabīla* can also help to establish a certain number of other 'facts' about that person, including their social status and political loyalties. Individuals may have parents from different *gabāīl*, but ancestral *gabīla* affiliation is inherited along paternal lines. Male and female facial scarification (*shilūkh*), though falling out of use, is designed as a conspicuous mark of *gabīla* identity,[364] and the permanence of scarification reflects the aforementioned belief that one's *gabīla* is fixed and unchangeable. Although most Sudanese speak Arabic, a *gabīla*'s name is sometimes interchangeable with the relevant ancestral language, and almost always interchangeable with its homeland. For example, the Fur speak Fur and the Mahās-Nubians speak Mahasi Nubian. One's *gabīla* is thus perceived to be strongly suggestive, if not quite an exact, signifier of the language one speaks.

364 Błażyński 2003.

Similarly the related question to "*gabīla shenū*?", "*intū min wīn*?" (where are you from?) shows that the link between *gabīla* and *dār* is perceived to be very important even on an individual level and, if anything, has become even more important given the migrations of Sudanese both within Sudan and across the globe[365] as a result of labour emigration, conflict and "territorial disruptions"[366] such as population growth, land grabs and dam building (below).

The five criteria for *gabīla* belonging—ancestry, language, religion, homeland and livelihood—recall the criteria by which Herodotus in c. 440 BCE noted that the ancient Greeks defined themselves, namely "blood and language, temples and ritual; our common way of life."[367] Hall (1991) famously referred to these as 'proofs of ethnicity', socially-constructed categories by which individuals and groups separate and differentiate themselves from 'others'; as Boyte notes, local discourse about social relations is "about difference more than similarity." [368] Of course, virtually all human populations set and use criteria for membership (in-groups) and thus non-membership (out-groups). But the specificities of each category change over time and space: "apparently uniform institutions like 'the family', 'a tribe' or 'science' take on a variety of meanings in different contexts."[369] In Sudan, at a national level, two of the five abovementioned proofs or criteria, namely ancestry and religion, have acted as fundamental components of the state's vision of the ideal Sudanese citizen. Indeed, greatly due to the long, continuous and successful economic and political dominance of the Ja'aliyīn and Shaygiyya, the proofs are 'Arab' and 'Muslim'; non-Arab and non-Muslim groups are marginalized in many ways. Of note, there is also discrimination among Arab-Muslim groups, such as based upon livelihood, with settled famers largely regarded as socially superior to migratory nomads and this distinction is particularly relevant for this study (see Chapter 6).[370]

Skin colour is frequently spoken about as a signifier of ancestry, or ethnic origin, as was demonstrated frequently in this researcher's conversations with site-community respondents. The colour coding of the racial hierarchy ranges from yellow to black: Nubians in the north are often referred to as 'blue' (*azraq*) while dark-skinned individuals from the south are called 'black' (*aswad*) or 'negro' (*zanjī*).[371] Dark skin signifies being 'African', descended from slaves; dark-skinned Sudanese are thus often generally referred to as 'slaves' '*abīd* (s. *'abd*): the Nubians of north Sudan were enslaved by the Egyptians in the millennia BCE, as were groups in what is now South Sudan. The south and south-west of Sudan, home to groups such as the Nūba and the Hassaniyya, suffered

365 For example, a large population of Mahās Nubians inhabits Tuti Island in Khartoum. There is also a large Sudanese diaspora, mainly in the Arab states of the Gulf, Europe, the US and Malaysia.
366 Gertel et al. 2014.
367 Herodotus 2015, trans. G. Rawlinson.
368 Boyte 2010: 37.
369 Silverman 2000: 10.
370 In 2009, Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) wrote, "[t]he sample for the NBHS 2009 does not include population groups such as nomads, people living in camps and homeless people etc." (CBS 2010: 14) which confirms this point about discrimination on the basis of livelihood.
371 Deng 2004: 1-2.

from slave raids by riverine Arabs such as the Ja'aliyīn since at least the 15th Century. The designation of such groups as '*abīd* is thus a longstanding tradition.

Above black and blue are the 'yellow' (*asfar*), followed by 'red' (*asmar*); according to Deng, the latter "literally means reddish, but it is used interchangeably to describe a range of color shades from light to dark brown."[372] At the top of the pyramid is 'green' (*akhḍar*), signifying close ancestral ties with the Arabian Peninsula. It is important to note that the attitudes behind the hierarchy of skin colour have historical roots: "although these colours describe individuals rather than racial groups, they are remnants of racial consciousness deeply engraved by a long history of stratification and discrimination."[373] Deng cites al-Baghir al-Afifi Mukhtar as noting:

> Sudanese passports never describe the holder as 'black.' The description used for the overwhelming majority of the holders would be 'green,' the standard color of the nation in official Northern eyes. Indeed, green is seen as the ideal Sudanese color of skin because it reflects a brown that is not too dark, giving associations with black Africa and possibly slavery, and is not too light, hinting at gypsy (halabi) or European Christian forbears, the infidel khawajat.[374]

Moreover, even though elite Nubians are educated, landed, wealthy and powerful, they are commonly viewed by Arab-Muslim groups through the Sudan state's 'ethno-religious' prism and thus denigrated as descendants of Christians and other pre-Islamic religious groups: Arab-Muslim Sudanese perceive Islam as a religion to be superior to Christianity and other non-Islamic belief systems.[375] It is also common for Arabic to be viewed as superior to other languages in Sudan, which are not taught in schools. The distaste of many among the Ja'aliyīn and Shaygiyya for other languages in Sudan is reflected in the denigrating word used to describe them: *rutāna* (gobbledygook). This word has become normalised in Sudanese society to the extent that some respondents whose mother tongue were not Arabic described their own native language to the present researcher as *rutāna*, and apologised self-consciously for speaking it.

The five criteria for belonging to a *gabīla* are thus widely recognized categories in Sudan for defining identity; including via construction of in- and out-groups, promoting the 'Self' and denigrating the 'Other'. The control of the state by Arab-Muslim groups has enabled not only the writing of their hierarchy of values into legislation, most notoriously via the institutionalization of Islamic law, but also the harassment and undermining of opposition groups, such as the Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement, via the arming of nefarious militias such as the Janjawīd. The bloody civil conflicts that have arisen stem from the attempts of Arab-Muslim elites to impose a dominating

372 Deng 2004: 1-2.
373 Deng 2004: 1-2.
374 Deng 2004: 1-2.
375 Although this happens the other way around, too: in the 1970s, Southerners were known to call the riverine northerners *Buonyo* in contrast to their own *Col* ('Southern') and referred to any Arabized and Islamized Southerners as having been 'Buonyalized' (Gwado-Ayoker 1986: 155).

vision of an Arab-Islamic nation are well-documented and demonstrate the high human cost of these 'proofs' and categorizations when applied on the national level.

However, two important qualifications need to be made. The first is that despite the divisions based on these criteria, there is still a broad-based aspiration to build a nation-state that is not divided along discriminatory lines. All the translators that worked with the present researcher in 2013-15 confessed that they "hated" to be asked "*gabīla shenu*?" because in their view it represented a "backward" way of thinking.[376] Instead, these respondents advocated a more inclusive national identity. Even in the 1980s, there was a "silent unorganized majority" that wished to move away from "primordial sentiments" of "religion, language, race, tribe, sect and colour."[377] This does not mean that such people necessarily buy into the ruling state's vision of what it means to be Sudanese—although some do. Rather, in these cases, it is indicative of a wish to move beyond the use of such categories as vehicles of discrimination recognition of the power of discourse to perpetuate the status quo. The second qualification is that while *gabīla* is perhaps the most important social identity, there are some social collectives that attract and incorporate individuals from many *gabāīl*. Sufi movements, for example, have a strong and historic presence in Sudan and appeal to audiences that go beyond identity based on *gabīla*, capturing the primary social allegiance of many people from different *gabāīl* (for some historians this the strength of Sufism was neatly illustrated by the success of the Mahdi, who was himself a Sufi (above)).[378] Others might identify most strongly via their political leanings, although in Sudan religion and politics tend to align.[379]

Nevertheless at present, "[t]he tribal basis of local society"[380] remains overt in rural Sudan, where Sudanese primarily identify as members of their *gabīla* and in which provides what Kinnvall (2006) calls 'ontological security'; the present researcher has rarely heard someone identify as Sudanese unless "by virtue of control by a common government."[381] Again, with regard to the impact of archaeology, the context of a failed nation is important because it means that ones *gabīla* is the ideological group with whom one identifies, often to the detriment of other putative identities—including those identities that might otherwise link them with the peoples who built the archaeological sites.

---

376 Conversations with Hana Ahmed, Basil Kamal Bushra, Omer Sharif and Rayan Alamin throughout 2015.

377 El-Bashir 1987: 162.

378 Despite the continued strength of Sudan's medieval Sufi orders, through which groups like the Ja'aliyīn gained much power during the 19th Century, membership of the Islamist group known as the Muslim Brotherhood has been a major factor for promotion since 1989; the Salafist group Ansar al-Sunna is also an increasingly large group in Sudan, largely due to the ideological influence of Saudi Arabia on Sudanese and Sudanese migrants in the Gulf.

379 The comparative unimportance of *gabīla* identification in urban settings was remarked upon by Rehfisch (1972), who noted that membership in rotating credit associations in Khartoum was based on geographical features (neighbourhood and locality, i.e. proximity and community) and personal characteristics (trustworthiness and shared backgrounds) and not *gabīla* allegiance. Harries-Jones (1972) similarly notes that when pastoral households migrate on a seasonal basis, the ties of *gabīla* unity are even more important, but that as they settle, the household becomes the more important social unit.

380 Coughenour 1991: 192.

381 Adar 2001.

4.1.2 State and Livelihoods

Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its per-capita GDP is very low and it scores weakly on indices including infant mortality, life expectancy, health, education and access to basic services such as piped water and electricity. In 2009, only 65% of the population had access to safe drinking water; only 42% had access to improved sanitation; only 57% of children completed their primary education; and average life expectancy was only 61.7 years.[382] In the 2013 Global Hunger Index, Sudan fell into the category of "Alarming Hunger Situation" and had the dubious distinction of being the fifth hungriest country in the world.[383] Sudan ranked 166th of 187 countries in the 2014 Human Development Index, with only one hospital for every 90,000 people.[384]

Human development indices are much weaker in the rural areas, where some two-thirds of Sudanese live. For example, while some 46.5% of the total population lives below the poverty line, the rate rises to 57.6% in rural areas.[385] Rural-urban disparities are exacerbated by environmental events, such as flash floods (*tissāb*), droughts (*mahāll*) and desertification, which have caused widespread famine in the countryside.[386] Rural areas have also suffered from a lack of investment as urban areas have received most international aid and local and overseas investment.[387] The rural infrastructure—roads, schools, health clinics, water, sewage, and electricity—lags well behind that in the towns, and is particularly poor in isolated areas and regions affected by civil conflict. Regions with poor infrastructure suffer from higher costs of goods and services; professionals such as teachers and health workers are reluctant to work there; and, businesspeople are less willing to invest.[388]

Agriculture is Sudan's most important economic sector in terms of employment, engaging some 70% of the active labour force, although it contributes only some 27% of Sudan's GDP, compared with around 32% for industry and around 41% for services.[389] Six main agricultural systems can be identified in Sudan: three rain-fed, two irrigated and one nomadic/semi-nomadic (Figure 3). The three rain-fed systems (mechanised, lowland smallholder subsistence and shifting/agro-pastoralist) dominate the southern third of the country. Medium to large-scale commercial irrigated farming is carried in a number of locations close to Sudan's great rivers, the Nile, the Blue Nile, the White Nile and the Atbara, but is relatively limited in total acreage. Medium to large-scale smallholder irrigated farming covers extensive acreage in the triangle between the Nile and the Blue Nile south of Khartoum, on the upper Atbara and along these rivers. Finally there is a nomadic and semi-nomadic belt some 200km-400km wide running across the centre of the country. North of the nomadic and

382 All figures from IMF 2013.
383 Von Grebmer et al. 2013.
384 Human Development Index 2014; UNDP 2014.
385 CBS 2010; World Bank 2011.
386 Ibrahim 1988; Rone 1999.
387 Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005: 98) call this process the "urbanization of economic power".
388 IMF 2013
389 IMF 2014.

semi-nomadic belt is a hyper-arid zone covering about 40% of Sudan's surface area that is not utilised for agriculture or livestock-raising, except for the narrow belt of irrigated farming that borders the Nile.[390]

The most important crops in Sudan are sorghum, wheat, cotton, sugar cane, oilseeds, including sesame and groundnuts, and gum Arabic. Sorghum, wheat and groundnuts are grown mostly for domestic consumption; sesame, cotton and Gum Arabic are grown mainly for export. The raising and trading of sheep, camels and goats by nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists is a vital part of the rural economy, contributing almost half of the value of all agricultural production, roughly the same as crop farming. While the exact number of pastoralists, semi-pastoralists and nomads in Sudan is unknown because they were not counted in the last census (see footnote above), estimates suggest they make up 10% of the population.[391] Despite being small in number, pastoralists dominate the central belt.

There is strong regional demand for Sudan's agricultural products; agricultural goods account for over one–third of total exports. Indeed, livestock, mostly sheep and camels, is the leading agricultural export, and Sudan's second-leading export after gold, earning more than US$670m in 2013.[392] Indeed, far from being economically marginal as they are sometimes viewed, "[p]astoral societies…contribute considerably to the national economy [via livestock to GDP and foreign exchange earnings] and supply domestic markets with meat, milk and ghee, white cheese and hides."[393]

However, all types of agriculture and animal husbandry are underdeveloped and inefficient. Rates of mechanisation and use of fertilisers and modern and high-yielding seeds are low; yields are even lower than those of countries with similar environmental conditions. Most farms are rain-fed and susceptible to drought. From the early 1960s, investment in farming focussed on mechanised rain-fed and commercial irrigated agriculture while traditional, smallholder rain-fed and irrigated farming was drastically underfunded.[394] Pastoralism suffers, too, particularly from a lack of selective breeding of stock and weak veterinary services. Livestock exports are also hindered by the high costs of transport to the Red Sea ports of Port Sudan and Suakin.[395]

390 Nile Basin Initiative 2012.
391 UNFPA 2012. In 2010, the United Nations' High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the number between 8% and 20% of the national population. These figures obviously differ wildly; estimating precise numbers is difficult, particularly as temporary labour migration skews figures even further. Therefore, the later finding from UNFPA is used here.
392 World Bank Group 2015a.
393 Salih 1999. Also see Salih 1990.
394 Paragraph paraphrasing Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.
395 IMF 2013.



Figure 3. The six main agricultural systems in Sudan (adapted from Nile Basin Initiative 2012: 124).

Crop farming and livestock-raising are the main occupations of rural Sudanese households, but the provision of services by blacksmiths, carpenters and potters, as well as builders, traders, teachers and members of professional classes are also important to the rural economy. Some rural Sudanese additionally find both permanent and casual employment in factories located on the outskirts of towns and cities. These include cement factories (mostly state-owned but some in private ownership) as well as a small number of mostly private "factories…producing [clothes], leather goods, sugar, flour and vegetable oil; as well as…petrol industries."[396] Mining for "gold, silver, chromite, asbestos, manganese, gypsum, mica, zinc, iron, lead, uranium, copper, kaolin, cobalt, granite, nickel, tin"[397] are important occupations in the rural areas.

Gold mining has boomed over the past decade and has created a Sudanese gold rush.[398] Gold is Sudan's single most important export; in 2013, gold exports, mostly from artisanal mining, generated US$1bn, around one-third of all exports.[399] However, the surface gold deposits are becoming increasingly depleted and the government is turning to foreign investors to develop commercial deep-mining operations for gold.

Labour migration is a longstanding feature of Sudan's rural economy.[400] The main flow of migrants from Sudan's rural areas is to the towns and cities, especially Khartoum, but the emigration of both skilled and unskilled work is also well established; indeed, Sudan has one of the highest net emigration rates in the region.[401] In 2011, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated the number at 1.3m with around half of this number in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Gulf.[402] Official sources valued remittances in cash and kind sent back from Sudanese working abroad at US$400m in 2014, but the wide gap between official and 'black market' exchange rates for the Sudanese pound encourages many Sudanese expatriates to transfer funds through unofficial channels, and the real value of remittances is likely to have been several times higher. In this vein, it should be noted that in November 2016, the Central Bank of Sudan introduced "an incentive policy" which allowed commercial banks to adopt much higher conversion rates, close to the black market rate, largely to "attract the savings of workers abroad and providing more foreign currency resources to the banks to fund imports for private companies."[403]

396 CBS 2010.
397 UNDP 2015a.
398 Calkins and Ille 2014. Sudan has been a gold mining centre for millennia. In recent years, however, the mines in the Nubian Desert, for example at Wadi Qubquba, have dried up, and many people have now gone south to the Fifth Cataract region, near the case-study area (see below).
399 World Bank 2015a.
400 Beck 1999.
401 World Bank 2011.
402 IOM 2011. Sudanese emigration accelerated in the 1970s when the Arab states of the Gulf began their development drives. According to IOM figures, another 360,000 Sudanese are in Chad, 164,000 in Uganda and smaller numbers in Ethiopia and other north-east African states, although many of these are refugees from Sudan's internal conflicts, which have also caused the internal displacement of several million people.
403 Reuters, 'Sudan offers its citizens broad incentive to sell dollars to banks', 5 November 2016.

Workers' remittances are an important part of the income of rural households and their communities. From a rural point of view, however, high levels of migration are a mixed blessing. Villages have lost many of their young people to the towns, cities and overseas; from the observations of the present author, at least half of any riverine village is taken up by empty and dilapidated houses. The loss of help with farm or livestock work, not to mention the emotional strain of being apart, is felt keenly by remaining members of the family and household,[404] even though remittances can outweigh the loss of manpower.

At the national level, labour force participation (measured as a percentage of the population above the age of 15) is estimated to be 54% overall, 76% for men and 32% for women; the national unemployment rate was estimated at 14.8% in 2012, rising to 20% for women and 24% for young people.[405] The last number is especially significant given that Sudan has a young demographic profile, with 58% of the population below 18 years of age. Unemployment rates are significantly higher in the countryside than in the towns, as observed by the present researcher. The Sudanese state has sought to reduce unemployment and the 1997 Labour Act did establish a number of employment exchanges;[406] nonetheless, generally those living in rural areas find it hard to participate in these schemes, particularly if they are nomadic or pastoral.[407]

The descriptions given here about the weakness of the Sudanese economy and the disarray in which the state keeps country's main industries are important for the present study because they compound the argument given above about the failure of the nation contributing to continued identification of Sudan's population with their *gabāīl* and not with Sudan's ancient 'Nubian' history or 'World Heritage'. Just as Sudan's *gabāīl* provide a measure of ontological security they also provide economic security in the absence of a working state: a state which fails to deliver adequate services, i.e. a 'weak' or 'failed' state, almost invariably induces individuals to seek to (further) rely on other actors/entities and/or social units, including *gabāīl*. Indeed, whether in Sudan or the Middle East, 'tribal' identity and the political strength of 'tribes' are oftentimes a direct result of the state's performance, including its delivery of security and socio-economic development (see Chapter 6). The impact of archaeology in Sudan is thus further determined by factors such as whether the state is marginalizing and/or providing patrimony to certain groups, including *gabāīl* (see Chapter 5). This argument is also aided by the following descriptions (till the end of Chapter 4, especially 4.3.1).

404 Chen and Korinek 2010.
405 All figures from IMF 2014.
406 Sudan, Labour Act 1997, see §8.3.
407 This was apparent from conversations with Ali al-Hassani and Medowi al-Mansūrī, Nov. 2015.

4.2 Household (In)Security

The household (*bayt*) is the main economic unit by which people orientate themselves and organize their finances.[408] The individuals interviewed for this study variously defined their household in terms of family (‘*usra*); residence (also *bayt*; ‘household’ and ‘residence’ are differentiated by context); and shared means of livelihood.[409] Family members are officially classified as “husband or wife, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, grandson, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, and stepdaughter”[410] but unofficially also include uncles, aunts and cousins. Household members usually share a residence or live in the same village. Some households may include non-family members. Increasingly, households include family members who live and work in other parts of Sudan or abroad, particularly if they support dependants “who have no work, profession or income by which they earn a living and…relatives…who depend wholly on [that family member] for their livelihood”.[411]

Due in large part to the weakness of the state (above), households in Sudan are mutual-support systems in which the survival of the collective is paramount.[412] Personal incomes and outgoings are secondary to making provision for the group, an aim to which all household members contribute. Young children and the elderly may or may not be income-producing (observation shows both), but they help with food and land preparation and the associated tasks of crop-farming and livestock-raising. Equally, there are cultural values that determine the division of labour and Sudanese families tend to live by the principle that young, economically-active men must support their household, family and dependants. In this context, this burden can be considerable: young rurally-based men face challenges from unemployment and agricultural stagnation. Even those who are educated find it hard to find work in the saturated job market for graduates. Moreover, “Sudan has a very high dependency ratio[;] there are four persons of dependent age (under 15 and over 65 years) for every Sudanese of working age (15-64 years)”.[413] Furthermore, as noted above, at the national level, labour force participation among women is only 32%, despite the fact that “women outnumber men in every cohort of the population aged 20 years and over.”[414] As 68% of working age women are not in separate employment outside the household,[415] the ratio of dependents to workers is even higher.

---

408 Grawert 1998. Chen and Korinek also identify the household as the “salient economic unit” in rural China (2010: 965).

409 Salih reported similar responses in 1999, see Salih 1999: 15.

410 Sudan, Labour Act 1997: 3. It seems likely that the inclusion of half- and step-relations into the definition of ‘family’ is a consequence of the practice of polygamy, which is now beginning to decline.

411 Sudan, Labour Act 1997: 4. Even though the Labour Act uses the pronoun ‘his’, there are a number of women in Sudan who are the head of the household.

412 Abdalla 1987.

413 UNFPA 2012. This is a dire situation but it does seem to have improved: the households analysed by Abdalla (1987) in 1981 had an average of nine dependants.

414 BTI 2014: 13.

415 Sudan Housing and Population Census 2008 in UNFPA 2012.

A sense of economic insecurity was pervasive among all of the rural Sudanese with whom the present researcher had contact, regardless of their location, age, job, residence or *gabīla*, and this has an important bearing on Chapter 6 of this study, as well as for the arguments about the link between 'nation', 'state' and '*gabīla*'(above). However, two economic challenges in particular were relevant for this study: land scarcity and lack of access to credit.

4.2.1 Land Scarcity

Many rural communities in Sudan perceive that one of the main reasons their lives are hard is that land is scarce.[416] Most farms in Sudan are small. In 1992, "the average land holding in the Sudan was estimated at [eight] faddans,"[417] which equates to 3.4ha or 8.3 acres. "However…in riverine…Sudan the average land holding is one faddan."[418] Small farm sizes are the result of a number of factors, including rural population growth and the endogamous nature of inheritance law, which has led to the steady sub-division of land holdings. The systematic appropriation of land by the state, which "dates precisely to the moment [Anglo-Egyptian government] took control of the territory of Sudan…in 1898"[419] has compounded the problem.

Indeed, land appropriation was initiated by the Anglo-Egyptian administration with the Titles to Land Ordinance in 1899, which only recognized private ownership of irrigated land; withdrew most customary or communal, as opposed to legal or statutory, rights to land; and declared all non-irrigated rain-fed farmland and pasture to be state property. This hit the pastoralists especially hard. Not only were their ancestral grazing lands almost entirely rain-fed and their rights to that land customary and communal, but later Anglo-Egyptian land laws in the 1940s would also state "that the rights of the cultivator should be considered as paramount to nomadic pastoralists"[420] (which again adds evidence to the argument about the state's discrimination against its citizens based upon their livelihood).

Since independence in 1956, successive Sudanese governments have followed similar policies.[421] The 1971 Unregistered Land Act denied the legitimacy of customary and communal property rights across all rain-fed land and transferred all rights to rain-fed land, water and grazing—some 596.6m *faddān*, or around 99% of all Sudanese territory—to the state.[422] The 1974 Law of Criminal Trespass made breaching the boundaries of agricultural projects a criminal offence. These policies have, in effect, nationalized the pastoralists' traditional grazing lands and the rain-fed plots of small farmers

416 Salih 1999. This was also more than apparent from this author's interviews.
417 One *faddān* (sometimes *feddān*) equals 0.42 hectares or 1.038 acres.
418 Salih 1999: 123.
419 Umbadda 2014: 36-7.
420 Suleiman and Ahmed 2013: 2, regarding the Soil Conservation Committee 1944.
421 Umbadda 2014: 33-4.
422 Elnur 2012.

and left both groups vulnerable to state policies of leasing land to investors, including foreign entities, in large-scale, mechanized and commercial farming.[423] The land tenure system was under review at the time of writing but was not expected to reverse the earlier state policies.[424]

The use of appropriated land for large-scale commercial farming began under the Anglo-Egyptian administration, with the Gezira Agricultural Scheme to grow cotton for export. Over the last two decades, the Sudanese state has encouraged domestic and foreign investment in commercial agriculture as part of efforts to diversify the economy.[425] These efforts have intensified since the secession of South Sudan in 2011, which deprived the government in Khartoum of 75% of the oil revenues on which it had previously relied to pay for imports. Indeed, the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, which had long been neglected, has become a national priority.[426] Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other Arab states of the Gulf (which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC[427]) have responded eagerly to the invitation from the Sudanese state to lease land for big commercial irrigated-agricultural schemes;[428] these states have rapidly growing populations[429] and import most of their food[430] and see these investments as helping to secure their own food security. Other states, including China, have also been involved. From 2004 to 2008, 'land grabs' have "amounted to 4 million hectares of land on leases whose average term is fifty years", though many have been longer.[431]

Pastoralists have traditionally opposed any move to fence off land that blocks the movement of their herds or prevents access to pasture. However, they have been unable to prevent the state's appropriation of their traditional grazing lands and the steady encroachment of commercial farming, mainly because their rights to these lands are customary as opposed to legal or statutory. The

423 World Bank Group 2015a.

424 B. Evans-Pritchard, 'Agriculture Sudan: Can local investors beat foreign investment?', *IPS News Agency*, 18 December 2008.

425 IMF 2014. For similar reasons, other cash-poor countries in the Horn of Africa have also sought to develop their agricultural sectors and open them up to foreign investors.

426 Speaking in 2014, Higher Council of Investment Secretary General Ahmed Shawur told the influential London-based Arabic newspaper, *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* that Sudan "is the most qualified country to bridge the gap in food shortage not only in the Arab World…but also a big portion of the global food shortfall." (Taha 2014). But Shawur's idea is not new. Private international companies have been leasing land in Sudan since 1990, while the Gulf countries began investing in the early 2000s. Indeed this idea goes even further back; it is a 'policy hangover' from the 1970s at which time the socialist-turned-capitalist government of President Jafaar Nimeiri was also spearheading a national revival based upon increasing agricultural exports and the idea of Sudan as 'the world's breadbasket'. Broadly speaking, the actors and their roles in the breadbasket enterprise have remained the same until now: Sudan still provides the raw resources, the wealthy Arab states of the Gulf are still providing the finance, and investors are still promised a number of perks as part of this open-door policy. Therefore this agricultural 'revival' may more usefully be seen as an 'agricultural renaissance' [*al-nahda al-zira'iyya*] which has done little to aid the lives of local farmers, let alone address hunger. (Also see Verhoeven 2015.)

427 The Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, is a political and economic alliance between the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, established in 1981.

428 B. Jopson and A. England, 'Sudan woos investors to put $1bn in farming', *Financial Times*, 11 August 2008.

429 Population growth in this region is more than double the world average.

430 K. Garber, 'As food crisis worsens, some nations are desperate for arable land', *US News and World Report*, 12 June 2008.

431 In 2012, the Sudan government granted one private UAE company a 99-year lease for land in Sudan. (D. K. Yousef, 'Al Ghurair to seal 99-year farmland lease in Sudan', *Gulf News*, 20 February 2012.)

extension of big commercial farming projects has caused a sharp reduction in the amount of grazing land available to the pastoralists. A study on Gedaref State south-east of Khartoum reported that grazing lands had reduced from 78.5% of the state's area in 1941 to 18.6% in 2002.[432] The steady parcelling off of land for big public or private agricultural projects has blocked their traditional migration routes, forced them to make lengthy detours and led to a pasture shortage. Increasingly, the pastoralists have had to buy fodder (*birsîm* or *gesh*) to supplement the pasture, which has driven up fodder prices. This has had the effect of making wage-labour jobs that also provide free fodder as part-payment-in-kind particularly sought after by the pastoralists.

Inevitably, "behind every land grab is a water grab",[433] and the extension of these big agricultural projects has increased Sudan's demand for Nile water[434] and helped trigger an expansion of dam building. Dam building has been one of the most important development policies pursued by Sudanese governments since the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955).[435] The Sennar Dam was built on the Blue Nile in 1925 to further the cultivation of cotton for export on the vast Gezira irrigation project in the triangle of land between the confluence of the White Nile and Blue Nile.[436] The Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile just south of Khartoum followed in 1937.[437] Alongside the Aswan dam (see Chapter 5), post-colonial Sudanese governments have built three big dams, Khashm al-Girba (1964) on the Atbara, Roseires (1966) on the Blue Nile and Merowe (2009) on the Nile, though the purpose of all three dams was as much to generate electricity as to store water for irrigation. The Merowe (sometimes called the Hamdab) dam was the biggest such project in post-colonial Sudan with a generating capacity of 1,250 megawatts (MW), equivalent to just under half of Sudan's total capacity, and holds the equivalent of 20% of the Nile's annual flow.

The Sudanese state is planning several more dams on the Nile for hydro-electric power generation and irrigation; three are in an advanced state of planning, although at the time of writing, construction had not yet begun. The three are Dal at the Second Cataract with a generating capacity of 340-450 MW; Kajbar at the Third Cataract with a planned capacity of 360 MW; and Shereik at the Fifth Cataract with a planned capacity of 350 MW. The Nile cataracts are preferred sites for dam construction because the bedrock is close to the surface at these points which forces the river into multiple smaller branches and making it "more tractable"[438] for dam construction. Although this has increased tensions with Egypt over rights to Nile water, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and China, now Sudan's largest trading partners, have invested heavily in dam building to feed the agricultural schemes in

---

432 Babiker 2011. Also see Sulieman and Elagib 2012; Sulieman 2013.

433 GRAIN, 2012. 'Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab there is a water grab', *GRAIN Reports*, 11 June 2012.

434 Speaking in 2010, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Agriculture said that his country "aims to grow cereals and animal feed in Sudan" because "these crops consume large quantities of water." (Arabian Business, 'Saudi Arabia boosts Sudan agriculture investment, says minister', 7 December 2010.)

435 See Welsby 2008 for a good overview of Sudan's dam building history.

436 Gertel et al. 2014.

437 Willis 2011.

438 Willis 2011: 19.

which these countries have also invested heavily (see below).[439] Although the human rights abuses and large-scale confiscation of land that has come with dam construction is widely condemned, and whilst the policy of building has become one of the most controversial and persistent themes of Sudan's recent history (see Chapter 2, 'Rationale'), successive Sudanese governments have argued that the dams are needed to support economic development. On a visit to the Merowe dam in 2007, Bashir declared, "Our battle against poverty starts from here."[440]

Dispossession of land is a traumatic event, whether in relation to farmers or pastoralists. The suddenness and rapidity with which oftentimes 'ancestral' lands can be taken away has added to the sense of insecurity of the farming and pastoral communities, partly because land represents not only economic security but also social prestige. In Salih's words:

> …land is not a single factor of production; rather it is a fabric of social, cultural and symbolic interactions and is understood as an essential means of maintaining natural balance between themselves, their ancestors and the generation yet unborn.[441]

Indeed, "intensive love of land has been growing deeper with every generation due to its scarcity and population increase."[442] Land scarcity means that few households, even those who are better off, are able to live solely on the income they make from the land, whether from crops or livestock. The appropriation by the state of the traditional rights of large populations has intensified the competition and conflict over resources within and between rural communities. "The social landscape of present-day Sudan is littered with land-related and resource-based conflicts that have…rupture[d]…the rural economy."[443] As such, these dispossessions have led to mass protests, indeed violent regional uprisings, over the years, most of which have been quickly suppressed by the authorities, sometimes violently.[444] The resistance to land appropriations has been so widespread and fierce that some observers have suggested that it might lead to wider political instability.[445] This is particularly important for this research since the ideas that land scarcity is directly linked to social peace[446] and that socio-economic insecurity "affects human behaviour"[447] has an important bearing on this study.

---

439 Verhoeven 2015. The mass displacement of people and the damage done to archaeological sites has caused increasing unease about dam building, and a growing reluctance of Western governments and financial institutions to finance them; major Western-led international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the EU, refused to support the $3.8 billion Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Project in 2011. Instead, the Merowe dam was financed by Arab development funds and a Chinese bank.

440 M. Lacey, 'A Race to Save Sudan's Past from Progress', *New York Times*, 30 May 2005. Also see Sudan Tribune, 'Beshir says new dam will help reduce poverty in Sudan', 20 March 2005.

441 Salih 1999: 222.

442 Salih 1999: 2.

443 World Bank Group 2015a: 70.

444 Agence France Presse, 'Sudan farmers protest government 'land grab'', 1 April 2011; Sudan Tribune, 'Hundreds of farmers stage demonstrations in central Sudan', 11 May 2011; Reuters, 'Sudan police teargas protesters in Khartoum – witnesses', 12 June 2015.

445 S. Martelli, 'In Sudan's breadbasket, a revolution is waiting to happen', *Agence France Presse*, 5 July 2011.

446 Egemi 2006.

447 Sloman 2000: 2. Strictly speaking, Sloman refers to "scarcity" and sees its effect upon behaviour as economics' central question.

4.2.2 Lack of Credit

In addition to land scarcity, the chronic shortage of credit is another major cause of hardship for rural communities. Both farmers and pastoralists need liquidity to purchase equipment, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and animal fodder at key points of the annual agricultural cycle and if their cash reserves have run out, as is often the case at certain points in the cycle, they need access to credit. According to Ahmed and Ammar, 'informal' sources of credit, such as local merchants, friends or relatives, are generally inadequate.[448] Liquidity loaned by 'formal' credit providers, including government institutions (e.g. the Savings and Social Development Bank) and private banks (e.g. the Agricultural Bank of Sudan), do not fulfil households' needs either.[449]

Loans with interest (*ribā*) as well as *shari'a*-compliant Islamic microfinance are theoretically available; in 1990, the government introduced measures intended to make microcredit available in rural areas. However, rural microfinance providers are few and far between. Even where they exist, small-scale farmers find it hard to obtain credit partly because they are considered to be high-risk borrowers; indeed, some 53% of farmers who have secured loans have defaulted on them;[450] pastoralists, who do not have a permanent place of residence, find it even harder to get loans. The credit system is, from their perspective, exclusive and biased in favour of those who are already wealthy. Suffice it to say there "is no sustainable, i.e. profitable, microfinance model for the rural areas."[451]

To meet their need for liquidity, households turn to a number of informal credit systems based on reciprocity and 'rotating credit'.[452] *Sandūg* (lit. 'fund') is one such system.[453] In Sudan, it is predominantly run and used by women, though men are not excluded, and developed to allow households to meet day-to-day expenses as well as the costs of social obligations such as illness, pregnancy, birth, circumcision, marriage and death.[454] Registers of contributors are kept (or memorized) and households are duty-bound to contribute in proportion to their means. Other economic support systems include *nafīr*, a system where a village's manpower is mobilised to support an individual household to build a house or an animal enclosure;[455] and *ishtrākiyya*, a system whereby households contribute cash for the purchase of goods to be used by the community. Again, each

448 Ahmed and Ammar 2015.
449 Salih 1999; Ahmed 2012.
450 Ahmed 2012.
451 Ahmed and Ammar 2015: 153.
452 Salih 1999: 39.
453 Ardener defines rotating credit associations as: "[a]n association formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is give, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation." (Ardener 1964: 201).
454 Rehfisch 1972. *Sandūg* emerged during and after World War II, with the sharing of tea and sugar between neighbours during rationing (a good example of economic scarcity). However, observations in Hamadab-Bejrawiya demonstrate that *sandūg* can also cause trouble when someone tries to change or take advantage of the rotation sequence.
455 Lewis 1991: 73. As Lewis notes, *nafir*, or *nafir 'āmm*, is a "general" but fundamentally obligatory "call to arms."

household contributes what it can and the contributions are recorded. The social obligation upon households to contribute to these schemes resonates with the Islamic duty to give alms (*zakāt*) to the destitute, the working poor and those who are unable to pay off their own debts.[456] These informal credit systems have been evaluated as "small but effective"[457] but neither they nor the formal loan systems provide enough liquidity for farmers and pastoralists to make longer-term investments; the traditional credit systems are not able to compensate for perpetual cash shortages either.

The annual cycle of income and expenditure known to economists as the "capital circuit."[458] This phenomenon has been studied in the farming communities in the locality of Zeydab, 80km north of the case-study area. Scholars there found an annual 'capital circuit' made up of three economic periods each comprised of approximately four months (Table 2).[459]

Surplus Period	April to July	Living off harvest sales; low expenditure, enough for subsistence but not investment.
Balance Period	August to November	Living off savings and stored food; farm and off-farm activities few.
Deficit Period	December to March	Money low, fewer stored crops; selling off assets and animals; high expenditure on household needs.

Table 2. Capital Circuit of main food crops in River Nile State (Source: created from data in Ahmed 2012: 324-5).

The 'surplus' period follows the harvest and runs from April to July as farmers sell most of their crops. The Zeydab study showed that farmers sold 77% of their crops of wheat, sorghum, legumes and vegetables immediately after harvest and 11% later in the year, keeping the remaining 12% for household consumption.[460] Farmers are constrained to sell most of their crops immediately after harvest due to a lack of adequate storage facilities; low access to liquidity (harvest follows the 'deficit' period); and since loan repayments are oftentimes due at the start of the 'surplus' period. Farm-gate prices are driven down as most farmers sell the same crops at the same time, limiting their income.[461] April to July is, therefore, the only period in which households commonly experience a liquidity surplus, though this does not mean that they have cash to spare. Most households have enough money for living expenses but little for investment.

456 Toor and Nasar 2004.
457 Abdalla 2013.
458 Ahmed 2012; Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.
459 Ahmed 2012; Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.
460 Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.
461 Ahmed 2012: 329.

The ‘balance’ period runs from August to November. During this time, households live off their diminishing savings and stored food, but cash reserves run low because there is little on-farm income until the next harvest. The ‘deficit’ period runs from December to March, during which households commonly face significant financial strain. Cash runs low but expenditure increases as food reserves deplete and households need to invest in seeds, fertilisers and fuel, preparing the land for the next harvest.[462] These inputs are critical to crop yields and thus household incomes; yet, most households do not have enough cash at this point in the ‘capital circuit’ to purchase both food, which typically consumes most income,[463] and production inputs.

4.3 Strategies for Survival

4.3.1 Networks

To the detriment of the majority of the population, the Sudanese state is controlled by a minority which appears both unable and unwilling to evenly deliver services, including the means for socio-economic development. The distribution of resources is controlled by networks of cronies linked to the ruling regime who favour their own familial, social and political circles, including (if not prioritizing) members of their own *gabīla*.[464] These kinds of structural deficiencies have important consequences. For instance, apart from land scarcity and lack of credit, another outcome of the structural inequalities produced by the Sudanese state’s uneven provision of services and opportunities is a lack of social mobility (defined as an upward movement through socio-economic class). The parallel marginalization and patrimony of certain groups also produces a context in which, as Hänsch notes of the *dār* of the pastoral Manāsīr, “the state is virtually absent.”[465]

The systematic shortcomings of the Sudanese state are widely recognized and long recorded. In 1986, Gwado-Ayoker argued that “it is the hakuma [state] itself which brings hunger, poor education, illness, and creates unemployment.”[466] In 1990, Woodward described Sudan as a “decaying” and “unstable state.”[467] In 2011, Transparency International described Sudan as “extremely corrupt” and noted that “all available data and country reports indicate persistent, widespread and endemic forms

462 Ahmed et al. 2012: 326; CBS 2010: 28.
463 CBS 2010: 27.
464 Malwal 1991: 179.
465 Hänsch 2012: 203.
466 Gwado-Ayoker 1986: 156.
467 Woodward 1990.

of corruption, permeating all levels of society";[468] indeed, the resolution of 80% of legal disputes is "influenced by local politics and alliances."[469] Salih has described how the state is incapable of adjudicating day-to-day disputes to the extent that there is no "full effective state intervention."[470] A corrupt judiciary and the lack of the rule of law have induced ordinary Sudanese to turn to cheaper and quicker "local" means of dispute resolution; in the cases reviewed by Salih, only 20% were resolved in civil courts.[471] Past processes, such as the introduction of numerous and often contradictory land laws following the centralisation of government during Turco-Egyptian rule from 1821 to 1885, worsened the situation by creating what Salih calls the problem of "legal pluralism."[472] In this vein, Safwat notes the seemingly perpetual "unworkability of the state."[473]

As noted above in section 4.1.2, in a context where citizens cannot rely on the state, other actors/entities and/or social units, such as households and *gabāīl*, tend to assume a greater role in providing key services, including social security. As Salih aptly notes, "[t]his system which is based on reciprocity provides the 'safety net' that takes the place of state welfare."[474] Looking at it from the perspective of Wasserman and Faust's (1994) social network analysis, within these collectives, there are individuals who have enhanced power and authority who might be termed 'key players'. Some might be decision makers or people in "authoritative positions", for example sheikhs[475] and other village elders, judges and local politicians; others have power because of the knowledge, information or *baraka* (good fortune) they are perceived to possess (e.g. fakirs, imams, healers, elderly figures).[476] Still others may be proxies who derive influence from proximity to a patron with whom they may have a client relationship. In all of these cases, the "status and influence depends directly on their ability to mobilize followers."[477] Therefore, individuals "diversify their options by a multiplicity of clientage [sic] and straddling of their social networks."[478] Societies organized in this fashion are often referred to by scholars as 'network societies';[479] the salience of this conceptualization was strongly suggested to the present researcher by the frequent complaints from respondents about a lack of contacts (*wasta*, from *wastāni,* lit. 'middle') to help them. Indeed, the importance of such networks in Sudan should not be underestimated.

---

468 Martini 2011: 2.
469 Salih 1999: 242, 256.
470 Salih 1999: 251.
471 Salih 1999: 227.
472 Salih 1999: 2; There are about 25 separate legislative acts related to land comprising more than 600 different sections (Salih 1999: 83).
473 Safwat 1991: 188
474 Salih 1999: 39.
475 As described by Salih (1999) and others, shaykhs dispense informal advice and customary justice to people in their territory (*sheikhāt).* Even if their politics does not align with those of the central government—and it is common for state law, imposed from above, and uncodified customary law, developed from below, to clash—and although some of the roles are no longer actively political—many shaykhs continue to exercise influence through informal channels.
476 Kerkvliet 2009: 231.
477 Salih 1999: 256.
478 Salih 1999: 252. Also see Abdalla 2013.
479 Castells 1997.

Of note, some scholars posit that the structural inequalities produced by the state, and its absence and/or presence, may in fact be deliberate. Salmon notes that "the Sudanese government relies on apparent disorder as a means of maintaining comparative advantage over political rivals and keeping a step ahead of international pressure."[480] In this vein, Salmon argues that Sudan is "not a cohesive state or even a shadow-state, but rather… institutions subverted by multiple, competing clientelisitc and personal networks."[481] Importantly, his subsequent argument is that the competition among networks created by uneven distribution of resources does not "focus solely on the accumulation of resources…but more importantly on the distribution of positions, powers and reputations to allies."[482] As such, the line of reasoning is that "conflicts create[s] disorder, disorder provoke[s] confusion, confusion obfuscate[s] responsibility and responsibility, for many actors, is much better left unclear."[483]

Regardless of whether political strategy underpins the Sudanese state's performance, the broader outcome is clear: the 'weakness' or absence of the state coupled with its uneven delivery of services strengthens the salience of networks such as *gabāīl*, seemingly at the expense of the construction of inclusive nationhood.

4.3.2 Livelihood Diversification

Because few rural households are able to live solely on earnings from the land, whether from crops or livestock, household members must take other jobs to supplement income. Elmqvist, who has carried out research in Kordofan in western Sudan, calls this "livelihood diversification" and defines it as "the efforts of all family and household members to generate household income from a range of occupations."[484] When evaluating a household's income, economists often distinguish between 'on-farm' and 'off-farm' income: 'on-farm' income comes from crops and livestock produced for consumption and cash; [485] 'off-farm' income derives from "wage employment, household entrepreneurship and/or multiple activities that span economic sectors."[486]

Household entrepreneurship includes the making of products for sale. Some farming households make mudbricks (*jalū*s) in large quantities in the courtyards of their compounds, some of which they sell to the pastoralists; other farmers manufacture red bricks by the Nile. Women often make beauty

480 Salmon 2005: 6. Also see Chabal and Daloz 1999.
481 Salmon 2005: 6.
482 Salmon 2005: 6.
483 Salmon 2005: 6.
484 Elmqvist 2006. Moen and Wethington (1992) similarly describe livelihood diversification as a 'family adaptive strategy'.
485 Netting 1993.
486 Chen and Korinek 2010: 963.

products such as wax (*halāwa*), henna, incense (*bakhūr*) and traditional dresses (*thuwūb*) as well as practical items such as rope (*habil*), baskets (*guffa*), tea flappers (*hababa*), hand brooms (*mūkshasha*), food covers (*tabaq*) and mats (*birīsh*) for personal and family use and to save money, although the number of women with these skills seems to have declined since the 1970s.[487] They further have the skills to use mobile and computer technologies, but access to these often consumes rather than stimulates household income. A number of women in the case-study area will offer services such as henna painting and hairdressing, but this carries with it the risk of gaining a reputation for being promiscuous. Homemade products are also occasionally sold to neighbours or at the market, and become part of household income. However, earnings from such sources are neither regular nor guaranteed.

The pastoralists also undertake household entrepreneurship and undertake a range of activities separate to their livestock. One of the main 'off-farm' work undertaken is gold mining. Pastoralists seem to dominate the industry, which is predominantly made up of small-scale artisanal mining carried out by individuals or small groups of men who make seasonal migrations (*kalla*) to the north, where surface gold deposits are located.[488] The miners often work in unsafe conditions (many are known to have lost their lives[489]) and their use of mercury for gold smelting is hazardous to both health and the environment. The Sudanese authorities estimate that in 2013, when the initial fieldwork for this study was undertaken, the industry employed close to one million workers (or 11% of total employment).[490]

According to Elmqvist, "[d]iversified livelihoods are crucial for food security and risk management" in rural communities.[491] Indeed, livelihood diversification is an example of making "choice under constraint"[492] that begins with what economists term the 'assumption of rationality', namely the assumption that people at all times attempt to improve their economic circumstances. Livelihood diversification is not only a poor man's strategy; observation shows that it transcends economic class. One of the wealthiest respondents in the case-study area generates income from crop farming, trading and transport. Furthermore, some households diversify so successfully that they can even change their primary source of income.

487 When discussing material culture with women, it became clear that those now in their 30s (and younger) often do not have the craftsmanship of their mothers and grandmothers.
488 Salih 1999: 157.
489 M. Gunn, 'Sudan Gold Mine Disaster Kills at Least 60 People, Official Says', *Bloomberg*, 2 May 2013.
490 IMF 2014.
491 Elmqvist 2006.
492 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001.

4.4 Life in Hamadab and Bejrawiya

4.4.1 A Riverine Environment

The case-study area is centred upon the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya as well as their surroundings, located beside the Nile roughly 200km north-east of Khartoum, in the Shendi Reach region of River Nile State (see Chapter 3). The Shendi Reach is a stretch of the Nile that extends for some 75km north and south of the town of Shendi. The climate is extremely dry, hot and dusty for most of the year. The annual mean temperature is 31°C. From May to October the average high is 42°C and the average low 27°C; from November to April the average high is 35°C and the average low 18°C. However, in summer, temperatures can spike to 47°C, and in winter they can fall as low as 6°C, with a strong chilling wind. Average annual rainfall is under 60mm, all of which occurs during what might be called the 'rainy season', which runs from May to October; three-quarters of rain falls in the months of July and August.

Ecologically, Hamadab-Bejrawiya lies almost at the northern limit of the nomadic and semi-nomadic agricultural system indicated in Figure 3 (above). Along the Nile, there is a ribbon of cultivation 1-2km deep made up principally of small, pump-irrigated farms (Figure 4, below). East of the cultivated strip is a zone of scrubland and rough pasture roughly 1-2km deep that runs up to and beyond the railway line from Khartoum to Atbara. The western fringes of this zone, close to the Nile-side farms, are used for the grazing of sheep and goats, and some camels. The scrubland zone is also the location of the clusters of houses linked by small tracks that make up the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya. Some 3km east of the railway line lies the major north-south asphalt highway between Khartoum and Atbara, and some 50km beyond that is the Butana, an extensive and fertile plain that lies between the Nile, the Blue Nile and the Atbara that provides grazing for large numbers of nomads and semi-nomads from across central Sudan. To the east of the highway, there are a number of state- and privately-managed agricultural schemes.[493]

Apart from the narrow and strikingly green ribbon of irrigated land hugging the Nile, the Shendi Reach presents a rather bleak, desiccated, dusty and mostly flat landscape. The Khartoum-Atbara highway is a major landmark, being "much more than simply a strip of asphalt...[rather] as part of a larger technological regime carrying the potential for the reordering of the political economy of a whole region."[494] Brightly coloured Chinese-made coaches are frequently seen on the highway, as are

493 The agricultural projects near Hamadab and Bejrawiya include the el-Hassa and el-Mamum projects, which are run by the government; the Tala and Fanar projects, which are sponsored by Saudi Arabia; and the al-Kima project, sponsored by the UAE. The projects are large (al-Kima covers 30,000 *faddān*) and they are highly mechanized, employing few workers from the local area (see Nile Basin Initiative 2012).

494 Beck 2017: 242. Beck is here describing the road known as 'the Artery of the North' which connects Omdurman to ed-Debba but the description matches that of the Khartoum-Atbara highway, too.

customised 1950s British Bedford trucks.[495] Every few miles are small clusters of ramshackle road-side shops and canteens selling tea, bread, plates of beans (*fūl*) and lentils (*'addis*) and maybe some sugared doughnuts (*zallabiya*). Soft drinks, sweets and crisps are also stocked here in large quantities. Against this backdrop, the pyramids of Bejrawiya, which lie in three sets, two east and one west of the highway, present a magnificent spectacle to the (Western) visitor. However, on the many occasions the present author travelled past the pyramids by coach, it was noticeable that none of the Sudanese passengers looked out of their windows to see them (see Chapter 5).

Daily life in the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya is largely self-contained; most activities take place within the village confines. Travelling from the highway towards the villages, groups of men, women and children grazing camels and livestock on whatever scrubby pasture they can find become an increasingly frequent sight. Modes of transport change dramatically. Most people move around on foot, on donkeys or riding donkey-carts (*carūs*). Occasionally there are crowded buses, small cars (mostly Hyundai Atoz[496]), and old converted Toyotas (*būxis*). In this context, the archaeologists' travel in new 4x4 vehicles is very conspicuous (see Chapter 7).

4.4.2 Farming Communities

In this region of Sudan, the landowners and farmers are predominantly from the Ja'aliyīn *gabīla*, or have married into it, and regard the Shendi Reach as their 'ancestral' homeland. Hamadab-Bejrawiya therefore lie at the very core of Ja'alī territory. Most of the Ja'alī households here depend upon smallholder irrigated farming and minor animal husbandry for their primary source of income. The farms lie in the cultivated strip adjacent to the Nile or in the Wadi al-Hawad, which meets the Nile just south of Hamadab, where the town of Kabushiya has grown up. The farms are irrigated using diesel pumps whose ownership is often shared. Before the introduction of motorized pump-irrigation in the 1970s, farmers used wooden waterwheels (*sagiyya*) to lift water from the Nile onto their fields (*hawashāt* s. *hōsh*, lit. 'allotments' or 'plots'); the *sagiyya*, like the pumps today, would have been co-owned.[497] The farms are privately owned but the owners are sometimes absent, working as merchants or professionals in the cities or abroad, although elderly landowners tend to stay close to their land. The farms are thus usually run by tenants who either farm for themselves or sharecrop with others, and this is a role that some members of the semi-pastoral Fadniyya have begun to take on.

---

495 See Hänsch 2009 "Sifinja: The Iron Bride", Sudan/Germany 2009.

496 The popularity of South Korean-manufactured Hyundai Atoz and the Japanese Toyota also attests to Sudan's economic interest in the East. Many other African countries are similar. In the case-study area, it is commonly thought that people who own Atoz vehicles must have "struck gold" in the mines.

497 Salih 1999.

The farms produce wheat (*gamih*), sorghum (*durra*), onions (*basil*), hibiscus (*karkadi*), okra (*bāmiya*), garlic (*thūm*) tomatoes, potatoes and citrus fruits; wheat is a particularly important crop in River Nile State, taking up 25% of all farmland.[498] The crops are produced both for household consumption and for sale. Some Ja'alī farming households own poultry (chickens) and most own at least a couple of sheep or goats, which graze freely around the villages. Wealthier households may also own one or two cattle, which they keep close to the Nile since the animals need a great deal of water. Livestock are kept principally to supply milk, butter and meat for household consumption and for sale. The sale of crops, and to a lesser extent livestock, is the most common source of cash income for farming households. There are small local markets on the west bank of the Nile at Mekniya, Goz Burra and Keleh. However, Hamadab and Bejrawiya are well placed to access important regional agricultural markets in Kabushiya and Shendi, 4km and 45km respectively to the south, and ed-Damer and Atbara, 40km and 70km respectively to the north. Data collected through interviews and observations by the present author show that the lives of most small farmers in Hamadab-Bejrawiya are hard. Few households are able to survive on their produce. Most farming households are therefore obliged to diversify their livelihoods. Some men try to find employment on local projects to construct schools, houses, wells and sanitation facilities. Others migrate to the cities for work; many Ja'alī households have at least one relative who works in Khartoum or another city, such as el-Obeid in Northern Kordofan, where many Ja'alī households have relatives. A small number emigrate for work abroad.

The large Ja'alī villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya may be thought of as four sub-villages: (n-s) Old Deraqab (evacuated, see below), Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South in Bejrawiya; and, Hamadab in Hamadab (Figure 4).[499] These villages are home to around 320 Ja'alī households or around 2,240 people (on the basis of households of c.seven individuals). The villages are made up of clusters of rectangular compounds (s. *hōsh* pl. *hawashāt*) near to their farms[500] in which the Ja'alī households live all year round (Figure 5). The compounds are built of *jalûs* and covered with dung (*zibāla*) or, if the family is wealthy, of cement (*ʾasmant*). Entrances are adorned with shiny-metal front doors. Inside, each family has its own single-story square or rectangular house and, typically, a shared cooking area and a tap for cold water. The houses have between three and eight rooms. Each room usually has at least one rope bed (*sirir*; *angarīb*) against each wall, upon which visitors sit and household members sleep. Some houses may have a separate saloon for the men to host guests or other features, like a shelter for water jars or a small sauna room (*dikka*).

498 Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.

499 Note that Garstang's (1914) map calls Deraqab 'Bejrawiya', and Hinkel's (2000) calls the whole area Bejrawiya.

500 Some farms, however, are up to 3km away from the villages (Salih 1999) and conversations with famers in Hamadab revealed that some rent land even further away: several men who rent land in Hamadab live in Shendi (45km away).



Figure 4. Villages and neighbourhoods in the case-study area. The settled Ja'aliyīn and Fadniyya are marked in black; the nomadic-pastoral settlements are marked by red dots (Source: graphics added by the author to Google Earth, 2017).

The village nuclei are densely packed with compounds, many of which share contiguous walls. The villages used to be located much closer to the Nile; they were moved east as Hamadab became more vulnerable to flooding from the Nile as well as from Wadi al-Hawad to the south, and Bejrawiya to flooding from Wadi Tarabil to the north. More specifically, residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya told the present researcher that the floods of 1946 and 1988 were catastrophic and destroyed a large number of houses, which caused the villagers to relocate to the east and build sand-bag walls on their western perimeter (Figure 7). Hamadab and Bejrawiya are now 1-2km east of the Nile and they have moved steadily eastwards as they have expanded; residents in Bejrawiya have even built new neighbourhoods such as (n-s) New Deraqab, Upper Kejeik and Upper Bejrawiya (see Chapter 7). For those in Hamadab, it has been harder to expand due to the settlements occupied by the increasingly

settled but still semi-pastoral Yazīd, Bawalīd, Jutab and Fadniyya; the latter in Dahwab and Fadniyya I, as well as in Mataris and Fadniyya II, although Fadniyya I and II are technically in the district of Kabushiya. Today, while some Hamadab residents have moved to the east of the railway, this is not a happy residential situation (see below).

Figure 5. Typical mud-brick compounds belonging to the Ja'aliyīn in Bejrawiya; view south-west towards the Nile. (Source: photograph by the author, February 2015)

4.4.3 Pastoral Settlers

While Hamadab and Bejrawiya are broadly recognised as Ja'alī territory, a large number of pastoralists have settled to the east of the villages. Moreover, although, like the government, most Ja'aliyīn do not count pastoralists as part of the community proper (see below), the present author classes them as members of the now-extended villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya and thus the site-community.[501] Starting in the north-east of the case-study area, in Bejrawiya, around Wadi Tarabil, New Deraqab and opposite Meroe itself, are the newest groups of pastoralists belonging to the formerly-camel-herding Hassaniyya and pastoral Manāsīr. The presence of these groups on Bejrawiya's eastern outskirts seems to have been seasonal up until the mid-1980s, when they began settling, although individual group members had been setting up temporary homes there since the 1950s.

Opposite Hamadab proper to the east are the now-settled Yazīd in Yazīd, the Fadniyya-Bawalīd in Bawalīd and the Jutab in Jutab. Below Hamadab proper, to the south in Mataris and south-east in

501 Of course, the following is not a complete list of all the people that live in the case-study area: conversations have been had with the camel-herding Hamamid branch of the Aliab Ja'aliyīn in the Wadi Hadjala; members of the Rubātāb, Rashāida, Shagiyya and Bijā as well as Fellata, a group originally from West Africa.

Dahwab, are the various branches of the Fadniyya. The Fadniyya also occupy the blocks of Fadniyya I and II in Kabushiya, just outside the case-study area. North of Hamadab is a small settlement of Yazīd, known as Zamarna. These groups (Yazīd, Aliab, Jutab, Fadniyya) seem to be inter-related, although the specifics were hard to obtain (the present author takes a significant liberty in gathering them under the broad name of 'Fadniyya'). Broadly speaking, these groups began settling on Hamadab's southern and eastern outskirts in the 1960s, and in earnest in the mid-1980s, following a notoriously bad drought in 1984-5. However, some individuals and their families have lived there seasonally since the 1930s.

The livelihoods of these *gabīla* are based on livestock, mainly goats and sheep but in some cases camels; unlike the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, the Fadniyya also own or rent small parcels of land. Their diet is largely vegetarian and includes plenty of dairy products and fermented foods;[502] only rarely does a family kill an animal for its own consumption. Male, and sometimes female, members of the pastoralist households spend the months during and after the July and August rains, usually until October and sometimes until December, migrating in search of pasture in the eastern hinterland (*khāla'*), which forms part of the Butana.

Despite being forced east by drought and other man-made and environmental factors, the pastoralists generate cash or goods-in-kind from the sale or exchange of dairy products, live animals, meat, wool, hair and skins. One of the reasons that they were first attracted to Hamadab-Bejrawiya is that these villages are well situated for livestock trading, being located upon a long-established corridor through which livestock are moved to market (Figure 6). They are also within easy reach of the livestock markets of ed-Damer, 40km to the north, whose camel market is famous, and Kabushiya, 2km to south, which is well-known for its market for small animals (*behaim*). From here, livestock are transported to other parts of Sudan, to Eritrea and Ethiopia, or to ports on the Red Sea coast for export to the Arab states of the Gulf. Pastoralists are also attracted by the river, road and railway and their concomitant micro-economies, and the proximity to the gold mines near Atbara.

502 While the Ja'aliyīn are also vegetarian, there was a noticeable difference in food consumption between farmers and pastoralists: Ja'aliyīn are far more likely to have powdered milk and fizzy drinks; the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya like to drink extremely hot goat milk.



Figure 6. The Northern Livestock Corridor. Note the traffic around Shendi (Source: adapted from Nile Basin Initiative 2012: 149).

However, the expansion of big commercial agricultural projects has disadvantaged the pastoralists in Hamadab and Bejrawiya by occupying their former grazing lands and blocking their traditional migration routes (*masarāt*). One agricultural project, belonging to a private Saudi Arabian company was said by a number of respondents in Hamadab-Bejrawiya as being a particular problem because of its great size (Figure 7) and the fact that its central-pivot irrigation (CPI) system blocked the pastoralists' migration routes to the pastoral corridor and to the Butana. The pastoralists' attempts to enter the boundaries of the scheme have resulted in the offending livestock being slaughtered or ransomed and the owners penalized. To appeal against the projects, indeed against any foreign investor, is forbidden by law.[503] The customary rights of the pastoralists have therefore been usurped and handed to a foreign company with the full complicity of the Sudanese state.

Whilst on migration, they live in tents (*hajīr*) made of dom-palm reeds (*birīsh*) and goat hair (*shaar*) built around a wooden Y-frame (Figure 8). *Hajīr* are designed to be assembled and dismantled with ease and thus suit a mobile lifestyle and would have been assembled to form camps in the open.[504] Most Hassanī household members continue to make the journey to the Butana. Among the Manāsīr, only two or three household members complete the annual migration. Most Fadniyya no longer go on migration, though they continue to rely heavily for their livelihoods on their herds, large numbers of which can be seen inside their compounds. In recent decades, these seasonal settlements have become permanent residences where their wives, young children and the elderly live.[505] The pastoralists who still migrate with their herds in the rainy season also maintain secondary residences in settlements in the hinterland, although increasingly the Fadniyya and Manāsīr are abandoning them.

Of the three non-Ja'alī pastoral groups, it is the Fadniyya who were the first to arrive, and have settled most densely in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and assimilated some of the lifestyle of the agricultural Ja'aliyīn, numbering around 1,275 residents in c. 160 households in total (on the basis of households of c.eight individuals. As noted above, they have established a number of neighbourhoods, the biggest of which, made up of Jutab and Bawalīd, they refer to as a 'line' of houses (*hi*) known as Hī as-Salām ("of Peace"). Hī as-Salām is now a permanent home to over 300 people and has its own Local Committee; other Fadniyya villages have similar numbers and together they now make up about 36% of the local population. The still pastoral Manāsīr and Hassaniyya in Bejrawiya only number around 75 individuals in c. eight households (on the basis of households of c.nine individuals), and some of these inhabit the area on a seasonal basis. While the number of pastoralists living near

503 Gertel et al. 2014.

504 Now, as in the past, the women of the household build these houses. Observations suggest that, in general, pastoral women are much more active in the manual tasks of their household than the farming women (see Chapter 5).

505 UNDP 2006. The settlement of nomads and pastoralists is a complex issue but in Sudan it takes three main forms, distinguished by the level of governmental coercion involved: organic and voluntary settlement, settlement as part of a government scheme, and forced re-settlement. Government resettlement and rehoming schemes have a bad reputation among the pastoralists for a number of reasons: the services they purport to provide do not materialize, compensation is inadequate and hard to get, and new settlements can be used as sources of control. These understandably explain why agro-pastoral and nomadic groups sometimes reject attempts to be settled in schemes where the government provides the impetus.

Hamadab-Bejrawiya is growing, partly because they traditionally have larger families than their farming neighbours,[506] they remain in the minority in the case-study area, making up c.2% of the local population. Exact data on the number of pastoralists at the local level is also hard to come by: the Hamadab and Bejrawiya Local Committees, which are dominated by Ja'alī farmers, tend not to record pastoralist numbers because they do not consider them to be part of (or living "inside") the community proper (again, this is the same tendancy as seen at the national level). Nevertheless, information gathered from interviews with local residents and personal observation confirms that pastoralists are a large minority, yet even if calculated with the still-pastoral members of the Fadniyya, probably make up no more than 38% of the population in the case-study area.

Since arriving in Hamadab and Bejrawiya, the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya have continued to live in *hajīr* but most are now set up within a mud-brick or cement *hōsh*,, similar to, but smaller than, those used by sedentary farmers.[507] However, unlike the densely packed Ja'alī villages, the pastoralists' compounds are widely spread to provide space for their livestock enclosures (*zirība*) and to minimise the mixing of herds. If a household has relatively few animals, an animal shelter (*raqūba*) might be set up abutting an outside wall of the *hōsh*. Although broken *hajīr* are still repaired, fewer new ones are being built; many pastoralists now choose to build in mud-brick. For the Hassaniyya, this is true of both their village residences and their residences in the Butana, though they may add an extra ring of reeds, known as a *hassīr*, to hold their livestock. In contrast, the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists build *hajīr* very rarely, preferring to build in mud-brick like the Ja'aliyīn. The differences in principal household location and domestic architecture are clearly concomitant with the relative importance of livestock rearing and farming to each of the groups, although it seems clear that as people continue to arrive and settle, they change and modify their habits and traditions to adapt to the culture of sedentary life.

506 Abdalla 2013. Certainly, the pastoral residents which the present researcher spoke with were all part of large families (see Chapter 6).

507 There are pros and cons to both types of architecture: the *hajir* often need repair, and *birīsh* reeds are expensive compared to *jalûs* mud-bricks. On the other hand, mud-brick compounds are less sturdy against floods.



Figure 7. Pressures on land in Hamadab and Bejrawiya**.** (L) The floods caused by rain overflow from the wadis cover a large part of the western side of the villages (Source: Google Earth, 2013); (R) Al-Rajhi's CPI machines running parallel to the Nile and the Wadi al-Hawad (Source: Google Earth, 2015).

Figure 8. A Hassanī family in front of their *hajīr*. Note the surrounding mud-brick wall. (Source: photograph by the author, February 2015.)

4.5 Everyday Politics

4.5.1 Cooperation and Conflict

Naturally, the sedentary Ja'aliyīn, semi-pastoralist Fadniyya and pastoralist Manāsīr and Hassaniyya find it "expedient to associate across kinship, residential and livelihood boundaries on the basis of mutual interests."[508] The most important, positive and long-standing element of these relationships is the exchange of goods and services. Ja'alī farmers pay pastoralists to take their sheep and goats (and sometimes camels) to graze in the Butana during the rainy season, running from May to October. During the dry season, the farmers employ pastoralists as labourers on farms by the Nile or in the Wadi al-Hawad for cash or in exchange for a share of the harvest.[509] Farmers provide the pastoralists with staple foods, such as wheat and sorghum, as well as vegetables and fruit, while pastoralists provide the farmers with animals, meat and dairy products, and herbs and plant-based medicines sourced in the hinterland. Farming households have also traditionally provided cash loans to the pastoralists, [510] though in more recent times the farmers' own need for liquidity to pay for farming inputs has decreased the amount of lending and borrowing between the groups.

The relationships between farmers and pastoralists have, however, never been completely smooth.[511] Historically, the migratory pastoralists have been both a threat and an annoyance to the settled farmers, with a reputation (not always deserved) for raiding villages, stealing crops and livestock and refusing to acknowledge the existence of boundaries. The farmers have long viewed the pastoralists as a nuisance, particularly when the pastoralists' unruly herds damage crops by eating or trampling them; when this occurs, the farmers will detain the animals in Kabushiya until a payment (rumoured to be SDG10/goat or animal) has been made by the owner. For their part, the pastoralists have viewed the encroachment of farmers on their traditional grazing lands with similar anger and frustration. Today, their relationships are under increasing strain in four inter-related areas.

First, the traditional economic exchanges between the sides have begun to break down. More and more, Ja'alī landowners or tenants are reducing their use of hired labour in order to cut production

508 Salih 1999: 50.
509 Also recorded by Weschenfelder 2014.
510 Warburg 1992. When the Ottomans began integrating Sudan into a monetised market economy in the 19th Century, traders (*jallaba*) would act as money-lenders to pastoralists who needed cash. Warburg also relates how, in the 1840s the export of cattle to Egypt was halted and this had a damaging effect on the cattle-herding nomadic groups such as the Baqqāra. The Ja'aliyīn and other Nile-based traders stepped in and organized a system whereby "the cattle were sold to the *jallaba* in cash, who in turn resold it to the Baqqāra in exchange for slaves." (Warburg 1992: 3). By the 1880s, the system had streamlined and there seem to have been 'stations' of traders: those in Kordofan paid the cash-taxes on behalf of the Baqqāra and received supplies of slaves in return; the traders in Kordofan then sent them on to their kin by the Nile, where they were used as labourers.
511 Komey 2014.

costs.[512] Slowly increasing mechanization, even on relatively small farms, also means that there is less of a need for seasonal labour from the pastoralists.

Second, the establishment of permanent Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya settlements in Hamadab and Bejrawiya has brought them into increasing competition with the Ja'aliyīn over land. The Ja'aliyīn regard the land settled by the pastoralists as their property and as part of their 'ancestral' homeland. Although the land was not being used by the Ja'aliyīn for residential purposes at the time when it was settled by the pastoralists, they did see it as potential space for the future expansion of their own settlements. The Ja'aliyīn therefore see themselves as having been boxed in between the river and farmland to the west and the pastoralists' settlements to the east. Indeed, a number of rifts have come about because of what the Ja'aliyīn see as residential pressures caused by slow nomadic encroachment. Important events date back to the 1960s when the Jutab and Fadniyya-Bawalīd first began building permanent houses near the fields in Hamadab (also close to the South Mound of Domat al-Hamadab). When diesel pumps were introduced in the 1970s, they were told by the Hamadab-Ja'aliyīn to move (this was so they could extend the width of their fields but the Jutab and Fadniyya-Bawalīd were told that it was illegal to build so close to the archaeological site); the groups were granted space to the east as compensation. The Jutab had thus begun construction in the east when the flash floods hit west Hamadab in 1988. By all accounts, some members of the Hamadab-Ja'aliyīn tried to tell the Jutab to go, but because they had started building their houses, they were allowed to stay. To this day, the residents of Hamadab are split over the actions of their Local Committee, which allowed the Jutab to settle there or, as some phrase it, "gave our land away." For their part, the Jutab and Fadniyya-Bawalīd seem to hold resentment only towards their neighbours in Mataris, who also had begun settling more permanently in the Nile-side areas of Hamadab, but were able to build and establish their village before the introduction of the diesel pumps.[513] These details are highly relevant in a context that is already characterized by insecurity and land scarcity; in fact, it seems that for a number of reasons, the floods in 1946 and 1988 as well as the intervening drought in 1984-5 are the most important moments in the history of Hamadab and Bejrawiya in the last 70 years. For the Ja'alī villages, both floods resulted in drastic changes to the social, political and physical landscape and set about an accelerated move of the Ja'aliyīn to the east. At the same time, the floods coincided with unprecedented numbers of pastoralists and semi-pastoralists moving into the eastern parts of the villages.

512 See Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012: 249-50.

513 There are two stories of how Mataris (lit. 'terrace', 'barricade', 'sand-bag wall') received its name. The first was given by Manāra al-Fadl (who was told by "old people"), who said that "[i]n the past there was a woman who owned all the land but lived on her own. Other people came from Matamma [a Ja'aliyīn town on the west bank, opposite Shendi, and settled there. Her friends [?] said to her not to let the newcomers stay because they will take over her cultivation. But the woman said she would let them stay because she wanted protection [i.e. in the same was as a sand-bag wall]. So the *hilla* became known as Mataris, which is the plural of 'terrace'." The other story, which is closely related, is that the word mataris relates directly to the sand-bag wall that the Ja'aliyīn built as a safety measure after the flood of 1988. The latter is also recorded by Weschenfelder 2014.

Third, farmers and pastoralists are increasingly in competition for off-farm jobs. The pastoralists are under increasing economic strain from the appropriation of their grazing lands, the blocking of their migration routes by major mechanized agricultural projects, and the reduction in the amount of wage labour offered by the farmers. Their need for wage-labour employment elsewhere, including on the agricultural projects (and on archaeological digs, as will be explained in Chapter 5) has grown.[514] However, most farming families in Hamadab and Bejrawiya are also under economic strain because the income derived from 'on-farm' activities is rarely enough to support a household; most of them live under the poverty line or very close to it. The farmers, too, are therefore obliged to diversify their livelihoods by engaging in 'off-farm' activities. There is thus a direct and growing competition between farmers and pastoralists for unskilled seasonal work and casual wage labour as well as indeed all other scarce resources in this challenging economic environment.

Fourth, and in addition to the economic competition with the pastoralists over land and off-farm jobs, the Ja'aliyīn also see them as a threat to their longstanding social and political dominance in the locality and perhaps, even, on a national scale. They seem to regard the creation by the Hamadab pastoralists of their own Local Committees as a particularly dangerous precedent.

The economic relationships between the Ja'aliyīn on one side and the Hassaniyya, Manāsīr and Fadniyya on the other, are therefore partly co-operative and partly competitive. The mutually beneficial economic aspect of the relationships depends upon the sides being able to fulfil their complimentary economic roles: the settled agriculturalists need to produce crops, and the migratory pastoralists need to graze their animals. If these roles are not fulfilled, the expedient economic basis of the relationship is compromised, competition is likely to grow fierce and thus, the ground may be paved for an increase in the overall chance of tension. As Kerkvliet puts it, "[b]ehavior [sic] regarding producing, distributing, and using resources can range from cooperation and collaboration to discussions and debates to bargains and compromises to conflicts and violence."[515]

4.5.2 The Allocation of Services

A key aspect of the competition between the Ja'alī farmers and the pastoralists relates to the allocation of basic services (*khadamāt*) through a political and administrative hierarchy that is dominated by the Ja'aliyīn, who are perhaps closest to the Sudanese state's idealized Arab-Muslim 'in-group'. At the top of the hierarchy is the office of the President, an office that has been held since 1989 by General Omar el-Bashir, who belongs to both the Ja'aliyīn and Shagiyya *gabâīl*. The president heads the

514 Umbadda 2014.
515 Kerkvliet 2009: 227.

national government. Administrative and political authority is devolved to 18 states, each of which has a governor and a capital in which ministerial offices are located. The states are divided into Districts, and the Districts into Localities, both of which have administrative centres with government offices. Finally, authority is devolved from the Localities to Local Committees, which operate at the village level and are responsible for the adequate allocation of basic services such as education, water supply, public health, the environment and, as Hamza al-Ja'ali notes, "social cohesion and harmony." Each committee numbers around ten men who are elected by the community members; women are theoretically eligible to stand for election but the present researcher has never observed this in practice. The Local Committees are the closest representatives of the state's political power to the rural population and although they are the fifth rung of government below the presidency they nevertheless wield significant authority at the local level. Indeed, Local Committees are the rural support bases of many governmental ministers.

The case-study area of Hamadab and Bejrawiya lies within the Locality of Kabushiya Rural, which comprises a number of villages around the town of Kabushiya which lies 4km to the south; Kabushiya itself is in the separate Locality of Kabushiya Urban. Kabushiya Rural falls within the District of Shendi, a town of 63,000 people with many ministry offices that lies 45km to the south, and in River Nile State, whose capital is at ed-Damer 40km to the north. Two of the Local Committees are based in Hamadab; one representing the Ja'aliyīn and one the Fadniyya; there is also one committee in each of the Bejrawiya villages. The Ja'alī committees are invariably made up of individuals from old and powerful Ja'alī families; former Head of the Hamadab Village Committee Hamza al-Ja'ali, one of the main respondents for this study, is a primary example of this (below). The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya are not eligible to vote in Local Committee elections and do not have a committee of their own. However, because of the length of time they have been settled in Hamadab and because of the growing size of their community, the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists were able to apply successfully to the government to establish their own Local Committee (above).

One of the most important roles of the Local Committees is to administer the distribution of water (*muya*) and electricity (*kharhaba*), good access to which, in the Sudanese context, are comparative luxuries. Water in Hamadab and Bejrawiya comes from the water table 150m below the surface, which is electrically pumped to water tanks (*sirīj*) from which it is distributed to all Ja'alī, some Fadnī and few pastoral households by pipe, although both pipelines are now suffering from old age. Most Ja'alī and some Fadnī households are also connected to mains electricity (a network that was installed thanks to the Merowe dam), providing power for lighting, cooking, ceiling fans and telephone chargers.

Although water and electricity were originally installed with government funds (after lengthy petitions), their extension and maintenance lies with the community residents. As Hamza al-Ja'ali

explained, "schools, mosques, water fixtures, clubs, kindergartens…they are all paid for and built by the local people." For example, if a water pipe breaks, then the residents have to pay for its repair. The extension of the Hamadab water supply has been paid for by remittances from labour migrants, as was the clinic in Kabushiya. In a context in which the central government is absent, the local residents rely heavily upon worker remittances and acts of charity, including money directed by religious organisations based in Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Gulf into school- and mosque-building; they also provide teachers because as Hamza al-Ja'ali notes, there is very little government support: "[t]he responsibility of the government is to bring teachers, books, chairs, tables and desks. But it only supplies teachers and books" (see Chapter 8). Part of the electricity provision stems from a solar panel that was donated by Poland and the Netherlands.

The Local Committees play a major role in managing these projects, sourcing materials, contracting labour and, of course, making key decisions as to which households get access to the services. However, in comparison with other areas in Sudan, the case-study area does not receive any significant outside relief. While the "international presence in Sudan"[516] has largely revolved around interventions during the disasters of the civil wars throughout the 20th Century, many aid relief schemes were, and still are, focused upon providing relief to the far west, Darfur, and to the south, and not to places such as Hamadab-Bejrawiya. This can be seen in economic terms, too:

> [t]here are significant regional differences in number of household receiving economic transfers from aid programs with as much as 41 percent of all households in Northern Darfur to less than 0.5 percent in several of the Northern and Central states.[517]

The humanitarian aid and foreign NGO personnel are therefore present in far larger numbers in peripheral areas is due to conflict. In other words, the reason for a lack of NGO presence in the case-study area is therefore attributable to the relative peace it experiences.

The case-study area therefore boasts few services; those that it does are firmly in the hands of the Ja'aliyīn, as long-standing residents of the area. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Ja'aliyīn seek to control their monopoly carefully. Indeed, although most Ja'alī households in Hamadab-Bejrawiya live either under the poverty line or very close to it, observation by this researcher suggests that the pastoralists are even less well off, and that the farmers have much better access to basic services than the pastoralists. In contrast to the Ja'aliyīn, most of the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya and many of the Fadniyya have no direct access to piped water or electricity.[518] Although the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya have a water tank, they do not seem to have a network of pipes with which to access it; consequently they have to get their water from a man who delivers it by bicycle. The absence of possessions that

516 Large 2011.
517 CBS 2010: 24.
518 Access to electricity is clearly being used as a political tool on a national level, too, as described by one pastoralist: "The houses who do not have electricity were promised it in exchange for their votes in the election. [Our family] have voted for the [ruling] NCP many times but we still don't have electricity."

need electricity, for example televisions, cookers and electric fans, is one of the most conspicuous features of the pastoralists' households. To charge their mobile telephones, the pastoralists must call upon friends in the Ja'alī villages, if they have them, or travel further afield.

In conversation with the present researcher, Mansūrī, Hassanī and Fadnī respondents commonly described the Ja'aliyīn who monopolize basic local services as being "like those people who take the eggs and then kill the hen". The comparative security enjoyed by the Ja'aliyīn is also explained by the pastoralists in terms of the Ja'alī ownership of land, better access to education, more profitable social networks and their political hegemony at the local, regional and national levels. As Layla Ahmed, a Hassanī woman, told the present researcher about the Ja'aliyīn in Hamadab:

> [They] all have a strip of land by the Nile, that they are all educated, that…people in Hamadab have their backs in [have people in] government and in education, so the government won't take their land.

Certainly from their perspective, the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya are ill-served by the Ja'alī-dominated Local Committees. But from the Ja'aliyīn's perspective, this is their *dār*, and only they have full rights to access the already strained services.

4.5.3 The Discourse of Insecurity

As noted above, normative social organisation is discursively expressed by a number of linguistic and historical signifiers, or 'proofs of ethnicity', namely ancestry, language, religion, homeland and livelihood. Therefore, insight into the social relationships in Hamadab and Bejrawiya can be gained by observing how the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya address one another as strangers, or refer to one another in the presence of an outsider such as the present researcher.

In the first instance, despite the ongoing rhetoric about 'Arab-ness' and 'Muslim-ness' on a national scale, these topics were notably absent in local discourse. The Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya are inevitably denigrated as inferior by the Ja'aliyīn due to their perceived inter-relationships with members of other 'inferior' groups of the south, such as the Nūba, but nevertheless they all recognize one another as descendants of immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula. The same can be said for religion: all of the Sudanese in Hamadab-Bejrawiya are self-identifying Muslims (as are 98% of the country's population), and religion (although not 'sect' or 'order') is one of the few things that unites all the residents, regardless of age, livelihood and *gabīla*. This was partly by design: discussion of Islam was not pursued in conversation unless it was raised organically, which was rare even though on a day-to-day level, Islam shapes people's lives: the hours of prayer structure their day, the associated Islamic architecture, particularly the mosque, provides (gendered) space as well as

social roles and hierarchies, guides life event celebrations, such as weddings, name days, circumcision days, and provides practical guides to the treatment of the dead. The issue of religion was most commonly raised by female respondents, and usually in relation to the present researcher's own Judeo-Christian cultural background. More specifically, the latter was discussed in terms of women's comparative relationship with men, and often in terms of marriage. Female respondents often asked the present researcher if she would "find a Sudanese man" and "convert to Islam." Only one conversation was explicitly about religion, with an imam of the Ansar al-Sunna (lit. 'Followers of the [Prophet's] Tradition'), a Sudanese adaptation of a puritanical Salafist religious order established in the 1970s. Even in the personal and family histories of the respondents (presented in Chapter 5), the Islamic context or adherence of the protagonist to Islamic principles was quietly presented rather than emphasized. What is clear is that Islam underpins every aspect of life, but not in a conspicuous way.

Therefore, while community residents are acutely aware of each other's *gabīla*, and are familiar with the national discourse of identity, people at the local level refer to one another as much with reference to respective livelihoods and residences rather than their ancestry or religion. The pastoralists often refer to the Ja'aliyīn by their residence, "People of the Village" (*nās al-hilla*), "People from Hamadab" and so on. Pastoralists also often refer to farmers as "People of the River" (*nās al-bahr*).[519] *Hilla*, relates to the verb *halla*, which means 'to settle down'. The Ja'aliyīn frequently describe the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya as "People of the Countryside" (*nās al-balad*) or, far more commonly, "nomad" (*'arab*). Importantly, even though all of these groups claim Arab ancestry, in this context the word *'arab* does not signify a genealogical connection with the *gabāīl* of the Arabian Peninsula, who came to the Sudan in the 7th to 14th Centuries CE, when Islam spread across north and east Africa. Instead, because the Ja'aliyīn take pride in their history as farmers along the Nile and in their success as traders (*jallaba*, see Appendix 7) and professionals, the word *'arab* is used to denigrate the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya lifestyle that requires them to move around the land and living with their animals. In separate conversations with three Ja'alī women, Awadiya Nassim explained that "they live in the open–there is no *hōsh*, no privacy, the animals can poo everywhere, the women can walk around without *thuwūb*"; Adira al-Sikina added that she did not "mind them" but did not like the fact that they are "dirty" and "eat and drink with their animals"; and Amna Suliman said, "The *'arab* here keep saying 'we belong to the Ja'aliyīn', but they don't!" The Ja'aliyīn make fun of the pastoralists' residences; some, including as Amna Suliman, told the present researcher that they were proud that "there have never been any *buyūt al-birīsh*" here. Even the reference to *buyūt al-birīsh* is derogatory: it literally means "Houses of Mats" (*birīsh* is both the raw material and the product) and does not take into account the fact that, for the pastoralists, it is a *hajīr*.

519 Of note, *bahr* in Modern Standard Arabic generally refers to 'sea', with the Nile officially known as Nahr al-Nīl (for example River Nile State known as Wilâya Nahr al-Nīl). However, *bahr* is also used with reference to the Nile too; hence the White Nile is known as Bahr al-Jabal or Bahr al-Abyad, while the Blue Nile is also known as Bahr al-Azraq.

The Ja'alī denigration of the pastoral lifestyle could, however, be seen as ironic since they themselves were once semi-pastoralists (and some even fully nomadic). The Ja'alī neighbourhood of Kejeik in Bejrawiya, for example, is named after *kajaīk*, a large sun-dried split fish.[520] Like many other fermented foods in Sudan, *kajaīk* was made for those who live far away from, rather than close to, the Nile. Moreover, according to a number of Ja'alī women, including Mariam al-Pasha, in the past mud-brick houses were built with animal shelters (*raqūba*) attached to it and crop storage facilities (*guseiba*) within the main house. It is noteworthy that the constructed link between livelihood and residence is assumed by everyone despite the fact that they have a questionable basis in reality: it is a stereotype.

As much as their different livelihood and the overwhelming experience of living in alien territory might serve to unite them, the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and especially the Fadniyya do not see themselves as a unified group. Instead, and as with all identities, 'Others' are measured through sameness and difference. In conversations with the present researcher, Hamid al-Harun, a Mansūrī, noted that the Hassaniyya are "like us" because they "have animals" but denied living in the same area as them. Similarly, when asked about her family, Fadiya Mohammed, also a Mansūrī respondent, noted that they "came here before the [Merowe] dam [was established in 2008] and before the *'arab* who live above [Meroe; i.e. the Hassaniyya]." So, we can see that the Manāsīr here use the same scale of ''Arab-ness' or 'nomadic-ness' as well as 'new-ness' and 'old-ness,' in other words the same hierarchy of values as the Ja'aliyīn when describing themselves in relation to the Hassaniyya.

A more nuanced picture of what we might call the scale of 'Arab-ness' and connection to territory is shown with the Ja'alī perception of whom it is acceptable to marry. In conversation with the present researcher, Ja'alī respondents dispelled the idea of inter-marrying with the *Manāsīr* or *Hassaniyya* on the basis that they are 'new' to the area, and marry off their daughters at an early age. They might, however, marry the Fadniyya because some of them are 'old' (i.e. they have been living there for the requisite length of time). Yet inter-marriage with Fadniyya is still regarded by the Ja'aliyīn as far from ideal and likely only if the Fadniyya family is well-known and long-established in the area; Hamza al-Ja'ali told the present researcher that there was still a marriage barrier ("partition") between them and that "while appearances can change because of nature and climate, ancestries cannot be changed."

Education is another signifier of sameness and difference. In Sudan, educational attainment is low all-round and even primary education in the site-communities in the case-study area is by no means universal. The monthly fee is around SDG35 ($5) for primary school and around SDG70 ($10) for secondary school, which are beyond the reach of most households, the vast majority of which have multiple children; in such circumstances, parents will often choose one or two children to be

520 Dirar 1993.

schooled.[521] In the case-study area, a good number of Ja'aliyīn were educated at least to primary school level and a small number have university degrees, but few of the pastoralists go to school because attending school, particularly secondary school onwards, can be perceived as a migratory experience that takes otherwise economically useful children away from the household. This matters because the economic function of each household depends upon members' presence therein; their 'entrances' and 'exits' to and from the household are significant events.[522] This was shown to be true for both the sedentary farmers and the pastoralists. Pastoralists tend to have more children (though again this is not shown in the data samples collected for this research) and on aggregate leave school to go to work much earlier than sedentary agriculturalists (that is if they have attended school at all). Farming families seem to have fewer children but expend more of their gross income on these children, particularly their education. Children play a strong economic role in the chores of the pastoral household, such as collecting wood or disbursing animal fodder. While the Ja'alī children and young adults go to school and ideally into employment, for the Mansūrī and Hassanī men, education rather involves a series of movements to and from the hinterland as one grows with age. This is changing of course, and the number of pastoral-nomadic children attending school is high in comparison to other areas of Sudan. Thus, while notions of 'education' are different, the economic salience is that both include 'leaving the home' for periods of time. This is of course one of the reasons school attendance remains low. Completing university is a 'social indicator' of independent family wealth and/or external patronage: incomes rarely provide the surplus for the lofty heights of university education, and the poor provision of education makes it equally out of reach for many. Fadiya Mohammed, one of the Mansūrī respondents, commented, "I cannot read or write as there were no schools in *al-khāla'* [the hinterland]…But we know that this is different in comparison with life at *al-bahr* [the Nile]."

A final popular slur against the pastoralists is to comment that, by becoming sedentary, they are attempting to become "like citizens" (*medaninîn*, from '*medīnā*' lit. 'city'). By implying that the pastoralists are not citizens already, the Ja'aliyīn are echoing the categorization of pastoralists on the national level. As noted above this insult finds its parallel in the law: Anglo-Egyptian land laws in the 1940s stated that farming rights trump pastoral rights and the CBS' 2009 NBHS (CBS 2010) did not even count nomadic homes as proper households, a point which foreshadows another made in Chapter 5 regarding Anderson's (1991) theorem that censuses are undertaken by new states as part of the ideological organization of their territory.

521 There are some who are exempt from paying, such as orphans, the very poor, and the children of *shahīd* ('martyrs': army officers who died in the war). The state also subsidizes brothers from the same family (apparently on a 'two for the price of one' basis) and the sons of teachers. These decisions are made on the advice of a 'Council of Fathers' who know the children and their families well and who advise the Local Committee about their circumstances.

522 Chen and Korinek 2010.

5. THE IMPACTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY ON IDENTITY FORMATION

5.1 Nubian Archaeology as Sudan's 'Authorized Heritage Discourse'

One of the *raisons d'être* of archaeology is that it increases knowledge and understanding about the past. Not all scholars agree that it reveals 'truth'; social archaeologists and archaeological ethnographers prefer to discuss temporally-situated 'interpretations' of material culture, as discussed in Chapter 2. Yet most scholars agree that specialized archaeological activities such as excavation are, at least partially, about creating new knowledge referred to as 'history'.

The early history of Sudan is to a large extent the history of what archaeologists refer to as 'ancient Nubia', a territory that stretched along the Middle Nile roughly from the First Cataract at Aswan in modern Egypt to Khartoum in modern Sudan, and is sometimes split into 'Lower Nubia' and 'Upper Nubia' (Figure 9, and see Appendix 5 for a historical timeline). 'Ancient Nubia' was much larger than the territory that is at present conventionally referred to as 'Nubia'; the latter extends roughly from Aswan in Egypt to Dongola in Sudan. However, it was much smaller than modern Sudan which, even after the secession of South Sudan in 2011, includes regions that are not regarded as part of 'ancient Nubia', such as Darfur and Kordofan.

From at least 5000 BCE, 'ancient Nubia' was occupied by a number of distinct cultures or polities; archaeologists thus generally use it as an umbrella term to refer to the cultural and political entities that for millennia existed along the Middle Nile, including the Kerma culture (c. third millennium BCE), the Kingdoms of Kush (c. 9th Century BCE to 4th Century CE), and the three Christian kingdoms that arose after the fall of Kush (c. 6th to 9th Centuries CE). As Adams (1977) notes, the links between these cultural and political entities are complex and by no means direct or linear. However, their co-location along the Nile and the continuities in some cultural debris have led archaeologists to place them all under the heading of 'ancient Nubia', making archaeology in Sudan 'Nubian archaeology'. Indeed, 'ancient Nubian' history is the period and area of Sudan's past that archaeologists have been most interested in excavating and writing about; this interest has been pursued almost to the exclusion of other time periods and places.[523] In 2015, there were over 40 multi-national archaeological teams working in Sudan, most of them working on 'ancient Nubian' sites in the Nile Valley.[524] Such narrow focus can also be attributed to the interests of funding bodies; the attraction of monumental sites; and the popularity of 'Nubian' history amongst the (mostly Western) interest groups who help fund archaeological magazines and TV shows. The strong and enduring Western public interest in, and consumption of, popular archaeology is important because "the wider public…although [they] often do not know it, are footing the bill" for archaeological research.[525]

At first glance, this focus appears to be part of the creation of an 'alternative history' (see Chapter 2), whereby Sudan-as-Nubia emerges from the shadow of its overbearing Egyptian neighbour: interest in this area has arguably shifted since the time at which fascination derived almost wholly from the monumental Pharaonic cultures of 'ancient Egypt', of which Sudan was seen to be an extension; Egyptologists such as Budge (1907) came south from Egypt to investigate Nubia not for its own sake, but to explore its connections to ancient Egypt,[526] as did travellers and proto-archaeologists such as Burckhardt (*Travels in Nubia*, 1819) and Emery (*Nubian Treasure*, 1948).

523 Edwards 2003.
524 Jakob and Ali 2011: 517.
525 Drewett 2012: 2.
526 Trigger 1994. Trigger also talks about the differing conceptions of 'Nubia' by early European archaeologists, who considered Nubia to be 'Hamitic' and 'civilized' in comparison with 'black Africa' but no less backward in comparison with Egypt (Trigger 1994: 322). Also see Edwards 2003. We might note that J-F. Champollion and others "concluded that the ruins of Meroe and other sites in the Sudan marked the "primitive home" of ancient Egyptian civilization, which had been carried north into Egypt by Sudanese colonists" (Bernal 1987, quoted in Trigger 1994: 325), but this was an exceptional view



Figure 9. Map of 'ancient Nubia' (Source: Mohammed and Welsby 2011: 27, Map 3.1)

However upon further inspection it seems that while it may have started as a form of 'alternative history', 'ancient Nubia' (and the pursuit of Nubian archaeology) has now become Sudan's hegemonic and exclusive authorized heritage discourse. Indeed for most archaeologists, far-reaching developments such as the slow but continuous arrival of Arabs from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, and the emergence in the early 16th Century of the non-Arab and non-Muslim Fūnj, who established the Sultanate of Sennar and converted to Islam, are not regarded as part of their remit (Appendix 6 for a historical timeline). Although their excavation licences, issued by NCAM (§1 IVc), require them to "excavate and record all ancient sites within the concession area irrespective of period",[527] and

527 NCAM Excavation Licence, n.d.

although there are some important exceptions, such as the work on Islamic archaeology by El-Zein (2000, 2010), archaeologists "seem to be rather indifferent to the region's history after the introduction of Islam in c.1500 AD."[528] This "unevenly distributed"[529] attention might partly be explained by the fact that written sources have been relatively abundant since the 16th Century; archaeologists might argue that this places the period in the realm of historians. However, the written sources are not complete, leaving plenty of scope for archaeological analyses of the material record.

That 'ancient Nubia' is Sudan's authorized heritage discourse is further demonstrated by the titles of seminal publications dealing with Sudanese archaeology, such as Adams' *Nubia: Corridor to Africa* (1977), Bonnet and Valbelle's (2008) *The Nubian Pharaohs: Black Kings on the Nile* and Fisher's *Ancient Nubia: African Kingdoms on the Nile* (2012).[530] The most prominent Sudan-focused archaeological organizations also carry the term 'Nubia' in their titles, such as the International Society for Nubian Studies (ISNS):[531] one consequence of this tendency to designate pre-Islamic Sudanese sites as 'Nubian' is that it creates the impression that all pre-Islamic Sudanese history is 'ancient Nubian' history, and that 'Nubia' is synonymous with 'Sudan' even though the latter stretches far beyond the Middle Nile Valley. There has moreover been a sharp increase in archaeological activity to excavate and restore 'Nubian' royal cities and necropoleis; establish 'Nubian' royal chronologies; assess the extent and density of 'Nubian' settlement; and conduct large-scale salvage archaeology of 'Nubian' sites. Investment in 'ancient Nubia' has also grown: in 2011, ICOMOS noted that "1.5m euros [c. $1.7m] has been pledged by the Italian government towards the preservation of Nubian heritage"[532] and since 2013, the Nubian Archaeology and Development Organisation (NADO), funded by the state of Qatar, has spent $135m supporting 'Nubian' archaeology (see Chapter 8).[533]

Furthermore, 'ancient Nubia' is not only Sudan's hegemonic and exclusive authorized heritage discourse but has been made by archaeologists into 'World Heritage'. UNESCO's intervention in Sudan from 1960 to 1980 in the wake of the Aswan High Dam, requested by archaeologists, was termed the 'International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia';[534] funds were also raised to establish an International Museum of Nubia, which opened in Aswan in 1997.[535] Of course, international attention and 'World Heritage' designations have not always been for positive reasons, nor has they always had positive results. Critics condemned the attention and money lavished by UNESCO and other Western bodies on the rescue of ancient monuments amid floods while allowing

528 Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011: 60.
529 Edwards 2003: 33.
530 Also see Török's seminal volume on 'Meroitic' and 'Kushite' art (2002), which subsumes such art under the heading of 'Nubian art'.
531 See the ISNS website. Trigger reports that the ISNS began as an association to promote the investigation of 'Christian Nubia' (Trigger 1994: 342).
532 ICOMOS 2011: 108.
533 See the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website.
534 Säve-Söderbergh 1987.
535 Hopkins and Mehanna 2010.

the very same floods to displace thousands of Nubians in both Egypt and Sudan. Moreover, the UNESCO campaign focused on the rescue of Egyptian monuments from the rising waters of Lake Nasser while hundreds of other archaeological sites from the 'Nubian' Kushite period were destroyed. However, as one NCAM staff member would later say of the construction at the Fourth Cataract of the Merowe Dam, completed in 2008, which flooded hundreds of Kushite archaeological sites, "[t]he paradox is that, yes, an entire area is being wiped off the map but thanks to the rescue project, Sudanese archaeology is being put on the map."[536] This has proved to be true, although not under the heading of 'Sudanese'; rather there are 'Nubian' collections in most major museums in the world.[537]

*

Archaeologists' preferences have over time created an 'authorized heritage discourse' (Chapter 2), which values the archaeology of 'ancient Egypt' above 'ancient Nubia', and in turn, that of Islamic Sudan. In a context where the history of 'ancient Egypt' is 'dominant' (most valued) and 'ancient Nubia' is 'subaltern' (less valued), the recognition by archaeologists that 'ancient Nubia' is worthy of study other than as a footnote to 'ancient Egypt', has been something of a triumph over prejudice.[538] Yet, the focus on 'ancient Nubia' over other histories in Sudan has turned it into a powerful historical construct, co-created by international communities of archaeologists and their public audiences, and one which, like 'ancient Egypt' before it, has become hegemonic in Sudan. Indeed it is possible to argue that the dominance of 'ancient Nubian' history over that of Islamic Sudan seems to have turned 'ancient Nubia' and Nubian archaeology from a burgeoning counter-hegemonic 'alternative archaeology' into a hegemonic authorized heritage discourse.

5.2 The Rejection of Nubian Archaeology by the Modern Arab-Muslim State

5.2.1 'Discourse Institutionalization' in State Rhetoric

Sudan's nationalist movements and governments have since independence have tried to forge a sense of nationhood in a country that is made up of a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups (Chapter 4). However, unlike states such as Egypt and Iran (noted in Chapter 2), they have not drawn

536 Salah Eldin Mohammed Ahmed, speaking in 2007 and referring to the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project (MDASP) organised by NCAM which, in 2002, issued an 'Appeal for rescuing a piece of Man's cultural heritage'.

537 De Simone 2014, Annex IV: 277-82, 'Nubian Collections Worldwide'. The listed collections give examples from Egypt, Ghana, the U.S., Canada, India, Europe and Australia.

538 Edwards 1998: 175; Török 2002: 8-9.

upon the country's ancient past; 'ancient Nubians' are absent from the Sudanese state's discourse (or what we might call the state's 'authorized heritage discourse') despite the iconicity and spectacle of their monuments and, indeed, *some* evidence of cultural continuity with modern Sudan (see below). Of course there is some measure of what Hajer (1993) calls 'discourse institutionalization', due in part to the measures taken by the Anglo-Egyptian government (see Chapter 7). For example at present, the view that land occupied by archaeological sites is important cultural heritage is common in state rhetoric and archaeological 'heritage' has been used as a tool in peace-building endeavours (see Leturcq's (2011) discourse analysis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the Joint Assessment Mission (2008)). The state financially supports—at least to some extent—an antiquities ministry (NCAM)[539] and at least nominally upholds its law, the Ordinance for the Protection of Antiquities (OPA).

Stemming from the same academic milieu as Western archaeologists, NCAM's commitment to the principle that archaeological sites are important on a global scale since they help tell the story of mankind and need to be protected "for future generations"[540] is also apparent: two Sudanese site complexes have been inscribed onto UNESCO's World Heritage list (Jebel Barkal and the Island of Meroe), and the rhetoric of its former Director-General, Hassan Hussein Idris, also demonstrates this:

> It has become clear to us that increased public knowledge of ancient Sudanese cultures could play a very important role not only in unifying the Sudanese but also in enriching contemporary civilization on a global scale.[541]

Furthermore the central government has named such sites as as 'national' sites[542] and has even deemed Meroe and the pyramids to the east so important that they were "confiscated" by a presidential decree in 2003, which declared that they should be managed as a "national reserve".[543]

However, as Deng (1995), Lesch (1998), Elamin (1999), Adar (2001) and Idris (2005) have shown, the main nationalist movements and post-independence governments have looked to Arabism and Islam as the foundation of the modern Sudanese 'nation' and have instituted this through the law. 'Acceptable' national identity is thus based on a blend of purported Arab ancestry and Islamic culture, military prowess and aspirations for modern economic and technological progress: state ideology thus works as a 'friction' or 'dysjuncture' that prevents this rhetoric from operationalizing in reality.

---

539 "NCAM's budget is allocated on a yearly basis by the Ministry of Finance…" (El-Masri 2010: 162), although a meeting of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS) at the British Museum in London in May 2015 suggested that there were only c.20 NCAM inspectors in Sudan vs. 5,000 in Egypt.

540 ICOMOS 1999, '8th Draft of the International Cultural Tourism Charter, Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance'.

541 Kendall 1998.

542 NCAM's UNESCO World Heritage Management Plan notes, for example, the sites of Meroe have been designated as "national" sites (El-Masri 2010: 182, 198).

543 ICOMOS 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is 'Presidential Decision/Decree no.162 for the year 2003: The Confiscation of the Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National Reserve within this Region and managing it.' The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the Nomination File for UNESCO World Heritage status was being written.

5.2.2 'Logoizing' the State Image

As Anderson (1991) has shown, a state's political and cultural ideology is symbolised by the words of its national anthem and the imagery of its flag, coins and banknotes. In Anderson's words, these offer a "pictorial census of the state's patrimony"; the "logoization" of the state's ideology.[544] In Sudan, these 'logos' are dominated by Arab, Islamic and military symbols alongside other symbols promoting technological advancement; representing the state's idealized vision of the 'nation'.

The national anthem, adopted immediately after independence in 1956, was originally that of the armed forces, and is entitled 'We Are the Army of God and of Our Land'.[545] The army is also commemorated and celebrated in the names of major roads and bridges in Khartoum.[546] When Jaafar Nimeiri assumed the presidency in 1969, the national flag was changed from three horizontal stripes of blue, yellow and green to three horizontal stripes of red, white and black with a green triangle; based on the Arab Liberation Flag, the new design was intended to underline Sudan's status as an Arab country.[547] The flag's central motif is a secretary bird bearing a shield from the time of the Mahdi, who some regard as Sudan's first nationalist (Chapter 4).[548]

Coinage is dominated by Arabic numbers, English words (such as 'Central Bank of Sudan' and 'twenty piasters') and symbols including an eagle, a cow and a generic pottery vessel. Only very rarely do pre-Islamic symbols appear; for example, a Meroitic (late Kushite) pyramid and tomb chapel appear on the 2006 ten-piaster coin. Banknotes issued in 2006 and 2011 feature both wild and domesticated animals (pigeons, camels, cattle, buffalo) alongside images of the People's Palace in Khartoum (reverse of the SDG10 note), the Central Bank of Sudan in Khartoum (obverse of the SDG1 note); and ceramic pots and musical instruments (obverse and reverse of the SDG2 note). However, by far the most striking of the banknote images are the representations of Sudan's modernist project, which appear on the higher value banknotes: satellites and hydroelectric dams (obverse and reverse of the SDG5 note) and machinery, oil rigs, factories and radio antennae (obverse and reverse of the SDG20 note). Sudan's national symbols, therefore, idealise its Arab and Islamic past, its military capability and its economic and technological development and modernization.

Anderson further suggests that newly independent states need three things to establish a sense of nationhood: a 'census' to decide who is a citizen (see Chapter 4); a 'map' with which to ideologically

544 Anderson 1991: 182.
545 Willis 2011.
546 Examples include 'Armed Forces Bridge' connecting Khartoum to Khartoum North across the Blue Nile; 'Victory Bridge' leading to Omdurman across the White Nile; and 'Army Avenue' which runs parallel to the Khartoum railway. Sudan has also cemented its 'Arab' and 'Islamic' identity through its membership of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Countries. It materially supported Arab countries during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to support Iraq in the 1991-2 Gulf War.
547 Willis 2011.
548 Also see Kevane (2008) who in a study of Sudan's stamps notes the Mahdi's appearance on them and that the Arab League was featured in 1962, 1967 and 1972.

organize the nation's territory; and a 'museum' to display the archaeological and historical evidence of the nation's attachment to the land, build a national identity by creating a collective memory, and project the unity of the state. As shown in Chapter 4, post-independence governments have conducted five censuses, all of which have been criticised for omitting minority groups such as the Rashāida gypsies and the Kababish and Baqqāra nomads. However, when it comes to museums, Anderson's conceptualization appears to fall short in the Sudanese context. Although pre-Islamic Sudan is largely absent from state discourse, the most comprehensive exhibits in the National Museum in Khartoum (f. 1904[549]) are those of 'ancient Nubia's' pre-historic, Kerma, Egyptian, Kushite and Christian periods. The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the museum was "the incidental by-product of the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s"[550] and was paid for by UNESCO and Western donors. The museum is thus arguably not an attempt to identify with 'ancient Nubia' but an outcome of the Sudanese state's desire to modernize and their use of dam building as a tool for such a programme.[551] Therefore, while:

> the material remains of…earlier states are well represented in the [museum]…and dominate the landscape with their monumental form throughout the Nile Valley, official culture in Sudan makes little of them: there are no roads named for them, nor public celebration of the long history of state formation in the Nile Valley that they represent.[552]

'Ancient Nubia' therefore presents a fundamental conceptual problem for Sudan's Arab-Muslim elite, partly due to the conflation of being 'Nubian' with being 'African', 'Christian' or 'pagan'. According to Abd al-Rahim:

> the African past of the Sudanese…was not regarded as an object of glorification or seen as a source of self-gratification…Their non-Islamic past, like their pre-Islamic past, was for them a part of the Jahiliyya, i.e. the 'Age of Ignorance' or 'World of Darkness', and they could not, therefore, identify themselves with either.[553]

Sudan's Arab-Muslim elites widely perceive African cultures to be inferior, a deeply engrained prejudice that has been reinforced by centuries of the slave trade (Chapter 4 and below). Indeed, nationalists and most post-independence governments have actively downplayed Sudan's African and pre-Islamic features in their logoization of the state image.

549 Jakob and Ali 2011: 514.
550 Willis 2011: 54.
551 The particular importance of dam-building projects to the government is illustrated in the fact that the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) was put under the direct authority of the Presidency in 1999, and augmented into a separate ministry in 2005 and finally into a Presidential department in 2007 by Presidential Decree No. 217. The head of the DIU is directly answerable to President Bashir (see Hänsch 2012: 219-20).
552 Willis 2011: 54.
553 Abd al-Rahim 1971: 234-5.

5.2.3 Teaching the State Ideology

Sudan's Ministry of Education, like many of its international counterparts, is "officially responsible for disseminating historical and cultural information"[554] and it has been used by post-independence governments to embed the state's Arab-Muslim ideology. In 1969, the National Conference of Education added overtly nationalistic aims to education policy; for example, that textbooks should include "national features" and that students should all master the "national language, Arabic" because it is a "factor of unity."[555] In the Conference on the Curriculum held at Bakht al-Rudah (the Institute of Education) in 1973, the importance of Arabic was once again emphasized as was "[r]einforcing the national unity among the people."[556] At the time, according to Hurreiz (1977), a number of schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education were compiled by Abdullah al-Tayyib, a prominent member of the powerful Arab-Muslim Ja'aliyīn, to whom the current president and many Arab-Muslim elites belong.[557]

In 1990, President Bashir and the NIF-led government instituted more educational reforms, influenced by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic teachers and administrators.[558] The curriculum which was created consisted of two parts: an obligatory and an optional course. The elements of the obligatory course were drawn from the Quran and the *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), and English was halted as a language of instruction.[559] Alongside these reforms, membership of the Popular Defence Force (a paramilitary body allied to the NIF) became a requirement for university admission.[560]

There are of course some exceptions. For example, the first principle of the 1958 '13-Principles Report of the Educational Objectives in the Sudan' states that education should include "[t]ransmitting the national and international human heritage",[561] although this may be because the committee that drew up the report was chaired by a UNESCO staff member and at a time when the political system had not yet been fully decolonized. President Nimeiri's 'New Education Ladder' allocated space for pre-Islamic and 'Nubian' Sudan in the syllabus, meaning that those Sudanese who attended school in the 1970s and 1980s had some exposure to pre-Islamic history. However, the current primary-level syllabus, introduced by Bashir's hardline Islamist government and to which school-attending Sudanese under the age of 40 have been exposed, contains little on the pre-Islamic past, concentrating instead upon modules in Islam, mathematics and the natural sciences. Although

554 M'Bow 1992: 13.
555 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979.
556 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979.
557 Also see Hofheinz 1992.
558 Metz 1992.
559 Metz 1992.
560 Metz 1992. At the time, Bashir dismissed around 70 faculty members at the University of Khartoum who opposed his reforms.
561 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979.

the ‘Comprehensive National Strategy 1991-2002’ included the directive of “[d]eveloping the national sense of belonging and taking care with the constituents of the Sudanese civilization”,[562] the changes that have taken place under Bashir have resulted in the demotion of history and geography at the primary school level, both of which were dispersed into modules such as ‘We [the Sudanese] and the Islamic World’ (Year 7) and ‘We [the Sudanese] and the Contemporary World’ (Year 8). However, it should be noted that lack of emphasis on the past applies to all periods of history, perhaps relating to the state’s discursive focus on modernism and technological advancement.

The present researcher examined the translated content of a kindergarten (*rawḍa*) administrative booklet (Appendix 8) and two primary-school history textbooks (Appendix 9). Kindergarten begins when children are 3-4 years old and lasts two years; the administrative booklet contains tick-boxes with which teachers assess a child’s progress in eight areas. The first area is ‘religious morals’, for which there are 14 goals for the child to attain including “1/ [The child] calls to God when he eats and drinks and at the start of each piece of work”; “2/ [The child] knows that God is God, knows the Prophet Muhammad and his book, the Quran”; “4/ [The child] exercises some *dū'ā* (supplications) and Islamic morals” and “10/ [The child] has knowledge of *wūḍū* (ablution).” Others are ‘social growth’, ‘self-growth’, ‘language’, ‘mental and cognitive skills’, ‘emotional intelligence’, ‘physical movement’ and ‘skills and creativity’. However, it is clear that of the eight categories, religious education is the most important.

The textbook for the Year 7 module ‘We and the Islamic World’ contains one unit on the ancient world, including a brief mention of the Kingdom of Kush, and eight on the development of Islam and the Arab world. The textbook for the Year 8 module ‘We and the ancient World’ devotes only two brief paragraphs to ‘ancient Nubia’; most of the limited space refers to the Kingdom of Kush while there is only passing reference to the three Christian kingdoms that followed its demise. There is no mention of the word ‘Christian’; ‘Nubia’ is used only twice. ‘Kush’ may have been given space due to its relative neutrality; the ‘Christian kingdoms’ and their African and non-Muslim nature may have been the cause of their limited representation.

The age at which children are taught about pre-Islamic history is crucial to their exposure to it. At present, the modules above are taught only in Years 7 and 8; however, this is a level that most rural children never reach. Furthermore, in the first three years of secondary school, students must choose either a course in ‘Humanities’, which contains modules on the past, including pre-Islamic history, or one in ‘Science’: a large majority of students choose Science. Relatively few Sudanese attend university and fewer choose to pursue archaeology.

562 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979.

5.3 The Ownership of Nubian Archaeology by the Nubian Descendant Community

Modern Nubia is divided between Egypt and Sudan, with the slightly larger section situated in the latter. Egyptian Nubia stretches roughly between the First to the Second Cataracts, from Aswan to the Sudan border, and comprises most of the Aswan Governorate. Most Egyptian Nubians were displaced to other parts of Aswan Governorate by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970 and the creation of Lake Nasser. Sudanese Nubia stretches from the Egyptian border to Dongola and falls within Northern State. The size of the Sudanese Nubian population is hard to gauge, but could be as high as 750,000, excluding the significant number of Nubians living in Sudanese urban centers and the diaspora.[563]

Sudanese Nubians tend to identify as members of one of four *gabāīl*: going from north to south, the Halfāwīn occupied the Nile Valley south of the Second Cataract, around the town of Wadi Halfa, until most of them were displaced by Lake Nasser, which reached full capacity in 1975; the Sukōt and Mahās occupy the Nile Valley between the Second and Third Cataracts; and the Danaglā occupy the region around Dongola (Figure 2, above). Most Nubians speak Nile Nubian, which comprises two umbrella languages, Nobiin and Dongolawi.[564] Nobiin includes the dialects of (from north to south) Fadikka spoken in Egyptian Nubia, Halfaawi, spoken in Halfa, and Sukōt, spoken in Sukōt and Mahas. Dongolawi is spoken in Dongola and also by the Kenūz *gabīla* of Egyptian Nubia, who live over 500km to the north.

Like most other rural Sudanese, Nubians in northern Sudan are poor. Yet the Danaglā are one of the three most powerful groups in post-independence Sudan, the other two being the Shaygiyya and the Ja'aliyīn (which claim Arab-Muslim ancestry).[565] The Danaglā are a prime example of what Hale (1973, 1979) points out is a Nubian 'contradiction': being marginalized by and yet successful within the Arab-dominated state. Indeed, many among the Halfāwīn, Sukōt and Mahās claim that the Danaglā are not 'real' Nubians, referring to them as 'Arabized Nubians' for having intermarried and politically collaborated with the Shaygiyya and the Ja'aliyīn, who are deemed to be anti-Nubian Arab "settlers".[566]

---

563 Poeschke (1996) cites sources that suggest that in 1963 only half of all Nubians were actually living in Nubia; the others were living elsewhere as a result of labour migration that can be dated back to the 19th Century (Hopkins and Mehanna 2010), if not the 17th Century.

564 The language spoken in the Nūba Mountains in Southern Kordofan in south-west Sudan is known as Hill Nubian.

565 See Wikileaks website. The relevant statement cited is in section 3C: "Members of just three tribes hold the balance of power in Khartoum. The ethnic Arab Ja'aliyin, Shaiqiya, and Dunqulah tribes come from the Nile valley north and south of Khartoum. Members of these three tribes, which account for only a small percentage of Sudan's total population, dominate the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), as they have previous governments…This long-term concentration of power is extraordinary, and it will not change in the near term."

566 See Hashim 2007. Interestingly, according to Edwards (2003), material culture with more blended Arab-Nubian characteristics seems to confirm that the area around Dongola was more 'mixed' than those places to the north or south.

Such fracture lines apart, Nubian *gabāīl* have a strong sense of shared identity.[567] Unlike groups such as the Ja'aliyīn, Nubians do not claim Arab ancestry, even if, given the ethnic complexity of Sudan, some such links likely exist. Instead, most Nubians see themselves as a distinct social and linguistic group within a specific territory, and with a history that goes back to 'ancient Nubia' and evidenced by Sudan's archaeological sites and by archaeologists who have formally designated the Sudanese as being 'Arabized Nubians';[568] Nubians being the original, most authentic and ultimately first people of the Sudan from whom all others—incluing the 'Arab' *gabāīl* such as the Shagiyya and Ja'aliyīn—are descended. For example Holt writes that,

> In spite…of the anxiety of the geneaologists to provide the Ja'ali group with a common Arab ancestor, it would be more realistic to regard the submerged *Nubian sub-stratum* as the common ethnic element among these tribes. This hypothesis does not, of course, reject the undoubted historical fact of Arab ancestry as such: the result of intermarriage between Arab immigrants and *the older Nubian population*.[569] (Italics added by the author.)

Indeed although modern Nubia is much smaller than 'ancient Nubia', which extended south beyond Khartoum (Chapter 4); Nubian nationalists claim the whole of Sudan's Nile Valley as their ancestral homeland, again pointing to archaeological sites and archaeological history as confirmation of this fact. This connection to the ancient past is evident in Nubian theatre, literature, poetry and music, and widely noted in the extant literature and in interviews conducted by the present researcher with Nubians who live both inside and outside Nubia throughout 2013-15. If communities that strongly associate with archaeological history are commonly termed 'descent' or 'descendant' communities, and those which inhabit their claimed ancestral homeland are termed 'indigenous descendant communities' (Chapter 2), then the Nubians in Sudan are therefore *seen as and claim to be* 'indigenous descendant communities' and take ownership of 'archaeology' as their cultural and patrimonial 'heritage'.

However, the Nubian claim to a linear genealogical link with the peoples of 'ancient Nubia' is difficult to substantiate; as Edwards (2003) has pointed out, archaeology has been unable to precisely establish the language or ethnic ancestry of the 'ancient Nubians'. The linguistic connections between 'ancient Nubia' and modern Nubians are uncertain; groups such as those of the Kerma culture, who established a powerful state in the region in the third millennium BCE, spoke an Afro-Asiatic

---

567 Poeschke 1996.

568 In Maliński's words, the Sudanese are the result of "mixed marriages between Arab men migrating to the Middle Nile Valley in 9th to 16th centuries and women from local Nubian communities." (Maliński 2014: 79). H. MacMichael, an administrator-historian in the Sudan Political Service under the British administration, was the first to use the term 'Arabized Nubians' (1922: 235). It was also used by Adams (1977: 557). Poeschke (1996) considers 'Arab' *gabāīl* such as the Shagiyya and Ja'aliyīn to be formerly Nubian-speaking but notes that they were Arabized 300-400 years ago. The historian Yusuf Fadl Hassan uses the term 'Arabized Nubians' (1967: 10). Trimingham (1949) uses the term 'Semitized Hamites'.

569 Holt 1961: 6.

language, as did the 'ancient Egyptians' and, most probably, the 'ancient Nubians'.[570] However, groups such as the Noba, who seem to have infiltrated Meroitic Kush from the 2nd Century CE and may have established the kingdoms of Nobatia, Makuria and Alwa which succeeded Meroe in the 6th Century, spoke a Nilo-Saharan language distantly related to the tongues presently spoken in South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Chad, Niger and Mali.[571] This language is believed to be the pre-cursor of Old Nubian, in that there are written texts dating back to the 8th Century CE, and thus the ancestor of Nobiin and Dongolawi.[572] However, this language does not seem to have been widely spoken in Nubia until around 300 CE. The languages of modern Nubians are therefore unlikely to be related to those of 'ancient Nubia'.[573]

Moreover, any possible biological link between the peoples of 'ancient Nubia' and modern Nubians would likely have been heavily diluted by millennia of population movements, including the migration of the Noba and other groups into Meroitic Kush; the migration of nomadic groups into Nubia from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula from the 9th Century CE onwards, and especially from the 15th Century; and, the importation of large numbers of Africans as slaves. Poeschke (1996) notes that Turco-Egyptian control of northern Sudan from the 16th Century brought Hungarian, Bosnian, Kurdish and Circassian troops to the fortresses at Aswan, Qasr Ibrim and Sai Island, where they proceeded to intermarry with locals.[574] In c.1500, the non-Arab Fūnj arrived from the Upper Nile and imposed their rule as far as the Third Cataract, adding another unquantifiable component to Nubian ethnicity. Modern Nubians, therefore, have a complicated ancestry which includes indigenous groups and immigrants from Egypt and the Mediterranean, the Red Sea coast and Arabia, the Sahara and sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, Nubians are not even mentioned in the historical record until the 3rd Century BCE, when the Greek scholar Eratosthenes writes of the Nubae tribe living west of the Nile,[575] and even this is etymologically uncertain: the origin of the word 'Nubia' is uncertain though some scholars suggest that it stems from the 'Noba', who were recorded by Eratosthenes in the 3rd Century BCE as living west of the Nile and seem to have migrated into the Middle Nile region after the 2nd Century CE "and ultimately filled the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Kushite state" in the 4th Century CE.[576] The 'Noba' spoke a Nilo-Saharan language that was the ancestor of Old Nubian and thus of the various present-day Nubian languages. The ancient Egyptians referred to that part of 'ancient Nubia',

570 The uncertainty stems largely from the fact that the ancient Kushite texts are largely undeciphered.
571 Satzinger 2010.
572 Satzinger 2010.
573 Although the language spoken by the Hamitic Bijā of Sudan's eastern desert may be.
574 Also see Edwards (2003) and Hopkins and Mehanna (2010). Poeschke notes that the descendants of these soldiers can be identified by their surnames, such as 'Kurdi', but which have adopted local traditions and languages. Poeschke also assembles evidence from Emery (1948) who recorded that the Nubians living Qasr Ibrim in Egypt "spoke 'of themselves with pride as Turks'" (1996: 23).
575 Edwards 2004.
576 Welsby 1996: 8.

from the First to the Second Cataracts, as 'Wawat';[577] the part from the Second Cataract to modern-day Khartoum was referred to as Kush or, more commonly, 'wretched Kush'.[578] Kush does not appear to be an Egyptian word but rather a name given to their land by Kushites themselves.[579] The ancient Greeks and Romans knew the land as part of a much vaster region they referred to as 'Ethiopia'.

The ethnicity of the Kushites and their relationship to the people of the earlier Kerma culture is unclear. Welsby notes that artistic representations of Kushites, many of them members of the ruling house, show that "many had markedly negroid features and dark skins" and cites the 1st Century BCE Greek historian Diodorus as writing that the 'Ethiopians' of the Nile were "black in colour, with flat noses and woolly hair."[580] Welsby also notes that during the life of the Kushite state, "there was a gradual assimilation of peoples from the east and west into the Nile valley, most notably the Noba."[581] Whether the Kushite language was linked to the languages spoken by the Kerma peoples is not known "as no inscriptions in Kerman have come to light";[582] however, scholars agree that it was not the precursor of Old Nubian, the ancestor of modern Nubian languages. The language was written down using hieroglyphs borrowed from Egypt, but used in a different way. The Meroites later developed their own cursive script, but their texts have not yet been fully deciphered.[583]

According to Welsby, it is assumed that the three kingdoms that emerged from the Kushite state, Nobadia, Makuria and Alwa, were established by those groups, such as the 'Noba', who had arrived over a period of centuries. The size of their populations is unclear; some scholars believe that the 'invaders' were essentially warrior aristocracies who came to rule over the Meroitic population. Edwards notes that "[d]uring this period the Meroitic language seems to have disappeared as the language of state," to be replaced by varieties of Nile Nubian.[584] Edwards adds, "[w]hile their origins still remain obscure, the dominance of Nubian languages was a key element in the creation of new Nubian identities, social and political."[585]

While cultural continuity over time in some form is plausible, it would be erroneous to claim, as do some Nubian diaspora activists, that a distinctive Nubian identity has existed since the "Nubian enslavement by the ancient Egyptians" and which is characterized by Nubia's resistance against "Egyptian conquests, Roman conquests, Muslim and Christian reforms" and modern-day dams.[586] Even archaeologists such as Haynes (1992) and De Simone (2014) have made similar claims and

577 The Egyptian pharaohs used the Sudanese mines extensively; *nbw* is the hieroglyphic ideogram for 'gold'. (See Gardiner's sign S12 in Gardiner 1957: 546.)
578 Smith 2003.
579 Welsby 1996.
580 Welsby 1996: 50.
581 Welsby 1996: 203.
582 Welsby 1996: 190.
583 Welsby 1996.
584 Edwards 2004: 182.
585 Edwards 2004: 182.
586 Nuraddin Abdulmannan edits the Nubia Project website on which this, and rhetoric like it, appears. See any one of their bulletins on the Nubia Project website.

written at length about the parallels between 'ancient Nubian' and modern Sudanese culture (see Appendix 10[587]); they see continuity in contemporary pottery; leather sandals; headrests; gold jewellery; hairstyles; shaved heads; scarification; tattooing; the habit of covering graves with white and/or green pebbles; stools "like those in Kerma graves"; 'Nūba' wrestling matches; fertility rituals; substances such as henna, perfumes and herbs, and ornaments used at weddings (*jīrtig*); and, the ubiquitous rope beds (*angarīb*) which are in turn often used in the *jīrtig* ceremonies (Figure 10).[588] Babiker (2010) gives other examples of supposed continuity between 'ancient Nubian' and modern Sudanese culture, including irrigation techniques and the so-called Nubian 'Coptic Months' by which the agricultural year was organised in the ancient world); iron making; weaving techniques; and, textiles. However, Edwards concludes that "a meaningful relationship…between these ancient 'Nubians' and those of more recent times remains speculative at best."[589]

What is clear, then, is that the modern Nubian communities have a strong sense of identity that is largely based on their claims to the past and their 'ownership' of 'Nubian' archaeology (claims that are heuristic in function and motivated by a host of contemporary factors). An additional element to note, however, is that archaeologists have themselves (wittingly or unwittingly) strengthened and legitimized the Nubians' claims not only through 1) writing exclusively 'Nubian' history; but also 2) testifying to material (read: verifiable) links between 'ancient Nubians' and 'modern Nubians'. Both phenomena have undoubtedly led to increased international awareness and recognition of a Nubian people, which in turn likely served to strengthen a Nubian sense of identity.[590] As Shinnie notes, "[t]he sense of history is probably most developed amongst [modern] Nubians because of the comparatively well-known history of their homeland from Pharaonic Egyptian times",[591] a history that is well-known because of archaeologists. This foregrounds an argument made in Chapter 8 (and which echoes those made by Meskell in Chapter 2), that the assignation of a modern ethnicity to ancient identities (and vice versa) via archaeology is dangerous and caution should be used when utilizing these terms: Nubian ownership of the past is a claim, not a fact.

587 Appendix 10.1 is an extract from Haynes (1992) given in De Simone (2014) as Annex 1 (pp. 272-3); Appendix 10.2 is De Simone's own Annex VII (285-6) entitled 'Table of Nubian artifacts displayed at Sudan National Museum which are still in use in modern Nubian society'.

588 *Jīrtig* are used to deter evil spirits and assuring reproductive safety and plenty. It is believed that those who do not undergo it become infertile. The colour red symbolizes fertility, so in the *jīrtig* ceremony, the *angarīb* will be covered in a red blanket, the bride herself will be in red, and she and her groom will have red bracelets, necklaces and gold ornaments. See Abusharaf 2002.

589 Edwards 2003 51.

590 Poeschke 1996.

591 Shinnie 1981: 29.

Figure 10. *Jīrtig* (left) and *Angarīb* (right). (Source: photograph by the author, Feb. 2015).

Nubian identity has been greatly impacted by the shared experience of 'victimhood' in the wake of the construction of Nile dams that have displaced Nubian communities and threatened others.[592] The most important of these is the Aswan High Dam, completed in 1970, which was built in Egypt's interest to store water for irrigation, generate electricity and prevent floods and droughts by equalizing the otherwise cyclical flow of the Nile.[593] Lake Nasser reached full capacity in 1975 and stretches for 400km south from Aswan. [594] The lake flooded most of Egyptian Nubia and almost one-quarter of Sudanese Nubia, displacing c.50,000 people from the former and c.80,000 people from the latter.[595]

Before the beginning of construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1960, a UNESCO appeal led to the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, which lasted until 1980. Around 22 important archaeological monuments, including the Ptolemaic temple of Philae and the Temple of Abu Simbel built by Rameses II (19th Dynasty, 1279-1212 BCE), were saved by being moved to the

592 Poeschke 1996; Hopkins and Mehanna 2010.
593 Waterbury 1979.
594 Hopkins and Mehanna 2010.
595 Most Egyptian Nubians were moved to new settlements 45km downstream from Aswan, an area dubbed 'New Nubia', where they were provided with irrigated land. Sudanese Nubians were moved from the old town of Wadi Halfa and its surroundings; some to New Wadi Halfa, on the shores of Lake Nasser. However, some 60,000 people were moved 800km south-east to Kassala State, where they were resettled in planned villages on the New Halfa Agricultural Development Scheme. Each household received a tenancy, but the land, though irrigated, was generally poor and yields were low and variable. By 1978-79, incomes were so low that 80% of the households would have been living below the official poverty line without additional sources of income, including mostly paid labour (World Bank1980). The hardship faced in New Halfa added to the deep sense of grievance felt among many Nubians over being uprooted. See Kennedy 1977, 2005.

shores of Lake Nasser or donated to countries that financially assisted the rescue work. But hundreds of sites, including the important fortress of Buhen (12th Dynasty, 1860 BCE), were flooded. Few Kushite archaeological remains were saved, fuelling sentiment among many Nubians that their cultural heritage was being deliberately targeted.

The plans to build the Dal and Kajbar dams have provoked outrage among Sudan's Nubian communities as well as in the diaspora,[596] whose homes and archaeological sites are threatened with submergence. If built, the Dal dam will displace 5,000-10,000 people while the Kajbar dam will displace over 10,000 people and submerge 90 villages and around 500 archaeological sites. Popular protests against the two dams have been violently suppressed by the Sudanese authorities; in 2007, four anti-Kajbar protesters were killed and 20 injured.[597] For many Nubians, the uprooting of their communities and the submergence of archaeological sites which they regard as their heritage are part of an ongoing campaign to erase their culture, tantamount to a form of cultural genocide. The campaign also strengthened ties between Nubian communities in Sudan and the Nubian diaspora, which also came to regard the archaeological sites as their own ancestral heritage.[598] Nubian diaspora activists,[599] many of whom were born abroad and do not speak Nubian, have been very supportive of their home communities and have been amongst the most vocal in condemning the loss through dam building of what they call their "archaeological heritage",[600] a phenomenon described by Poeschke as a "reactionary coping mechanism under threat".[601]

Dam-building has thus helped cement Nubian identity and foster Nubian nationalism. The Nubians are suspected by both the Egyptian and Sudanese governments of harbouring separatist ambitions. The Nubian flag is sometimes seen in Nubian villages (Figure 11) and in the Sudanese diaspora; there is rhetoric of Egyptian and Sudanese Nubians uniting in a Nubian nation-state and that accords have already been signed to this effect.[602] Indeed, while most stakeholders understand 'Nubia' as the regions in Egypt and Sudan inhabited by modern Nubian communities, it is significant that neither Egypt nor Sudan use the term 'Nubia' to identify a political or administrative entity; perhaps to decline legitimacy for Nubian demands for autonomy or even independence. In this vein, Nubian languages are not taught in schools. Indeed, as their claims to a connection with the ancient past clashes with state ideology, Nubians have become both a 'dissent' and 'descent' community, and thus subject to repression by the Sudanese and Egyptian states.

596 See the Save Nubia website, run by Manu Ampim and others; see also Gamal 1998.
597 D. Morrison, 'Four Killed over Nile Dam Project that Threatens Nubian Towns', *National Geographic News*, 15 June 2007.
598 Poeschke 1996: 26; Adams 1977.
599 'Diaspora-activist' describes a member of a specific group who lives abroad but actively campaigns on problematic issues on behalf of their compatriots.
600 Scheffer 2003.
601 Poeshke 1996.
602 Interview with Ali Askouri, August 2013. Also see Askouri 2004a, 2004b and 2008.

Figure 11. Nubian flags painted on houses in Mahas near the Third Cataract. (Source: photograph kindly lent by Prof. Nicholas Hopkins, October 2013)

In sum, Nubians are an 'indigenous descendant community' given the common sense in the community of a strong ancestral connection with 'ancient Nubia'. Even though the modern Nubians' claim to descent from 'ancient Nubians' is strongly contested, the idea has nonetheless been encouraged by the culture of archaeology in Sudan, which has generated a wealth of information about 'ancient Nubia' and significantly less about Islamic Sudan. In the eyes of many Nubians, archaeologists have provided scientific evidence of their longstanding presence on their land; their 'right' to that land; and, for some, even a 'right' to statehood; rights that are seen by the Sudanese state as a threat to national unity and political stability. The Nubians' sense of identity has also been strengthened by what they see as the Sudanese state's attempt to extinguish their 'heritage' via dam construction, displacing them from their homes and forcing them to settle in other areas. Alongside the excavation of ancient Nubian sites in Sudan, this has assisted the emergence and consolidation of a Nubian identity that is widely recognized and accepted by others (as discussed by Lane (2011), Chapter 2). Thus, as Hopkins and Mehanna (2010) put it, archaeological history in Sudan is a 'people-making' history.

5.4 The Irrelevance of Nubian Archaeology to a Non-Descendant Community

In sharp contrast to the ownership of Nubian archaeology by Sudan's Nubian populations, a claim to be connected to 'ancient Nubia' does not appear to be common among most of Sudan's other *gabāīl*, including those who live on and around the many ancient Nubian archaeological sites; these groups may thus broadly be termed 'indigenous non-descendant communities'. To illuminate the relationship between Nubian archaeology and indigneous non-descendant communities in Sudan, the present researcher conducted a case-study of the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya *gabāīl* living in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, who, while living amidst celebrated 'Nubian' archaeological sites in the Nile Valley, claim Arab-Muslim descent.

5.4.1 Archaeology in the Case-Study Area

To archaeologists, the case-study area is one of the most important archaeological locations in Sudan. Situated within a vast archaeological landscape to the north-east of Khartoum, it is enclosed by the Nile, Blue Nile and Atbara rivers. It has been dubbed part of the 'Island of Meroe' by scholars and was in 2011 designated as one of Sudan's two UNESCO World Heritage sites.[603] There are two archaeological sites in the case-study area: Domat al-Hamadab in Hamadab and Meroe in Bejrawiya. Both date predominantly to the second, Meroitic, phase of the Kingdom of Kush (350 BCE-350 CE). Although not a royal residence, Domat al-Hamadab (Figure 12) has relinquished some important finds, such as the so-called Hamadab Stelae, which was found by Garstang in 1914 and attests to the Meroites' unique written language.[604] The site was also one of a chain of Meroitic-Kushite settlements with religious significance: these settlements all lie on the east bank of the Nile, are of similar size (15-20ha) and spaced roughly 15km-20km apart.[605] Findings such as these have changed how archaeologists see settlement in Meroitic Kush, demonstrating denser settlement in this area (ancient 'Upper Nubia') than previously thought.[606]

603 The full name for the site is the 'Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe'. As noted by Welsby and Ahmed, the first known mention of Meroe was in the 5th Century BCE, when "…Herodotus was informed while on a visit to Egypt of a fabled city of the Ethiopians, 'the burnt faced ones,' lying far to the south (II,29)…Referred to in the Graeco-Roman world as Meroe, its Kushite name was variously spelt Bedewi, Medewi, and Bedewe" (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 34; also see Török 2014).

604 Garstang writes of the discovery: "One other site was examined, an isolated mound lying some two or three kilometres to the south, not far from the village of Hamadab. We were led to this spot by results of our casual examinations in previous years, and of some intelligent experiments made by one of our Arab foremen…the most immediate result was the discovery of two giant stelae, inscribed in Meroitic cursive characters, both apparently historical narratives" (Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914). Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997.

605 Baud 2008.

606 Edwards 1989; Edwards 2004.

Meroe (Figure 13) was the capital of Meroitic Kush,[607] housing the main royal residence and acting as an important administrative hub and religious centre. Meroe consists of ruined sandstone temples and palaces as well as features such as the so-called Royal Baths, which enjoy particular fame amongst archaeologists given the 'Hellenistic' style adopted in crafting the interior sculptural decoration.[608] The discovery of a bronze head of Augustus Caesar in 1910 underneath the threshold of Meroe's Temple of Victory also sparked interest in the otherwise little known wars between Meroitic Kush and Roman Egypt in the late 1st Century BCE.[609] Although most central to village life, Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe are not the only sites in the area (Chapter 3). Moving eastwards, one encounters the Apedemak Temple, the Sun Temple, and next to it, the reservoir (*hafir*). Ancient mounds of iron slag as well as spoil heaps generated by archaeologists characterize the landscape here. Finally, three sets of monumental pyramids, the burial grounds of the Kushite-Meroitic rulers, lie some 4-5km to the east of the case-study area; as such, this part of the 'Island of Meroe' can be charaterized as an interconnected archaeological landscape.

Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe have been under periodic investigation by explorers and archaeologists for the past 100 years. Published accounts about Meroe include those written by Bruce and Shaw (1782[610]), Burckhardt (1813), Cailliaud (1826[611]), Hoskins (1835), Ferlini (in the 1830s, also noted in Budge 1907), Crowfoot (1911), Garstang, Sayce and Griffith (1911), Garstang, Phytian and Sayce (1914), Reisner (1918, 1923), Crawford (1953), Dunham (1957, 1963) and Arkell (1961). Shinnie began work at Meroe with the University of Ghana in the 1960s and returned throughout the 1970s as Project Director of the multi-national University of Calgary-University of Khartoum team, and led their last excavation season at Meroe in 1983-4.[612] A brief Sudanese-German expedition arrived in 1992 and then again in 2002.[613] Thereafter, excavations at Meroe were renewed by the Royal Ontario Museum and University of Khartoum, which ran from 2002 to 2004 and again in 2007,[614] and by the German Archaeological Institute (DAI), which has been investigating the Royal Baths since 1999. The University of Khartoum has also spent numerous seasons there running fieldschools and conducting excavations.

At Domat al-Hamadab, the early work of Garstang in the early 1900s was resumed in 2001 by a mission from the DAI in collaboration with the University of Shendi and, since 2013, with the Qatar-

607 Welsby 1996.
608 S. Wolf and Onasch 2003; S. Wolf et al. 2008.
609 Török 2009. The head seems to have been rendered in the Prima Porta type that was typical of the 1st Century BCE. See Walker 1995 for additional stylistic analyses.
610 Bruce 1790.
611 Cailliaud 1826.
612 Shinnie 1967, 1984; Shinnie and Bradley 1980; Shinnie and Anderson 2004.
613 Hinkel and Sievertsen 2002.
614 The project co-directors, Grzymski and Osman, were both students of Shinnie. The 2002 and 2003 seasons are published in Grzymski 2003; the January to March 2004 season in Grzymski 2005; the November to December 2007 season in Grzymski and Grzymska 2008.

Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP).[615] Both Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe are also being investigated by UCLQ, whose team has been studying the development of metallurgy since 2012.[616] Both sites contain evidence of a significant iron smelting industry from the Meroitic period; the mounds of iron slag that litter the landscape have earned Meroe the nickname of "the Birmingham of Africa."[617]

Located at the centre of agricultural and residential spaces, both sites take up great space. However, one key difference is that while many of Meroe's ancient buildings and townscape are not only exposed but still standing and may be traversed, Domat al-Hamadab is a mound that is seasonally excavated and backfilled. This raises the question of whether the larger, more conspicuous and thus more 'busy' archaeological sites have a greater phenomenological effect upon site-communities. Certainly, such a hypothesis may be reasonably posited since conspicuous sites have historically attracted more archaeological attention. However, as Shankland notes, even if residents "have absolutely no idea of the existence of the site they may have developed different and perhaps complex ways of integrating the same material remains into their own conceptions of history."[618]

615 P. Wolf et al. 2008; P. Wolf et al. 2014.
616 Humphris 2014; Humphris and Carey 2016.
617 Sayce 1912: 55.
618 Shankland 1999: 140.

Figure 12. Domat al-Hamadab. Top: the site as seen from above (Source: Google Earth, 2016); bottom left: Domat al-Hamadab's upper town (top) and suburbs (bottom) on the North Mound (Source: P. Wolf 2014: 105, Fig. 2); bottom right: an active excavation trench in the North Mound (Source: author's photograph, Feb. 2015).



Figure 13. Meroe. Top: the site as seen from above (Source: Google Earth, 2016); bottom left: Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids (Source: Edwards 2004: 146, Fig. 6.2); bottom right: rams statues lining the Amun Temple's processional way (Source: author's photograph, Feb. 2015).

5.4.2 Disconnections from Archaeology

5.4.2.1 Language

To examine the impact of archaeology on the 'non-descendant' site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the present researcher collected data on how Ja'alī farmers, Mansūrī and Hassanī pastoralists as well as the Fadnī semi-pastoralists view archaeology. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Sacks et al.'s (1995) linguistic analyses involved coding, lexical searches, looking for *in vivo* codes for single words such as 'archaeology', 'heritage', 'culture', 'archaeologists', the 'sites' and so on. An immediate finding from interviews and conversations with the Ja'aliyīn was that Western terms associated with the archaeological endeavour were largely absent from local discourse. It could be that one fundamental reason for this is the absence of a direct Arabic word for 'archaeology'; the closest Arabic word for 'archaeological sites' or 'materials' is 'antiquities' (*'athār*), and the closest phrase to 'archaeology' (the discipline) is"science of antiquities" (*'ilm al-'athār*). Of note, the state body responsible for archaeology in Sudan is called the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums (NCAM). Of course these concepts are not wholly dissimilar; 'antiquities' is not very far, conceptually, from 'archaeological sites'. 'Antiquities', as old or ancient materials, are part of the jigsaw of the archaeological endeavour, and both terms share a connotative reference to the actual words used by residents to describe the sites: a "thing" (*hāja*) from some time that is "old" (*gadīm*/*a*) or "from the past" (*min zamān*; or *min ba'īdā*, lit. 'from far away'). However, most respondents did not use the word *'athār* in interviews and conversations with the present researcher. Therefore, since no hybrid word for 'archaeology' has emerged (unlike 'geophysics' (*geophysia*) or 'anthropology' (*anthropologia*), it clearly functions as a limited concept in the case-study area—neither quite what archaeologists think of as 'archaeology' nor quite what the Sudanese think of as 'antiquities'. There was also a noticeable absence in local discourse about archaeology of the words 'culture' (*thagafa*) and 'heritage' (*turāth*), with even fewer respondents ever speaking about their 'identity' (*hawiyya*), 'civilization' (*haḍara*), 'ancient monuments' (*ma'alīn qadīma*), 'restoration' (*tarmīm*), 'conservation' (*himāya*), 'artefacts' (*mathūrāt*) or 'art' (*fann*). Instead, one UCLQ employee, when asked if he had learned any new words from his interactions with the archaeologists, replied, "Yes, I've learned 'come', 'brush', 'quickly', 'no' and 'yes'." The word used most frequently in conversations with both farmers and pastoralists, then, was not 'archaeology' or even 'antiquities' but something more personal: 'history' (*tarīkh*) (see below).

The present researcher also investigated how the members of the site-communities specifically referred to the sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe, which, by default also shows how they refer to archaeologists. Place-names in Sudan are highly significant and can refer simultaneously to a people, language, notable features of the landscape and even, subtly, to a way of life (Chapter 4). Indeed,

elsewhere, a number of archaeological sites seem to be named *'Hōsh el-Khwāja*' or '*Hōsh al-Kafir*' (the latter is a Meroitic site 15km north of Hamadab; there is also a Hōsh al-Kafir near Hobagi, a Ja'alī village on the west bank of the Nile). A Sudanese colleague offered the explanation that the *hōsh* is recognised to be something from the deep past and will therefore be known to "be of interest to the *kafir,* or even made by the *kāfīr* (lit. 'infidel')."[619] While the present researcher has not heard archaeologists referred to as *kafir,* they are occasionally referred to as *duktūr*/*a*; very rarely are they referred to as 'archaeologists' (*ʿūlāma al-'athār*, lit. 'scholars of antiquities'). By and large, however, archaeologists are simply '*khwāja*' or '*khwajāt*'.[620] Indeed, if the archaeologists were known, their compounds were individually referred to as '*bayt khwajāt*', those who know the Ja'alī owners of the compounds refer to them by the latter's names; UCLQ's compound is owned by one of the village patriarchs, Mohammed Hassan al-Shaykh Kuku, and thus referred to as '*bayt* Mohammed Kuku'.

In interviews and conversations with the Ja'aliyīn, the few respondents who had worked on the sites as employees sometimes referred to Meroe as "the Royal City" (*al-madīna al-mālikīyya*), the name that appears on a sign at the site entrance (Figure 14); other, older Ja'aliyīn referred to the Late Meroitic temple, Building M750, as the "prison" (*sijin*)[621] and the altar as the "church" (kenisa), from the way the exposed buildings look.[622] Young men and women referred to a location near the altar in the middle temple on the main road as the "slaughterhouse" (*salakhāna*). Only Mariam al-Pasha noted that Bejrawiya received its name from a past king, known as Bedjir, who had built Meroe and the pyramids. However, most respondents referred to Meroe vaguely as the "area" (*muntiga*) or "station" (*muwgīf*) of antiquities. Something almost mechanical is implied in this name; the word *muwgīf* is most often used for a place at which vehicles stop, and is thus used to describe car parks (*muwgīf al-'arabiyya*), bus stations (*muwgīf al-hāfilāt*) and taxi ranks (*muwgīf al-taksī*). The reference is as much to Meroe's location, along one of the main thoroughfares, as for its monumental archaeological remains. These findings offer insights into how the Ja'aliyīn view Meroe as part of the landscape which, essentially, is that it recognized to be a meaningful (if utilitarian) part of the landscape but independently of its designation as an ancient 'Nubian' archaeological site.

619 Conversation with University of Shendi archaeology lecturer, 2015. The Director of the ed-Damer Museum and the Director of Tourism for River Nile State were conducting fieldwork here at the time of writing.

620 Christie (1946), Mallowan (1977) and many other archaeologists have also noted being called this.

621 Grzymski (2005) notes that this may be connected to the fact that Garstang himself had noted that the building looked very geometric and that the small square rooms were like cells. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997.

622 The local reference to the altar as the 'church' is also recorded in Garstang, Phytian and Sayce (1914: 57 (under the section, 'A preliminary note on an expedition to Meroe in Ethiopia')). Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997.

Figure 14. The entrance to Meroe as seen from the east. The sign reads, "al-Madīna al-Mālikīyya", The Royal City. (Source: author's photograph, Feb. 2015)

Domat al-Hamadab, located farther away from the villages, and with no standing buildings above the ground level, is less well known to locals than Meroe. Even in Hamadab, the only terms the present researcher heard the Ja'aliyīn use to describe it were "mound" (*gōz* or *kom*; akin to 'tell' in the Middle East). Hamza al-Ja'ali referred to it as the "castle" (*gasūr*), "because it is very high." The name Domat al-Hamadab (Figure 15) recalls neither its Meroitic-Kushite origins nor its elite status in 'Ancient Nubia'. Instead, it refers to the nearby village (Hamadab) and the dom-palm trees (*hyphaene thebaica*) that scatter the site. Who chose the name is not clear (despite the author's attempts to find out!), but it seems to relate to the first name of the area, which was Domat al-Kharbana "the ruined doma [tree]", referring to the Ja'aliyīn's settlement history (below). The naming of the site after a tree species is wholly in keeping with the "strong relationship between beliefs of the local people in the importance of traditional use and the availability of such trees in the area";[623] the dom-palm is, like many other trees in Sudan, deeply symbolic[624] and associated with specific prosperity and peopleas well as devils (*shayātīn* s. *shaytān*) and spirits (*jinn, zayrān*).[625] Indeed, Adil Moukib, a Ja'alī tenant farmer whose field is near the South Mound said that *jinn* live in the tundoop and lalob trees there.[626] But the name of the archaeological site also suggests an overt claim of ownership by the Hamadab

623 Taha et al. 2014: 48-9.

624 The celebrated Sudanese author Tayeb Salih often referred to popular Islamic beliefs in his writing, one example of which is entitled 'The Dom Tree of Wad Hamid' (see Nasr 1980).

625 Taha et al. 2014: 50.

626 Adil even advised the green-fingered translator of the present researcher not to plant a dom-tree by the UCL Qatar dig-house because of the *jinn*, citing evidence that every household that had done so had later been abandoned. Apparently *Tamarindus indica*, *Prosopis juliflora*, and *Ziziphus spina-christi* (sidir) trees are also associated with *jinn* (Taha et al. 2014: 50).

family of the Ja'aliyīn, who are named after the village's founder, Hamad (see below). As such, the naming of the site seems to have far more significance when seen as part of the Ja'alī claim to the land rather than specific recognition of the site as part of ancient 'Nubia'.

Figure 15. The sign for Domat al-Hamadab, as seen from the approach to the South Mound (Source: author's photograph, Feb. 2015).

The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists used different terminology for Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe. The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, who live only a few hundred metres from Meroe and use it for grazing, do not see it as an archaeological site. The pastoralists described Domat al-Hamadab with reference to the village of Hamadab and Meroe with reference to the acacia trees ("the place in the acacia", see Chapter 7) or with reference to the archaeologists (*khwajāt*). It was clear that female members of the pastoral groups used none of the Ja'alī terminology at all: neither *athâr* nor *muwgīf*, and certainly not *al-madīna al-mālikīyya*; perhaps because of their lesser exposure to the archaeologists or the archaeological sites. Indeed there seems to be a deeper misunderstanding of 'archaeology' by pastoalists than farmers: the author was frequently told that the archaeologists come to Sudan to "look for gold" or to "dig up their ancestors".[627] Outside the case-study area, even the small new settlement of Wadi Tarabil (lit. 'wadi of the

627 The idea is not irrational: there are many battle sites in the area, such as Abu Telih (also known to the British as Abu Klea) on the west bank of the Nile, which was the location of a battle between the Anglo-Egyptian and Mahdist forces in 1885.

pyramids'), near which some of the pastoralists live, is not overtly connected to the ancient 'Nubian' monuments after which it was named.

However, perhaps due to their size, the pyramids do incite more explanations than Domat al-Hamadab or Meroe; although the explanations are still not connected to Nubian archaeology proper. One common explanation from respondents from all communities was that the pyramids were constructed by the "Anaj", a semi-mythical people from the Gezira and the south-east, because they were "tall"; as Ali al-Hassani explained, "You couldn't make the pyramids with scaffolding, even now."[628] The myth of the Anaj seems strong in the lands in which they had power, even centuries later; semantic usage suggests that although the designation 'Anaj' is not always scientifically constituted, it is nevertheless given as an explanation for many pre-Islamic and ultimately unknown phenomena.

*

In sum, almost all respondents displayed a high level of linguistic and conceptual disconnection from Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe as archaeological sites and with archaeology in general, regardless of age, gender, livelihood and *gabīla*. In addition to the obvious linguistic and conceptual barriers, other reasons for the absence of archaeological terminology from local discourse include an educational syllabus that is almost devoid of 'ancient Nubian' history and the lack of educational outreach by archaeologists in the case-study area, despite their long-term presence (see Chapter 8). Even so, the dissonance between the archaeologists' and the site-community residents' concept of archaeology, and of the meaning of the archaeological sites, was striking.

5.4.2.2 Antiquities

Among others, Meskell (1999, 2002, 2005b) and Hodder (2012) have theorized the fundamentally 'enmeshed' or 'entangled' relationship between humans and objects, whereby material culture does not only construct and express identity but also constitutes part of the experience of 'being in the world' and negotiating one's place within it.[629] Thus, to examine the relationship between residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya and the archaeological 'antiquities' that surround them, the present

628 Scholars posit that the Anaj were a people who lived far to the south-east of the case-study area, and whose little-known kingdom was overrun by the Fūnj Sultanate of Sennar in the early 1500s. Musa (2010) records that oral tradition in the Gezira and in the east portrays the Anaj as being "extremely tall, well built warriors, skilled in riding horses and camels" and to whom many people attributed things of ancient age. The Anaj are alternatively referred to as 'Hamage', which Musa records were the nephews of the defeated Anaj absorbed into the Fūnj administration. In a similar account, Holt (1961) records that the successors of the Fūnj Sultan Badi IV Abu Shulukh, who ruled from 1724 to 1762 and was overthrown in a rebellion by Fūnj aristocrats, became the puppets of powerful hereditary viziers drawn from the Hamaj, a group that probably consisted of Arabized and Islamized members of the non-Arab pre-Fūnj population. These viziers ran the declining Sultanate until its total collapse in the face of the Turco-Egyptian invasion in 1821. These narratives echo what Rodriguez was told about giants building the mounds in Yucatán (see Rodriguez 2006: 165).

629 Also see Lane 2006 for an examination of household assemblages in Mali.

researcher asked respondents to show examples of their own 'antiquities'. Significantly, few referred to the nearby archaeological sites and none to their official 'ancient Nubian' character.

Two of the most common items shown by Ja'alī respondents and some of the older Fadniyya respondents was their family's wooden plough (*mihrāth*) and waterwheel (*sagiyya*), both of which represent a clear historical and material link with the past and to their livelihoods. In response to a question about the Ja'aliyīn's traditional crafts, Hamza al-Ja'ali replied:

> There were not crafts, exactly, but skills around them…these crafts of hats [tagiya], handkerchiefs [*manadīl*], ceramics [*fukhâr*], water containers [*azyār* s. *zīr*]…[But mostly], all the things to do with the *sagiyya*. They also manufacture *sagiyya* here. We were *sagiyya* specialists.

Some Ja'alī respondents directed the present researcher to their mechanized pumps (modern *sagiyya*) and older pumps if they were of British manufacture; others to sources of water such as jugs used for ablution and toilette (*abārîg* pl. *ibrîg*) in their clay form. Most importantly, in Hamadab, the source of water was the Well of Wagy Al'a[630] (Figure 16) and in Bejrawiya South, this was the Well of Osman al-Fajaali. Both wells are said to be linked directly to the Nile, and have been named after the men who dug them (see below). Although the wells are now non-functioning, the water is described as having been 'sweet' (meaning 'clean', *nadif*), and it was emphasized that all houses in this area were made using the wells' water. In Bejrawiya South, Amna Suliman was also keen to show the present author an old acacia tree with extensive branches, under which they said they eat corn and congregate during winter. Pre-prepared adzuki beans (*balīla*; a bean dish eaten to break fast at Ramadan) were also offered as an example of their culinary traditions.

630 The official story of Wagy Al'a narrates that when, at the beginning of construction, work was stopped by some rocks blocking the well shaft, women brought sacks [*būrma*] full of *simīn* [milk whey], poured it over the rocks and lit a match: the blockage broke. Two halves of a big rock, said to be the original, now lie next to the well. The date of this sign is quietly debated by the Ja'aliyīn intelligentsia and ranges from 1707 [on the sign] to the Turco-Egyptian period in the 1860s [in conversation]. This story and the debate about the date is also recorded in Weschenfelder (2014).



Figure 16. The Well of Wagy Al'a in Hamadab. The sign reads: "Wagy Al'a Well al-Hamadab; It was dug in 1707 [CE] and is attributed to Wagy Al'a Suliman Zeyd Arman Hassan Hamad Abdalbagi Bedawi Abdalbagi." The sign was made by Osman Ahmed Suleiman Waqi-Allah Hamid Hamad." (Source: author's photograph, Feb. 2015.)

The 'antiquities' presented by the newer Fadniyya semi-pastoralists and the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists included their goat skin water sacks (*girba*); smaller animal-skin sacks used to make yoghurt and butter (*sazin*); and, gourds to keep butter in (*gara'*), which hang from the beams of the roofs of their tents (*hajīr*); when hung in the shade, the contents are cooled. Camel saddles, cowbells, swords, pieces of gold from the mines, *hijab* necklaces (leather pouches with Quranic verses in them that serve the symbolic purpose of the head-covering *hijab* and which are often worn by pastoralist women who cannot do manual work in a covered dress), and shells (*wadi'*) used by women to predict the future, were also presented as 'antiquities'. Most respondents greatly desired to show the present author a number of wells in the hinterland that they value (regrettably, visits could not be arranged); Ali al-Hassani, for example, wanted to show a well nearby that had the depth of "fifty-five men" (see below), and Nasir Muawad, who still spends up to half his year in the hinterland, desired to show the grass called *ghrabash,* which "stays" for one year and "even after it has grown, it just keeps growing." He said this as he noted that every snake and insect hides in the shade of the grass, and that when the goats, sheep and camels come to graze, the snakes bite them and they die.

*

Clearly, the material culture that is important to the residents, and which they displayed to the present author: the water-lifting devices, wells, cowbells, saddles and so on, relates predominantly to their livelihoods as farmers and pastoralists. The contexts in which the Ja'alī farmers displayed their 'antiquities' suggests that they may have on some level symbolised a claim to authenticity and connection to the land in the present; for the Fadniyya, Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, their displays appeared to show far more nostalgia for the past.

The displays of 'antiquities' are a further demonstration of the disconnection of the site-communities from 'ancient Nubia'. Even the cultural phenomena which Haynes (1992) and De Simone (2014) posit derive from the 'ancient Nubian' past (the *jīrtig*, *angarîb*) and have been incorporated into the culture of the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya are not recognized as such; when respondents were asked to explain their origin, they either claimed not to know or told stories about a time or a person located in their own histories.

5.4.2.3 Histories

To establish whether the site-communities sensed a historical link to the ancient peoples amid whose remains they lived, the present researcher asked senior members of the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya to recount their own *gabīla*'s history. The purpose of this was to establish whether the respondents would, unprompted, make any reference to 'ancient Nubia' or the sites which arguably evidence its existence. A loose version of Brooks' (2012) narrative analysis and Fairclough's (2003) discourse analysis has been used here.

A number of histories have been written about Sudan's main *gabāīl*, all with shortcomings (e.g. MacMichael 1922). Thus, the oral histories (*tarīkh shifâhī*) gathered and presented here by this author are of interest in their own right. Oral histories are defined here as cultural as well as historical memories and knowledge transmitted from one generation to another in spoken stories, songs and other mediums.[631] The oral histories were recounted to the present researcher in interviews and informal conversations principally with older respondents, who were much more aware of their communities' histories, genealogies, land ownership, past livelihoods and claims over resources than the younger respondents. Many of the latter said that they "did not know anything" about their history and referred the present researcher to their elders (termed "grandparents"). As in many parts of the world, this tendency was bemoaned by the elderly, who asserted that the younger generation is "not interested in history."

631 Leavey 2011.

The present researcher was thus regularly referred to older people regarded as keepers of the communities' histories. While this role is still alive, the number of people who possess this information is declining; oral traditions have clearly diminished among the communities in the case-study area, as they have elsewhere across the globe.[632] Indeed, Hurreiz (1977) as well as Al-Shahi and Moore (1978), who carried out ethnographic fieldwork among the Ja'aliyīn of the Shendi Reach and the Shaygiyya of the Fourth Cataract respectively, describe scenes in which an elder tells stories with dramatic intensity to an enraptured audience. Yet, the present researcher never encountered such story-telling in the case-study area or elsewhere in Sudan. The causes of the decline of oral tradition are many and include increasing literacy, use of mobile technologies and the growing accessibility of radio and television. Nevertheless, it is still possible to find and hear the histories of different groups, be them "…clans, lineages or craft specialists", and highlights the extent to which it is "…necessary to think in terms of multiple histories rather than history."[633]

Broadly speaking, the main Ja'alī respondent, Hamza al-Ja'ali, narrated the history of the Ja'alī farmers with a focus upon the *gabīla*'s ancestral links to the land. Medowi al-Mansūrī, the main Manāsīr respondent, Ali al-Hassani, the main Hassaniyya respondent, and Mohammed al-Fadni, the main Fadniyya respondent, all characterized their history with narratives about leaving their ancestral homelands, arriving in this new place and losing livelihoods in the process. The material gathered from the interviews has been synthesised with extant literature to clarify the meaning and significance of the references that were made. This task has been easier with reference to the dominant Ja'aliyīn, about whom more has been written and from whom it was easier to get a coherent chronological narrative.

The Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya in the case-study area all claim Arab-Muslim ancestry, which may be one reason for why Sudanese and Western scholars alike oftentimes conflate these groups; MacMichael (1922) and Maliński (2014), following the Ja'alī historian Ibrahim (1988), subsume the Manāsīr under the heading of 'Greater' Ja'aliyīn and the Ja'aliyīn of the Shendi Reach the Ja'aliyīn 'proper'. However, the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya of Hamadab and Bejrawiya made it very clear to the present researcher that they see themselves as separate groups.

5.4.2.3.1 The Hamadab-Ja'aliyīn in Hamadab

Hamza al-Ja'ali traces the ancestry of the Ja'aliyīn to al-'Abbas ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib,[634] the uncle of Prophet Muhammad and a member of the Quraysh *gabīla*, through a semi-mythical character, Ibrahim Ibn Idris, commonly known as Ibrahim Ja'al (from whom the Ja'aliyīn take their name). According to

632 For a case-study example in Iraqi Kurdistan, see Allison 2001.
633 Reid and Lane 2003: 10.
634 Abbas (568-653 CE) was a paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad. His descendants founded the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 CE.

Hamza, Ja'al migrated at an "early" date from modern-day Iraq to Bara, some 200km south-west of modern Khartoum, in what is now the state of North Kordofan. Hamza further narrated how the nickname 'Ja'al' was gained:

> [When the wars between the groups in Kordofan] became worse…[the] weak *gabāīl* who couldn't fight in the war, they came to him [for help], and he told them, 'you belong to us now.' This, in Arabic, is where *ja'alī* came from.[635]

Hamza described how, in the 16th Century, one of Ja'al's descendants, Arman, travelled from Bara to settle in the Shendi Reach, which is now claimed as the Ja'alī ancestral *dār*.[636] His dozen sons founded the Ja'alī towns that now line the Nile, such as Zeydab near ed-Damer, established by one of Arman's 12 sons, Zeyd.[637] One of Zeyd's descendants, Hamad, left Zeydab to come south to present-day Hamadab.[638] Finding the space "empty" (a claim made vigorously by all groups in the case-study area about their ancestral homelands), Hamad settled "under a dom-palm tree and had many sons and cattle." When Hamad arrived, he "brought with him the tradition of *butān* [male flagellation]." As Hamza explained:

> The origin of our music is from war, [and] we use drums [*daluka*] to encourage people to go to war. So when it comes to the wedding, this type of music [inspires] men to try to express their courage to others [by being lashed with whips]. Everyone wants to show that he is a man.

Hamad's brothers, Hamid, Abu Shura and al-Arabi, are later said to have come to settle and as a group, 'the Hamadab', began cultivating lands in Wadi al-Hawad and further east in the Butana, eventually making a seasonal centre at Basa. Over time, the space under the *dom*-palm tree became too small, so they moved east "to the sand mounds [*goz*]." Then, "between 200 and 180 years ago [i.e. early 19th Century]" the Hamadab moved again, this time "from the *goz* to Hamadab" (i.e. the modern village of Hamadab), 500m to the east. According to Hamza, "The first thing [the Hamadab] did here, of course, was build the well [*bi'r*]. It's called 'the well of Wagy Al'a'"[639] (see above). "The first *shaykh* was Mohammed Elamin Ba'ashom," one of Hamza al-Ja'ali's maternal great-grandfathers. "Then they built the Islamic school [*khalwa*]. There was no education at that time, but the *khalwa* [provided some] education." When Fūnj power declined in the 18th Century, the Ja'aliyīn were among

635 Interestingly MacMichael records a similar account, but instead of war it was Ja'al's "munificent charity" in feeding the starving at a time of famine. He is said to have said to the recipients, "ga'al nakum" (lit. 'we have made you') (1922: 197). However, conversations with other non-Ja'alī respondents suggested that the name deliberately (and arrogantly) implied courage and military prowess.

636 MacMichael also records that the Ja'aliyīn 'proper' (Arman's sons) go back twelve generations (i.e c.400 years from 1922) to the Arab-Fūnj movement before Sennar.

637 The '-ab' at the end of the *gabīla* and town names is a possessive suffix used widely in Sudan: the people whose ancestor is Ali are the Aliab; descendants of Omer are the Omerab, and so on.

638 Later, Hamza recalls the whole genealogy: "Hamad ibn Bedowi, ibn al-Arabi, ibn Abdelbagi, ibn Yazid, ibn Dawab, ibn Graanim, ibn Himidan, ibn Sobh Abu Markha, ibn Masaar, ibn Serarr, ibn Hassan Kerdem, ibn Ghada'a, ibn Haraan, ibn Masrook, ibn Ahmed, ibn Ibrahim al Ja'ali, ibn Idriss, ibn Geyyis, ibn Yemen, ibn Adi, ibn Hassass, ibn Karab, ibn Haatil, ibn Yaatel, ibn Zelklaa', ibn Saad, ibn al-Fadl, ibn Abdullah, ibn al-Abbas."

639 Also, P. Wolf (2015) confirms that Domat al-Hamadab's South Mound was occupied during the medieval period and that there was a much larger occupation on the North Mound between the 15th and 19th Centuries, thereby confirming that there has been continuous occupation of the area since the Meroitic period.

a number of collectives strong enough to assert their independence; records translated by Warburg (1992) tell of a Ja'alī 'king' (*mek*) seated at Shendi (see Appendix 7), and certainly they spearheaded many revolts against the Turco-Egyptian administration in the 1820s and 1840s. Notably, Hamza's narrative acknowledges only one of these, and that is that "Hamadab participated in the ruling and the administrative system of the Turkish. At this time there were administrative…districts and for some reason, we participated in this." He concluded by stating that "[the residents of Hamadab] registered this land in 1901. Officially."

5.4.2.3.2 The Manāsīr al-Badiyah in Bejrawiya

According to Medowi al-Mansouri, the Manāsīr, like the Ja'aliyīn, descend from Abbas of the Quraysh through Ibrahim Ja'al.[640] However, while the Ja'aliyīn claim ancestry through Arman (see above), the Manāsīr claim ancestry through a descendant called Mansour. Medowi also claimed kinship with the Manāsīr of Yemen, from whom we may presume they split to migrate west. However, Medowi preferred to focus on the Manāsīr's history during the past 50 years, which he characterised as a series of voluntary and involuntary moves and transitions, each broken down into "befores" and "afters" and "departures from" and "arrivals at."

Medowi explained that the *dār* of the Manāsīr used to comprise a 100km stretch of the Nile above the Fourth Cataract together with the northern parts of the Bayuda Desert. To the north-west were the Shaygiyya and to the south were the Rubātāb and Ja'aliyīn. Like most *gabīla*, the Manāsīr included both pastoralists and settled farmers (Chapters 2 and 4). The former, the Manāsīr al-Badiyya, were nomadic pastoralists who migrated with their herds around the volcanic fields[641] of the northern Bayuda Desert,[642] while the latter, the Manāsīr al-Nil (or al-Bahr), had farmland along the river. However, the Manāsīr al-Badiyah and the Manāsīr al-Nil have been almost entirely displaced from their claimed ancestral *dār*. The Manāsīr al-Badiyah have moved away over the past 50 years because of the drying up of the Bayuda Desert, a slow and ongoing process that has put pressure on land, water and animals.[643] The Manāsīr al-Nil were displaced when their land was flooded by the Merowe dam in 2007-8.[644] The Sudanese state has provided a number of resettlement sites for the displaced; one of the biggest is near Mukabrab, some 35km from the case-study area. Some of the Manāsīr al-

640 Also see Maliński 2014: 79, who points to Lorimer 1936: 162.

641 Interestingly, the man who gave the first detailed description of the volcanic field was the same H.C. Jackson whose work is quoted in the first pages of Chapter 2. (Noted in Maliński 2014: 81).

642 Maliński 201 4; cf. Beck 2008.

594 Some of these pastoralists form part of the over 220,000 families in Sudan estimated to be at risk due to climate change (UNDP 2015b).

644 See Hänsch 2012. Her account of the way they were unceremoniously uprooted can be found in both her documentary ("Manasirland – Development Refugees" (Hänsch 2009)) and in her publications. As the water of the Merowe Dam rose, she describes people grabbing their possessions and saying, "Nihna muhâjirîn" ("We are refugees") and commenting that life is "'hayya mujahjaha'" ("a mess.") (2012: 186-7).

Nil have opted to live in the new settlements but others have settled elsewhere in the region. Indeed, as Medowi explained, both Manāsīr al-Badiyah and Manāsīr al-Nil have settled in the Shendi Reach.

Medowi's family, which belongs to the Manāsīr al-Badiyah, settled on the outskirts of Hamadab and Bejrawiya because of its "good grazing land and…[being] half way between the *khāla'* [the hinterland] and *al-bahr* [the Nile]", but that "now [they] have no animals and have had to learn about how to farm." However Medowi added that "in the past, our fathers came from the north border at Atbara to this land for grazing and getting *birsîm* and *gesh*, so they knew it was cultivatable, quiet and clean with good top soil." (This echoes the Fadniyya that came from the west bank, who, according to Mohammed al-Fadni, left because "even though the land there is good for agriculture the eastern bank is better for animals—the water is better")

According to Medowi, it was justifiable for the Manâsîr al-Badiyah to move from their *dār* because of the drought and desiccation of their grazing lands in the Bayuda. However, he insisted that the flooding of Manāsīr lands by the Merowe dam was not an acceptable or excusable reason for the Manāsīr al-Nil to leave their *dār* and that those who have done so, specifying those who have moved to Mukabrab, are "not true Manâsîr." This reflects the view widely held by the Manāsīr al-Badiyah that the Manâsîr al-Nil did not put up sufficient resistance to the construction of the Merowe dam.

Medowi's narrative shows that displacement has had a deep emotional and psychological impact upon the Manāsīr, which mirrors the findings of other studies of displaced groups,[645] and also suggests the fragmentation of the older, more solid *gabīla* designations and sense of belonging.

5.4.2.3.3 The Hassaniyya in Bejrawiya

Ali al-Hassani described the Hassaniyya as descending from immigrants from Arabia but, unlike Hamza al-Ja'ali did not provide further details, or an explanation of how the Hassaniyya received their name. He did not acknowledge the Hassaniyya's traditional designation as part of the Kawāhla *gabīla*, who claim descent from Zubeir ibn el-Awwam of the Kusai of Arabia through a certain Kahil, and whose *dār* stretches west from the White Nile into Kordofan. According to Ali, the Hassaniyya *dār* includes farmland by the White Nile south of Khartoum and grazing lands that run north, parallel to the Nile, up to the southern Bayuda Desert (a distance of some 500km). Their migration routes, he explained, meant that the Hassaniyya who now live on the outskirts of Bejrawiya knew the Shendi Reach long before they settled there (see above).[646]

645 Studies of dam-induced displacement have been carried out by Scudder who coined the term "development refugee/s" (1993: 124). Also see Ruppert 1988.

646 Indeed even in 1837, the traveller Holroyd recalled that on the west bank of Khartoum, there was "a small settlement of Hasaniyeh Arabs".

However, Ali emphasised that the Hassaniyya did not move from their *dār* to Bejrawiya out of choice. He claimed that although the sedentary Hassaniyya had originally been displaced by the construction of the Jebel Aulia dam on the White Nile in 1937, the pastoralist members of the *gabīla* had not.[647] He also said that in the past, the grazing available to the Hassaniyya had been perfectly adequate, but that since migration routes were "getting shorter" (i.e. they were travelling shorter distances than in the past) and "the climate changed", they moved near the Nile. Nevertheless, when showing his 'antiquities' (see above), Hassan stressed that the family still goes very regularly to Wadi Sukkara and Rojbab (extended family homes in the hinterland, unknown to the present author but likely in or near Wadi Muqqadam on the west bank). Indeed, from the way Ali spoke about them, it seems that the nomadic Hassaniyya see themselves as apart from their former sedentary neighbours, whom he termed 'Arab al-Bahr',[648] and noted the latter's keeping of cows in comparison with the camels of the Hassaniyya. Again, this suggests the breaking down of the older, more solid *gabīla* designations.

Yet, or perhaps indeed, Ali also went some way to obscuring the dimensions of the *Hassaniyya*'s history by speaking at equal length about being part of Bejrawiya's "original people", whilst emphasizing that the Hassaniyya and the Ja'aliyīn are "all one" (*kūlu wahīd*). He later explained that he was born there and that his family were there "early"; implicitly hinting at 'early' equating to 'authenticity' and 'late' with 'inauthenticity', whilst adding that because he and his family and the Ja'aliyīn are the "original people" and "have more rights to the land than the people from Wadi Tarabil", who "only came here 15 years ago": "our relationship is better."

5.4.2.3.4 The Fadniyya in Hamadab

The Fadniyya who live on the south and south-eastern outskirts of Hamadab include both sedentary farmers and semi-pastoralists (Chapter 4). Some Fadniyya, such as Mohammed al-Fadni, have lived outside Hamadab for a number of decades, having been pushed east to Hamadab by drought, intermarried with the Ja'aliyīn, become well-established tenant farmers and formed Local Committees to represent themselves politically (see Chapter 4). Other members of the Fadniyya are more recent arrivals who live as semi-pastoralists. The groups do not speak on behalf of one another; the status of the semi-pastoral Fadniyya in the Local Committee of Hi al-Salaam (part of Jutab), the village where they live, for example, was impossible to ascertain, but the sedentarised Fadniyya are clearly resentful of the "still-pastoral" Fadniyya, perhaps because the former were successfully integrating into the

647 According to Harries-Jones (1972), in 1938 the Anglo-Egyptian government brought Hassaniyya tenants affected by the dam from the White Nile to part of the Gezira's main canal, known as the Abdel Majid block, ostensibly to provide them with alternative means of livelihood.

648 Trilsbach (1983) reported that the Nile-side Hassaniyya referred to the semi-pastoral Hassaniyya as *arab al-dhariya* (Arabs of the Clay Plain) and the nomadic Hassaniyya as *'arab al-behaim* (Arabs of the Animals), but, perhaps predictably, Ali al-Hassani did not refer to himself in these ways.

Ja'aliyīn riverine community and see the arrival of the latter as potentially damaging to their newfound status.

However, any rift between the established and recently arrived Fadniyya is closely guarded from the other *gabāīl*, and when Mohammed al-Fadni recounted their history, he spoke as if for all Fadniyya in Hamadab. In his account of Fadniyya history, he rejected the idea that the Fadniyya were newcomers by explaining that they had known "this place" (specifically Hamadab, but also the area more generally) for a long time, having had their *dār* and river-irrigated fields in the Wadi al-Hawad some 50km to the east. To substantiate this claim, he spoke about the tomb of a Bafadni holy man (*faqīh* pl. *fuqahā*, lit. 'Islamic jurist', expert in *fīqh*), which he described as being a major landmark in Basa, the wadi's main town.[649] As if to consolidate their place in Sudan's elite, Mohammed also spoke with pride about Amer al-Zeen al-Hassan, a Fadnī Lieutenent General in the Sudanese air force who was born in nearby Kabushiya. The latter has been awarded one of Sudan's highest military honours, the Medal of Courage, which makes the local Fadniyya especially proud of him.

Other pastoralist Fadniyya who recounted their history to the present author described a much more ancient and extensive *dār*, centred on the southern Gezira and extending south towards to Sennar and north into the Butana and Wadi al-Hawad. Their descriptions centre around a number of wells in the hinterland. For example, the Fadniyya in Mataris talk about a well called Bir Gabush (well of changing colors); other Fadniyya talk about Bir Abu Najma which is "55 men" (c.105m) deep (also see 'Antiquities', above). [650]

*

The narratives recounted to the present researcher are significant not only for what they include but also for what they leave out. Significantly, considering the discourse of social relations on the national level, the narratives make little mention of the important role all four *gabāīl* played in the slave trade. It is well known for example that Ja'aliyīn and Manāsīr traders (*jallaba*) were deeply involved in the slave trade. And, while the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya were never as deeply entrenched as the Ja'aliyīn, the "big men" of the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya "regional elite"[651] did engage in the trade until at least 1928,[652] much later than the Ja'aliyīn and Manāsīr, though for most of them it remained "simple in organization and small in scale."[653] From the perspective of the present study, however, the most

649 MacMichael also notes this tomb, writing that it is a "well-known sanctuary" (1922: 250, n.1).
650 Also recorded in Weschenfelder 2014.
651 Spaulding 1988: 26.
652 Spaulding (1988) writes that even when the commercial slave trade officially stopped, domestic slavery continued for some decades. He suggests that slavery eventually died out as the increasing use of machinery produced a surplus of wage labourers. Spaulding also notes that in the late 1920s, A. J. Arkell counted 392 slaves who had been acquired during the years 1910-1927. (The Arkell Papers are kept in the SOAS University of London library.)
653 Spaulding 1988: 41. Ordinarily, the slaving activity of the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya involved wealthy men travelling to slave farms in north-western Ethiopia to buy small numbers of slaves (usually young women) for domestic help. On other occasions, however, it would involve small, organised expeditions to enslave women, girls

important and striking thing about all the narratives is the complete absence of any connection to 'ancient Nubia' or to the archaeological sites upon and around which they live.

The author hastens to add that this is striking not because there *should* be connections but rather because such connections would be expedient for the respondents to claim in this context. Such a constructivist view of people's (dis)connection to archaeology is supported by the ways in which residents such as those in the case-study area respond to dam building plans. Comparing the protests made by the Nubian groups against the Aswan dams (Chapter 5) and those made by the Manāsīr, Shagiyya and the Rubātāb against the Merowe dam (Chapter 2) it is clear that they use two different aspects of archaeology to support their cause.[654] The Nubian groups use their 'ancient' connection to the archaeological landscape: archaeological sites have played a great role in anti-dam community mobilization and the forging of modern 'Nubian' identity with a distinct link to the ancient past. These dynamics are distinctly different from that among Manāsīr, Shagiyya and the Rubātāb Arab-Muslim groups, who display greater concern about the submerging of their *lands* rather than of the Nubian sites (with which they sense little 'ancestral' connection) and instead use the presence of archaeologists to mobilize support. The latter strategy has also been used by the Arab, predominantly Ja'aliyīn, communities to plans to build the Shereik Dam at the Fifth Cataract, though this has been far less studied by scholars. The residents of towns such as Abidiya, upstream from the Fifth Cataract, have tried to stop archaeologists from working in the area,[655] and when the fieldwork for this project began in 2013, little salvage archaeology had taken place. Therefore, as at Merowe, local opposition to the dam was based upon attachment to the land and not the archaeological sites, and rather focused on making political use of the archaeologists even though the precedent set by Nubians suggests that the claim of connection with the ancient 'Nubian' past is perhaps the most expedient course to take if international attention is to be paid to the cause.

5.4.3 Connections to Archaeology

Despite the summary above, it is clear that the archaeological sites have more impact and importance than the evidence so far suggests; after all, Domat al-Hamadab plays a vital role in the Hamadab-Ja'aliyīn's settlement history even if it is not conceptually connected to or important via 'archaeology' or 'ancient Nubia'. Moreover the findings of scholars such as Shankland (1996, 1999), Gomes (2006) and others discussed in Chapter 2 had led the present author to expect that, even if the residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya perceived no ancestral connection with 'ancient Nubia' and its

and boys. According to Spaulding, few men were sought or brought back as slaves by the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya.

654 For a further comparison of the Aswan and Merowe dam cases see De Simone 2008.

655 Pers. comm., Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Head of Fieldwork NCAM, Nov. 2013.

archaeological history, the physical sites would still hold some meaning and be represented within local culture as places "delineated by the outcome of interrelations and the existence of multiplicity, continually transformed and under construction."[656] Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe are, after all, significant elements of the local landscape, located amid residential and agricultural spaces. Local residents move through the sites to get to the Nile or to the villages, and the pastoralists use them for grazing their animals and as a source of wood for fuel (despite the fences constructed by archaeologists for site management, see Chapter 7). Indeed, following Gomes again, it is arguable that the geographical 'space/s' taken up by sites are made into 'place/s' by the myriad interactions that take place between the people who move within them. 'Place-making', in this view, is thus action-orientated and cumulative; human experiences may be subtle or fleeting, but they nonetheless gain meaning as they build up over time.

The data collected for this research confirms that this has been the case at the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Bejrawiya, and still is to a certain extent. What little literature exists on this theme has also been marshalled to act as supplementary sources about other archaeological sites in the Nile Valley. For ease of analysis, the meaningful beliefs, practices and interactions have been grouped into a) the existence of spirits; b) beliefs about fertility; and c) the sacredness of cemeteries. Academically speaking, all of these may be considered to be the dynamic result of the long-term interplay between pre-Islamic and Islamic ideas.[657] Ethnographically speaking, they are rarely seen to be so. The aim here is less to pinpoint the exact origin of previously recorded practices but rather to see if they are still being practiced in the case-study area, and what they currently mean.

5.4.3.1 Spirits (*jinn*)

Jinn are immaterial beings, or spirits, that inhabit the liminal space between the physical and metaphysical worlds. In the human world, they are said to inhabit empty or ruined houses (*kharaba*, from *kharhābāt*), open spaces (*fasahāt*), rubbish dumps (*nifayāt*) and cemeteries (*maqābir*) as well as in trees (above). The presence of *jinn* is thus often predicated upon the absence of humans, whether humans are wholly absent (as in open spaces) or were formerly present (as in ruined houses). While *jinn* are regarded as essentially benign, they are also seen as protective of their space, disliking the movement of humans within their territories. Encountering *jinn* is thus believed to be dangerous to a person's bodily integrity. To counter the potential risks of such interactions, locals utter the phrase '*Bismillah'* ('In the name of God') or, less commonly, recite verses from the Quran when entering

656 Gertel et al. 2014: 9.
657 Zabek 2005.

spaces where *jinn* might be.[658] Certainly, the prospect of encountering *jinn* seems to tap into a deep-rooted fear of emptiness and openness, and the importance of the endogamous social unit (in producing children) and the safety of enclosure.[659] This line of thinking may itself be causally related to a number of other aspects of Sudanese life, such as the habit of building increasingly high compound walls and the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM, *khifāḍ*), a rampant practice in rural Sudan and one that directly reflects the safety and purity believed to be inherent in a closed and protected space and thus fundamentally connected with female fertility (see below).[660] In a connected note, the oldest and most severe form of FGM in Sudan is thought to trace back to 'ancient Egyptian' Pharaonic culture and is locally known as 'Pharaonic circumcision' (*khifāḍ fir'ūi*), although no respondent explained that FGM is undertaken because of this.[661]

Archaeological sites which have buildings exposed, such as Meroe, are fundamentally associated with *jinn* because they fall into the category of places where humans were formerly present but have since abandoned. Subterranean sites, such as Domat al-Hamadab, seem to be associated with jinn for their status as a mound and the presence of trees, although the distinction is not always clean cut. Cailliaud, one of the first European explorers to visit Sudan in the 17th Century, recalled being told that "every mound [site] is enchanted [haunted by spirits]" (*kul gōz maskūn*), testifying to the time-depth of this association (and use of the word '*gōz*' to describe subterranean sites like Domat al-Hamadab).[662]

Interviews and conversations between the present researcher and residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya suggested that belief in *jinn* is still present in its Quranic form, but diminishing as part of an active culture around archaeological sites. Indeed, only a small number of people spoke about *jinn* in serious terms, most of them in Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab (presumably because they are closest to the site). Moreover, it was always a topic that the present researcher enquired about rather

658 The present researcher's translator, Hana Ahmed, commented that *jinn* "hate living with other people" and advised her to recite the Sura al-Falaq (113:1-5), Sura an-Nas (114:1-6), and Ayat al-Kursi (2:55). Shankland similarly notes that "[u]sually on encountering the devil, some protection would be afforded by calling the name of God, Bismillah" (Shankland 1999: 149).

659 Indeed, this fear may also have been shared by the ancient Nubian-Kushites, who also put high importance on the ordering of space to ensure a balance of energy and control over chaos (Török 1995, 1997, 2002), but this is speculative at best. Although we know that the importance of matrilineality—tracing one's ancestry back through the female line—is very low in this, and indeed most, parts of Sudan. This is despite the apparent vitality of matrilineality of ancient and Christian Nubia (see Welsby 1996).

660 Boddy 1989. UNFPA (2012) suggests that the FGM rate in Sudan is at 65%.

661 *Khifāḍ fir'ūi* is the World Health Organization's 'Type III' category of FGM (ironicallt known in Egypt as 'Sudanese circumcision) and involves "excision of part or all of the external genitalia [clitoris, labia minora, and labia majora] and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening (infibulation)" leaving a small hole for urine and menstrual flow (WHO 1995: 6). In 2014, a midwife in Sai Island explained the Pharaonic origin and contemporary persistence of FGM to the present researcher, noting that it is "a tradition in a society that values tradition very highly." The most common form of FGM in Sudan is WHO's 'Type I' category known as '*sunna*' (tradition, duty). *Sunna* involves the "excision of the prepuce [clitoral hood] with or without the excision of part or all of the clitoris" (WHO 1995: 6). WHO's Type II, known in Sudan as '*matwasat*', was not mentioned to the present researcher in interviews, but is described as the "excision of the prepuce and clitoris together with partial or total excision of the labia minora" (WHO 1995: 6) (also see Kheir et al. 1991).

662 Cailliaud 1826. This finding was recently corroborated by wide-ranging interviews conducted at the early royal Napatan-Kushite site of el-Kurru by a student at the University of Kareima, Tohamy Abul Gasim Khalifa.

than wa spontaneously told. Upon asking, the (mostly pastoral) employees of UCLQ whether they knew any stories about *jinn*, only Zubeir Rahma, a Ja'alī farmer from Kejeik, knew of any and clearly found the question anachronistic. He recalled a story about a guard who worked at Meroe and a "female Muslim *jinn*" who appeared and spoke to him. In another story, set in Meroe in 2012, he said that a policeman was manning the police station on the west side of the site when:

> He heard the sound of daluka [*Ja'aliyīn* drumming]...so he went [to the source of the music,] took his gun and shot at it, but it turned out to be nothing. The policeman [nevertheless] moved his station to the eastern side of the city.

Zubeir said he had heard the gun himself and therefore concluded, "this proves that the area [Meroe] is inhabited by *jinn*." Of the others that the present researcher asked about *jinn*, men tended to tease and only a few women spoke about them with any seriousness.

The few stories about *jinn* recounted to the present author often featured subterranean spaces with secret caches of riches, particularly gold (*dhahab*),[663] protected by *jinn*. This is perhaps due to the association of *jinn* with places in a state of ruin or disrepair. In other tellings, living close to *jinn* was said to have damaged people's mental health. Even though she herself lives in Kejeik, in close proximity to the site, Adira al-Sikina alleged that the people who lived in Old Deraqab (the now-abandoned village that is built directly over the northern edge of Meroe) were "crazy" (*majānīn* s. *majnūn*). Indeed Amna Suliman said that fear of madness was the reason the people of Old Deraqab had moved to New Deraqab, and added that there was a house in the centre of Old Deraqab for the guard (*ghaffir*), but that he refused to live in it. *Jinn* are thought by some to be present at Domat al-Hamadab, too, but crucially, this is because they are believed to inhabit the dom-palm trees there, rather than the ancient site (see above).

Yet, again, the idea of *jinn* living on the sites was either shrugged off or laughed at by most respondents. Hamza al-Ja'ali, Ali al-Hassani and Medowi al-Mansouri all said that the stories were not true; in Medowi's words, "the people who say there are *jinn* here [do it] to scare people to stop them touching the site, [unless] the government [NCAM] is here." *Jinn* are perhaps more meaningful as tropes in cautionary messages such as those used by parents, teachers, elders and other authority figures who wish to prevent behaviours or habits that are seen to be dangerous or illegal.

Perhaps because of its presence in Islam, there was no correlation between the gender, age or level of education of the few respondents who believed that *jinn* live on archaeological sites; even members of the intelligentsia could not be discounted. The one major demographic difference between the respondents was their *gabīla* and/or livelihood. The very few stories about *jinn* told by the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya pastoralists were set in caves and not archaeological sites.

663 Osman describes a similar story about snakes guarding gold at an Egyptian inscription of Seti I (1315-1295 BCE) in Nawri in Third Cataract (1992: 32-3).

Those of the Hassaniyya were located in Wad Hassauna, a wadi on the opposite bank of the Nile. One reason for this may be that since they are relatively new to the area, they have not built into their own traditions the cautionary tales told by the Ja'aliyīn about *jinn* on the sites. A related reason is perhaps that, as noted above, their histories are located elsewhere and connected to different parts of Sudan.

Yet, or perhaps because of the lack of seriousness behind the concept, the presence of *jinn* and the effects they can have on human behaviour is not incompatible with spending time at the sites. Meroe in particular is said by the Ja'aliyīn to have been popular in the past as a shady space for outings (*rihāl* s. *rihla*), parties (*hafla*) and festivals (*mahrajāt* s. *mahrajān*). One male respondent said that it used to be the perfect place for a daily rest (*magīl*). During Eid, Meroe's "slaughterhouse" (above) does actually seem to have doubled as a place to slaughter sheep, although this testimony came exclusively from residents of Old Deraqab and Lower Kejeik and according to respondents has now been banned by the site guard. On aggregate, the pyramids are rarely visited by the residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya, for whom 5km is quite a long way to travel, given that most either walk or use donkeys for transportation. However Meroe and the pyramids still act as spaces for the Ja'aliyīn to celebrate New Year's Eve parties.

5.4.3.2 Fertility (*khusūba*)

"In the past", it also seems that women would go to Meroe alone during the day, seeking shade to talk in, in the same way that they go alone to visit friends and family (these trips are referred to as '*marga'*, trips without male supervision). Women also seem to have gone there at night, for different, although related, reasons to do with women's fertility. As the practice of FGM (above) suggests, a woman's fertility, and the power, vulnerability and danger it simultaneously represents, is a matter of great concern in Sudan and is seen to be in need of protection. Birth is seen as a time of potential peril for a household; the opening of the woman's body, the inevitability of bleeding and the high chance of mortality stir powerful emotions and tap into the most extreme depths of fear. This extends even post-birth: congratulations are never offered to the new parents because it is thought that this, either deliberately or accidentally, draws the attention of the evil eye. Infertility (*agir*) is seen to be a severe and pitiful condition, and one that ultimately threatens the entire social order. Of course, concern for personal and societal welfare exists everywhere, not just in Sudan, and it may be assumed that most people take steps to minimize the risks that come with having children and/or optimize the chances of conception. However, Western society has mostly abandoned non-scientific means of controlling fertility to embrace medical remedies. In Sudan, Western medicine is used alongside other, less scientifically verifiable means. And, as Shankland has noted, because of women's general exclusion from public Islamic praxis, they seek alternative channels through which they can express their

religious feelings; for instance, "[t]hough men visit tombs, women do so even more…They are also more likely to practice alternative healing methods."[664]

Outside the case-study area, in the Third Cataract region in Nubia, ethnographic data (albeit scant) suggest that archaeological sites often feature in rituals designed to improve fertility, although such data are largely unpublished. Accounts have been given to the present author from Kawa by one of the site's long-standing Sudanese NCAM inspectors. He recalled that the women would light a fire and interact with the Kushite statues to become fertile.[665] He also recalled another account from the quarries at Tombos, where a collapsed Kushite-Napatan statue is known locally as '*oginondi*' (which apparently means 'man' in Dongolawi Nubian). In his 1992 work Hinkel also mentioned this as the Tombos "oginondi", and remarked that it needed re-housing in a shelter to "stop the mischief to which the statue is exposed by the local women, who pounded and crushed certain parts with stones and urinated on the statue…to obtain fertility".[666]

This phenomenon can be found even outside Nubia. One early account comes from Budge, who noted that Sudanese women would rub themselves against the monuments to ensure they created a strong and large family.[667] In 2013, a fellow archaeologist gave the present researcher unpublished fieldnotes about a female fertility rite (referred to here by the umbrella term 'rites' (*taqūs*) at the archaeological site of Jebel Barkal, about which a woman had given him details.[668] According to his female respondent, a woman seeking a remedy for infertility or stillbirth would make a secret journey at night in the company of an older woman who had had many children. The women would proceed to the cemetery where the older woman would cut the younger woman's right leg and let it bleed. They would then cross a short stretch of empty desert to the Napatan-Kushite Amun temple complex that sits at the foot of the cobra-shaped mountain of Jebel Barkal. Proceeding to the ram statues which line the approach to the temple complex, which the informant referred to as not "rams" (*kharūf*) but as as "lions" ('*usūd*), the elder woman would cut the left leg of the younger woman and allow it to bleed. The younger woman would then jump over a ram[669] and the older woman would walk around to meet her. They would then go to the Nile to wash. The younger woman was then required to stay indoors for three days. The point of the ritual was to remove the affliction that was preventing her from motherhood. In this example, the archaeological site provides both the ritual context and the fetish object for childless women seeking a solution for their predicament.

A related fertility ritual involves *zayrān* (s. *zār*), spirits that belong to the metaphysical world shared by *jinn*. And, like *jinn*, scholars such as Zabek (2005), see *zār* as cultural survivors of ancient

664 Shankland 1999: 154.
665 Conversation with NCAM Antiquities Inspector, Nov. 2015.
666 Hinkel 1992: 172.
667 Budge 1907: 70.
668 Interview Notes from December 2000, written by T. Kendall, received by the present researcher in November 2013.
669 Kendall's notes say that the woman may also urinate upon the ram.

Nubian-Kushite rituals. Coincidentally, in 1989, Boddy scholarly addressed spirit possession in one of the Ja'alī villages within the case-study area.[670] Boddy showed that spirit possession is typically undergone by women who have suffered trauma to the womb (such as bleeding, miscarriage) or failed to conceive, which suggests that the womb is somehow under ill favour. Bleeding and barrenness are powerful experiences that violate bodily integrity; they are the ultimate examples of when the pure and safe centres of enclosure are breached. However, Boddy also shows that the *zār* events are actually moments of strategy through which a woman may address her problem through empowerment. The emancipatory acts are inherent in the woman's adoption of *zār* personalities, each of which represents a contrast to who she is in society. In key parts of the ceremony, which on some occasions may last for days, she is 'diagnosed'. In Sudanese practice, there are seven *zār* personalities: Darawish (Sufis), Pashawāt (Turks), Khawajāt (Europeans), Habashi (Ethiopians), Blacks (Africans), Arabs (nomads) and Sitat (women) and to discover which one she is involves a ritual called "opening the box" (*'ifta al-'ilba*).[671] After her diagnosis, spirit chants (*khuyūt* lit. 'threads') are sung ("pulled") to draw the *zār* out, and the possessed woman is given all the material tropes she needs to transform herself into that *zār*. Crucially for the present study, one of the *khwāja* spirits revealed to Boddy was 'Mr Prinze', who represented a British archaeologist. Women who, during their trance, are possessed by the archaeologist's *zār* wear men's clothes and smoke cigarettes, illustrating very neatly how the image of the archaeologist was materialized.

On the surface, little seems to have changed. In the case-study area, site-community residents often encounter archaeologists buying cigarettes from local shops; and the female archaeologists' use of trousers and other male attire defies and blurs gender roles. Furthermore, non-Sudanese archaeologists continue to be known as *khwajāt*. Boddy's detailed descriptions thus illustrate the archaeologists' impact over time and serves to highlight that the local residents "are writing us [archaeologists] as we are writing them."[672] However, while the *zār* rituals were a vibrant phenomenon in 1989, as evidenced by Boddy, the fieldwork carried out by the present researcher in 2015 suggests that they are little practiced today. Even taking into account those women who may practice but not disclose that as such to the researcher, the evidence shows that it is only the older generation of Ja'aliyīn women in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, and sometimes the older men, who still know about them. These people were surprised to find that the present author also knew of them, but as with the *jinn* and fertility rituals, they dismissed them as "old wives' tales." During this author's time in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, only Mariam al-Pasha of the Ja'aliyīn explained more about it, and sang a song that lists the different *zayrān* and their trappings:

---

670 Boddy gave the village a pseudonym to protect the identity of her respondents, so the name has not been revealed here. The present author does note, however, that Boddy chose to name the village 'Hofriyāt', from the word '*hofra*', 'hole' and related to the verb 'to dig'.

671 See Messing 1958 for Ethiopia; Hadidi 2016 for Egypt.

672 Quoted above, Meskell 2005: 90.

Khwāja is wonderful, he has a cross,[673]

Luliba al-'Arabiyya, she loves her *shabal*;[674]

Dudu, *yā* Jebel Lādu, Habashī orders *jabana*![675]

Mariam's *zār* was a Turkish nobleman (Pashā, hence her pseudonym), and she sang her own thread:

Hakīm Pashā went to his garden for a tour, *yā salām*![676]

But the singing ended abruptly when she confessed, "I don't remember the rest." It was also noticeable that when she was singing, few of the other ladies sung with her, and not many of them knew the words, which were in any case brief. Women were also far less boisterous regarding the *zār* songs after the present researcher brought out an audio recorder.

Overall, the extant ethnographic data offer rich accounts of the ways in which archaeological sites and archaeologists are intertwined with traditions surrounding the culture of (in)fertility both inside and outside 'Nubia'. However, this author's interviews and informal conversations in the case-study area showed that while such traditions still exist among the Ja'aliyīn, they are greatly diminished. The present researcher did not see or hear of fetishist use of archaeological materials by infertile women, nor were they described or spoken about by most of the women who took part in the research. Rather the details of such events were related to this author mostly by men, in brief anecdotes that lacked detail and were located in the past. Knowledge of the *zār* rituals was also fading and their actual practice was rare. The practice of *khifāḍ fir'ūi* FGM was the most widespread in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, but the female participants of this research did not link its practice to the Pharaohs. It is also clear that links between the archaeological sites and *jinn* or fertility rituals do not seem to be part of the traditions of the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya or Fadniyya pastoral women in Hamadab-Bejrawiya either now or in the past, perhaps because these *gabāīl* are new to the site-community. This does not mean that such rituals are not practiced; rather they do not seem to be linked with the archaeological sites in the case-study area.

673 European foreigners, or *khwajāt*, are assumed to be Christian.

674 'Shabal' seems to refer to a hairstyle that looks like a straw mat (*birīsh*); this is a reference to the building materials nomads and pastoralists use to make their houses.

675 'Habashi' represents an Ethiopian woman of loose morals (the Sudanese think of the Ethiopians as "prostitutes", often referring to them as *sharmūta* (lit. 'dried meat'). To adopt that personality, the afflicted woman will receive *jabana* (very strong coffee, made from Ethiopian zigay coffee beans; the word also refers to the once-ceramic now-tin coffee jug) and a red dress that is cut off at the knee.

676 A '*Pashā*' represents an Ottoman Turkish dignitary or nobleman. Like the British, the Turks were seen to be very orderly and to have a preference for manicured gardens.

5.4.3.3 Cemeteries (*muqābîr*)

Up and down the Nile Valley, Islamic cemeteries are often located in the same area, if not on the same place, as pre-Islamic cemeteries. Like the association between archaeological sites and *jinn*, this phenomenon is long-standing and evident from the scholarly literature. Osman recalls being told a story about the cemetery at the monumental Kushite site of Nawri in modern 'Nubia', near the Third Cataract. Apparently, local people had reported that gold sometimes emerged suddenly from the ground, but could only be gathered if the finders prayed before collecting it. If they did not, it would disappear.[677] This appears to be another cautionary tale, perhaps designed to encourage piety.

Outside modern 'Nubia', when visiting Jebel Barkal in the 1920s, Griffith noted that the burials (*madfān*) of local sheikhs traditionally took pace near or on top of ancient graves.[678] Kendall's fieldnotes are also useful here as they record his interview with Saad Karsani Mohamed Karsani, the great-great grandson of the saint Ahmed Karsani of Shiba Village (c.1840-1897), who became a high-ranking Sufi (*wālī* pl. *awliyā*, lit. 'custodian', 'friend' but commonly used to indicate an Islamic saint), the patron of a Quranic school and an "intermediary between God and the people" who could do "abnormal things."[679] A native of another major archaeological site, Nuri, Ahmed Karsani moved to, and died in, Shiba, and was buried in a trapezoidal gubba about 90m west of the south corner of Jebel Barkal. Regarding the location, Saad recounts that at his funeral, his shrouded body is said to have risen up and flown away by itself, to Jebel Barkal, where it came down beside the mountain; "they buried him there just where it landed." As Kendall himself notes:

> [The gubba's] ancient historical interest derives from the fact that it is almost entirely built of stones gathered from the ancient ruins of Jebel Barkal. A few of these [stones] bear traces of ancient relief and/or inscription, and many of the stones appear to be of 'talatat' dimensions…Reused Egyptian stones, some inscribed with the cartouches of Ramses II, appear throughout the walls inside the shrine.

Saad also noted that women "do" fertility rituals here "and…the men come to ask [for] his help in getting married; they put money inside the tomb chamber, and poor people come and take it."

In the case-study area, residents were keen to talk about how, in the past, the primary cemetery for Hamadab residents was near the South Mound of Domat al-Hamadab, known as Galad Faqi al-Saki, although it is no longer in use or apparently even visible. Residents of Bejrawiya bury their dead in the Muqābîr al-Jabry north of Deraqab, named after Jabir, the ancestor of the Juwabra, and a third cemetery is used by residents from both Hamadab and Bejrawiya; known as the Wad al-Ar, it is located in Upper Bejrawiya. Yet only Galad Faqi al-Saki was associated with an archaeological site, although it appears to have been chosen for its proximity to the village of Hamadab at that time rather

677 Osman 1992: 32-3. Also see Kurcz 2002.
678 Griffith 1929.
679 Kendall's fieldnotes from Jebel Barkal in 2000, given to the present author in 2013.

than with the subterranean archaeology. This leads one to reassess the importance of the placement of Gubba Ahmed Karsani in Jebel Barkal, and re-emphasize how its location near the mountain is not untypical. As Saad himself explained, Sufis have long since found symbolic capital with mountains and their perceived role as the physical buttress between the earth and the universe.

Indeed, not only are cemeteries not typically associated with archaeological sites, but also they are lessening as places of activity. With reference to Muqābîr al-Jabry, Abbas Saad explained:

> 15-20 years ago, the women would go if they didn't have babies, or for weddings, but they didn't know exactly which one was his grave. People might also go and bury money if they want a baby; old people still believe [in] this.

In interviews and conversations with the present author, explanations of why these places had been chosen as cemeteries, and speculations of their meaning, were not usually forthcoming at all, let alone with reference to ancient Nubian archaeological sites. It was harder, even, to ascertain where exactly the pastoralists bury their dead; Ali al-Hassani explained that they use the Wad el-Ar cemetery because it is close to their homes. Perhaps inevitably, then, on the few occasions where respondents did elaborate on the topic, it was always the Ja'aliyīn who noted that the cemetery was "theirs", and that they did not "share it with the *'arab*", by which they meant the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya pastoralists. The historical resonance of cemeteries thus seems to have been drawn into the conflict about residential purity and contamination (Chapter 4).

5.4.3.4 Openness and Enclosure

It is clear from these findings that the cultural connections of the pastoralists of Hamadab and Bejrawiya to the archaeological sites are far weaker than the sedentary Ja'aliyīn. There are arguably several interrelated reasons for this. First, they do not have the same concepts of openness and enclosure as the Ja'aliyīn, preferring openness to the closely built houses of the Ja'alī villages and, by default, the densely packed ancient settlement sites in Meroe and Domat al-Hamadab. The pastoralists' grazing lands are traditionally open and women still work outdoors, often uncovered; and, as Oxby notes, since pastoralists plan their activities with reference to the stars, they thus place great store by what Oxby terms "natural visual beacons."[680] Testimony from Kalil Karim, a UCLQ employee, confirms this: he spoke at length about an *angarīb* shape in the sky made by the stars, and another set of stars shaped like *Ragul al-Yamanī* (lit. 'man from Yemen'; Kalil is Mansūrī). Furthermore, pastoralists have great "attachment to the open spaces where [their] animals thrive."[681] While the

680 Oxby 1999: 55.
681 Oxby 1999: 62.

pastoralists live in the hinterland, their *hajīr* and animal pens are spread out across the land, a habit they have continued as much as possible in Hamadab and Bejrawiya (Chapter 4). The pastoralists who have come from the hinterland in more recent times told the present researcher that they found the close-knit *Ja'alī* villages unattractive. When asked to describe her home, Manāra al-Fadl, noted that "it used to be wide (*wāsi'*) and beautiful (*samīh*) but now…[it is not]."

The pastoralists' difference sense of architecture and the built form may also be relevant. The Ja'alī compound, the *hōsh*, is a reflection of the concept of enclosure; in contrast, the pastoralists still use the *hajīr*. Although less common, some pastoralists in Hamadab-Bejrawiya have chosen to retain and incorporate the *hajīr* into a *hōsh*. The description of 'antiquities' above also showed that the pastoralists' need for mobility has also fostered different uses of material culture and thus different cultural equipment. Therefore, while day-to-day life is a continual process of adjustment, is clear that pastoralists' notions of materiality are—or were—quite differently conceived to those of sedentary populations (here the Ja'aliyīn) and, more so, to those of the 'ancient Nubians', whose penchant for settlement and monumentality is paradigmatically illustrated by the buildings of Meroe. As Oxby writes, this is not necessarily indicative of a wholly different "pastoral worldview"; she has argued against seeing pastoralists as "social isolates" in this way.[682] However, it does show that the pastoralists experience and value the landscape in different ways from the Ja'aliyīn.

*

Chapter 5 has aimed to explore the intersections of archaeology, identity and culture in the Sudan, with particular emphasis on 'the invention of ancient Nubia' and how this construct relates to constructs of the Sudan as a modern Arab-Muslim state (and particularly its lack of connection with the archaeology of ancient Nubian civilization, which dominates foreign archaeological interest), contemporary notions of Nubian identity, and the oral histories concerning the origins of the four communities that currently reside in proximity of the archaeological landscapes of Meroe and Domat al-Hamadab. This important chapter also discussed the author's distinction between 'descendant' and 'non-descendant' communities, and the continuing primary affiliation of people with their *gabāīl*, which in the case study area is strongly divided between Ja'aliyīn (sedentary farmers, who identify the case study area as their dār or 'homeland') and what are identified as incoming groups such as Hassaniyya and Manāsīr (identified as pastoralists). Neither identify culturally with the ancient Nubian archaeological sites (unlike the modern Nubian population, who identify strongly with them and assert continuity with them despite the absence of evidence to support this). The chapter has also reviewed the various cultural connections some of these communities have with the archaeological sites, and the reasons for the ongoing weakening of these ties, the implications of which will be picked up on in subsequent chapters.

682 Oxby 1999: 62.

6. THE IMPACTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY ON LOCAL ECONOMIES AND SOCIETY

Archaeology's perceived failure to provide economic dividends was introduced into most conversations this author had with residents in the case-study area. Mansūrī, Hassanī and Fadnī pastoralists were keen to secure the economic support of archaeologists, particularly given their struggles in the face of governmental and foreign agricultural development schemes that block their livestock routes (Chapter 4); the Ja'aliyīn farmers were often quick to describe archaeology's failure to provide their village with services (*khadamāt*): for example to build a dispensary, club or school. A few older Ja'alī respondents noted how, in the past, archaeologists had contributed to the construction of a water tower[683] and helped lobby for the installation of electricity in the Bejrawiya area, but they nonetheless decried the lack of provisions more recently.[684] The severely limited discourse on archaeology's historical and cultural aspects (Chapter 5) was striking in contrast with the ever present question: "but what is its *fāida* (lit. benefit)?"

683 Apparently in collaboration with a group of archaeologists, the German Development Bank installed a water tower in Bejrawiya South that now provides water to some of this part of the Bejrawiya area.

684 Other efforts that have been made by archaeologists, most notably by the UCLQ project director since 2012, were not mentioned by respondents. Observations have shown that the UCLQ project director takes members of the local community to the hospital (some 40km away) when needed; frequently makes *karāma* (from *karīm*, lit. 'generous': the charitable act of buying meat and sharing it amongst the poorest in the community, as thanks for God's generosity); purchased and donated 50 chairs to the Hamadab club; and, recently paid for one of her employee's considerable medical expenses. The DAI Hamadab project director also helped the community by providing hoses to residents when the water pipes burst, and may very well have done more that was not observed by the present author.

6.1 The Negligible Impact of Tourism

The topic of tourism was a key part of the discussions that followed on from this question. Many local respondents asked this author if any progress was being made to expand the industry "behind the scenes", whilst pointedly describing it as an "overdue" prospect and making it clear that tourism remains an aspiration rather than a reality. The paucity of tourists and the lack of tourism infrastructure was one of the few topics all of the diverse respondents agreed upon; this includes interviews and conversations with members of a range of socio-economic groups, from farmers and pastoralists to community leaders, women and the few traders who work at the Bejrawiya pyramids.

Somewhat ironically, although rather predictably considering the rhetoric used in extant literature (Chapter 2), making sites tourist-friendly has figured heavily in archaeologists' plans for the sites they work on in Sudan. The emphasis on tourism grew particularly strong when Meroe (including the pyramids), Musawwarat es-Sufra and Naga were granted 'World Heritage' status by UNESCO in 2011. (The status was established under the joint heading of the 'Island of Meroe', meaning that while the three sites all possess World Heritage status, they constitute one World Heritage Site.) Following a call for public and private investors to open up the tourism sector by the Sudanese Minister of Tourism in the same year,[685] there have been several tourism developments, including the Wadi Tarabil Museum, the Muzan Hotel and the Italian Camp near the pyramids; additionally, a number of tourist compounds in the case-study area are being constructed by local residents, such as the site guard of Meroe. The emphasis on developing sites for tourism grew again when the archaeological teams working in the Nile Valley received funding from the Qatar-sponsored Nubian Archaeological Development Organization (NADO) in 2013. Since then, a large complex, named Dohat Meroe with high barb-wire fences, a gym, high-speed internet and other mod cons, has also been built by NADO's managing body, the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP), to accommodate the increased needs of archaeologists and other professionals associated with the tourism industry.

Despite these efforts, official data confirm that Sudan lacks a significant tourism industry. In 1997, only 29 tourists visited the Island of Meroe UNESCO World Heritage Sites. In 2005, "the number had increased to more than 4,000 foreigners and about 2,500 national visitors",[686] but this decreased to a total of fewer than 6,000 tourists in 2010 and 2011.[687] World Heritage status was intended to boost tourist numbers, but in 2013, Sudan had only 390,000 recreational visitors (as opposed to business visitors).[688] There was nothing to suggest that tourist numbers were any higher during the fieldwork period (2015) or at the time of writing (2016-17).

685 Heierland 2009: 26.
686 El-Masri 2010: 205.
687 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
688 UNWTO 2015.

Furthermore, the International Council on Monuments and Sites's (ICOMOS) 2011 UNESCO evaluation report noted that "River Nile State has no comprehensive tourist plans" and that even at Meroe and the pyramids, Sudan's most famous sites, "there is no central ticketing office, information centre, adequate and functioning toilets, interpretative panels and brochures, trained guides or established trails".[689] The UNESCO Management Plan, written by NCAM and supported by Western and British consultants as part of the UNESCO Nomination File, also acknowledges that buildings such as the Wadi Tarabil Museum is "incomplete for lack of money."[690] None of this has changed in the period under study, and observations by the present author suggest that the Muzan Hotel and the Italian Camp remain empty for most of the year. Moreover, as international arrivals appear to mostly originate from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the wider Middle East,[691] regions that are home to a large number of Sudanese expatriate workers, it is possible to presume that at least a portion of these visitors have kinship ties in the area and come to engage in family and community events rather than (solely) in archaeological tourism.

The small amount of revenue that is generated from tourism, such as the US$10 site entrance fees charged to foreign tourists, also may not be trickling down to local economies: while income from the sites should be shared between the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums (NCAM) and the Department of Tourism in River Nile State,[692] there is evidence to suggest that there is conflict over management of this allocation.[693]

The Sudanese state's continued international pariah status, the perceived lack of security[694] and the real lack of tourism infrastructure mean that for the foreseeable future, tourism in Sudan is likely to remain small scale. Indeed, no matter the external input, the Sudanese government seems resistant to opening up the country to mass tourism, and ideological barriers between Sudan's predominantly 'Nubian' archaeology and the state (see Chapter 5) has meant that NCAM's budget, allocated by the Sudanese Ministry of Finance, is not sufficient to support the tourism industry at a foundational level.[695]

689 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
690 El-Masri 2010: 162.
691 UNWTO 2015.
692 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
693 NCAM's UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File notes that "[t]he Transitional Constitution of the Sudan (2005) contains some contradictory articles related to tourism that have given rise to tension between the local administration (State/Province level) and the Central Government" (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 56). In short, because the sites of Meroe have been designated as "national" sites, the revenue coming from them apparently cannot be directed to the state body (i.e. River Nile State) as would usually be the case with other, ostensibly less important, non-national sites. Instead, because Meroe is a national site, revenue should go to the Treasury, leading to "[c]onflicts of interest between the national level and the state level and the differing interpretations of constitutional and institutional mandate texts, which has sometimes led to situations of competition over the use of the cultural resources of the State and their exploitation" (El-Masri 2010: 182, 198).
694 Several Western governments, including those of the UK and US, advise against all travel to west and south Sudan and warn of a general threat from terrorism in the rest of the country.
695 El-Masri 2010: 162. El-Masri continues to explain: "NCAM's budget is allocated on a yearly basis by the Ministry of Finance. The reluctance of the Ministry of Finance to approve budgetary increases and funding requests for 'Development Projects' is seriously affecting NCAM's performance and the ability to fulfill its mandate and plans.

Given the macro-level situation, it was thus not surprising that respondents in the case-study area of Hamadab-Bejrawiya evaluated archaeology's benefit in micro-scale economic terms: whether or not archaeology financially contributes to their households via archaeological employment, referred to as *shaqūl yomiyya* (lit. daily work). Indeed broadly speaking, respondents deemed archaeology to be beneficial if they or a member of their household worked as an archaeological employee; conversely, it was regarded to be unbeneficial if they did not. Of course employment is not the only way in which archaeology has an economic impact: the *ad hoc* provision of services (above) is important, as is the effect of site management plans on agricultural yields (Chapters 2 and 7) and the dividends wrought in the informal economy by 'looting' (Chapters 2 and 8). However, respondent valuations make it clear that of the few ways in which archaeology financially contributes to (rather than detracts from) individual households, employment is generally perceived as the most impactful. Observations seem to support this: men queue up each season to sign on for work with the archaeologists (the present author has counted groups of up to 50); and, throughout the season, men and women can be seen approaching the archaeologists in the hope of being offered work.

But the situation is more complex than this. Ali al-Hassani, who worked with Peter Shinnie (in the 1970s) and Fredrich Hinkel (in the 1990s), and who has three nephews that are currently employed by UCLQ, evaluated the overall benefit of archaeological work to be poor. Upon being asked what economic impact archaeology has had, he responded "nothing!", and laughed. When asked if he had questions about archaeology, UCLQ employee Kalil Karim told the present researcher that the employees consistently ask one another, "what is the benefit?" Abdel Hakim, another UCLQ employee went even further, saying, "we want to deliver this message [to the archaeologists]: all the people here don't get *fāida* [from archaeology]."

Given that a) the economic impact of archaeological employment is one of the least studied areas within academic scholarship on the discipline, b) there are major flaws in the literature that does examine it (see Chapter 2), and c) there is clear dissonance among respondent testimonies about the scale of its effect, there is an urgent need to examine and explicate the dimensions of this significant phenomenon. As noted in Chapters 3 and 5, several archaeological teams have worked in the case-study area in recent years: two teams from the DAI, one in collaboration with the University of Shendi; one team from UCLQ; and teams from the University of Khartoum, which often collaborate with a team from the Royal Ontario Museum, Canada. The DAI and UCLQ teams were active during the field research for the present study, but most of the data that follows relates to the UCLQ mission.

In an attempt to address the financial deadlock which is seriously undermining NCAM's activities, and the ability to respond to urgent needs, a proposal was made to the government in order to transform the Corporation from a fully dependent government institution into a semi-governmental, semi-independent 'Authority'…The Ministry of Finance rejected this proposal permitting only an immediate shift to semi-financial independency or maintaining the present status quo" (El-Masri 2010: 204). Yet see NCAM's World Heritage Nomination File, which states that "NCAM is attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport. Although its Director is responsible to the Minister, NCAM has its own independent budget and administration" (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 80).

6.2 The Positive, if Limited, Impact of Employment

6.2.1 Categories of Archaeological Work with UCLQ

To conduct fieldwork, archaeologists live near the archaeological sites for a certain number of weeks or months per year, staying in one of the four dig houses in the case-study area. Three dig houses (referred to as 'compounds' by the archaeologists) are next to one another in Hamadab. Two compounds are leased to the DAI missions by local residents and one compound was purpose-built on rented land by the UCLQ mission. The fourth compound, located within Meroe itself, was constructed by Shinnie's team in the 1960s, augmented by the Royal Ontario Museum team in the 2000s, and is now used mostly by teams from the University of Khartoum (who were absent during the period of fieldwork for this study, as mentioned above).

There are two categories of employment related to archaeology on offer to residents in Hamadab-Bejrawiya (Figure 17): permanent jobs in archaeological site protection, paid for by NCAM, and seasonal jobs with the archaeologists. In the first category are jobs with the Tourism and Antiquities Police. At Meroe, three residents are employed as policemen (*dabid*) to guard the site, although they work on rotation with men from other areas, and guard the Bejrawiya pyramids, too.[696] Also in the first category are the two residents employed by NCAM as site guards to provide year-round protection for the archaeological sites in the area. One site guard works to protect Domat al-Hamadab, and has been employed for the past 20 years. The other site guard works to protect Meroe, a position which has been filled since 1939.[697] These men receive an annual salary from NCAM and another seasonal salary from the archaeologists working at the sites they are charged with protecting. The amount of money which is injected into the local economy via these positions is unknown, although official data suggests that it is not much: the 2011 UNESCO Management Plan estimates that between NCAM and the project directors, c.US$220,000 is spent annually on "salaries of the employees engaged in guarding and administrative work on the property; archaeological research; and protection and restoration works" for all three World Heritage status sites in the region.[698]

696 NCAM additionally employs a number of staff in its regional office in Shendi, the nearest urban centre c.45km to the south. In 2011, the office had one inspector, four technical staff and over 20 permanent and temporary guards (ICOMOS 2011: 108). However, their distance from the sites and the irregularity of their interventions mean that they are rarely active in the case-study area. NCAM's national office in Khartoum also assigns antiquities inspectors on rotation to oversee and monitor the activities of foreign archaeological teams, and their presence is mandatory during fieldwork. While the inspectors and other Sudanese team members, such as scientific specialists, university lecturers and students, are often paid by the archaeological team—in US dollars—they are not included in this study because they are invariably from Khartoum or elsewhere in Sudan, and spend only small amounts of money in Hamadab and Bejrawiya.

697 The inauguration of this post is also noted in Arkell 1939.

698 Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 78.



Figure 17. Categories of archaeological work in the case-study area.

The second category of archaeological employment encompasses the seasonal wage labour jobs on offer from archaeologists. These jobs can be divided into three types: domestic help in the archaeologists' dig houses, e.g. cooking and cleaning; off-site archaeological assistance; and work on archaeological excavations. Although other members of the communities can also be hired (e.g. bus drivers, builders), they are not included in this study because the use of their services is usually infrequent. The number of seasonal jobs on offer differs from team to team, depending on the plans of the project directors, who are responsible for recruiting teams (see below). In Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the UCLQ project director has hired residents for two archaeological seasons per year since the project began in 2012. In the November-December 2015 season, for instance, UCLQ and the DAI mission working at Domat al-Hamadab hired one man to cook and clean the kitchen on a daily basis and one woman to launder clothes each week. Three female residents were also hired as archaeological assistants to help with community engagement at one of UCLQ's social events, and two female residents to wash pottery (see below, 'The Impacts of this Research'). However, the main employment offered by UCLQ, and indeed the other missions in the area, is seasonal wage labour on archaeological excavations. Since 2013, UCLQ has employed 35 different men from Hamadab-Bejrawiya (Table 3).[699] The number of employees employed each season varied from 11 to 18, averaging 15 employees per season. The nature of the employee group has changed over time (see below), but from late 2014/early 2015 to 2016, 16 men worked for three seasons or more, signalling the annual re-hiring of a regular working group. These employees dig up sand and debris, move it to spoil heaps, brush surfaces, clean trench sections and collect and bag finds; sometimes they help with construction and other labour-intensive tasks.

699 It was not possible to attain reliable employment data for UCLQ's inaugural 2012 season.

Employee No.	3 Mar - 20 Mar 2016 (18 days)	2 Nov - 6 Dec 2015 (35 days)	11 Jan - 30 Mar 2015 (c. 75 days on/off)	3 Nov - 4 Dec 2014 (32 days)	16 Feb - 29 Mar 2014 (42 days)	2 Mar - 23 Mar 2013 (21 days)	Total Seasons Worked
1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	**5**
2	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	**5**
3	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	**4**
4	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	**4**
5	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	**4**
6	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	**4**
7	-	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	**4**
8	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-	**4**
9	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	**4**
10	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	**4**
11	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	**4**
12	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	**3**
13	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	**3**
14	-	✓	✓	✓	-	-	**3**
15	-	✓	✓	-	✓	-	**3**
16	✓	✓	-	-	-	✓	**3**
17	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	**2**
18	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	**2**
19	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	**2**
20	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	**2**
21	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	**2**
22	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	**2**
23	✓	-	-	-	-	-	**1**
24	-	✓	-	-	-	-	**1**
25	-	-	✓	-	-	-	**1**
26	-	-	✓	-	-	-	**1**
27	-	-	-	✓	-	-	**1**
28	-	-	-	✓	-	-	**1**
29	-	-	-	✓	-	-	**1**
30	-	-	-	✓	-	-	**1**
31	-	-	-	-	✓	-	**1**
32	-	-	-	-	✓	-	**1**
33	-	-	-	-	✓	-	**1**
34	-	-	-	-	-	✓	**1**
35	-	-	-	-	-	✓	**1**

Table 3. UCLQ employees, 2013-16.

6.2.2 Measuring Incomes from Archaeological Work with UCLQ

As noted in Chapter 3, project directors commonly keep the finer financial details of their employment records private. But in order to allow this author to evaluate archaeology's economic impact on site-communities in the case-study area, the UCLQ project director explained to the present researcher the basic wages given to the employees; provided anonymized data about the number of people she had employed (also see above) as well as the number of seasons each employee had worked; and supported the present author's request to gather wage and employment data via her own semi-structured interviews with the 11 excavation employees who worked on the site in February 2015 (see Chapter 3).

Combined, this data has made it possible to calculate the incomes from wage labour on excavations from the November-December 2015 season (Table 4) and the March 2016 season (Table 5). During both seasons, the basic wage was SDG60 per six-hour work day (US$9.8 at the average official exchange rate recorded between November 2015 and March 2016). On the occasions when the men were required by the project director to work longer or shorter shifts, the pay was adjusted on a pro-rata basis. In addition to the basic wage, the UCLQ project director sometimes pays each employee a one-time sum at the end of the season, typically SDG60-120 (US$10-20), equivalent to one or two days' work.

As clarified in Tables 4 and 5, in the November-December 2015 season, which lasted for 35 days, 16 employees earned a collective total of SDG30,200 (US$4,950.8). On an individual basis, employees earned from SDG720 (US$118) to SDG2,260 (US$370.5). The average individual earning for this season was SDG1,887.5 (US$309.4).

In the March 2016 season, which lasted for 18 days, 15 employees collectively earned a total of SDG17,195 (US$2,729.4). Individually, each employee earned from SDG360 (US$59) to SDG1,385 (US$227). The average individual earning was SDG1146.3 (US$187.9).

Of the 12 UCLQ employees who were employed both seasons (for 53 days over the five-month period from 2 November 2015 to 20 March 2016), individual combined earnings from both seasons ranged from SDG1,260 (US$206.6) to SDG3,525 (US$577.9). The average total individual earning for these 12 employees was SDG3,042.5 (US$498.77). Excluding the one individual who earned SDG1,260 (US$206.6) over both seasons—far less than the other 11 employees—the average pay for those who were employed over the 53-day period rises to SDG3,204.5 (US$525.3).

Employee No.	Earnings (SDG) 3 Mar - 20 Mar 2016 (18 days)	Earnings (SDG) 2 Nov - 6 Dec 2015 (35 days)	Total Earned (SDG)
1	1,080	1,980	3,060
2	1,385	2,140	3,525
3	1,155	2,260	3,415
4	1,215	2,200	3,415
5	1,215	2,200	3,415
6	1,385	2,140	3,525
7	-	2,020	2,020
8	1,145	2,260	3,405
9	890	1,980	2,870
10	360	900	1,260
11	-	-	-
12	1,275	2,080	3,355
13	1,095	940	2,035
14	-	2,200	2,200
15	-	2,140	2,140
16	1,190	2,040	3,230
17	1,155	-	1,155
18	1,265	-	1,265
19	-	-	-
20	-	-	-
21	-	-	-
22	-	-	-
23	1,385	-	1,385
24	-	720	720
25	-	-	-
26	-	-	-
27	-	-	-
28	-	-	-
29	-	-	-
30	-	-	-
31	-	-	-
32	-	-	-
33	-	-	-
34	-	-	-
35	-	-	-

Table 4. Wage data for UCLQ employees, Nov-Dec 2015 and March 2016.

	3 Mar - 20 Mar 2016 (18 days)	2 Nov - 6 Dec 2015 (35 days)	Total Earned (SDG/US$)
Total Earnings (SDG)	1,7195	30,200	47,395
Total Earnings (US$)	2,729.4	4,950.8	7,769.7
Average Earnings/Employee (SDG)	1,146.3	1,887.5	
Average Earnings/Employee (US$)	187.9	309.4	

Table 5. Total and average earnings for UCLQ employees, Nov-Dec 2015 and March 2016.

6.2.2.1 The Scale of Archaeological Employment's Local Impact

The question now arises as to what these wages mean in real terms, for the individual employees and their households, and for the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya more broadly.

6.2.2.1.1 Households

In Sudan, as elsewhere, wages earned from employment have an economic impact beyond the individual employee because they augment the income of their household (see Chapter 4). Of course, household members are not solely wage consumers, nor are the employees only wage generators: in the interviews with this author, the UCLQ employees revealed that they spend an average of 20% of their wages on personal items such as mobile phone credit, clothes and cigarettes. However, in the cultural context of the case-study area, most of the cash income earned by household members is invested back into the household, meaning that archaeological employment has an automatic impact upon households as well as individuals. Furthermore, the demographic and employment data abstracted from the interviews conducted with the 11 UCLQ excavation employees in February 2015 (Table 7, below) show that all employees contribute to households made up of between seven and 10 people—just under nine on average—which is much higher than the national average of 6.1.[700] Their dependency ratio is also high: there are on average 5.7 persons of dependent age (under 15 and over 65 years) for every local resident of working age; the national average ratio is 4:1.[701] It might thus be posited that archaeological employment has a particularly significant economic impact upon the employees and their households.

700 CBS 2010: 14.
701 UNFPA 2012.

It may also be reasonably presumed that the value of archaeological income is high because while the livelihoods of all of the employees' households are founded principally upon farming or livestock rearing (whether husbandry at home or grazing in the hinterland) or a mixture of the two, they all undertake some form of wage labour in agriculture or archaeology in order to meet the needs of their household. Archaeological employment thus figures in both farming and pastoral households' strategy of off-farm livelihood diversification in a tough and variable economic climate.

Since 2013, income from seasonal wage employment generated by the archaeological activities of UCLQ has therefore directly benefited 35 households in the case-study area, or 7.14% of the c.490 households in the case-study area (see Chapter 4 and below). While seemingly small, this figure is in fact rather high given that this is an economic context in which most households are severely pressed financially and some endure periods with no non-agricultural income at all,[702] their incomes have a real impact. Indeed, it should not be overlooked that 32% of the population of River Nile State live below the poverty line, defined in 2011 as US$1.9 per day or some US$693 per year. This figure rises above 40% in relation to the rural inhabitants of River Nile State. Combined with the information gained about the employees' above-average household size and high dependency ratios, archaeological employment seems to be a very impactful economic phenomenon.

6.2.2.1.2 Site-Communities

Evidence also suggests that the income generated by archaeological employment produces indirect benefits for site-community residents not directly employed in archaeology. Data gathered from observations indicate that much of the income earned from employment with UCLQ is spent locally: in markets, on locally-produced goods and food (food expenditure as part of income is estimated by Salih as being as high as 60%[703]); social commitments (12%[704]); and other goods or services available within the case-study area such as medicine, clothing and travel (26%[705]). Therefore if, as Salih suggests, "the life of the individual…is a series of social connections and commitments, knitted kin, friendship and neighbourhood",[706] this research might posit that by boosting household income, archaeological employment also provides valuable indirect economic benefits for the broader site-community.

Archaeology's economic impact upon the site-community may also be roughly scaled up, going beyond the households of the UCLQ employees, because there have been at least two other

702 According to the CBS' National Baseline Household Survey, "for non-agricultural based income, 19 percent [sic] of all households reported no income last month prior to the survey and similar [sic] 13 percent [sic] of the households for the last 12 months" (CBS 2010: 29).
703 Salih 1999: 52.
704 Salih 1999: 52.
705 Salih 1999: 52.
706 Salih 1999: 123.

archaeological teams at work there for the past 15 years. Observation by this author shows that the DAI Domat al-Hamadab project employed at least 18 employees in the spring of 2015 and, by common agreement, paid the same wage as UCLQ, namely SDG60 for a six-hour day. Data provided to this author by the DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director also show that this number has been even higher in the past: in 2013-14, the mission employed 30 different employees from Hamadab and Bejrawiya. Some of these employees have also been working with one or other of the archaeological teams (listed above) for many years now. In addition, the Qatar Mission to the Pyramids of Sudan (QMPS), a Qatar-sponsored team based at the pyramids, employed at least 40 men from the case-study area to conduct excavations in late 2015; their compound at Dohat Meroe (above) has also provided some graduates in the case-study area with jobs in security or at reception.

Taking a historic view on archaeology's economic impact in the case-study area, one might also note that archaeological employment has been on offer at various times for over 100 years. Earlier archaeologists even seem to have employed many times the number of employees hired by contemporary missions. In the early 20th Century, for example, John Garstang's University of Livepool team hired between 300 and 500 men from Hamadab-Bejrawiya to work at Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe.[707] Later, in 1971, Shinnie hired 100 men to work for him as he excavated at Meroe.[708] Conservative estimates, based on the number of teams working in Sudan (from over 60 between 1960 and 1969[709] to at least 40 in 2015), suggest that during more than a century of archaeology in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, archaeologists have provided seasonal employment for thousands of residents, benefiting the whole site-community as well as their individual households.

6.2.2.2 Archaeological Income vs. the Official Minimum Wage

Relating earnings from archaeological employment more specifically to total household incomes in Hamadab-Bejrawiya is not straightforward, not least because of the paucity and unreliability of official data, and especially at the local level. Estimates of Sudan's per-capita gross national income (GNI), for example, can vary because estimates of both gross national income and population size are

707 Garstang notes that he brought an Egyptian man named Saleh abd el-Nebi to act as head foreman, and that in 1910-11, "under [Saleh abd el-Nebi's] charge forty of our trained Arabs came from their homes in Egypt to take part in the work…each overlooking a gang of native labourers, of whom some three to five hundred were more or less constantly employed" (Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914: 46). In the third season, Garstang reports that the number of local workers was cut down given the construction and use of a cable-way (Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914, in the section entitled "Third interim report on the excavations at to Meroe in Ethiopia"). Garstang's colleague, Mond, noted the following season that "it saves a remarkable proportion in wages, doing the work of 100 carrier boys" (this extract is taken from, "Note on a ropeway carrier for use in excavations" from the "Third interim report", above). However, even with the loss of 100 employees, the numbers would have been much higher than they are today. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997.

708 Email interview with John Robertson, October 2016.

709 Jakob and Ali 2011: 516.

inconsistent. Thus, according to the World Bank, per-capita GNI in 2015 was US$1,740 (SDG10,614).[710] In contrast, the UN puts the figure at US$2,100 (SDG12,810).[711] Moreover, these kinds of national averages conceal significant variations between genders, occupational groups and places of residence, among other factors to consider. As a general principle, incomes in Sudan's rural areas are lower than in urban areas; the incomes of farmers and livestock herders are also lower than those working in industry. In the absence of detailed and official date, the per-capita incomes of the farmers and pastoralists of Hamadab-Bejrawiya can thus be plausibly assumed to be below the national average.

A perhaps more meaningful exercise to grasp the contextual dimensions of wages earned from archaeological work is to compare them with the official minimum wage. Until 2014, the minimum wage was SDG165 (US$29 at the average 2014 official exchange rate of US$1=SDG5.7) per month or SDG1,980 (US$347.3) per year. In that year, it was raised by 250% by a presidential decree to SDG425 (US$74.5) per month, equivalent to SDG5,100 (US$894.7) per year. However, the official minimum wage applies mostly in industry and in urban areas; elsewhere, it is widely ignored, and especially in rural areas, where job opportunities are in short supply and casual labourers often have to accept what they can get.

Nevertheless, the official minimum wage offers a useful benchmark against which income from archaeology can be evaluated. Indeed, those who were employed by UCLQ over the 53-day period spanning between November 2015 and March 2016 on average earned 60% of the annual minimum wage. The highest paid employee (SDG3,525) earned 69% of the annual minimum wage over the aforementioned 53-day period alone; even the lowest paid (SDG1,260) earned 24.7% of the annual minimum wage during the same period.

The real value of archaeological wages becomes ever more apparent when considering that unskilled labour, especially in agriculture, is often paid well below the official minimum wage, if paid at all. Indeed, daily wages in agriculture are considerably lower than in any other sector; at a national level, one quarter of all agricultural workers earn below US$3.2 (SDG20) per day, and almost half receive no income at all.[712] When compared to the official minimum wage, archaeological employment therefore appears to be a very lucrative occupation for households.

710 World Bank 2015b.
711 UN DESA 2015.
712 World Bank Group 2015a.

6.2.2.3 Archaeological Income vs. Rural Household Consumption

Another approach to quantitatively evaluate the value of the employee's income from archaeology is to compare it against household consumption. A limitation of this method is that the data, from the National Baseline Household Survey (CBS 2010), are available only at the national and state levels and are out-of-date (see Chapter 3). An attempt is nonetheless worthwhile.

In 2009, average monthly total rural household consumption was estimated at SDG122 (US$53 at the average 2009 official exchange rate of US$1=SDG2.3).[713] Correcting for the steep annual increases in consumer prices between 2009 and 2016, which was on average 23.4% during this period according to the World Bank,[714] would significantly raise this amount. Assuming constant consumption moving in line with—and unaffected by—consumer price rises, and without fully correcting for significant currency devaluation, average monthly total rural household consumption would, in early 2017, in this author's estimation, be SDG640 ($97 at the official exchange rate in January 2017) or SDG7,680 (US$1,163.6) per year at the national level. Although hard data is not available, observation, interviews and anecdotal evidence, in addition to the socio-economic trends noted above, point to average household consumption in the relatively poor locality of Hamadab-Bejrawiya being significantly lower than the state and national averages for rural areas.

Nonetheless, assuming household consumption in line with the national average for rural areas, the average earnings of those who worked for UCLQ in the 53-day period between November 2015 and March 2016 equated to 39% of annual rural household consumption. In other words, for the employees in the case-study area, earnings from archaeological employment alone could sustain household consumption for approximately five months of the year.

The value of average earnings from archaeological work relative to average rural household consumption rises to 103.2% for the 140-day period between the beginning of the November 2015 season and the end of the March 2016 season.

Again, ethnographic data combined with a quantitative comparison to average monthly rural household consumption suggests that, at a household level, the wages made from archaeological employment are significant.

713 CBS 2010: 27.
714 World Bank 2017.

6.2.2.4 Archaeological vs. Non-Archaeological Income

An additional route to measure the impact of archaeological income is to compare it with the employees' other incomes. World Bank data (above) showed that archaeological wages compares favourably with the official minimum wage for unskilled labour and agriculture, and that daily wages in agriculture are considerably lower than in any other sector; at a national level, one-quarter of all agricultural workers earn below SGD20 (US$3.2) per day, with almost half receiving no income at all.[715] However, although the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and Ja'aliyīn farmers alike regard archaeological employment in the form of excavation jobs as the most beneficial aspect of archaeology, and while the results above suggest that archaeological employment is a valuable source of household income, all of the 11 UCLQ employees who were interviewed for this research perceived archaeological employment as paying poorly in comparison with other unskilled wage-labour occupations. Indeed, each employee described their pay of SDG60 (US$9.8) for a six-hour day in 2015-16 (SDG10/hour) as "low" or "not enough", noting that they pay for breakfast on rotation at a cost of SDG8/day.

Of the UCLQ employees interviewed for this study, the Ja'alī farmers, Bashir Kamal, Abdel Hakim and Zubeir Rahma, who diversify their incomes by doing farm work for other landowners or tenant farmers, reported that such seasonal agricultural labour paid SDG70-SDG100 (US$11.5-16.4) for a ten-hour day (SDG7-SDG10/hour) of threshing, harvesting and clearing fields. Ten hours of work from 8am to 6pm or sunset at a government-sponsored agricultural project to the north at Mahmia paid SDG90 (US$14.8), equivalent to SDG9/hour. Meanwhile, planting onions for local farmers from 2pm to 6.30pm earned them SDG50-SDG60 (US$8.2-9.8), equivalent to SDG11-SDG13/hour.

The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, Jabir Malik, Kalil Karim, Jahid Latif, Nasir Muawad, Faisal Kazim, Halil Masoud, Azim Rafiq and Hamid al-Harun, who predominantly diversify their incomes with artisanal gold mining, also perceive the potential income from the latter to be much higher then archaeological employment. In the interviews with the present author, they claimed that five weeks' work at mines could yield gold worth anywhere from SDG3,000 to SDG9,000 (US$491.8-US$1,475.4) when sold at the markets in ed-Damer and Berber. If true, that would equate to SDG600-SDG1,800 (US$98.4-295.1) per week against the SDG420 (US$68.9) per week from archaeological work. These perceptions persist even though returns at the higher end of the scale are rare. Indeed, the pastoralists explained to this author that some trips to the gold mines yield little or nothing; the work is dangerous and potentially damaging to health; is far from home; and involves significant expenses, such as transportation, equipment, food and water. Faisal Kazim, who abandoned school to go to the gold mines, reported his expenses as being SDG35 (US$5.7) for one

715 World Bank Group 2015a.

amphora (*zir*) of water and upwards of SDG750 (US$ 123) for a phone with a good GPS, referred to as "*magellān*" (Magellan®). Speaking about the monetary gains of gold mining, using a hypothetical 'find' worth SDG9,000 (US$1,475.4), Jabir Malik explained to this author that after necessary division of revenue with the providers of the transportation and of the mining equipment, he might be left with SDG3,000 (US$491.8). This is then subject to further reductions of SDG300 (US$49.1) for the cost of food and at least SDG300 (US$49.1) for water, noting that the latter rises exponentially during the summer. Nevertheless, Faisal, Jabir and the other pastoral employees are attracted to the gold mines by the chance of a big pay-day.

Employee No.	*Gabila*	Age (years)	Residence	Household Size	No. of Dependents	Employee's Other Jobs	Household's Sources of Income	Education
2	H	22	Upper Bej.-Deraqab	7	6	Agricultural/wage labour; Gold mining	Agricultural/wage labour, Gold mining	Primary School
3	M	25	Wadi Tarabil	8	5	Agricultural/wage labour; Gold mining; Bakery	Animal Husbandry; Farming/Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	No school
4	H	20	Upper Bej.	8	7	Gold mining; Agricultural/wage labour	Agricultural/wage labour; Animal Husbandry; Farming/Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	Primary
5	J	25	Kejeik	10	4	Family agriculture; Migration to cities; Building	Professional Jobs; Trading; Car Manufacturing; Archaeological employment	University
6	H	26	Upper Bej.; Wadi Sukkara/Rojbab	8	6	Gold Mining; Animal Husbandry; Farming/Grazing in Hinterland	Gold mining; Animal Husbandry; Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	Primary
7	M	27	Upper Bej.	10	9	Agricultural/wage labour; Animal Husbandry	Animal Husbandry; Grazing in hinterland	No school
12	J	25	Kejeik	7	3	Family agriculture; Migration to cities; Building	Professional Jobs; Trading; Archaeological employment	University
13	H	21	Upper Bej.	8	5	Gold mining	Gold mining; Animal husbandry; Farming/Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	Primary
14	M	22	Upper Bej.-Deraqab	10	3	Agricultural/wage labour, Gold mining	Gold mining; Animal husbandry; Farming/Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	Primary
15	M	21	Upper Bej.	10	6	Gold mining; Animal husbandry	Gold mining; Animal husbandry; Farming/Grazing in hinterland; Archaeological employment	Primary
17	J	17	Kejeik	10	9	Family agriculture	Agricultural/wage labour	Secondary

Table 6. UCLQ Employees' Employment Profiles, February 2015.

6.2.2.5 Impact of Inflation and Devaluation on Archaeological Income

Alongside the dissonance noted at the start of this chapter, there is clearly a tension between the quantitative assessments above and the evaluations presented by the qualitative data, and sometimes within the qualitative data itself. While the present author was not expecting a blemish-free report on the wages provided by archaeologists, employee evaluations were nonetheless surprising and signalled the need for further investigation. Indeed, upon inspection, one reason why archaeological wages are perceived to be low in comparison with other wage labour may be because they have not kept pace with the high rate of inflation that has afflicted Sudan in recent years, which puts "upward pressure on food prices and…aggravates the poverty situation."[716]

Although the daily wages offered by UCLQ (and DAI) were increased from SDG30 in 2013 to SDG50 in early 2014, and then SDG60 in late 2015—thus doubling in nominal terms between 2013 and 2015—they barely kept pace with inflation, which was 30%, 37% and 17% in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively, according to the World Bank.[717] To have kept pace with inflation (of 19% in 2016[718]), the daily wage would have had to rise to at least SDG65 by the March 2016 season, suggesting an approximate 10% decline in real wages since 2013, despite the doubling of wages. This is an oversight and shows that the employees' claim that archaeological employment is less remunerative than other off-farm options is clearly not unfounded and cannot be ignored (see Chapter 8[719]).

In this vein, the severe devaluation of the Sudanese pound in recent years should be also considered. Shortages of hard currency due to US sanctions and reduced oil export revenues has given rise to parallel currency markets; foreigners typically convert currency to Sudanese pounds at the black market rate, which is widely available in markets and shops. In November 2016, the Central Bank of Sudan introduced "an incentive policy" which allowed commercial banks to adopt much higher conversion rates, close to the black market rate (see Chapter 4).[720]

In March 2013, the black market rate for the US dollar was SDG6.3-5 while the official exchange rate was approximately 30% lower, at SDG4.4.[721] At the end of the UCLQ mission's March 2016 season, the US dollar black market rate had risen to 13SDG;[722] the official exchange rate was half as high, at SDG6.4. This trend has continued: in early 2017, the US dollar traded for as high as

716 UNDP 2016a.
717 World Bank 2017.
718 World Bank 2017.
719 This issue was fortunately resolved at the time of discovery: upon being told this result by the present author, the UCLQ project director immediately approached her colleagues at the DAI to coordinate an increase of the wage for the subsequent seasons (see below, 'The Impacts of this Research').
720 Reuters, 'Sudan offers its citizens broad incentive to sell dollars to banks', 5 November 2016.
721 Sudan Tribune, 'US dollar losing ground to Sudanese pound on black market: traders', 16 March 2013.
722 Reuters, 'UPDATE 1-Sudanese pound falls sharply against dollar on black market', 12 April 2016.

SDG19.4 while the official exchange rate was SDG 6.8.[723] Assuming that the official exchange rate has been used as the method of currency conversion by archaeologists, budgets in local currency would have expanded by 45% over 2013-16 solely due to devaluation. If the black market rate is used, the latter figure rises to 106%, meaning that local currency budgets would have doubled, easily covering the wage increases without a need for larger budgets in the original (foreign) currencies.

The scale of the impact of local currency devaluation on the purchasing power of archaeological missions should not be underestimated, particularly given the combination of the Central Bank of Sudan's recent 'incentive policy' amid the ongoing devaluation. For instance, the US dollar black market rate in early 2017 was more than quadruple that of the official exchange rate in 2013. It is unclear whether this potential significant boost in the purchasing power of foreign archaeological mission will translate into higher local spending, including on wages. The latter is a poignant point to bear in mind given that the inflation which has been eroding the purchasing power of local households is partly driven by currency devaluation.

6.2.2.6 Non-Monetary Benefits of Archaeological Work

Despite UCLQ's local employees' concerns about the rate of pay, they value their jobs and come back each year to work. One of the farming Ja'alī employees, Bashir Kamal, explicitly stated to this author that his employment with the archaeologists has been long term and that he has anxiety about being re-employed and thus not losing his job to others (see below). This is not just about paucity of employment elsewhere: when asked about their reasons for choosing to work for the archaeologists, it became clear that the UCLQ employees conceptually offset their perceptions of poor rates of pay with six main perceived non-monetary benefits. Indeed, interview evidence show that the employees evaluate their off-farm employment options, including archaeology, against a broad range of criteria. This shows that when "making choices in the context of constraint"[724] occupational options are not evaluated solely by their monetary value. For example, when given the hypothetical choice of "going to the gold" or working in archaeology, Jabir Malik replied with a representative answer:

> I would choose working in archaeology because it's closer to my home, and I can go back to my home easily… The money [is OK], I guess, [and] it's not too far, like [the gold mines]; [I don't] have to pay travel… We only work for a few hours, from 7[am] to 1[pm]. After [work we] can come back to the goats and sheep and feed them.

723 Sudan Tribune, 'U.S. dollar inches up against Sudanese pound on black market', 20 February 2017.
724 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001: 1.

Jabir's reply shows that proximity to the household and short working hours are two perceived benefits of archaeological employment. Bashir's statement (above) shows that a third perceived benefit is its regularity; in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the availability of opportunities for wage labour on local farms is irregular and uncertain.

Other conversational data suggest that the relative physical safety of archaeological employment is a fourth reason why the men, and their families, prefer it to artisanal gold mining; the wives and mothers of the men who mine for gold frequently expressed relief at their husbands' or sons' decisions to work for the archaeologists. Another important (fifth) perceived benefit of archaeological employment to household incomes in Hamadab-Bejrawiya is that the employees are paid in cash (*garūsh*) for each week's work every Thursday afternoon rather than given payment-in-kind. Cash is scarce in rural Sudan and is preferred to payment-in-kind, which is widespread; for example, pastoralists who assist farmers with their harvests are often paid in animal fodder, which is welcome because the encroachment of large-scale farming has reduced their grazing land (see Chapter 4). However, payment-in-kind limits the receiver's purchasing power because of its relative inflexibility as an illiquid commodity. Inputs, or 'factors of production', such as seeds, fertilizers, livestock, vaccines and fuel, are needed by both farmers and livestock herders and can only be purchased with cash. If farmers cannot buy the inputs they need, crop and livestock yields suffer. Of course, cash income from other off-farm activities could fulfil this function; however, they are arguably less dependable. Gold mining and even the sporadic migration of Ja'aliyīn youth to the cities can be undertaken year-round and in spontaneous ways to fill gaps between other seasonal jobs. Although both have the appeal of being flexible, neither source provides guaranteed income. The scarcity of cash was frequently mentioned in discussions with residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya more generally, and if a job is spoken about, however briefly, the speaker always tends to note if it does or does not pay in cash; in interviews with employees, cash was thus highlighted as another non-monetary benefit.

Moreover, while particular to the Ja'aliyīn farmers, a sixth non-monetary benefit is the fact that opportunities for archaeological employment is on offer twice during the 'annual deficit period' (December-March), when households are most economically strained and find themselves obliged to seek credit (Table 6, also see Chapter 4). Credit is hard to come by and rarely amounts to little more than 5% of the total cost of inputs to crop production; borrowers often default on their loans, which can create tension and even conflict. It should thus be stressed that the typical arrival of the archaeologists in November-December, at the start of the 'deficit' period, and once again in the New Year, until March, at which point the 'deficit period' ends, is especially useful to the Ja'alī farmers. Data suggests that the cash earned in March is particularly advantageous to those households that

have taken out loans, since the government usually requires repayment during the 'surplus' period (April-July).[725]

Archaeological Employment	Surplus Period	April to July	Living off harvest sales; low expenditure, enough for subsistence but not investment.
	Balance Period	August to November	Living off savings and stored food; farm and off-farm activities few.
Archaeological Employment	Deficit Period	December to March	Money low, fewer stored crops; high expenditure on household.

Table 7. The Capital Circuit and the Archaeological Seasons (adapted from Ahmed 2012: 324-5).

A seventh, but no less important, non-monetary benefit of working for archaeologists is the concomitant increase in one's social capital and thus social networks. Over time, and because of the archaeologists' access to economic capital, perceived power and relative influence—aided in no small part by the archaeologists' cooperation with the Sudanese state (see Chapter 7)—archaeological employment is perceived to act as a conduit for social mobility and access to resources. Each employee also has a certain amount of economic influence by virtue of enjoying first refusal for additional paid work, and futher, being more likely to have other relatives in archaeological employment. The UCLQ employees also mention how, if one of them is ill, the archaeologists allow him to send another household member as a substitute, which is important to maintain the household's earning power (again, see below). Indeed, eight of the 11 employees interviewed in February 2015 had relatives in employment with one or other of the archaeological teams (Table 7, above; also see below), and each employee described hearing about the archaeologists' arrival each season via one of their family members. Furthermore, in looking at the site-community residents' relative degree of closeness to the archaeologists, who are perceived to be rather elusive, it is noteworthy that apart from the site guards, the excavation employees spend the most time with archaeologists. This can elicit further personal favours and establish relationships of quasi-economic significance such as tokens of friendship, wedding gifts, and donations of leftover equipment and so on, although this is hard to quantify.

*

725 Ahmed 2012: 326, Table 4. Also see Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012.

On aggregate, the wages earned from the seasonal work offered by archaeologists generates a palpable and positive economic impact for the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya and its households. In contrast, and despite being used by archaeologists and other heritage professionals to justify their interventions, tourism offers negligible economic dividends to these residents and indeed to the whole of Sudan. With a number of hurdles to overcome, the time at which tourism will produce impactful sums for the residents seems far off.

More specific results of this economic investigation show that, while a limited proportion of site-community households are impacted by archaeological employment (members of 7.14% of the households in the case-study area worked for the UCLQ mission between 2013 and 2016), the above-average household size of the employees and their high dependency ratios mean that the earnings from archaeology go further than they might do elsewhere. Furthermore, undertaking archaeological employment provides both pastoralists and farmers with an opportunity to diversify their livelihoods and income streams to minimize insecurity in an environment of scarcity and economic uncertainty. Given the above-average number of archaeological teams which work in the case-study area, and the years over which archaeological employment has been on offer, these findings can also be scaled up.

Very close examination of wage data suggested that earnings from archaeological work were even more impressive; in just 53 working days over the November 2015-March 2016 period, the UCLQ excavation employees earned on average 60% of the annual official minimum wage; or, 39% of the average annual rural household consumption.

Yet there was also a tension between the types of data under examination. While quantitative data clearly show the positive economic impact of archaeology, qualitative data provided by UCLQ employees showed they were largely of the opinion that their compensation was low compared with other wage labour occupations. This perception may be related to the impact of high inflation in recent years, which includes an approximate 10% decline in *real* wages for archaeological work over 2013-15, despite UCLQ's doubling of wages during this period.

Nevertheless, the employees were keen to secure employment with the archaeologists, as were other residents of the case-study area. This is because overall, archaeological employment provides not only a wage but also carries important non-monetary benefits including: proximity to home; safety and regularity; payments in cash, which is scarce and which arrives at a convenient point in the capital cycle; and, perhaps most importantly, unlike other jobs in the region, offers new channels through which social, economic and political networks can be expanded.

The implications of these results for archaeological practice are discussed in depth in Chapter 8, but essentially discuss the author's opinion that in contexts such as this, archaeology's economic impact via employment needs to be considered alongside, if not in preference to, its impact via tourism. As part of this recommendation, the present author reiterates the conclusion that while

employment produces good economic dividends and is thus positive overall, the UCLQ and DAI Domat al-Hamadab wage still did not keep in line with the devaluation of the SDG or reflect the high rate of inflation. The economic context therefore needs to be carefully considered by project directors when deciding on wages.

6.3 Archaeology's Social Ramifications

6.3.1 An Unexpected Reaction

Through the collection of data for this economic examination, it became clear to the present author that archaeology's impact upon the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya is not limited to the money that employment contributes to households and site-communities: archaeological employment has social ramifications, too. One of the times that this was most apparent was during an interview with two of UCLQ's Ja'alī employees, Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal.[726] As with the structured interviews with the other nine UCLQ employees, once the formal questions about their economic status had been answered, they were asked: "Is there any information you want to give me or think I should know?" In contrast to the Manāsīr employees, who had tended to ask questions about the present author, Abdel Hakim immediately responded:

> The people in our neighbourhood keep saying to us, "Why are the *'arab* [pastoralists] who work with [the archaeologists] more [in number] than you?" We don't have money or resources, just [work at] school, agriculture and construction. Even the students on holiday [cannot] find work.

Bashir Kamal then, unprompted, told this author:

> This is our land and our archaeology. Why does [the archaeological project director] let them [the pastoralists] work with us? We have educated people but they are jobless.

The end of the interview was thus dominated by the question of why the pastoralists are hired by UCLQ in greater numbers than the Ja'aliyīn, a situation that Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal perceive as a great injustice. Although both have relatives in archaeological employment (they are both related to Meroe's site guard; Bashir Kamal's brother is employed by UCLQ, as is Abdel Hakim's father), Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were indeed working in a team in which eight of the 11 employees were pastoralists and only three were Ja'alī farmers (Table 7, above). And, as noted in Chapter 4, the

726 Interview with Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal, February 2015. As it was a recorded interview, it has also been possible to quote the text and analyze the use of language more carefully.

Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya pastoralists are relative newcomers to the case-study area and herald a new, more diverse and less certain future for the Ja'aliyīn. There are wide differences between their lifestyle and that of the predominantly Ja'alī sedentary farmers, and these differences are drawn out by Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal in the interview to make and substantiate their claim that the allocation of jobs in this way is unfair.

First, both men refer to their fellow Manāsīr and Hassaniyya employees as *'arab*, a word they used as a derogatory reference to nomads or people who move around the landscape and live with their animals; not to signify a genealogical link with the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula (although as noted in Chapter 4, such a link exists). The word *'arab* is deliberately used by Abdel Hakim, and later Bashir Kamal, and indeed by most Ja'aliyīn, in a pejorative way because they consider pastoral and nomadic lifestyles to be inferior to their own agricultural livelihood and settled community. Despite the increase in livelihood diversification, which undoubtedly blurs the lines between farmers and pastoralists, they directly contrast being a pastoralist with their own (normative) identity as educated farmers and the respectable jobs that farming families do. Clearly the Ja'aliyīn feel they strengthen their claim to archaeological jobs by narrating the 'backwardness' of pastoralist livelihoods and land uses.

Their use of the word *'arab* was particularly striking because it contrasted with the semi-structured part of the interview in which the questions referred to the other employees as "Manāsīr" and "Hassaniyya" and Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal had followed suit: they only used the word *'arab* during the unstructured discussion at the end of the semi-structured interview. To the present author, this demonstrated very clearly that they see the allocation of jobs by the UCLQ archaeologists to the pastoralists as sufficiently unfair to tap into their insecurity and lead them to speak of their co-workers in stereotypical and disparaging ways.

From the Ja'alī perspective, the pastoralists' nomadic lifestyle also presupposes the lack of an ancestral connection to the land and consequently a lack of rights to the resources it bears. It is clear that Abdel Hakim believes that his *gabīla*, the Ja'aliyīn, own the land along with the archaeological sites, and thus, the jobs 'their' land generates. This demonstrates that archaeological sites are seen as an integral part of the land; part and parcel of, rather than separate to, the Ja'alī site-community residents' property. Indeed, Bashir Kamal asserted a sentiment that goes some way to justifying this view of ownership of land (and rights over archaeology's benefits) when he stated to this author:

> We are the original citizens…This is not their hometown; they just came for water and agriculture; they are *'arab*… We have a saying here, 'the chicken of *al-khala* [the hinterland] comes to the house and kicks out the chicken of *al-bahr* [the Nile].'

Bashir's claim to 'originality' here refers to the Ja'aliyīn's claims to have been the people who first settled in the area and thus the group with the most legitimate claim on the land. The Manāsīr and

Hassaniyya's perceived lack of long-term investment in the land that this implies is also hinted here. Their origin thus justifies their prior claim to resources, as does their status as "citizens" (remembering from Chapter 4 that the Local Committees do not register the pastoral settlers as part of the community, and that they did not appear even in the Sudan government's most recent national census in 2008).

In his first statement (above), Bashir Kamal also makes overt reference to the Ja'aliyīn in his neighbourhood of Bejrawiya being "educated," which implies that, by contrast, the pastoralists are less educated. He further states that the pastoralists are "jobless." In this context, 'being jobless' is better understood to mean 'they have no profession' since to acquire a profession one needs formal education. Formal education in the school system is not a large part of the pastoral life experience and identity, even though 'nomadic school attendance' is increasing as part of a broader national initiative to settle nomads and pastoralists (see Chapter 4). For the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, education rather involves a series of movements to and from the hinterland as one grows with age. Value is put on experience and the things one sees in the hinterland, and how to utilize natural resources. For example, the skill of avoiding snakes, and awareness of how to treat their bites, were extremely common topics of conversation, as was knowledge of grass, trees, water and other natural resources. Therefore, while for a variety of logistical as well as cultural reasons the pastoralists continue to have low school attendance rates, Bashir Kamal notes that when the UCLQ archaeologists arrived in 2012,

> We were busy with studying. That is why the people in our area keep telling us we should be more [involved in archaeological work] than them…[They say:] 'We have a lot of graduated people without work and need the basic services. We should have something from this money.'

Clearly, a formal education is perceived by both men to make them and their Ja'alī neighbours more deserving of archaeological employment than the pastoralists. The importance of possessing a formal education is key to the Ja'aliyīn's identity construction in this context. Six further statements along the same lines show that there is a perception that the *'arab* only work with the archaeologists because they were available for work when the archaeologists arrived in Hamadab-Bejrawiya and began to hire people. According to Abdel Hakim, the pastoralists were available for work because "they don't go to school and just go to *al-dhahab* [gold-mining] and *al-khala* [hinterland, for grazing animals]." In contrast, Bashir Kamal contends that they, the Ja'aliyīn, "were at school and busy with the agriculture", allowing the "*'arab* [to come] first, before us." In the view of the Ja'aliyīn, their educational attributes justify why it is wrong that archaeological work, which should be theirs to take or reject, has been given to poorly educated newcomers, whose attachment to the land is perceived to be temporary and superficial. If anything, the following exchange made their position clear:

> B: [The Domat al-Hamadab site guard] brought a lot of workers from his people.

> A: All of them work with [the archaeologists]…[They] should be equal and choose five from each place, including from Hamadab... When [the project director tells the Domat al-Hamadab site guard to] bring workers, he chooses his relatives.

*

The unstructured discussion with Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim at the end of an otherwise structured interview, of which these excerpts are only a part, strongly suggested that UCLQ's disproportional employment of Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists causes concern for Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim, who see themselves and their community as well-established owners of the land, thus making it self-evident that they deserve the seasonal jobs offered by archaeology. The perceived unfairness of this situation was the first topic they raised when given the chance to speak freely. The language they used to define their livelihood, 'original' and educational identities were also emphasised with the intention of strengthening their own group's claims to the land and its resources (including archaeological employment) and weaken those of the pastoralists. It was shown in Chapter 4 how derogatory stereotypes—albethem different in content—are used in the discourse of competition over resources at the national level: they must therefore not be dismissed here.

Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were not alone in their sentiment; many other respondents in the Ja'alī community pointed this out to the present researcher. Mariam al-Pasha made a representative comment:

> All the workers are from other [non-Ja'alī] villages except one guy and he is my cousin…I am so happy and proud of him, I was too angry with this problem…He is the only one from Hamadab [to work with the archaeologists]…when he says that no one there is from Hamadab, I get very angry and disappointed and I want to get my work clothes and carry my tools and go with him. There are people who want or have a desire to work but didn't get a chance. Also, I think the *khwāja* always hire specific people. They choose them by name. Am I right? Tell her [the present author] that [this] happens every season.

Indeed, as fieldwork progressed, it became clear that Bashir and Abdel Hakim's interview is representative of Ja'alī sentiments more broadly, with many more respondents using harsher language than that described above. A smaller category of Ja'alī respondents addressed the topic of "unfair" employment, but were more philosophical about it. Amna Suliman, for example, acknowledged that pastoralists are employed disproportionate to their numbers in the area, but nonetheless justified this, curiously using the same criteria as Bashir and Abdel Hakim, "The *'arab* do not go to school and they do not have farms: we [do]. Also they accept a small salary." Amna was in the minority, however, and other Ja'aliyīn not only criticised "unfair" employment strategies but also explicitly linked employment to site protection. In this vein, Adira al-Sikina told the author that the archaeologists should employ

> people from Kejeik as the workers; not the *'arab*, because the people from Kejeik will protect and guard the site, and because everyone knows each other. With the *khwāja* we would be one team: we know the *khwāja*, and even though we have work as farmers, we can leave it for some time because it's only a small season. The *'arab* are strangers and now they know our precious things.

Mariam, too, believed that this was critical, insisting to this author, "[y]ou must have confidence in the workers and leaders...They should be honest." This was further echoed by the Tourism Police, who explained that in the wake of any 'looting' incident, the guard and employees are the first people under suspicion.

*

Two important points must be taken away from this section. First, and as the reader will recall from Chapter 5, this possessive rhetoric was otherwise absent from local discourse: there it was shown that archaeology, archaeological history and archaeological sites play a negligible part in contemporary identity construction in the case-study area. Here, however, archaeology clearly does have an impact on identity construction, but because of its economic dimensions rather than its ideational meaning; this is discussed in Chapter 8. Second, these claims required investigating to fully explicate the social impact of archaeology in the case-study area. At length, it was possible to substantiate and also qualify the Ja'aliyīn's statements about how UCLQ chooses to allocate jobs to site-community residents.

6.3.2 The Allocation of Jobs

As noted above, at the time of the interview (February 2015), Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were indeed working in a team in which eight of the 11 employees identified as Manāsīr or Hassaniyya pastoralists and only three as Ja'alī farmers (see Table 7, above). Moreover, of the 16 men employed by UCL Qatar for more than three seasons, i.e. half of the total (six) seasons under review (2013-16), 12 were Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and four were Ja'alī farmers. These 16 employees belonged to at least four extended family groups (spread over different households): two Mansūrī families, one Hassanī family and one Ja'alī family (the extended family of Bashir and Abdel Hakim, above). Members of the other (semi-)pastoral group under consideration here, the Fadniyya, made up one-third of UCLQ local employees in the 2013-14 seasons of fieldwork; however, their numbers significantly dropped over subsequent years: in November-December 2015, only one was employed, while UCLQ hired three in the March 2016 season. The latter may have been due to that the UCLQ mission was 2013-14 based at Domat al-Hamadab.

The employment figures are certainly disproportional to the relative size of these communities at the local level (Figure 18). And, as we saw in Chapter 4, while estimates of the number of pastoralists nationwide vary wildly, the present author's observations in the case-study area suggests that the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists account for only 2% of the populace, and even with the pastoral members of the Fadiyya make up no more than 10% of the inhabitants. It is clear, therefore, that the number of pastoralists hired by the archaeologists is out of proportion with their weight in the local population. As shown in Figure 19, the proportion of pastoralists in the employ of UCLQ is striking; among the 'regular' employees, namely those who worked with the mission for at least three seasons, 75% belong to the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya. In comparison, the Ja'aliyīn make up over 60% of the population of the case-study area (Figure 18) but only a quarter of 'regular' UCLQ employees as per the definition above (Figure 19). Lastly, and even more significantly, in the November-December 2015 and March 2016 seasons, Mansūrī and Hassanī employees of UCLQ accounted for 70% of archaeological income (Figure 20). Indeed, given their simultaneously small numbers and overrepresentation among UCLQ's employees, it seems that at least 16% of Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists (combined) were in archaeological employment in 2015-16. If examined from a historic perspective, this number may even increase exponentially considering that these same employees also had been themselves or had relatives that had worked with Shinnie's teams throughout the 1960s, 1970s and finally in the 1980s (see below), and/or with Hinkel at the Bejrawiya pyramids in the 1990s (such as Medowi al-Mansouri and Ali al-Hassani, who has three nephews in archaeological employment).



Figure 18. Population by *gabīla* in the case-study area.



Figure 19. *Gabīla* affiliation of local employees who've worked with UCLQ for at least three seasons, 2013-16.



Figure 20. Earnings from archaeological work with UCLQ by *gabīla* affiliation, Nov-Dec 2015 to March 2016.

If past trends are an indicator of future performance, empirical evidence suggests that pastoralists could maintain income from archaeological employment. All of UCLQ's employees in February 2015 had relatives in archaeological employment, either now or in the past, and not only with UCLQ but also with missions from both DAI teams, the University of Khartoum and Royal Ontario Museum teams. As such, the pastoralists in the case-study area are in a prime position to maintain or even expand access to a valued source of income. Futhermore, given the socio-economic conditions of rural Sudan (see above on the local dependency ratio, estimates incomes etc.), and particularly those faced by pastoralists, it should be noted that archaeological income could reasonably be assumed to constitute a significant financial boost to these parts of the site-community.

6.3.3 The Mechanics of Archaeological Employment

Qualitative and quantitative employment data thus appear to substantiate the Ja'alī perception that earnings from seasonal employment with the UCLQ archaeologists, earnings which the site-community residents perceive to be the main economic benefit of archaeology, flows disproportionally to the pastoralists, the smallest and newest segment of local society. The question now is, how does this happen? Are pastoralists over-employed due to an accident of archaeological 'disciplinary culture',[727] or is it done deliberately? Change to a more egalitarian system of job allocation, if indeed such change is sought (see Chapter 8), can only be successfully implemented if the conditions that produce this result are understood.

6.3.3.1 The Project Director as Decision-Maker

Starting at the top, the job of the NCAM antiquities inspector is to safeguard the Sudanese state's interests at each site by monitoring excavations and submitting reports to the Director-General of NCAM in Khartoum at the close of each season; officially, they take no part in the recruitment of employees (although they have been known to wield influence). Rather the project directors of archaeological missions are in charge of employment. Yet, neither the OPA (1999) nor the excavation licence issued by NCAM set out regulations on how archaeologists should recruit employees, how much should be paid, or how to resolve conflicts; indeed, the OPA provides no guidance regarding working behaviour at all (see Chapter 7). Observation shows that the NCAM antiquities inspector can provide some of this information to the archaeological project directors on an *ad hoc* basis, but there

727 Moser 2007.

is no formal requirement for them to do so. The archaeological mission is thus under the effective control of the project director, who is the creator of the project; the generator and distributor of its funds; and the manager of its team. While *de jure* under the supervision of the NCAM antiquities inspector and required to take instruction from them, she is *de facto* the main authority for the execution of the project. The project director chooses the employees, decides their jobs, instructs them on when to work, determines wages (in collaboration with her DAI colleagues) and pays them in cash every week. The greater proportion of pastoral employees thus seems to have been her choice.

However, interview data further qualifies this evaluation. When asked about her employment strategy, the UCLQ project director explained to this author that she "used to hire the same men [as the longer established DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director]", with whom she shares a compound and staff, but added that now that she is based at Meroe, she has an almost entirely different workforce, chosen with the help of the Meroe site guard.[728] When asked about his employment strategy in turn, the project director of the DAI Domat al-Hamadab mission explained to this author, "…from the very beginning [i.e. since the 1990s], we always discussed with [the pastoral Domat al-Hamadab site guard] who to choose as excavation employees."[729] Alongside the project director, then, the site guards seem to play a pivotal role in the mechanics of archaeological employment.

6.3.3.2 The Site Guards as Brokers

The primary responsibility of the NCAM-employed site guards is to protect the archaeological sites from man-made threats and to take care of the archaeologists' dig houses while they are away (see Chapter 7). However, during each archaeological season, the site guards are also present from the moment employees are chosen and every day throughout the season, mediating between the project director, the archaeological team and the local employees. As most archaeologists lack Arabic skills (see Chapter 8) and few local employees speak English, the site guards are therefore needed as facilitators and mediators because they are able to communicate with both groups: although usually fluent in English, the NCAM inspector is able to choose the extent to which he or she participates in field activities and his or her presence to translate cannot be relied upon. The language of archaeology here is mostly broken Arabic and English and quite specific in content: trowel (*mustarīn*), string (*khayt*), nails (*musmār*), brush (*fursha*), mattock (*'azma*), and shovel (*maqrifa*) are most commonly heard. Fluency in this language, and well-considered handling of archaeological machinery and objects, shows that the site guards have long-since picked up a sense for what the archaeologists want. Indeed, while the site guards are appointed by NCAM and derive their authority from this link with

728 Email interview with UCLQ project director, September 2015.
729 Email interview with DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director, August 2016.

the Sudanese state, they also enjoy delegated authority from the project directors. Because they are the first layer of authority and those most familiar with the sites, NCAM even endows site guards who "with police powers to arrest without prior legal authorisation in relation to their assigned duties."[730]

The most important consequence of the above for the current examination is that the site guard is able to make decisions on the project director's behalf and to influence how things get done. More specifically, the site guards are likely able to help direct who gets the jobs in archaeological employment; they are, after all, the first to know about the arrival of the archaeologists and their plans for the season, and they are therefore the ones who choose which people to call to say that work is available. The interview data from Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal, the Ja'ali employees, certainly seems to confirm this regarding the Domat al-Hamadab site guard (who, it was later discovered, is himself related by marriage to the Meroe site guard). Thus, in this instance, observation suggests that the disproportionate allocation of archaeological work appears to be the result of the UCLQ project director's decision to rely on the guidance of the site guard as well as fellow project directors in recruiting local employees. The motivations behind the site guards' actions must not be seen wholly with regard to nepotism, however. It is important to note, for example, that Shinnie, who worked in Meroe in the 1960s and 1970s, had a strict policy of hiring pastoralists, perhaps due to his great friendship with the leader of the Manāsīr at the time, and with the Manāsīr man he chose as the excavation's foreman.[731] The Meroe and Domat al-Hamadab site guards may thus be assuming that this is the archaeologists' preference.

The present author collected much more data about the ways in which project directors, site guards and indeed other actors such as NCAM inspectors and even employees contribute to the status quo; there is much more to be developed on these points. However a number of factors have stopped this author from doing so, not least the guarantees made to respondents about what would and would not be included in the present thesis. Happily for now this suffices to give some indication of the complex nature of archaeology's *chaîne opératoire* in Sudan.

*

Archaeological employment is an economically beneficial but contested resource in the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. Indeed the positive impact of the archaeological wage is limited by its unequal allocation by the UCLQ project director: 75% of regular employees (those that worked for three or more seasons between 2013 and 2016) are pastoralists, who make up only 2% of the local population; 25% regular employees are farmers, who make up 60% of the local population; and, perhaps most importantly, during the November to December 2015 and March 2016 seasons, 70% of

730 OPA 1999: 24.
731 Email interview with John Robertson, October 2016.

the earnings from archaeological employment went to the pastoralists. Evidence gathered from other projects directors both now and in the past indicates that this is a historic trend.

This unequal allocation causes social tension, as evidenced by the reactions given in interviews and conversations with other Ja'aliyin and well as with Ja'ali employees. Yet while there seems to be good economic reasons for the Ja'alī claim to jobs, their tangible displeasure it is based, at least in part, on their community's claim to the land, of which the archaeological site is an integral part. In other words, the main thrust of the Ja'alī argument taps in to their broader experience of and narrative about the injustice of their land being taken over by 'outsiders', whether agricultural investors or pastoralists. Of course, insecurity also characterizes the pastoral way of life in Sudan, arguably to an even greater degree than the Ja'aliyīn, and this is clear from the language they use about the Ja'aliyīn when discussing their unjust hegemony over basic services (Chapter 4). However, as the segment of society that receives most economic benefit from archaeological employment, discontent was not expressed by them in this context.

Collected data about the mechanics of archaeological employment demonstrate that while they are not the sole movers in the culture that conditions the distribution of jobs, the project directors and the site guards are the main decision-makers and brokers.

*

Overall, Chapter 6 has examined in some detail the socio-economic impacts of archaeology on individuals and different communities in the case study area, from both monetary and livelihood perspectives, and more sociologically. In the absence of promised economic development through tourism, this is largely concerned with employment, as guards, or casual labourers by visiting archaeological teams, and sought to examine the value of this income in real terms. It has identified the social ramifications of recruitment practices and in doing so identified several fracture lines and existing rivalries between the communities, particularly the attitudes of the sedentary farming Ja'aliyīn to the more mobile, pastoralism-oriented Hassaniyya and Manāsīr, and the seemingly preferential access the latter have to waged-employment on archaeological projects. There has also been some exploration of the social composition of the archaeological projects themselves, and the roles of key actors on the archaeological side in potentially shaping relationships with these different communities (both wittingly and unwittingly).

7. The Impact of Archaeological Management on Local Landscapes

Archaeological site management is another way in which archaeology economically impacts site-communities in the case-study area. Here, the processes going back over 100 years are looked at in light of Chapter 4, which discussed at length the challenges posed to the equitable consumption of the landscape's resources by dam building and large-scale commercial farming, and well as Chapter 6, which demonstrated that there is a contestation over archaeological employment, one that taps into the Ja'aliyīn residents' insecurity regarding their socio-political hegemony in the case-study area.

In this chapter, site management processes in the case-study area are described before the Ja'aliyīn residents' narratives are presented to show the experience of site management processes from their perspective. It is clear that they are recounted as highly disruptive events, perhaps because archaeologists, both Sudanese and Western, have not taken the fact that the land is already used for agriculture, livestock-raising, and as a source for fuel, sufficiently into account. NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan (2010) for the archaeological sites in the case-study area is then evaluated to show how it is potentially detrimental to the livelihoods of the site-communities. The findings pertain mostly to the Ja'aliyīn, Manāsīr and Hassaniyya living around the site of Meroe. Although plenthy of evidence for similar processes at work has been collected for the Ja'aliyīn and Fadniyya living around the site of Domat al-Hamadab, it is not included here because the present author was not technically given permission to study the DAI team's work.

7.1 Identifying Threats to Archaeological Sites

The protection of archaeological sites, monuments and materials is a concern that is shared by archaeological professionals, descendant communities as well as the wider public. The question for these groups is not *whether* or not to protect, and thereafter preserve, conserve and restore, but *what* to protect (see Chapter 2). For Hinkel (1992), a German architect who worked at Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids in the 1970s to the 1990s, the key question is to identify which sites, materials and monuments are important enough to preserve. For the archaeologists Renfrew and Bahn the key question is efficacy of conservation: they argue that there are "two principal stages in archaeological conservation: 1. Gathering of information, so that relevant sites and areas may be recognized and properly recorded; 2. Conservation of those sites/areas that can be effectively protected."[732] Assessing risks and controlling threats to ancient archaeological sites and site preservation, conservation and management are clearly central to the archaeological discipline. Protecting the integrity and longevity of ancient sites, monuments and materials 'for future generations' is addressed by fields that have developed out of the expanding archaeological discipline, such as site management and conservation science; and the practical tasks of preservation, conservation and restoration are often undertaken with the curation and public display of sites, monuments and materials in mind (linking the whole endeavour to, and justifying it through, the development of tourism, above).

Threats to archaeological sites are numerous and include "[c]limate, rain…changes in temperature…catastrophes like inundation, lightning strike and tectonic effects…as well as vegetation and insect attacks…[to] new agricultural areas, the foundation and extension of settlement, the extraction of mineral wealth, and…martial and ideological hostilities".[733] Hinkel divided the causes of deterioration of ancient Sudanese monuments into "intrinsic" causes that are "connected with the conception and genesis of the building;" and "extrinsic" causes both natural and human (Table 8).[734] Hinkel subdivided the 'intrinsic' causes of deterioration into those that are "related to the site" and those that are "inherent in the structure".[735] Those related to the site include "proximity to the…river [or] hafir [man-made reservoirs]", "orientation [with regard to] wind" and "the building ground, its quality and load capacity."[736] Those that are inherent in the structure include "the material used in the construction" and "the faults in the design [such as] incorrect roof formation."[737]

732 Renfrew and Bahn 2008: 558.
733 Hinkel 1992: 147.
734 Hinkel 1992: 150.
735 Hinkel 1992: 151.
736 Hinkel 1992: 151.
737 Hinkel 1992: 151.

Causes of Deterioration						
A. **Intrinsic** to the building				B. **Extrinsic** to the building		
A.1 Related to the site		A.2 Inherent in the structure		B.1 Natural Agents		B.2 Human Activity
A.1.a Geo-topographical, climate and orientation	A.1.b Ground-carrying foundations	A.2.a Building materials	A.2.b Building concept and its execution	B.1.a Long-term action	B.1.b Occasional action	B.2.a Alteration, neglect, excavation, treatment

Table 8. Causes of deterioration of ancient buildings. (Source: Hinkel (1992: 151, Figure 1) who modified G. de Angelis d'Ossat (1982: 13).)

Hinkel further subdivided the extrinsic causes of deterioration into "natural agents" and "human activity". As extrinsic threats, natural agents include "long-term action" such as "physical actions [and] stresses" by "water…wind…[and] sand" as well as "chemical…botanical…[and] biological causes" including bacterial damage, and "occasional action" such as "earthquakes, volcanic eruptions…and floods."[738] For example, in 2011, ICOMOS noted that the "abrasive effect of the wind has almost completely faded the reliefs of the Sun Temple at Meroe" and that a "small section of the Meroe town site on the western boundary of the property…has flooded four times in the past 60 years."[739] As 'natural agents' herds of animals have also long been seen as a particular threat to Meroe:

> [s]everal hundred goats browse inside the fence of the MEROE [sic] Town site. They destroy stones and walls by rubbing their backs against the walls, walking over fallen stones, climbing and standing on stones in order to reach higher branches of trees and by urinating.[740]

'Human activity' is by far the largest of Hinkel's categories, and ranges from "alterations during time of use, unpredictable damage in war time, defacing and demolition…to a complete abandonment and lack of maintenance."[741] Threats from human activity also include deliberate vandalism, looting, the plundering of ancient monuments for building materials, the extension of agriculture, the spread of settlement, road-, pipeline- and dam-building. For example, the villages of Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab were built on top of the southern and northern parts of Meroe; the Anglo-Egyptian government built the Khartoum-Atbara railway across the outskirts of Meroe in 1899;[742] the Sun Temple was damaged by the installation of a modern pipeline; and graffiti covers almost all upstanding remains.

738 Hinkel 1992: 152.
739 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
740 Hinkel 1992: 152, n.33.
741 Hinkel 1992: 153.
742 Hinkel 1992: 148.

7.2 Site Protection as Stewardship

7.2.1 The OPA

Of course, "[o]nly some of the natural causes described as being of prolonged activity can normally be brought under control."[743] It is, for example, hard to prevent the effects of desertification and wind erosion, which are considered by ICOMOS to be the biggest threats,[744] without building protective shields, which is not possible, or acceptable, in most locations. It is even harder to prevent damage from earthquakes. However, threats deriving from human activity can, hypothetically, be controlled through legislation, regulation and the management of access to sites. Indeed, ICOMOS "notes that physical protection [of archaeological sites] relies on the power of the formal laws".[745] In Sudan the most important of these laws is the Ordinance for the Protection of Antiquities (henceforth 'OPA') (1999[746]), which constitutes the first layer of protection for the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe. The OPA defines 'antiquities' as,

> anything surviving from the ancient civilisations or past generations and has been discovered or excavated whether the object is fixed or mobile and is a hundred years or more old…[including] documents, prints, some human, animal or botanical remains…

The OPA defines archaeological land as "the land which accommodates the site of archaeological interest, or a historical building"[747] and states that "[t]he limits of [such] land shall be defined by [NCAM]"[748] and that "[a]ll relics or objects of archaeological interest, whether buried deep in the earth or found on the surface, are considered the property of the State."[749] As noted in Chapter 5, Meroe and the pyramids to the east, although not Domat al-Hamadab, have been deemed so important that they were "confiscated" by a presidential decree in 2003, which declared that they should be managed as a "national reserve".[750]

The OPA regulates against potential threats from commercial development (clause §2.10-2.10.1);[751] prohibits 'looting'; and outlaws the trade in antiquities (clause §2.14).[752] Significantly, the

743 Hinkel 1992: 153.
744 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
745 ICOMOS 2011: 106.
746 Crowfoot, then-Director of Education in the Anglo-Egyptian administration, was the author of the first OPA, published in 1905 followed by Shinnie in the same post in 1952 (Hinkel 1992: 168; Jakob and Ali 2011: 513-4, 518).
747 OPA 1999: 13. Both excerpts are from §I.3.
748 OPA 1999: 13.
749 OPA 1999: 16.
750 ICOMOS 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is 'Presidential Decision/Decree no.162 for the year 2003: The Confiscation of the Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National Reserve within this Region and managing it.' The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the Nomination File for UNESCO World Heritage status was being written.
751 OPA 1999: 17.

OPA implies that the main threats to archaeological sites come from the site-community residents. Thus clause §2.6.1 rules that landowners or landusers are not allowed to "dispose of" or "excavate" without prior approval[753] and clause §2.9 states that "[b]oth the planting of trees and their cutting on such land is forbidden without prior permission from [NCAM]."[754] "[A]ny modification to historical buildings"[755] by the landowner is also prohibited. "Fines for graffiti are about USD90 for a first offence, which is high for most Sudanese."[756] From an archaeological point of view, identifying site-communities as the main threat to the archaeological sites is not, in fact, unfounded: apart from 'looting' and graffiti, both of which are evidence of what archaeologists call 'destruction', the preferred areas for farming in the Nile Valley are along the levees of paleo-channels that were settled heavily during the Kerma and Kushite periods; archaeological sites have traditionally been used for the grazing of animals; local communities have customarily used archaeological sites as sources of building materials; and local farmers have long engaged in the practice of removing material from ancient sites and spreading it on their fields to increase soil fertility.[757] However, the question tacitly asked here is whether archaeologists are justified in framing residents in such a way, considering the broad socio-economic conditions of the context.

7.2.2 NCAM

As the legal owner of all archaeological sites, materials and relics in Sudan, the state has responsibility for their preservation, conservation, management and presentation (although see Chapter 5 and below), but under clauses §2.4.2 and §2.12 of the OPA (1999), the state devolves these responsibilities to NCAM.[758] Other governmental bodies also intervene on archaeological matters,[759] but NCAM's 400-plus employees have responsibility for the practical implementation of the OPA. NCAM therefore constitutes the second layer of protection for Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe.

---

752 "The sale or donation of registered antiquities owned by the State is prohibited. These shall be kept in museums and shall not be removed from the sphere of influence of the Corporation, except through legitimate ways according to the terms of this law." (OPA 1999: 18). Also §2.21, 19: "[i]mitation and falsification or trading in transportable antiquities is prohibited."

753 OPA 1999: 17.

754 OPA 1999: 17, §2.9.

755 The examples given are "to demolish the building concerned or make any modification that may change the historical shape of the structure or its artistic character." (OPA 1999, §2.8.1: 17.)

756 ICOMOS 2011: 106.

757 Welsby and Davies 2001.

758 OPA 1999: 15. "[NCAM] is responsible for the *preservation* of antiquities and for *assessing* the archaeological value of objects, historical buildings, the archaeological sites and *recording* such information and is also responsible for the *implementation* of the terms of this law." (Italics added by the author.) Also see §2.13.1: 18.

759 For example the attendees of the conference on 'Safeguarding the Cultural Heritage: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities in the Sudanese Context' held on 29 November 2015 in Khartoum, included the Minister of Education, the Sudanese National Commission for Education, Science and Culture, the Minister of Culture, the General Director of Islamic High Academy, the head of the Dam Construction Unit, the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity and the Dams Implementation Unit.

The first basic survey of the sites was made in around 1905 by the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Antiquities Service (SAS), which had been set up in 1903 not long after the establishment of the condominium. In 1911, following Garstang's 'rediscovery' of the sites, a roof was constructed over the Royal Baths.[760] In 1939, the SAS moved to protect Meroe by providing it with a full-time salaried site guard "with police powers to arrest without prior legal authorisation…to combat illegitimate trading in antiquities and their smuggling and to combat damages against…archaeological sites".[761] Meroe was one of the first sites in Sudan to be given this type of protection[762] and the post is still occupied today (Chapter 6). In 1946 Meroe, the Apademek temple and the Sun Temple were enclosed with low barbed-wire fences by the then Commissioner of Archaeology under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, A.J. Arkell, apparently using war surplus materials.[763] In the 1970s, the government deemed the sites so important that the first regional archaeological office in Sudan was established in Shendi, some 45km from the case-study area; the second such office, in Dongola, was not established until the 1980s. It was at this time that Meroe was also given its own Tourism Police station, manned by full-time salaried officers who work for and represent the interests of the central government, although there is evidence to suggest this arrangement is not always productive.[764]

However, from an archaeological point of view, the Sudanese state does not fund NCAM (which is a restructured version of the SAS, made so in 1991[765]) well enough to allow it to provide adequate protection for the archaeological sites. NCAM salaries are low and most employees have to take second jobs to make ends meet.[766] Experience shows that most NCAM employees have a genuine commitment towards archaeology but are frustrated at the limited funding that NCAM has to do its work and the close control of its activities by other government bodies.[767]

Indeed in 2010, under the guidance of Western and Egyptian archaeologists, NCAM applied for UNESCO World Heritage status for the Island of Meroe (Meroe, Musawwarat es-Sufra and Naqa),

760 Hinkel 1992: 169. "On 'the 26th January 1911…the Financial Secretary, Sudan Government, approved the sum of £E 60 to be spent for a roof of corrugated iron over the 'painted chamber' [i.e. the Royal Baths] in Meroe"; roofs were put over other buildings sporadically in the 1930s and 1960s.

761 OPA 1999: 24. These powers are extended to "inspectors of antiquities, museum curators and guards of museums…"

762 Hinkel 1992: 169 using Arkell 1939: 9. The number of guards at sites seems to have expanded during the office of A.J. Arkell as CfA (Hinkel 1992: 169). Alongside Meroe, 'Buhen, Abdel Gadir Church, Semna, Soleb, el-Kurru, Barkal, Nuri and Naga/Musawwarat' were also given guards by the Antiquities Service. Mirgissa, Amara West and Kawa were given guards but they were paid for by their missions (Hinkel 1992: 169 using Arkell 1939: 9). The missions were the Harvard Boston Expedition, the EES and Oxford University Excavations in Nubia.

763 Arkell 1946.

764 NCAM's Management Plan (2010) notes that the police constructed a guard station "within the Royal City immediately on top of the unexcavated portion of the site. […] The presence of armed guards on the site, while welcome in terms of security, poses also a threat with the police seemingly unaccountable to the antiquities authorities and erecting structures within the antiquities area" (NCAM's Management Plan 2010: 149).

765 Hinkel 1992: 168; Jakob and Ali 2011: 513-4, 518.

766 ICOMOS 2011: 109. According to this dossier there is a "great need to develop the status of NCAM and the importance of its work in managing the cultural resources of the country…"

767 "The general policy of NCAM is set by a board of nine members on the basis of the proposals of its Director and is approved by the Council of Ministers. The members of the board are the Director himself, "a representative of the employees, and seven individuals representing other disciplines and functions related to the mandate of NCAM". (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 80).

which they hoped would help to generate revenue to be re-invested into site protection. However, World Heritage status gives UNESCO the right to monitor designated sites and to call for improvements where appropriate. UNESCO's has high standards of protection and conservation that are expensive to maintain and require a level of logistics, coordination, infrastructure and investment that the state cannot provide.[768] World Heritage status has thus placed an even heavier burden of responsibility for site protection on NCAM, which it is ill-equipped to meet.[769]

Moreover, in an environment where corruption is rife, thefts from, or damage to, archaeological sites are not always followed up. In the late 1980s Trigger recorded that the antiquities service was engaged in political manoeuvring[770] and in 1992 Hinkel noted that government administrators sometimes "close their eyes"[771] to damage done to archaeological sites by their colleagues. An additional problem on the ground is that members of site-communities tend to mistrust NCAM and archaeologists, both Sudanese and Western archaeologists, because of their association with the state. In a political climate where there is heavy state surveillance of the population, respondents in the case-study area often asked the present researcher if the Sudanese translators she was working with were members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS, the secret police, or Mukhābarāt). From an archaeological point of view, such suspicions clearly challenge NCAM in its efforts to protect archaeological sites.

7.2.3 Project Directors

Day-to-day responsibility for protecting the archaeological sites is shared between NCAM and the archaeologists working on them. This sharing is well-recognised by all involved and is formalised in clause §1.IVb of the official excavation licence, which states that "[d]uring the term of the licence [the licensee must] have the site guarded to the satisfaction of the Government."[772] Clause §1.IVg also places responsibility for the preservation and conservation of materials upon the archaeologists.[773] The archaeologists working on the archaeological sites thus constitute a third layer of protection. During field seasons their very presence probably helps to limit damage to the sites. However, their

768 The UNESCO documents show that the state party (NCAM) is repeatedly asked for reports and additional pieces of information but does not comply.

769 This is also true of Sudan's only other UNESCO World Heritage Site, 'Jebel Barkal and the sites of the Napatan Region'.

770 Trigger noted that the Sudan antiquities services was "subject to partisan political intrigue, as exemplified by the recent imprisonment [in 1990] of its director general, Osama El Nur" (Trigger 1994: 345).

771 Hinkel 1992: 149.

772 NCAM Excavation Licence, n.d. In 2011 the licence cost $1,000 with a renewal fee of $500 and additional $250 payable to NCAM for subsequent years (Jakob and Ali 2011: 518). Also see Gillot 2010: 6-7.

773 "[T]he Excavation team must include specialist [sic] in conservation and restoration, by the type of excepted material, with at least 5 years of experience. All proposed Conservation/Restoration works for sites…should be implemented by specialist [sic] with a resume of relevant conservation project… Although OPA §2.20 notes that NCAM's approval and supervision are compulsory.

effectiveness at protecting, preserving and conserving the sites depends to a large extent upon the ability of the archaeological project directors to raise sufficient funds to carry out these duties as licensees.

In the case-study area, most recent conservation efforts have been directed at the Bejrawiya pyramids; made of friable sandstone and filled with rubble, the pyramids have become ruinous. However, much of the work done so far to 'conserve' the pyramids has actually involved their reconstruction using both ancient and modern materials.[774] Between 1975 and 1999, "a number of structures [in the Bejrawiya pyramid field] were dismantled and rebuilt" and 14 pyramids were "restored and roofed using the original blocks or prefabricated replacements."[775] The archaeological team from the Royal Ontario Museum, whose long-time Sudan archaeologist, Grzymski, collaborates with the University of Khartoum, plans a "partial reconstruction" of the Temple of Amun.[776] And according to their website, QSAP-QMPS are aiming for the "restoration and conservation of the over-230 pyramids".[777] Since 2013 the two DAI teams and the UCLQ team working in the case-study area have received funding from NADO-QSAP, which donated US$135m to protect and conserve archaeological sites in the Nile Valley.[778] The DAI Royal Baths team has used its funding to enclose the bath complex with a protective shelter,[779] while the DAI Domat al-Hamadab team decided to demarcate site boundaries with concrete posts to stop agricultural encroachment. There are ongoing site management works at the pyramids also.[780] However, while the archaeological teams preserve archaeological materials on an *ad hoc* basis, they do not have a holistic programme to preserve and conserve the sites because they choose to dedicate their funding to the costs of excavation.

7.2.4 UNESCO

A fourth layer of protection for Meroe and the pyramids to the east is their status since 2011 as part of the UNESCO World Heritage site of the 'Island of Meroe' (Domat al-Hamadab is not part of the World Heritage site). NCAM's UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File and Management Plan conceptualizes Meroe as a falling into two core zones, one around Meroe (the 'Meroe town site') and the second around the Bejrawiya pyramids (the 'pyramids site') (Figure 21, in red). The town site and

774 ICOMOS 2011: 99.
775 ICOMOS notes that "Conservation works to the pyramids and temples have involved more *reconstruction* (in the Burra Charter sense of introducing new material)…" (ICOMOS 2011: 102.) See Hinkel's own description in Hinkel 2000.
776 ICOMOS 2011: 107.
777 Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website.
778 G. Gibbon, 'Qatar invests $135m in archaeological heritage of Sudan', *Arabianindustry.com*, 24 March 2014; M-B. Griggs, 'Qatar Gives $135 Million to Sudan for Archaeological Projects', *Smithsonianmag.com*, 27 March 2014.
779 Wolf, S., Onash, H-U., Kere Architecture, 2016.
780 Riedel et al. 2017.

the pyramids site, which are linked by an ancient processional way, are enclosed by a buffer zone (Figure 21, in blue) and are thus seen as one ancient landscape. The UNESCO plan refers to the two core areas as 'Greater Meroe'.



Figure 21. UNESCO's 'Greater Meroe'. Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids are outlined in red and their shared buffer zone is outlined in blue. (Source: adapted from Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 12, Fig. 3.) 'Bejrawiya' refers the broad Bejrawiya area.

NCAM's UNESCO World Heritage Management Plan has two key strategies to protect Meroe and the pyramids ("protecting humanity's achievements"[781]). The first plan is to extend the boundaries of Meroe to include "the archaeological remains of the northern part of the Royal City" which are currently underneath the modern, but now evacuated, village of Old Deraqab (Figure 22).[782] ICOMOS agreed that the "unexcavated part of [Meroe] beneath [Old Deraqab]…should be included [within the property boundary] because it has future research potential to contribute to the understanding of the property".[783] The expansion of Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South are also described as "a potential

781 Bernbeck and Pollock 2004: 337.
782 ICOMOS 2011: 100. The plan also proposes to include other areas including "the southern flanks of the northern hills within the buffer zone of Meroe" and the port site of Wad Ben Naga.
783 ICOMOS 2011: 101.

threat to [Meroe's] integrity".[784] An extended version of this idea is also on the agenda of QSAP: detailed plans have not yet been revealed, but in January 2014 QSAP and QMPS held a workshop in Khartoum on their plans to include the "demarcation (and possible enlargement) of [Meroe]"; the construction of a fence around it; and the promotion of Old Deraqab as a "traditional Sudanese community".[785]

The second UNESCO plan is to build a fence around the merged core zones of Greater Meroe, which extend to some 1,718ha,[786] and to ban all development inside the buffer zone. These measures are designed specifically to protect the sites from "encroachment, looting and damage caused by local herdsmen"[787] and from the expansion of local settlement. Hinkel recommended fencing in 1992 as "the only way of controlling access"[788] and fencing also figures heavily in QSAP's plans to make "drastic transformations of the [Bejrawiya pyramids] site".[789] However, fencing off the sites in this way could have serious consequences for hundreds of local residents.

At the time of writing the implementation of the UNECSO plans does not seem to be imminent largely, it appears, because of a shortage of funding. [[It is clear that "…in order to guard the sites adequately [the sites] would currently need more guards."[790]

In 2010 NCAM noted that "It is not explained how the additional staff will be funded"[791] and in 2011 ICOMOS reported that "the Management Plan is yet to be implemented. It awaits funding and staff." [792] Although neither plan has been implemented, preparatory work has taken place. Consultation meetings have taken place with stakeholders including the Tourism Office in Shendi, the State Tourism Police, the NCAM Office in Shendi and, representing the residents of the case-study area, "the Popular Committee of Bejrawiya North [Kejeik and Deraqab] and the Popular Committee of Bejrawiya South".[793] According to the NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan all the stakeholders had agreed to the plans (although the narratives of the Ja'aliyīn in Hamadab and Bejrawiya (below) contradict any suggestion that the site-communities are happy with them). QSAP-QMPS have also taken steps to impose greater control over the area by building an archaeological research facility, Dohat Meroe, just outside the buffer zone.

784 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
785 Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website.
786 ICOMOS 2011: 96. Meroe town site measures roughly 612ha and the pyramids roughly 1,106ha.
787 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
788 Hinkel 1992: 169.
789 Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website.
790 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
791 El-Masri 2010: 147.
792 ICOMOS 2011: 108.
793 El-Masri 2010: 192.



Figure 22. Bejrawiya Villages (close-up). To show current living arrangements in this area of the Core and Buffer Zones. Ja'aliyīn villages are in bold; the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya settlements are in italics. (Source: adaptation of Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 13, Fig. 4).

Despite these measures, however, many issues still remain unsolved when looked at from an archaeological point of view. Observations show that the pastoralists continue to graze their goats on the scrub within the boundaries of Greater Meroe and on the Meroe acacia, and to a lesser extent, to cut the acacia for firewood and building timber. There has in fact been an increase in acacia growth over the past ten years, because of the increase in animal droppings. There have also been an increasing number of thefts from the sites, which is the result of the absence of a sense of stewardship towards the archaeological sites among the site-communities (discussed in Chapter 5); a thriving black market in antiquities channelled through Khartoum's Souk al-Arabi; and extreme economic hardship. In 1992 a statue in the Royal Baths at Meroe, known to some Ja'aliyīn as the Bride of the Nile (a*rûz al-Nil*), was stolen although later recovered; in 2000 three faience plaques were stolen;[794] and, also in 2000, a number of statues were looted from a newly restored pyramid in Bejrawiya.[795] There were also illegal excavations in an uninvestigated cemetery in the south mound of Domat al-Hamadab in the weeks prior to the arrival of the present author in January 2015.[796]

7.3 Site Protection as Dispossession

The historical development of site management, as well as the significant plans for the future, are now presented from the perspective of the residents of the site-communities.

7.3.1 The Ja'aliyīn sedentary farmers

7.3.1.1 Space and Housing

Members of the Ja'aliyīn *gabīla* have been resident in the case–study area since at least the 16th Century (Chapter 5). The villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya are long-established and elderly Ja'aliyīn have memories of what has happened at the sites since the archaeologists arrived. Residents of Old Deraqab, Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South narrated their memories as a set of notable events that caused the trajectory of their lives to change, and not always to good affect. Most narratives clustered around five main events: the establishment of a permanent site guard; the erection of a

794 Also reported in El-Masri 2010: 168.
795 The Courier ACP-EU 2001.
796 Also reported in P. Wolf 2015.

barbed-wire fence; the return of the archaeologists; the gradual abandonment of Old Deraqab from the 1960s; and the recent UNESCO consultations over the future of the sites.

1) 1939: The establishment of a site guard: "First, he told them they couldn't use the bricks."

When asked to recount their earliest recollections about the sites and the archaeologists elderly Ja'aliyīn residents began with what they were told by their parents. The most common recollections related to the establishment of a permanent site guard at Meroe in 1939; that had been a pivotal event because they were afterwards forbidden by the guard to use the archaeological site to collect stone and fired red bricks from the remains for building. The bricks from Meroe were specifically mentioned because they were highly valued house building; new red bricks are expensive and hard to make.[797]

2) 1946: The erection of the barbed-wire fence: "Then they made the wire thing."

Most narratives then recalled the erection in 1946 of the barbed-wire fence (referred to as "the wire thing" (*silik siyaaj*)) around Meroe, although no one knew the name of the man who ordered it to be built (it was A.J. Arkell, as noted above). The event was notable for the respondents for several reasons. The fence physically intruded into the property of residents in Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab (Figure 23); it stopped the villages from expanding; it impeded the cutting of the acacia, which, at this point had re-established itself within Meroe's perimeter; and it prevented the grazing of livestock on the site.

3) 1965: The arrival of the archaeologists: "Then the *khwāja* came."

Most of the Ja'aliyīn respondents recalled the arrival of modern archaeologists in the 1960s; the name of "Shinnie" is still remembered by some of his former employees and neighbours (Chapter 5). While most residents in the case-study area had no clear recollection of the sequence of archaeological missions that followed, or of the key discoveries made, the comings and goings of the archaeologists—and the perception that the site was being detached from them a little bit more with each encounter—were part of the residents' personal memories.

797 The abundance of ancient red bricks were noted 200 years ago by Burckhardt who reported that "low mounds consisting of rubbish and red burnt bricks…extended quite across the arable soil, for at least one mile…" (Burckhardt 1819: 275). It is very significant that the notes record, "Sa'ad's father told him that when Ahmed Karsani died and they wanted to bury him near the mountain, they wanted to bring some stones [from the temple ruins] to put on the grave, but some Englishmen there at the time prevented them from taking the stones. So they took stones from the mountain itself (which suggests that the saint was buried sometime after 1897)."

4) 1960s: The abandonment of Old Deraqab: "The houses became ruins."

The best-remembered event was the Ja'aliyīn's evacuation of Old Deraqab. From the 1960s to the 2000s its residents moved to a new site to the east, which became the village of New Deraqab; 'Deraqab' came to be known as 'Old Deraqab' and quickly became, in the respondents' words, a collection of ruins (*kharaba*). Most of the New Deraqab residents interviewed for the present study claimed that the move was caused by pressure from archaeologists and NCAM who, among other things, forbade them to build more houses or connect their home to mains electricity. Some even described being intimidated by government officials who forced them to leave by cutting their water supply.

5) 2000s: UNESCO Consultations: "And now they've come back."

The consultation process over UNESCO's plans, noted above, was the final event to be narrated by all of the respondents in the case-study area. Some narratives were angry, others less concerned. The residents of New Deraqab talked about NCAM's "broken promises"; they dismissed rosy predictions of more jobs and a boost for tourism ("[the authorities] always say that"); and they described NCAM's pledge to treat them equitably as "rubbish". The residents of Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South were less concerned by the UNESCO plans. The former are slowly moving to Upper Kejeik, which they began to leave after floods in 1988 and the latter are gradually moving to Upper Bejrawiya for more space; neither group blamed the development of the archaeological sites for the pressure on space.

*

Of course, these narratives are not fully shared by all of the respondents; there is also a counter-narrative to consider. This was provided by a minority of Ja'aliyīn respondents from Hamadab, even though they too gave similar narratives to the present researcher about the DAI work at Domat al-Hamadab.[798] Nevertheles these respondents agreed that pressure from archaeologists, NCAM and government officials was an important reason why the residents of Old Deraqab began to move to New Deraqab and they acknowledge that the process began after the arrival of the archaeologists led by Shinnie in the mid-1960s. However, they say that Old Deraqab was also abandoned for practical reasons including the risk of flooding, poor drainage, the lack of an electricity supply and the lack of space to expand because the village was hemmed in by farmland. In their narrative of events, the decision made by Shendi Development Council in 1962 to allocate space for new settlements to the east, the establishment of a primary school there in the 1970s, and the severe Nile floods of 1988 were

798 Key events for the included the start of excavations under a British archaeologist, Garstang, in the 1910s; the visit of a site guard and a ban on building upon the site in the early 1950s; and the prohibition on grazing livestock on the site in the 1990s

more important ‘push’ factors than pressure from archaeologists. Some respondents who provided this ‘counter-narrative’ said that Old Deraqab was probably an illegal settlement anyway; Ali al-Hassani claimed that the Deraqabians had built their houses on top of the archaeological site even though they knew that it was a regulated site and that building was prohibited, and added, somewhat ironically (see below), that “if you deliberately build on top of the sites you should not receive compensation”.

Figure 23. Northern parts of Meroe as seen from an abandoned house in Old Deraqab. Note the close proximity of the fence (Source: author’s photograph, February 2015).

7.3.1.2 The impact of archaeological site-management

The narratives show that archaeological site-management has had a significant impact on the Ja’aliyīn site-communities of the case-study area over the past 80 years or so. For many residents, particularly those in Lower Kejeik, Bejrawiya South and New Deraqab, it has meant the steady encroachment of site boundaries into their residential and agricultural space and has reduced their access to the Meroe acacia. For the residents of New Deraqab it has also entailed the evacuation of their homes and what

they see as outright dispossession of their land. The narratives demonstrate that in a context in which land is perceived to be extremely scarce the loss of land, such as installing a site guard or erecting a fence, can have important detrimental consequences for the site-communities. This explains why UNESCO's plans for Greater Meroe are a cause of concern and insecurity for the residents of the case-study area.

When the language used by these respondents is carefully analyzed, the narratives also show that, in the eyes of the site-community residents, the loss of land as a result of archaeological site management is no different from the loss of land to commercial agricultural schemes, mining or industrial development (discussed in Chapter 4), which also involve the state-sanctioned confiscation of land for foreign-run enterprises that, like archaeology, also dig holes (*hofra*) and take things away. Thus, the narratives frequently included phrases such as, "we know you are looking for gold and treasure", "we are used to *khwāja* coming in and taking things", and "does the state [*hukūma*] direct these things?" The new Qatari-sponsored archaeological research facility at Dohat Meroe was also highlighted as evidence of state influence because of the presence of ministers and "big cars".

In most narratives the move from Old to New Deraqab was presented as a divisive issue. The older generation was said to have wanted to stay put and clashed with the younger residents and even the Local Committee on the matter. The Local Committee reportedly went to great lengths to persuade the 'remainers' to move, building extra-large compounds supplied with electricity in the new settlements to the east. Most narratives agreed, however, that whatever the reason for their move from Old to New Deraqab, the empty and now ruined houses in Old Deraqab are still belong to the residents of New Deraqab. Indeed, residents of all three Bejrawiya villages (Old Deraqab, Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South) stressed the continuing value of the remains of Old Deraqab, such as bricks, doors and window frames. While mud bricks are relatively easy to come by and make, and are often left if a household moves elsewhere. However, they continue to serve an important purpose as evidence of prior occupation and ownership, which explains the existence of many empty and half-ruined houses in the village. There are also a number of large animal shelters on the north side of the abandoned village, which are still in use. The key message is that the land on both sides of the railway still belonged to them and they could move back and forth if they wished to do so. As noted in Chapter 4 land is socially and economically precious and is "not idle, even when not in use."[799]

Archaeological site management has thus become a key ingredient in site-respondents' narratives of village foundation, expansion and abandonment, which emerged as lists of key events that have taken place in the past. Archaeology is therefore placed alongside collective memories of floods, the coming of piped water and electricity and the establishment of commercial agricultural projects that have shaped the dynamics of the site-communities. From an archaeological point of view, NCAM's

799 Runger 1987.

UNESCO Management Plan proposals to extend the boundaries of Meroe town site further into the villages of Bejrawiya South, Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab might seem to offer an effective means of protecting the site. However, the evidence collected by the present researcher suggests that, if implemented, they will have potentially damaging and divisive effects for the site-communities.

NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan of 2010 acknowledges the potentially damaging effects of its implementation upon the site-communities and refers to the need to "resolve the situation" of some of the inhabitants affected by the extension of site boundaries and buffer zones.[800] NCAM's UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File (2010) reported that there were 80 residents, primarily from Old Deraqab, in the core zone around Meroe town site and 1,500 residents, primarily from Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South, in the buffer zone. ICOMOS noted in 2011 that "there are sufficient means to control [damaging impacts] as long as the Antiquities authority (NCAM), the local authorities and local communities hold regular meetings to discuss development plans"[801] (though it was striking that the claim made in NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan (2010) that all the stakeholders invited to consultation meetings, including representatives of local residents, had agreed to the plan, was contradicted by the residents' own narratives. There is also a glaring absence in the Management Plan of any reference to the abandonment of Old Deraqab).

The justification for making and suggesting such radical changes to the landscape is that, if NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan was implemented, it could provide more jobs for members of the site-communities. The Management Plan recommends

> a Site Manager for each of the three component sites, two assistant managers and two technical assistants for each site, a ticket office operator and 10 guards for each site…[and] the systematic integration of the local population into the archaeological, conservation, and tourist site management (e.g. by training them as guards and restorers).[802]

The clear paradox is that if these plans materialize, and if archaeology and tourism really do develop, more land confiscations are likely to take place and the more restrictions are likely to be imposed on the land to which the site-communities feel a right of ownership and an ancestral connection, both of which are important despite the fact that they do not align with official archaeological priorities.

800 ICOMOS 2011: 106.
801 ICOMOS 2011: 104.
802 El-Masri 2010: 147.

7.3.2 The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists

The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists of the case-study area rely heavily on the Meroe acacia for grazing, fuel, lighting, building materials and a range of other uses and use 'Greater Meroe' for settlement and for grazing their herds. The key respondents from the pastoralist *gabāīl*, Medowi al-Mansouri and Ali al-Hassani, were reluctant to talk to the present researcher about their use of Meroe for grazing and acacia cutting because those activities are, in fact, illegal (although they did admit to collecting deadwood). This reluctance was shared by most of the respondents from the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya *gabāīl* and those pastoralists who were asked about it directly usually denied using the sites in those ways. Evidence of those activities was, therefore, gathered through personal observation, supplemented by conversations with two local charcoal makers, Jaffar Hussein of the Manāsīr and Amadi Farran of the Hassaniyya. Their testimonies showed that those activities are very important to the pastoralists. Herds of goats routinely enter the site of Meroe through the main entrance and troop past the site-guard's office on their way to the acacia groves; and the pastoralists were occasionally observed by the present researcher carrying off bundles of acacia.[803] The pastoralists appear to have an unspoken agreement with the site guard that their use of Meroe's acacia should go undisturbed.

7.3.2.1 Space and Grazing

Acacia nilotica is economically and socially important in Sudan, playing many roles, including providing "…fodder…fuel wood [and] charcoal" and construction materials for "shelter…sand stabilisation and dune fixation".[804] Some 70% of rural households in northern Sudan use firewood for cooking and acacia is widely used for that purpose.[805] For the many households that live without electricity acacia also provides light. Acacia also has a traditional social role, as an ingredient in women's toiletries and cosmetics and in events such as "[child] delivery, marriage, circumcision, death and festivals…"[806] Acacia is adept at surviving hot and dry summers and droughts but it is in decline in Sudan because of over-cutting as the population has grown and demand has increased. Charcoal prices increased four- to five-fold between 2010 and 2015 as acacia has become scarcer. The problem has made worse by Sudan Forestry Commission's control of forest and woodland areas,

803 Kennenni and van der Maarl 1990: 419. Walsh, Hulme and Campbell (1988) also write about the importance of acacia to Hassaniyya in the White Nile region.
804 Kennenni and van der Maarl 1990: 419.
805 CBS 2010: 22; Taha et al. 2014: 48.
806 Taha et al. 2014: 48.

including Meroe,[807] and by the government's monopoly since 2015 over charcoal manufacture; at this time Hamza and Hamedi were ordered to sell their remaining charcoal and not to produce any more.

Acacia is still abundant in Meroe in a region where the trees are otherwise scarce. Ironically, its abundance is the result of archaeological site-management. Meroe's acacia can be traced back to the early 20th Century when acacia trees "naturally re-establish[ed]" themselves in and around the then-unfenced ruins of Meroe.[808] As desertification and over-exploitation both degraded acacia supplies elsewhere, local Ja'aliyīn farmers and the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists who came seasonally to the area began to use the Meroe acacia for grazing, fuel and building materials. After archaeologists enclosed Meroe with a barbed-wire fence in 1946 the acacia flourished.[809] The fence did not, however, prevent people from gaining access to the site, particularly as it became increasingly dilapidated, but it remained effective enough to prevent the acacia from being over-grazed and over-cut.

The Meroe acacia is used by the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists as an important source of animal fodder and for fuel, lighting and building materials.[810] The grazing provided by the acacia has become even more important to the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya because their pastures have been reduced by the extension of big commercial agricultural projects (Chapter 4). The pastoralists have been obliged to buy increasing amounts of fodder just as rising international demand has pushed up fodder prices to levels the cash-poor pastoralists find it hard to afford. Meroe is therefore a rare and important repository of acacia, which provides the pastoralists with vital resources. Archaeological site management has helped to create that resource, but it has the potential to dispossess them of it in future.

Furthermore, Greater Meroe encompasses the land upon which the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists in the case-study area have settled since their families arrived in Bejrawiya, some fifty years or almost three generations ago. It is upon the scrubby pasture of this area that they have built their relatively low-density villages and that they graze their flocks. And it is from Greater Meroe that they embark in the rainy season on their long-distance migrations with their herds of sheep, goats and camels deep into the Butana. This is the area that, as discussed above, UNESCO proposes to fence and ring with a buffer zone within which no development would be allowed.

807 A Forestry Commission licence is needed to fell trees and only one man in the case-study area has one of these licences.
808 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
809 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
810 Humphris (2014) demonstrates that *acacia nilotica* was favoured by the ancient Meroitic iron smelters who used it for over 1,000 years.

7.3.2.2 The impact of archaeological site-management

While NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan of 2010 acknowledges the potentially damaging effects of its implementation upon the Ja'aliyīn sedentary farmers in Bejrawiya, it fails to consider its impact on the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists. With regard to acacia, the Management Plan notes the following:

> An acacia plantation to the north-east of the Northern Cemetery at Meroe is being considered, but it is doubtful whether such a plantation would be sufficient. The complete Meroe property may need to be fenced in order to allow ecological recovery such as that which can be observed in the Royal City.[811]

However, a) the plantation is being considered for reasons unconnected with the the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and b) does not signify a concern with how the local population would be able to use the acacia (if at all) or how they would react to further limitations on their current usage. This omission is glaring and puzzling since the Management Plan identifies the grazing of animals as one of the main threats to the archaeological sites of Greater Meroe, alongside wind erosion, desertification and village expansion. However, it might be explained by the Sudanese authorities' long habit (which goes back to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium) of failing to consider the interests of nomadic and pastoral groups and refusing to recognize their customary rights to land (see Chapter 4).

UNESCO's plans would affect the pastoralists on three counts. First, the extension and fencing of Meroe would end their access the Meroe acacia and cut them off from their immediate grazing grounds inside the Greater Meroe site, which would reduce their ability to feed the herds upon whose well-being they rely. Second, extending and fencing the site of Greater Meroe would probably oblige them to uproot their current settlements and move, which is a traumatic process they have already been through (Chapter 5). And third, it would block their traditional migration routes (*masarāt*) to the east, which are vital to their near-subsistence economy. These effects would clearly be very damaging to the livelihoods of the local Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, so damaging, in fact, that it seems unlikely that they would be able to comply. A fence around Greater Meroe would almost certainly be resisted by the pastoralists and, if built, quickly breached; it therefore not an equiable or realistic proposal.

Indeed a lesson may be learned from a report by the UN Development Programme which noted that Sudanese pastoralists faced with the "depletion of natural pastures…shortage of water resources, exhaustion of crop residues…and damaged grass" encroached upon crops belonging to big commercial agricultural schemes in order to feed their herds.[812] If pastoralists are willing *in extremis*

811 ICOMOS 2011: 105.
812 UNDP 2006.

to encroach upon commercial agricultural land and come head-to-head with government-backed commercial interests (see Chapter 4), they seem certain to try to breach any fence that stopped them grazing their herds on land that they consider they have customary rights to, even one patrolled by site guards. A new fence around Greater Meroe therefore seems likely at best to result in an increase in tension between the pastoralists and the authorities and at worst to conflict.

*

Chapter 7 has explored some of the logical consequences of the socio-economic dynamics that have emerged from the long history, spanning over a century, of archaeological projects in the region, and the current situation with reference to the efforts of the various agencies involved aimed at site conservation and protection. Particularly key issues to emerge are how the fencing-off of the monuments is understood by different communities, crucially the perception by Ja'aliyīn communities in particular of site 'protection' as a form of expropriation (the land being fenced off and appropriated by either the 'state' or 'archaeologists'), how this affects their daily practice and livelihoods and how measures introduced with purely archaeological objectives in mind may result in increased conflict and contestation between the state, foreign archaeological missions and the different resident communities.

8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Impacts and their Implications

8.1.1 The Impacts of Archaeology on Identity Formation

As shown in Chapter 2, official archaeological histories, or 'authorized heritage discourses', have been used by states to forge a sense of nationhood because they provide objects, images and symbols rooted in a distant past and that can be interpreted as an 'authentic' ideational framework for a unifying collective identity. Like European states before them, archaeological symbols have been used by post-colonial nationalist movements in places such as Egypt and Iran to legitimize power and cement national identity; usually expressed via what Anderson (1991) terms the 'logoization' of narratives of archaeological history and iconic images of sites, typically representing moments of achievement.

In Sudan, successive post-independence governments have chosen to ignore its 'ancient Nubian' history—once an 'alternative archaeology' but now its authorized heritage discourse—as the focus of nation-building, favouring emphasis on Arab and Islamic identity. Rather than utilizing carefully calibrated re-interpretations of archaeology, the Sudanese state has preferred to 'invent [their] traditions'[813] and 'imagine [their] communities'[814] to cement legitimacy and forge nationhood through a version of Arabism and Islamism which, instead of looking back at a 'golden age', focuses on a modernist path to achieving a golden future. The vision of the state as not merely Arab-Muslim, but a modern and forward-looking Arab-Muslim entity, has been promoted via imagery and through education. Indeed, historicism in itself is a notably small component of the state's identity construction (see below). Alternative visions of the state have been repressed, along with minority groups, and especially those, such as the modern 'Nubians', who are suspected of having separatist tendencies.

813 Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012.
814 Anderson 1991.

Although many Sudanese continue to self-identify with their *gabīla* over their nation or state (due to the failure of the former and the weakness of the latter), it should be noted that a significant portion of the main *gabāīl* in the Nile Valley appear to have accepted the state's Arab-Muslim ideology; perhaps since it does not diverge, or more importantly does not clash with, their self-identification as Arab-Muslim. As data collected for this study indicates, a connection to 'ancient Nubia' is rare(ly claimed) among the non-Nubian *gabāīl*, even though most scholars posit that the modern Sudanese are fundamentally 'Arabized Nubians'.

The most important exception to this inclination are the modern Nubians. While the Sudanese state has decline to acknowledge or utilize 'ancient Nubia' as the foundation, or even a component, of state identity, the Nubians have embraced it, even though their ancestral, linguistic, material and etymological links to 'ancient Nubia' are hard to substantiate. The claims held by modern Nubians thus make them a 'descendant community'; moreover, they are an '*indigenous* descendant community' because they still live upon the land and amidst the archaeological remains of their claimed ancient forebears. To echo the phrasing of Gillot (2010) as well as Jacobs and Porter (2009), for the Nubians, 'archaeology' (*'athār*) is 'heritage' (*turāth*).

*

Archaeology has thus long been used in the service of identity construction. However, this has not been limited to states.[815] Indeed, in 'revisionist' or 'alternative' histories, the archaeological record as well as other cultural and historical evidence, both tangible and intangible, has also been used by marginalized people and their supporters to show the 'real' story of the nation to counter the hegemony of official state histories. In the Sudanese context, the question thus arises of whether 'Nubian' archaeology is the creation of an 'alternative history', or even 'indigenous archaeology'. Identity construction among Nubians, a marginalized 'indigenous descendant community', is, in many ways, echoing the empowerment processes emanating from alternative histories, for example with reference to the 'Khoisans' noted by Lane (2011). Indeed, particularly given the impact of dam building on Nubian sites and communities, it is clear that archaeology in Sudan has served to reinforce group boundaries rather than provide a unifying historical framework. Therefore while 'Nubian' archaeology may have initiated as an 'alternative history', (see the comment about Nubia's 'triumph' over Egypt's hegemonic image, in Chapter 5), it has transcended the marginalization of those who claim it as their heritage to become the hegemonic authorized heritage discourse in Sudan, even if this has not directly translated into an 'indigenous archaeology' (see 8.2, 'Collaborative Archaeologies').

*

815 Trigger 1984; Arenas 1995; Schmidt 1995.

The residents of the case-study area also live upon the land and amidst the archaeological remains of 'ancient Nubia', and this thesis sought to examine how they react to or use this hegemonic discourse. Empirical evidence gathered for the present study via interviews, conversations and observations demonstrate that, unlike Nubians, the residents of the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya do not sense or claim descent from, or cultural affiliation with, 'ancient Nubia' or related sites. Scholarly contention that the Sudanese are 'Arabized Nubians' does not appear to be known about let alone accepted by most of the Ja'alī, Mansūrī, Hassanī or Fadnī *gabāīl* in the case-study area; neither is it accepted by Ja'alī historian Ibrahim, who questions the basis on which scholars have come to this conclusion, arguing that the idea of Arab-Muslim Sudanese having a 'Nubian substratum' (Holt's words, above) is "misguided."[816] Indeed, in terms of identity formation, analyses of language and 'antiquities' as well as collection of oral histories indicate that the residents are disconnected from 'Nubian' archaeology; it is virtually irrelevant to and certainly not claimed by residents of the case-study area, who may thus be termed 'non-descendant' communities.

The findings also revealed that although many among the site-communites feel no ancestral connection to the 'ancient Nubians' and no connection to the archaeological sites-as-archaeological-sites, they do feel a strong sense of connection to the land. Analysis of respondent language showed that many saw the sites as an element of the landscape and that many of the terms they used to describe them, such as "station" (*muwgīf*), were strikingly utilitarian. The displays of 'antiquities' to this author, such as ploughs, waterwheels, wells and water sacks demonstrated the centrality of their connection to farming and pastoralism and thus to the land itself. Moreover, the oral histories showed that although the sedentary Ja'alī farmers reject an ancestral connection with the 'ancient Nubian' sites, they do claim an ancestral relationship with the land; the presence of 'ancient Nubian' archaeological sites in the local landscapes is wholly incidental. Hamza al-Ja'ali's narrative is the most striking example of this, because while the archaeological site of Domat al-Hamadab is central to his story of Ja'aliyīn development—the establishment of the Ja'alī *dār* in Kordofan; the move of Hamad and his family to the Shendi Reach; the foundation of the settlement, Hamadab, which bears Hamad's name; the spread of the village to the east; and the establishment of the well and the Islamic school—it is not manifest in its archaeological guise. This thesis has thus corroborated the findings of Shankland (1996, 1999) and others in Chapter 2 that the historical impact of archaeology upon identity here is rigourously 'unarchaeological'.

This result is further supported by the analyses of the site-community resident's connections to archaeology, which suggested that the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe were important parts of the cultural and symbolic landscape for the Ja'aliyīn, and especially Ja'alī women. They thus compare favourably with the descriptions of archaeological connections offered by scholars in Chapter 2 and confirm Roseberry's well-known argument that "cultural production is not limited to

816 Ibrahim 1988: 217.

those who control the means of cultural production".[817] Past descriptions of the beliefs and practices associated with spirits, fertility rituals and cemeteries suggest a lively and rich set of traditions, of which sites and even archaeologists were a part, and serves as an important reminder that the distinction between 'connections' and 'disconnections' with a phenomenon are not always clear cut. Nevertheless it is still possible to argue that in the case of connections, archaeology was again valued for being part of the landscape and not for its archaeological resonance. The data also suggest that such practices are diminishing, along with the sense of 'place' with which the sites used to be endowed (below).

The findings additionally demonstrated that the Ja'aliyīn have a different sense of connection to the land compared to the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya. This may be primarily because the two livelihood groups in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, farmers and pastoralists, have different world-views; it is almost certainly due to the pastoralists having spent less time in the area. Whatever the precise reason/s, data suggest that while sites retain a utilitarian value for the pastoralists in the case-study area, archaeological history is even less relevant to them than to the sedentary farmers. In a context where the site-communities are themselves are transforming—from Ja'aliyīn farming villages to heterogeneous towns—the variety of (dis)connections to archaeology will surely only increase.

In sum, many of the residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya perceive no link with the ancient 'Nubian' inhabitants of the land on which they live, and do not see the 'ancient Nubian' archaeology (*'athār*) as part of their heritage (*turāth*). This is not the same as arguing, as Loosley (2005) does, that the idea of archaeology is unknown to an 'Arab Muslim' societies; NCAM employees, archaeology students and professionals, and the many engaged members of Sudanese civil society in Khartoum are themselves evidence of this. In the site-community, however, the disconnection to archaeology was clear. Again this contrasts heavily with modern Nubians, who appear to have adopted the authorized heritage discourse of the archaeologists. If nothing else this is also shown by the difference between the approach to dam building by the 'Nubians' under threat from the Dal and Kajbar dams at the Second and Third Cataracts and the 'Arabs' under threat from the Merowe Dam at the Fourth and the Shereik Dam at the Fifth Cataract: the modern Nubians have a strong cultural attachment to the ancient Nubian archaeological sites and the international support for the rescue of such sites before their submergence by Lake Nasser helped to reinforce their sense of Nubian identity. However, the Manāsīr and Ja'aliyīn do not have a close cultural attachment to the archaeological sites and their opposition to the Merowe and Shereik dams is based on the loss of land and the political use of archaeologists themselves.

In 1994, Trigger asked:

817 Trigger 1994: 345. Roseberry 1989: 45

> [d]o studies of the pre-Islamic period have any attraction to the many Sudanese who trace their descent from Arabs who settled in the Sudan centuries ago or to Islamic fundamentalists who regard pre-Islamic times as an Age of Ignorance?

In Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the research findings point to a clear 'no'. Collected data thus also agree with Trigger's conclusion that "the time when the findings of archaeology will be of interest to most Sudanese seems far off."[818]

*

Many questions arise from these findings. The first is, 'why do the site-community residents feel no archaeological connection with the archaeological sites?' To answer this question it is necessary to look, at least in part, to the state. Respondents in the case-study area had little formal knowledge about pre-Islamic Sudan, in part because of its absence from state imagery and the educational syllabus. Such is the state's weakness that in order for families to make ends meet, many children in the case-study area leave school early to work, and do not even reach the level of school wherein ancient 'Nubian' history is taught. The members of the site-communities thus do not see themselves as an 'ancient Nubian' descendant community, and are encouraged not to by the state. Modern 'Nubians' are, of course, subject to the same state imagery and education system. However, as described above, their sense of connection to 'ancient Nubia' has been cultivated by the shared group experience of marginalization and by 'Nubian' nationalists who have used the sense of such a link as a focus of political opposition to the dam construction that has displaced so many, and threatens to displace many more.

Identifying the channels through which Sudanese site-community residents acquire archaeological and/or historical information, where they might find information if they wished to, and additionally how the information is distributed, it is clear that the various forms of media (television, newspapers, radios, the Internet) and mobile technologies are all low-impact sources of information, likely because they too are controlled by the state. While both men and women in both groups own mobile telephones, the pastoralists will often share one phone between a household or group of working men (*kalla*), and it will be an old model rather than a smartphone, clearly reducing its ability to be used as a vehicle for historical information. This medium of communication is hampered also because there are very few accessible, coherent and reliable Arabic sources about archaeology online. Television programmes and newspaper articles about archaeology and history can certainly be found, but they are often badly produced (from the point of view of an archaeologist), and they are infrequent. In the case-study area, daily and weekly newspapers can be found in the market town of Kabushiya, but they do not seem to be sold much in the villages. Many houses have short-wave radios, but televisions are far less common, being an element of the Ja'aliyīn and some Fadniyya houses and not

818 Trigger 1994: 345.

of the Manāsīr or Hassaniyya houses. The same can be said for books: not only is their provision low to start with (the nearest library is in Shendi, 45km away), but those who could profitably utilize them are proportionally low in number.

Alongside what we know about the state's controle of education and sources of information, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that statements about "not know[ing]" about archaeology were common. Indeed the most common source of information seems to be local discourse, a catch-all phrase used here to refer to what respondents have 'heard' and 'seen' as a result of living in the site-community. The importance of rumour and the residents' observations, more specifically, what they "see" or "do *not* see", to their understanding of archaeology also shows how archaeologists are not seen as a source of historical information. Lack of encounters—mentioned above—limits more 'educational' or 'historical' talk between archaeologists and site-community residents, and automatically restricts the potential scope of archaeologists as sources of information. Thus the urgency of archaeological work and the inherent time-money limits put on archaeologists to complete work quickly often silences the discourse of archaeology within site-communities (see below).

A fundamental reason for the site-communities' disconnection from 'ancient Nubia' thus lies in the value system and ideology of the Arab-Muslim groups that dominate the state, evidenced by the state's imagery and educational syllabus, compounded by its control of the media, and exacerbated by a lack of information provided by archaeologists. Behind this is a reluctance to acknowledge a connection to anything 'Nubian' since, like perhaps most Arab-Muslim Sudanese, there is a broad belief in that 'Nubians' fall short in the three most important 'proofs of (acceptable) identity' (as discussed in Chapter 4): ancestry, language and religion. Thus, modern 'Nubians' are disparaged for their African ancestry and for being the descendants of slaves; Nubian languages are denigrated as 'gobbledygook' (*rutāna*); and, while the modern 'Nubians' are strict adherents to Islam, they were once Christian (and pagan before that). For all these reasons, the 'Nubians' are stigmatized as an inferior 'out-group' by the Arab-Muslim residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya.

The biggest question of all, then, is whether or not the idea of a shared 'heritage', and certainly a shared 'Nubian' heritage, is possible in a failed nation run by a weak state. Starting first with the problem of 'nation', it could certainly be argued that a broad social connection with the ancient past is impossible in a tribal society like Sudan; it even seems to have been proven. This question is not limited to failed nations in the global south: Lilley (2000) has asked similar questions about Australia and remarks on the number of scholars that, operating in combative societies, stress the importance of reconciliation between societal groups before moving on to positive self-identification with the ancient past. The result there, as seems to be the case in Sudan, is that subscription to ideas of 'archaeology', 'Nubia', and 'World Heritage' will not be possible until there is a nation. Such 'national myth-making', or construction of a 'mythscape', commonly requires the backing of the state;

archaeology alone is unlikely to act as a focus of nationhood, without a coherent national programme to steer it.

This is not an impossible outcome for Sudan: a government's ideational connection to archaeological history is not set in stone but is rather dependent upon what its members perceive to be the most expedient form of identity. Although civil war has prevented the full development of a nation and national ideology, the South Sudanese government, for example, which split from the north in 2011, claimed a link to 'ancient Nubia' through their national anthem, entitled 'Land of Cush',[819] showing that the narratives behind 'nation' can change. However, in Sudan, this would inevitably mean that the state would have to want to modify the fundamental components of its own image. As has been noted in Chapter 5 and above, the state cultivates an Arab-Muslim ideology, and staunchly rejects the 'Nubian' component of Sudan's history and thus archaeology's current focus. Even when South Sudan claimed a link to 'ancient Nubia', Sudan still did not try and counter-claim it ideologically; the succession may have even precipitated a stronger relationship between Sudan and its Arab neighbours in the Gulf.[820] Indeed such is Khartoum's disinterest that looking to the future it may be that if 'Nubian' archaeological history continues to be used in the identity construction of the South Sudanese nation, that there will then be a different question about, or even conflict between, the ownership of such history and monuments by South Sudanese and the Nubians.

Meanwhile the Sudanese state also promotes a modern image of itself, evidenced at least in part in its simultaneous pursuit of development projects and neglect of archaeology its policies of 'heritage distancing' and 'excluding the past'.[821] Ideationally, the state's pursuit of modernity provides an equally big challenge for *any* practice of archaeology because it points to the state's broader conceptual problem with historicity; the idea of 'modern Sudan' is as much a driving factor in the state image and policy as the 'Arab-Muslim' elements that seem to monopolize it. Because of this we may confidently say that it is not just 'ancient Nubia' that presents a problem for the state, but all history. Indeed even though they may seem the most relevant to such an image, the medieval Islamic kingdoms of Darfur and Sennar (the Funj) are equally as absent in state rhetoric (although this would require study in its own right). Of course in terms of the proofs of identity (Chapter 4), the medieval Islamic kingdoms of Darfur and Sennar are also 'problematic' because of their presumed ethnicities: the Funj are viewed as having been 'black', and the government and militias in Darfur are still

819 Martell 2011.

820 Indeed the impact of the succession of South Sudan on the relationship between the Sudanese state and archaeology seems to have been indirect and economic in nature: first**,** the loss of land and revenues therefrom has increased the amount of land the government is willing to lease to foreign nations, which aggravates the level of insecurity felt by residents and thus has knock-on effects for the results in Chapters 6 and 7 about tourism, employment and site management. Second, and as part of the land leasing phenomenon, the succession seems to have precipitated an intensified relationship with the GCC, which itself prompted the unprecedented QSAP funding. This may have intensified an ideational relationship with the GCC, currently it is hard to assess because of Bashir's recent visit to meet President Putin of Russia. Otherwise, the succession of South Sudan seems to have had little ideological impact on the government, certainly none that has affected its strategy to exclude swathes of society that do not meet with modern Arab-Muslim national identity.

821 McAnanay and Parks 2012 and Stone and MacKenzie 1990 respectively.

engaged in civil war over such stereotypes made about the ethnic identity of the Fur. However even if we ask whether the state would be more invested in archaeology if Islamic subjects were investigated, the answer is still 'no', because it is *modernity* that the state seeks, as much as being 'Arab' and 'Muslim'. For historical activities to blossom, be they archaeology or any form of historical enquiry, the state would have to be willing to downplay or de-emphasize the modernist element of their image. Under the current state, it does not seem likely that forays into the past will be pursued unless there is political and/or economic capital to be gained (as was the case with the 'donation' of Qatar).

Questions might also be asked about the weak state and the effect relative poverty has on producing the results presented in this thesis. Certainly poverty is an important factor in the creation and maintenance of sub-national 'tribal' identities which, in turn, produce and sustain the residents' lack of connection with 'ancient Nubia' (above). The poverty level and low standard of living also obviously effects the importance of tourism, employment (Chapter 6) and site management (Chapter 7) to local livelihoods; such developments (or lack thereof) may not have such critical impact upon the residents if their living standard was higher. However, poverty is just one of the conditions that contribute to this outcome: it does not inherently prohibit a people's ideological connection with the 'Nubian' past. Rather it is the combination of a failure to unite via 'nation' and the failure to provide via the 'state' that produces the disconnection, plus the ideological leanings of government that aggravates the disconnection and renders it not simply an irrelevant history but an inexpedient one.

If, as Wendt (1992) argues, "identities are the basis of interests", it could be understood that in a tribal society in which *gabīla* identification remains strong, it is not in the interest of members of non-Nubian communities, including those in the case-study area, to identify with 'ancient Nubia', *even if they did know more about it*. Indeed the interview with Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim provides strong evidence of this: even when trying to argue for greater access to archaeological jobs with someone they identify as a *khwāja* (the present researcher), at no point do they make reference to the archaeological sites or to 'Nubia'. As Gomes (2006) notes about the Parauá, they have a choice (albeit limited) about how to present themselves and have chosen not to (re)fashion themselves as descendants of the ancient 'pre-Islamic' Nubians. Instead, they justify their request for broader Ja'aliyīn access upon their connection to the land and its produce (its 'benefits'). Indeed to identify with 'ancient Nubia' or Nubians would fundamentally contradict their own ancestral narratives, which are based upon claimed descent from Arab immigrants and be tantamount to celebrating a Sudanese history in which they, and their *gabīla*, are absent. If nothing else, identifying with the construction of 'ancient Nubia' would undermine their status as members of the Arab-Muslim 'in-group', at the top of the national identity value-system, and, connect them with 'out-groups' linked to Africans and slaves.

*

Of course other evidence gathered in Hamadab-Bejrawiya by the present researcher also showed that the main cultural connections between the site-communities and the sites had been through the latter's association with spirits, fertility rituals and cemeteries. These findings this align in particular with those of Shankland (1999). However, the data additionally suggested that these connections have diminished. There are two main explanations for this decline: the palpable increase in conservative values and orthodoxy across Sudanese society, and the simultaneous and increasing segregation of residents from the sites by archaeological site management processes.

The growing conservatism of society is reflected, amongst other things, in changes to what are considered to be acceptable behaviours and dress for women, who seem increasingly expected to remain indoors. Over the past 40 years, scholars such as Grzymski (pers. comm) have noted that women living in riverine settlements are far less often seen outside the *hōsh* than before. Women themselves expressed to the present researcher how household technologies such as room fans and indoor taps have enabled them to remain inside the *hōsh* year-round, rather than face the air outside during the hottest parts of the year or collect water from a well or outside tap. Indeed for Amna Suliman, nostalgia for the women's sanctioned solo trips outside the home (*marga*, trips without male supervision) was the main motivation for her to show the present researcher the Well of Osman al-Fajaali; she herself spent time there when she was little with her mother and noted it as a 'mixing spot' (*abuj biyha*). Simultaneously, there has been a change in the architecture of the homes, or *hōsh*, in the riverine farming households; the walls of the *hōsh* have grown higher, a back door added (*natadj*), through which women can enter and exit hidden from view, as well as a 'turn' in the front so that outsiders cannot look directly inside. This was referred to by Mariam al-Pasha as a "new style" called 'turn' (*wiranda lāfa*). Interestingly enough, Shankland (1996) notes the same increase of orthodoxy in rural Turkey, and similarly connects it with the fact that in Küçükköy, houses are all surrounded by increasingly tall walls.

Echoing the 'enclosing qualities' of the walls of the *hōsh*, there also increasingly strict expectations about what women should wear outside the home. The introduction of the *niqab*, a veil for the face that leaves the eyes clear and is worn with an accompanying headscarf, has also been a gradual process over the past four decades years or so, but the present researcher recorded a notable increase in its use while conducting fieldwork in Sudanese riverine communities over a five-year period. It is significant that the 1997 Labour Law states that women should not wear trousers unless their work specifically requires it; there are even restrictions on women taking such jobs. Indeed one female Sudanese archaeologist commented that,

> Once, at a site near Shendi, we [archaeologists] were wearing trousers. Everyone sees us and asks what we are doing, in a curious way. I tell them I'm working with antiquities and they say, 'you're working here?! You're wearing trousers?!' 'It's better to work inside!'. The people who saw me were very confused.

These more conservative behaviours have been widely adopted by women in riverine farming communities, such as the Ja'aliyīn of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, but less so by women of the pastoralist *gabāīl*. Indeed, the former now find it offensive, and almost indecent, that pastoralist women still labour outside the home.

One of the catalysts for this increasing conservatism is the radical Islamist stance of the central government, whose Salafist orientation is entrenched in the constitution, the law and the educational system. In this vein, it should be noted that Sudan has long been religiously divided; in addition Muslim-Christian confrontations, Arab-Muslim allegiances are split between the Sufi orders (*tariqa*) that emerged in the 19th Century; the enmity between the Khatmiya and Ansar is the most famous example of Sufism's fracture lines. The Mahdiya, the uprising led by the Mahdi at the end of the 19th Century, was based, in part, on a desire to sweep away corrupt religious practices and return to a purer form of Islam; however, it did not produce the extreme religious conservatism widely seen today. The latter is rather the result of the growing influence in Sudan of forms of Wahhabi Salafism, an austere branch of Islam imported from Saudi Arabia (in part through returnee labour migrants) and propagated by Saudi-funded imams in Saudi-funded mosques and schools: at least two schools and a mosque here have been sponsored in such a way (also see Chapter 4).

Unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State, Salafists have not seriously threatened archaeological sites or archaeologists in Sudan. However, some radicals have attempted to arouse suspicion of the archaeological sites themselves, and are known to be intolerant of pre-Islamic as well as Sufi rituals and material culture.[822] The belief in *zār*, for example, is seen as a practice that contaminates 'true Islam', and has long been the focus of a government crackdown; today, citizens need a permit in order to undertake the ritual activities. Men, who often sourced the trappings needed for possession to take place, are strictly forbidden by law from taking part since it is believed to encourage homosexual tendencies. Medowi al-Mansouri, for example, narrated a story to this author of a "big stone" with an indentation that had come to be seen as the footprint of the Prophet Muhammad. Tradition followed that after the signing of the marriage contract (*'agid*), grooms would take their brides to this stone and say prayers and receive blessings. However, Medowi reported that members of an ultra-orthodox Salafist group known as Ansar al-Sunna had eventually removed the stone and placed it face-down in the mosque.

Zooming out, if you will, from the specifities of the site-community, it is possible to see archaeology and Salafism as opposing forces both of which are attempting to 'recruit' or 'assimilate' people into their worldview. Certainly both archaeology and Salafism seem to be the result of Sudan

822 Asad Abdelrahman (of the Ministry of Culture's Documentation Folk Life Centre) has given a paper on 'The Risk of Religious Extremism on the Archaeological Sites (Islamic Domes Models [sic])' paper delivered at the 'Safeguarding the Cultural Heritage: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities in the Sudanese Context' held on 29 November 2015 in Khartoum. There have also been reports by NCAM staff of attempts by the ultra-orthodox Salafist group Ansar al-Sunna to destroy Christian relics in Dongola and orders "not to work with the 'infidels'".

trying to make its way in the global economy (archaeology through cultural economy and relations with the West; Salafism through the religious economy and relations with the Gulf and Arab world) but the result on the ground is more complex and dynamic than this description suggests. There are, of course, other forces at play here, but it nevertheless seems that, in an extreme case, the future of archaeology here will depend on the acquiescene of residents who are liberal minded if not openly pro-Western.[823]

Increasing orthodoxy is therefore one reason for diminished connections to the archaeological sites. And, as noted above, a second reason seems to be because of the increasing segregation of the sites by boundary fences and stricter site management; it is significant that many of the stories told about the sites were about the setting up of fences or being told off by guards. As Amir Walid, a Ja'alī respondent from Deraqab, noted: "[t]he guard stopped [us] going into [Meroe]—[we] used to have festivals there". Adira Nassim also commented,

> In the past, it was difficult to go there [to the site] unless by the door. When I was younger I made many journeys there with my mother, but [the guard] screamed at us.

They was not alone: many more respondents noted that in the past residents had used the archaeological sites as social spaces: a shady location for outings, parties, rituals and festivals; women could go to Meroe alone during the day; at night, sites were seemingly frequented for fertility rituals. Again, however, these appear to be dying practices. For riverine women, this is partly because of their increasing seclusion in the home, as discussed above, but it is also the result of the creation of tangible and intangible barriers to the site.

Thus, in addition to the ideational disconnect, physical barriers now segregate the communities in Hamadab and Bejrawiya from the archaeological sites. For many, these barriers imply that the site is in danger from the site-communities and needs to be protected from them; in consequence, the site-communities seem to have lost all sense of ownership over the sites. When asked, 'who does the archaeological site belong to?', most respondents replied either "the government" or "the *khwajāt* [archaeologists]". For the site-communities, the loss of the archaeological sites in this manner could thus arguably be conceived of as paralleling the loss of farming and grazing land to government-sponsored commercial agricultural projects (see Chapter 7 and below).

823 For Gillot, "Christian populations and Alawis communities seem more favourable towards the presence of the western archaeologists (in particular women archaeologists) than Sunni populations, who disapprove of some attitudes (alcohol consumption, clothing, shared accommodation etc.)" (Gillot 2010: 13).

8.1.1.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice

So what do these results mean for archaeological practice? Along with, or perhaps as part of excavating 'Nubia', are archaeologists also excavating differences? Are they providing modern rivalries with an ancient language, through with contestation occurs? If so, what can archaeologists do to ameliorate the consequences of their work?

In the view of the present author, the answer is yes: in writing 'Nubian' history, and in promoting 'Nubia' as the authorized heritage discourse, archaeologists such as Haynes (1992), Bonnet and Valbelle (2008), De Simone (2014) and others risk exacerbating tribalism because it reinforces group boundaries and attributes to the Nubians a more important and, importantly, a more 'authentic' claim to Sudanese territory rather than providing a unifying historical framework. As shown in Chapter 2, several authors, not least Meskell (2005), have already highlighted this risk. (Indeed see below for the way in which archaeological employment also exacerbates difference.) Therefore, in a society where *gabīla* is the primary mode of identification, what archaeologists of 'Nubia' end up doing is catering for only one of these groups, the Nubians. Once again, Trigger anticipates the key issue when he writes that:

> [a]rchaeological research in the northern Sudan has helped to promote the pride of Nubian intellectuals in their history and culture, which some of them maintain is the essence of the Sudanese culture. Other Sudanese regard such an attitude among Nubians as threatening the unity of their country.[824]

Indeed, as Silverman notes, "[t]he emphasis on certain messages and stories of archaeological material can increase social and cultural capital for some interest groups, but decrease it for others".[825] An example of this is clear from many archaeologists' desire to preserve 'Nubian' antiquities using rules, site guards and fences, but at the cost of reduced cultural intimacy (and economic benefit, below) for the residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. The affection for 'ancient Nubia', the principle of site preservation at any cost and the concomitantly inevitable site management processes therefore have cultural (and economic, below) knock-on effects for the Arab-Muslim residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya.

So how can archaeologists actively address these problems? They can recognise that the state is a very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which modern populations connect with archaeology. Writing about England, Schlanger (2016) suggests that the nation state should be understood as an archaeological context in much the way excavations operate via context. In his example, the English state is understood to be an institution that incubates and helps the archeological

824 Trigger 1994: 345.
825 Silverman 2002.

endeavour: "Without the state, instilling regulations, procedures and common purpose, archaeology will not really thrive."[826]

Without such care in place, and with the state's current ideological and economic orientation firmly in place, a further implication is that archaeologists should stop writing exclusively 'Nubian' history, and be careful in how they present such histories to the public. In practice this would mean concentrating their intellectual efforts on a range of sites from different historical periods and in areas outside the Nile Valley, both 'Nubian' and non-'Nubian', for example the Ottoman port of Suakin on the Red Sea coast and the 18th Century mosque and palace associated with Sultan Mohammed Tayrub at Old Shoba in northern Darfur (see Chapter 1). Although

> for foreign archaeologists, the ultimate decolonization is the realization that they have little, if any, direct control over the use that is made, or not made, of their findings by the Sudanese people,[827]

archaeologists also need to begin highlighting the erroneous nature of a connection between 'ancient' and 'modern' Nubians. As Gomes rightly points out about the Parauá *caboclos,* the issue here is that without thinking of the ramifications, archaeologists are perpetuating "the idea of historical continuity between past and present populations."[828] Archaeologists should simultaneously distribute their own findings to the local residents in a more meaningful way so that the knowledge created even by more traditional archeological work is not monopolized.

Second, site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between modern populations and the sites so that the cultural and economic impacts of fencing and other exclusive methods might be mitigated. Interestingly, it seems that the authors of NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan do not consider this to be a problem: the Plan's authors' claim that a layer of protection for the sites also derives from

> traditional and popular interest in the sites and their cultural heritage…organised under popular committees or cultural clubs operating from the localities surrounding the sites…such as at Shendi, Kabbushiyya, Begraweya, Ba Naqa and al-Awatei.[829]

Not only does ICOMOS doubt whether "traditional and popular interest in the sites and their cultural heritage exists", but also none was observed by the present writer during extensive fieldwork in the case-study area. The Management Plan's erroneous claim may be based on the fact that most archaeologists working in Sudan (commonly British, French, German, Polish and American) come from cultural backgrounds that encourage them to see archaeological sites as part of a shared 'heritage,' which in turn fosters an innate desire to protect them. Functioning states with a sense of shared heritage also tend to produce organizations such as English Heritage and the National Trust

826 Schlanger 2016: 48.
827 Trigger 1994: 345.
828 Gomes 2006: 156.
829 ICOMOS 2011.

designed to preserve and protect that heritage. However, the historical disconnection between the residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya and archaeological sites, and the physical and legal barriers that now separate the two, means that they have little sense of sense of ownership over the sites or of stewardship towards them. As Miller (1980) noted, there are difficulties in implanting a European construction in a foreign setting:

> Where archaeology is employed in societies very different from those in which it originally developed, it may not be able to reproduce itself in its old image and expect all the familiar sets of relationships that define it to follow.[830]

These disconnections, and the low chance of archaeologists being able to 'recruit' and 'assimilate' residents into their view of 'archaeology as (world) heritage', therefore have implications for the stewardship of Sudan's archaeological sites. Part of the amelioration of these issues will therefore inevitably require archaeologists to stop assuming that archaeology is of importance to residents in the way it is important to them; as has been shown, pristine 'archaeology' is not necessarily perceived to be untouchable 'heritage', and it is only when this is appreciated that archaeologists may better understand the ways in which such (dis)connections are produced and address them effectively.

Finally, then, we must ask: in a tribal society, and under the conditions jut described, can archaeology be made relevant for residents of site-communities such as Hamadab-Bejrawiya? If so, how? Like many scholars before (such as Smith and Waterton 2009), the present author stresses the need for archaeologists to have more egalitarian views of what constitutes 'archaeology' and 'heritage', and to make time during the season (and space in their budget) for such collaborative explorations.

A key problem to overcome will be archaeologists' dismissal of the residents' history as folklore. Indeed returning to the issue of the Sudanese as 'Arabized Nubians', it is clear that there is an epistemological gulf between the two that can sometimes manifest itself in contempt. Ibrahim quite rightly notes that, "[c]ontemporary research on the ethnic identity of the Ja'aliyīn in Sudan directly challenges the indigenous genealogical tradition"[831] and that archaeologists unfairly dismiss these traditions as 'folklore' if not outright falsifications. Naturally, questioning the veracity of local narratives reflects, in Cunnison's words, "justifiable scepticism",[832] but Ibrahim is also right to argue that there is a clear "[i]ntolerance of the ambiguities and indeterminacies" surrounding indigenous histories and a tendency for scholars to dismiss them for the analytical challenges they present.[833] Ibrahim rightly argues for less criticism of the story-tellers and more integration of their narratives into historical accounts of the past: while oral histories have more recently been recognized by

830 Miller 1980.
831 Ibrahim 1988: 217.
832 Cunnison 1971: 188.
833 Ibrahim 1988: 219. No doubt Ibrahim is referring to scholars such as Lowie (1915) who notoriously wrote about the redundancy of oral tradition.

archaeologists as valid sources of information,[834] and they are still regarded as a subsidiary to the archaeological record.[835] Indeed, this is why the present researcher has circumvented the debate about the usefulness of myth and folklore to the historical record.[836]

Archaeologists in Sudan therefore need to amend the culture of knowledge production in two ways: first, they need to invest more in the *production* and serious recording of the archaeologies and knowledges of the local residents, even if this proves tricky in practice; second, they need to *distribute* the archaeologies and knowledges they produce themselves more equally.[837]

8.1.2 The Impacts of Archaeology on Local Economics and Society

Leaving aside the failure of tourism to provide economic benefits for the site-communities, there are mixed findings when it comes to the economic impact of archaeological employment. Chapter 6 shows that while the archaeological wage itself is comparatively low from the perspective of many local employees, they also see it as having worthwhile non-monetary benefits and a nature that justifies seasonal pursuit. Those who are not employed by archaeologists also see jobs in archaeology as an important economic opportunity; one to which they desire more access. For many among the sedentary agricultural Ja'aliyīn, the view—whether directly employed or not—is that the resource of archaeological employment is unfairly allocated to non-Ja'alī pastoralists. As the 'original', settled, farming and educated members of local society, the Ja'aliyīn perceive any resource to emerge from their land to be their property. The pastoralists are seen, quite frankly, as interlopers to a resource to which they have no legal, biological or historical right. The competition for resources is already increasing tensions between farmers and pastoralists (Chapter 4) and we may reasonably conclude that the disproportionate allocation of jobs to the pastoralists exacerbates this tension. However, there are several other dimensions of the matter to consider, too.

First, and to emphasize a point already made above, while it is perhaps predictable that those who perceive marginalization in the present context, i.e. Ja'alī perceptions of work with UCLQ's mission, would make the case for increased access to employment for fellow members of their community—in this instance, by forging a historical reason for their 'right' to the jobs on offer—one must take into account that the aspect of archaeology that they claim a historical link to is the *land*

834 See Carruthers (2008) on the stability of memory.
835 Zimmerman 2001: 173.
836 Sudanese folklore was widely studied under the heading of 'myths and legends of primitive people' by early anthropologists in Sudan who, like the early archaeologists, arrived with the colonial administration. This trend continued and many of the fullest compendia of Sudanese folklore are from this period and the subsequent heyday of folklore studies in the 1960s and 1970s.
837 Scholars such as Popa believe that archaeologists have a duty to disseminate to the public so that damaging forms of information do not gain currency: "the ideas of pseudoarchaeologists and re-enactors have greater visibility and circulation in the public sphere than those of archaeologists." (Popa 2016: 34).

and not the archaeological site or what they believe it represents historically. In this vein, the absence of any mention of Nubia in Ja'alī reactions to the disproportional allocation of archaeological employment thus strengthens the argument from Chapter 5. The salient point here is that it is these markers that were used, based upon agreed hierarchies, by the employees and others. A large amount of value is therefore ascribed to the identities or stereotypes which appear in their speech, because these are clearly the identities that they feel serve them in this context.

Second, there is, of course, another major 'disproportion' on the local job market to note, namely the disproportionate allocation of jobs between men and women. As we have seen, if the archaeologists employ local women, it is for house-based work such as laundering clothes or washing pottery, and these tasks require far fewer employees than excavation. Moreover, when archaeological teams work alongside each other, as in Hamadab, such house-based tasks are often shared, which means that the number of women employed is even smaller than it may otherwise have been.

In an attempt to address women's frequent requests for work, some archaeologists have tried to increase the number of women they employ, notably the UCLQ project director after she was informed of the requests by the present author. But their scope to do so is limited: this disproportional scenario is, in a sense, un-actionable. Archaeological excavation is strenuous and dirty in nature, and the cultural and social constraints about female exposure (which, elsewhere, Chen and Korinek (2010) call "life course traditions" and Abdalla (1987) "limiting factors"), mean that only men are employed to do this work. The jobs offered by UCLQ are gender-segregated in conformity with the norms of Sudanese society.[838] As we have seen in Chapter 5, cultural factors mean that women come into contact with the archaeologists and the archaeological sites in far fewer numbers than men.

We might say that in this case, while gender norms are extremely important "life course traditions", they also act as a "limiting factor" to the socio-cultural impacts of archaeology in Sudan. Thus, for cultural reasons, most of those earning cash wages from the archaeologists, and all of those employed on excavations, are men. This does not necessarily have an effect on archaeology's economic impact: we saw above that most of the men's earnings are channelled into their households, meaning that women—wives, mothers, sisters and daughters—share the economic benefits of archaeology.

Nonetheless, as excavations are the main way in which archaeologists and local residents interact, and are thus the main "opportunity" residents have to spend time with archaeologists[839] female respondents' broad framing of their relationship to archaeology as providing them with "no benefit" from the archaeological site (via tourism) or from the archaeologists' activities (via archaeological

838 The Sudan Labour Law (1997) has restricted rules about the times and ways women are allowed to be employed, including making specific allowances for their break times and keeping them from doing "works which are…exceeding the reasonable limits women can withstand." (§19, Sudan Labour Law 1997: 7.)

839 Gillot 2010: 11.

employment) becomes clearer. “Not seeing” the archaeologists, and the latter’s absence from their homes for visits for tea, were also common topics of conversation with female interviewees, as were frequent declarations that they have “no relationship” with the archaeologists or the archaeological site. The finding above with reference to the seeming demise of the tradition of fertility rituals at the archaeological sites (Chapter 5) adds weight to this perspective.

However, in the wake of the issues raised by the Ja’aliyīn with reference to demographic disproportionality in the allocation of archaeological work with UCLQ, the culture which produces this very discourse also needs to be evaluated for its potential as a driver of conflict risk. Indeed, multiple questions arose as this author encountered the delineation of in-groups and out-groups in interviews with the employees: is the Ja’alī rhetoric about encroaching outsiders appropriating their ‘rights’ merely rhetoric? Do they really *want* the jobs they are asking for? If no, what are the conditions which drive and may exacerbate such sentiment? Is the predominant allocation of jobs to pastoralists likely to empower the latter, thereby impacting local power dynamics and perhaps even inducing social conflict in Hamadab-Bejrawiya in the long term?

If past experience is an indicator of future performance, precedent suggests that the primary allocation of archaeological jobs to pastoralists will have little impact on the status quo. In this viewing, the Ja’alī expressions of discontent are no more than rhetoric. First, the unequal distribution of money and material resources, and wide disparity of wealth and the extreme insecurity it fosters, is not new in Sudan but rather a grim reality of contemporary Sudanese society (Chapter 4). In the case-study area of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, economic and political power is dominated by the Ja’aliyīn. The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and the semi-pastoralist Fadniyya are not only in the minority in Hamadab-Bejrawiya but they have traditionally held less power and influence than the sedentary Ja’alī farmers on the national scale, too. Recalling the tribal dynamics explained in Chapter 4 and the history narrated in Chapter 5, we know that the Ja’aliyīn have held significant power in the Shendi Reach and much of the Butana since at least the 16th Century, both under the dominion of external forces (the Fūnj, the Turco-Egyptian state and Anglo-Egyptian rule) and since independence in 1956. With the additional inertia caused by an absent state, there is evidence of very little social mobility, while Ja’alī families have grown into their almost preassigned roles and remain in them. The Ja’aliyīn have established channels of political representation and recorded rights to the land: everyone knows this is their *dār*. Because group membership is strictly controlled, there has been little upward mobility over time. In comparison with the pastoralists, the Ja’aliyīn are materially wealthy and well-represented on the national stage: most positions of power in Sudan are held by sedentary agriculturalists, many of whom are also members of the Ja’aliyīn, who in the case-study area considers the land their home.

Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, while the present author is convinced of their sincere and well-founded insecurity regarding day-to-day life, it is difficult to overcome the conclusion drawn from observation that the Ja'aliyīn do not really want the jobs: it is neither the archaeological wage nor most of the non-monetary benefits of such employment which drives the sense of injustice; rather it is the sense of being not merely marginalized in employment, but losing out to pastoral outsiders. Indeed, reflecting on narratives in interviews with Ja'alī employees, archaeological work did not appear to fit with what they appear to see as a respectable occupation, given the type of labour involved. Thus, perhaps the most fundamental element to consider is that archaeological employment—if not the site itself—is a valued resource in a context characterized by economic insecurity and competition for resources between sedentary farmers and pastoralists; a scenario that exists in other parts of the world, too.

Yet herein may lie one, if not *the*, core problem and indeed the reason why Ja'alī expressions of discontent cannot simply be dismissed as rhetoric: there are other important factors driving this sentiment. The acute competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists is exacerbated by the Ja'aliyīn's feelings of insecurity over the slow erosion of their hold on economic and political power, which has resulted in their deliberate withholding from the pastoralists of basic services under their control, such as water and electricity (Chapter 4). Any progress made by non-Ja'aliyīn, especially non-Ja'alī pastoralists, is seen as a threat. It therefore seems as if there is widespread inertia to the idea of change, and the Ja'aliyīn are deliberately holding on to the reigns of power in terms of basic services and settlement areas. The fragility of their long-standing encumbancy of powerful positions means that the Ja'aliyn are reacting against any potential dilution of political power, or the space taken up in political representation. The discourse of Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim is a form of reaction, and resistance, to what they regard as unjust.

Referring again to Chapter 4, it was noted that for farmers living along the Nile, ownership of land contributes to social standing and prestige; indeed, many scholars argue that land is a social commodity first and an economic one second. These two dimensions of land ownership are thus interlinked; a breakdown in the present economic status quo, including changes in the farmers' spending power vis-à-vis pastoralists, has in turn important repercussions for social networks. Thus, the possibility of a breakdown in social relations are likely to draw emotional responses. We therefore see how marginalization from access to resources, whether perceived or real, is seen as a main obstacle to prosperity and thus dramatically "affects human behaviour".[840] Within the context of archaeological employment, this dynamic has a similar effect; it induces the Ja'aliyīn to express themselves as they did in interviews and conversations with this author: asserting their role-identity as owners of the land, with resulting 'rights' to archaeological employment.

840 Sloman 2000: 2.

Regardless of whether it is intended or not, it is therefore highly significant that the archaeological project directors in Hamadab-Bejrawiya appear to disproportionally hire members of the Manāsīr, Hassanī pastoralists and Fadnī semi-pastoralists rather than Ja'alī farmers. In doing so, archaeological missions have, in effect, undermined the established privileges of the Ja'aliyīn, the group to whom access to opportunities and services are traditionally bestowed; they have also provided a route for the traditionally marginalized Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya to sustain new forms of influence by virtue of the economic and social impact of archaeological work.

While the extent of the role of archaeology is certainly arguable, it should not be overlooked that the Fadniyya have become an established community in the case-study area; they already have formed one Local Committee and begun assimilating to the ways of the riverine Ja'aliyīn. Indeed, there are further, political, changes afoot: after having described at length the dominance of the Ja'aliyīn in government, Azim Rafiq, a Mansouri employee of UCLQ, told this author, "[i]n the past, there were no people from [my village] in the government or education, but now there are."

Thus, rather than approaching archaeological work as an exogenous and isolated potential driver of change in social and political dynamics in the case-study area, it would perhaps be more prudent to seek to place the impact of archaeology within a context in which existing, local social and political processes – or change – is being affected, and perhaps even accelerated. As seen in Chapter 6, it would be imprudent to seek to gauge the value and impact of archaeological work in absolute terms, and in isolation. Rather, it is when placed in the local socio-economic context, and when seemingly mundane characteristics of such employment are considered – such as the seasonal timing of its availability and the form of payment – that a grasp of potentially powerful, and outsized, ripple effects could be properly understood.

With reference to the evolution of emergent protest or opposition movements, as shown in Wiley's (1992) 'Political Process Model of Movement Emergence' (Figure 24), it may be argued that the disproportional archaeological employment could potentially act as a catalyzer which accelerates the empowerment of the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists which, when combined with "expanding political opportunities" and "increases in indigenous organizational strength", could eventually lead to what he deems "cognitive liberation", and thus the embryo of a social movement.

Other scholars such as Alavi (1973), Adnan (2007) and Kerkvliet (2009) have also investigated the conditions under which everyday ("peasant") resistance feeds into open, organized, and confrontational resistance. One important reason appears to be changing political circumstances that favour 'peasants' and disfavour the individuals and agencies that peasants have been surreptitiously

resisting. Such altered circumstances help 'subordinates' to "cross the threshold of fear and insecurity."[841]

One question emerging from this, then, is whether archaeological employment constitutes a "broad socio-economic process" that provides such conditions. This study does not contain any data substantiating such a position; indeed, it is clear that neither employment nor money in itself constitute a "socio-economic" process, let alone a "broad" such process. However, what data collected for this research suggests is that archaeological employment first and foremost increases spending power; and perhaps more significantly, that such an increase in spending power disproportionally applies to certain parts of the site-community—and is perceived to occur at the expense of others. Thus, the key question, rather than solely the magnitude of the spending power, is its relevance for affected communities, and when layered within the local socio-economic context, whether, and how, it has an impact. Thus, does increased financial means lead to anything? The answer is a clear 'maybe', if such means can act to either affect or facilitate change in existing, and ongoing, socio-economic processes which have hitherto failed to alter the status quo.



Figure 24. Political Process Model of Movement Emergence (Source: Wiley 1992: 102)

Thus, what could arguably be posited with reference to Wiley's 'Political Process Model of Movement Emergence' is that existing competition for resources; migration; and, in the Ja'alī view, encroachment of pastoral groups into the 'right' of others to opportunity presented by the land,

841 Adnan 2007: 214.

including archaeological work, all constitute the ingredients for a potential "socioeconomic process." In this model, the establishment, for instance, in the case-study area of Local Committees by competing groups is, again, an existing effort to forge "indigenous organizational strength": indeed, interview and conversational data show that these efforts have already begun to alter access, and representation, in education and government, presenting a potential basis for "expanding political opportunities." The key challenge, which this research has sought to address, is thus that of forging understanding of the relevant socio-economic and political context; identifying reasonable and realistic ways to measure the impact of archaeological employment within that context; and, perhaps most importantly, prudently situating that impact within the framework of the ongoing socio-economic and political processes in which archaeological work takes place (see below).

Questions which have emerged in the process of this research include whether the impact of archaeological employment in the case-study area has the potential to have a rather damaging effect on inter- and intra-communal relations, and more broadly, whether it could serve to in the long term jeopardize the potential of archaeology to, by forging better understanding of an ancient past, help provide a path to a different future. In this context, it should not be overlooked that more and better understanding of the output of archaeology could function as a foundation for the re-assessments of identity which could help forge the kind of dialogue that can overcome the social power dynamics that pervade Sudan. The present author posits the latter, mindful of that the uncovering of archaeological sites could also involve the proverbial digging up of buried hatchets, most importantly by providing contemporary contestations with the means to utilize history as a language or tool for mobilization, and perhaps more importantly, claims to authenticity and thus legitimacy (see above).

In short, archaeological employment also has ramifications for the established social order and for what Boyte (2010) and Kerkvliet (2009) call 'everyday politics': "people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources" beyond the formal political system.[842] The disproportional distribution of access to archaeological employment by archaeologists in Hamadab-Bejrawiya has therefore had a significant impact upon the long-established power dynamic between the groups which reside in the case-study area by exacerbating insecurities about the potential for a change in the established social and political order. By tracing the dynamics of the mechanics of archaeological employment and the passage of money; by concentrating on how the different livelihood groups interact; and by recasting archaeological employment as a resource; it can be seen that UCLQ's archaeological excavations are a dynamic resource which shapes and politicizes the interaction between archaeologists and site-communities and between the site-communities themselves. Like other resource-based tensions in Sudan, the (mis)management of archaeological employment has thus potential to cause conflict.

842 Kerkvliet 2009: 232.

*

Inevitably, there is thus the subsequent task of attemping to put the social impact of archaeological employment in binary terms: is it 'good' or 'bad' for the site-communities? As archaeology has the latent power to change lives in the case-study area, it also comes with potentially serious consequences for social and political relationships more permanently. Indeed, the question of whether this makes archaeology's social impact 'good' or 'bad' is a complex one. The answer to that question must thus depend on whether the status quo is viewed as one that is worth upholding. On one hand, some might see the disproportional employment of pastoralists as a 'good' thing; a positive (if unwitting) consequence of archaeological practice here. Given their socio-economic rank and form of livelihoods, the pastoralists arguably need cash income from archaeological work more than the farming Ja'aliyīn. Moreover, partly since pastoralists are not recorded in the national census, and while Ja'alī-dominated local committees refuse to register pastoralists as part of the communities, unless under duress, there is a clear deficit in terms of political representation on the part of groups such as the Manāsīr. In the current context, the pastoralists also suffer from the "hoarding" of basic services by the Ja'aliyīn. In terms of archaeology as a tool of social action, one might then posit that archaeological employment is positively empowering the pastoralists. Reports from around Sudan studying the same dynamic argue that there is a

> likelihood that the local elites will reap much of the benefits of the livelihood support services if no careful selection is made to target the poor segments of the population in the different locations.[843]

Thus, there is a clear incentive for socially and politically marginalized groups, such as the pastoralists, to seek greater representation.

On the other hand, others might view the disproportional employment of pastoralists as a 'bad' thing; a practice that unnecessarily interferes with the local context and actively 'does harm'.[844] Indeed both positions are reinforced by the all-pervasive feeling of insecurity; and when compared with how other resources in Sudan are contested by clashing claims of ownership, this is certainly a cause for concern. For instance, Adar (2001) puts into perspective the role of oil exploration; the question of 'who should benefit' from the riches of (what lies under) the land imposes limitations on conflict resolution and undermines the possibility of the establishment of a consensus on national identity. As we saw in Chapter 4, and indeed as recent Sudanese history attests, "[b]ehavior [sic] regarding producing, distributing, and using resources can range from cooperation and collaboration to discussions and debates to bargains and compromises to conflicts and violence." Of course, archaeology itself is not the crux of the matter but rather a catalyzer or stimulant; as noted above, the disproportional employment of pastoralists is the result of the long-term dialectic between the

843 World Bank 2014: 17.

844 See Anderson 1999: 'doing no harm' was made part of the humanitarian code of conduct after Anderson examined the effect of assistance on conflict.

thoughts and actions of a chain of people, particularly the projects directors and the site guards. But it is nonetheless worth taking a long-term view of how this might play out.

8.1.2.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice

An important and related question is whether archaeologists need to change their strategy with regards to archaeological employment. Given the agency shown in the assessment of the mechanics, or the 'chaîne opératiore', of archaeological employment, this author suggests less of a reliance upon the site guards and more awareness of the local socio-economic and political context. Of course, given the emergence of norms and thus expectations with reference to employment practices, and more broadly, the disinterest and disincentive for archaeologists to insert themselves into contestations beyond their control and interest, it is difficult to alter the status quo overnight, particularly on an individual basis. Nevertheless, when offering wage labour on excavations, the project director/s take/s on the role of 'employer' and the residents that of an employee.[845] And, even through "[i]t is now widely accepted [and] enshrined in the national environmental and social regulations…to promote socially-responsible corporate behaviour",[846] there are very few guidelines or rules on how exactly archaeologists should behave when working in Sudan. Indeed, there are no rules in archaeological legislation, such as the OPA, or in Labour Law, to guide such activities (Chapter 6). And yet, data collected for this research suggests that there is a need to do so; more precisely, a necessity for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad, including rules pertaining to activities to archaeological work such as hiring and employment practices.

For example it should not be forgotten that the local employees inhabit a context in which the Sudanese state provides virtually no protection. Although the archaeologists are engaging in an employer-employee relationship (above), the associated rules of the Labour Law are not applicable to local employees because the work is seasonal, and no worker tends to be hired longer than the 3-month continuous work period which most of the (albeit causal) Labour Law requires before regulations apply.[847] Working contracts can be verbal or written, but the men hired by UCLQ are

845 Labour Law 1997: 4. An employer, according to Sudan's Labour Law (1997) is "any person who employs by contract of service one person or more for a wage of any kind". The employee, the man who acts as the 'worker', is defined as "any person male or female not less than 16 years old who performs work in return for wages of whatever type..." It continues, "...in service and subject to the management or supervision of the employer, whether his contract of service is written or oral, expressed or implied or for the purpose of training or probation, or who performs manual or semi manual work whether skilled or unskilled in consideration of wage of whatever kind"

846 Hildyard 2008.

847 §95.1 states that "[n]o factory owner shall assign any work to a worker unless he has received sufficient training therein or unless such work is performed under the supervision of a person or persons of experience in such field of work" (Labour Law 1997: 21). Of course the archaeologist is conducting work outside of a factory setting, but it nonetheless highlights the fact that archaeologists here do not train the men who work for them.

uninsured, non-unionized and unprotected against loss or injury despite the occupational hazards involved in their work.[848] They operate on a day-to-day basis, and can be replaced or 'laid off' without notice; essentially working a zero-hours contract. There are no living allowances—instead, one employee noted that employees pay for breakfast on rotation at a cost of SDG8/day—and no travel expenses; but archaeologists do tend to give smaller one-time sums at the end of the season. If the employees are engaged by the project director to work for longer or shorter periods for any reason, the pay rate is determined at the discretion of the project director, and the employees can choose the extent of their participation. In the case of the UCLQ mission, the latter involves pro rata adjustments to pay. The employees are usually given the power to choose a replacement, so if one is unable to work he will usually send a male relative or household member to replace him. The project director, however, has the power to disallow this choice and choose someone else.[849]

Further justification for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad may be found in the results of Chapter 6, which show that in the case-study area, archaeological wages for local workers, have failed to keep up with inflation despite substantial increases particularly since 2013. Indeed, while UCLQ and DAI both doubled daily wages from SDG30 in 2013 to SDG60 in late 2015, high inflation has meant that by 2016, there had been a 10% decline in wages in real terms.

Parallel with nominal wage increases, working hours were cut from 6.5 hours per day in March 2013 to 6 hours in 2015. Although this had the effect of increasing the employees' nominal hourly wage, the key indicator is the daily wage. Merely to have kept pace with inflation, the daily wage would have had to risen to approximately SDG65 by the March 2016 season. While not a legal requirement, it is common practice for employers in places like the UK to increase wages roughly in line with inflation. Of note, there is no mention of such a requirement in Sudanese Labour Law.

As Starzman points out about archaeology in the Middle East more broadly, "[t]he wages paid on excavations are extremely low, occasionally even remaining below the local minimum wage level."[850] However, in the case-study area, wages are above the minimum wage, which in 2014 was by presidential decree increased to SDG425 (US$74.5 in 2014) per month, equivalent to SDG5,100 (US$894.7 in 2014) per year. Indeed, those who were employed by UCLQ over the 53-day period spanning between November 2015 and March 2016 on average earned 60% of the annual minimum wage. This has a significant impact given that that unskilled labour, especially in agriculture, is often

848 Turkey seems to be the exception in these cases because "social insurance and insurance covering workplace accidents are government requirements." (Starzman 2012: 408).

849 Mallowan wrote about employing local men, descriptions which, as Gillot (2010) notes, clearly still apply to today: "During the excavations we employed 200–250 men, sometimes less, sometimes more. They worked for us from sunrise to sunset with an interval of half an hour for breakfast and an hour for luncheon. It was a strenuous day's work for which they were paid at the rate of one rupee, the equivalent of about eighteen pence. In addition, bakshish, that is tips, were awarded for all small finds as an encouragement to them to keep their eyes open. The gangs consisted of a pickman, a spademan and four, five or six basketmen" (Mallowan 1977: 42-43).

850 Starzman 2012: 408.

paid well below the official minimum wage, if paid at all; on a national level, one-quarter of all agricultural workers earn below US$3.2 (SDG20) per day, and almost half receive no income at all.[851]

Yet, it should be noted that per §35.3 of the Sudan Labour Law, "[t]he wage of the production worker shall be calculated at a rate equivalent to that received by any other labourer carrying on a similar work."[852] In interviews with this author, particularly the Ja'alī employees, who diversify their incomes by doing farm work for other landowners or tenant farmers, reported that seasonal agricultural labour paid SDG70-SDG100 (US$11.5-16.4) for a ten-hour day. Meanwhile, it was also reported that a ten-hour work day at a government-sponsored agricultural project to the north at Mahmia paid SDG90 (US$14.8), while planting onions for local farmers from 2pm to 6.30pm earned them SDG50-SDG60.

When this author alerted the UCLQ project director to the erosion of local employees' spending power due to inflation despite the wage increases, and also general wage levels in the case-study area, the reaction was a pledge to increase wages the following season.[853] While certainly positive, the wider reality is that archaeological project directors in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and elsewhere tend to look to one another—internally—for hiring and employment practices, rather than looking externally, to the context in which they operate: "it is common in professionalized archaeology to accept as standard rather than to question exploitative work situations."[854] To a large extent, this is largely the outcome of reliance on past, 'proven' practices, including reliance on the site guard as an informant, and due to the language barrier, also often a liaison with site employees and the site-community alike. Yet collected data suggests that, while convenient, sticking to the tried approach may not be sufficient to keep up with changes in the local context, and also often involves the overlooking of problematic aspects of praxis (Chapter 6). According to Starzman, this is because they allow—nay, enable—the archaeologist's way of life: "many archaeologists decline a radical critique of their material and discursive practices, because it is these very practices that ensure smooth functioning of our discipline."[855]

Yet informal conversations with archaeologists since 2013 shows that they tend to perceive their own ability to change the situation to be limited and seem to refer responsibility for the pitfalls of the current system upon their site guards or predecessors: for example, when talking about the fact that local workers are usually paid very low wages by foreign archaeologists, several people explained to

851 World Bank Group 2015a.
852 Labour Law 1997: 10.
853 Further wage increases were given in the 2017 winter season (at the time of post-viva editing of this manuscript) and will need to be taken into account in further studies.
854 Starzman 2012: 410. In most cases, she claims, "the labour politics of foreign archaeological teams working in the Middle East aim, in quite strategic ways, at preserving existing power asymmetries between foreign scientists and the locally hired workforce, which are symptomatic of neo-colonial control" (Starzman 2012: 404). Starzman (2012), and Scheper-Hughes (1995) whom she quotes, see this as 'artificial moral relativism' in which archaeologists "suspend the "ethical in our dealings with the [vulnerable] 'other'"" whilst maintaining certain standards for ourselves at home. (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 409, in Starzman 2012: 405. Cf. Hamilakis 2012.
855 Starzman 2012: 412.

her that introducing higher standards of employment would mean 'interfering' with local conditions. Even those that *do* engage with this discourse find that conversations about the politico-economic conditions of archaeological work take place 'behind-the-scenes', where they tend to quickly slip off into "the anecdotal and non-committal".[856] Ultimately the agency of archaeologists—how much they are actually *able* to act for social good—is not agreed upon more broadly.[857] This furthers Starzman's description of how archaeologists 'discursively frame' their practices using the idea of trying to avoid 'interference' whilst at the same time deferring responsibility through reliance, inheritance and the lack of space for change.

Overall, the implications this chapter has for archaeological practice is that, as employers, archaeologists should be aware of the local and national financial context, including unemployment rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates between groups. In the first instance, the archaeologist-cum-employer (usually the project director) should reasonably develop awareness of local conditions, avoid default perpetuation of past practices and avoid moral relativisim with regard to hiring and pay practices. When calculating the seasonal wage, data on local minimum wages for daily work should be collected, considered and updated each season; inflation rates and subsidy cutbacks on key staples should also be taken into account. Contracts should be drawn up at the beginning of the season, stipulating how many days of work the employees can expect. Strategies should be formed to ensure that local workers are protected both short and long-term in case of site accidents. This is the bare minimum. In the absence of formal rules and regulations pertaining to the aforementioned, there is thus a need for self-regulation. As Wait and Altschul suggest, best practice can be achieved by "individuals and organizations acting with professional and ethical responsibility."[858] An alternative way of perceiving the archaeological mandate might be through 'contextual identities' with correspondingly contextual 'responsibilities'. In other words, archaeologists' contextual *identities* in Sudan require them to fulfil associated contextual *responsibilities*.

856 Starzman 2012: 406.

857 See the lively discussion about the ability of archaeologists to 'change the world' in Stottman 2010.

858 Wait and Altschul 2014: 151-2. From the "desert fringes" in Mongolia and Senegal, Wait and Altschul (2014) report that neither heritage organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund, the development banks as well as the charitable/voluntary sector advocacy organizations) nor development organizations ("'developers' whether it be mineral extraction, infrastructure construction, urbanization companies or non-profits…") are enough in promoting sustainable economic development, either separately or together, although they note that this is in part because there are no NGOs or IGOs in either area.

8.1.3 The Impact of Archaeological Management on Local Landscape

The Sudanese conception of land is a holistic one that encompasses the surface area and whatever lies beneath it: 'land' is "not just the surface but also subterranean".[859] By custom everything upon the land and everything that the land produces belongs to the people who occupy it, including archaeological sites. The sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe were traditionally used for settlement, as grazing land, as a source of building materials (including stone and highly prized fired red bricks) and as soil-enriching fertilizer (Chapter 7); had they not been registered as archaeological sites, then they would have continued to be used for these purposes. Furthermore, in Hamadab-Bejrawiya the importance of land transcends the economic sphere to become part of the social sphere (if, indeed, the two spheres can be separated) in which land ownership brings social prestige. This explains why there is a tightly-held tradition in Sudan of not selling land.[860] Far from becoming less important as Sudan has diversified its economy, "love of land [has] been growing deeper with every generation".[861]

For the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, archaeological site management is narrated as a gradual process of appropriation, dispossession and displacement from their land by 'foreigners' backed by the legal authority of the state. As noted in Chapter 4, customary rights are not recognized by the Sudanese government and clause §2.9.1 of the OPA (noted above) ordains that "land that has archaeological value [can be] requisitioned by the state"[862] even if it is sorely needed by local communities "to build, or dig irrigation channels, or make a cemetery, or a water tower". It is therefore with impunity that the site boundaries of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe have steadily encroached upon their limited residential, agricultural and grazing (economic and social) spaces. In a context of extreme land scarcity (Chapter 4) this has had serious consequences for the livelihoods of many residents, and, alongside unequal allocation of archaeological jobs (Chapter 6) has exacerbated economic insecurity and social conflict in Hamadab-Bejrawiya.

It should therefore be unsurprising that in the eyes of the site-communities, the process of dispossession by foreigners backed by the state is little different from the piecemeal appropriation by the state of communally or customarily owned land for big, commercial agricultural projects, or for dam building. The vocabulary of archaeological law supports this comparison: for example, the word used to describe the areas of land that NCAM authorizes archaeologists to investigate is a **'**concession', which typically range anywhere from 10km to 40km in length.[863] The packaging of land

859 Gertel, Calkins and Rottenburg 2014: 10.
860 Salih 1999: 2.
861 Salih 1999: 2.
862 OPA 1999, §2.9.1: 17.
863 For example in the NCAM Appeal for salvage archaeology in the wake of the Merowe Dam states that, "NCAM will continue its investigations from the Dam site to Dar el–Arab (24km). The Sudan archaeological Research Society (SARS) will keep its concession in the region between Dar el-Arab and Kerbikan (40km)" (NCAM Appeal 2007). Archaeological seasons are also often referred to as 'missions' or 'campaigns', both of which words carry a colonial, almost military, connotation.

into concessions that are awarded to archaeologists is a familiar and longstanding practice and echoes other mining, hydrocarbon and commercial-agriculture industries, wherein the government award appropriated concessions to mineral and oil and gas prospecting companies or industrial-agricultural firms. The OPA's use of the word "requisition" in §2.9.1 (above) and the fact that, as noted above, Meroe and the pyramids to the east have also been "confiscated" by a special presidential decree in 2003[864] only add to this impression. And finally, it is indeed "interesting" that NCAM's power to "specify the modalities of land use within the limits of an archaeological land…is [so] clearly stipulated in…[the] clauses of the [OPA]" [865] and that the definition of 'antiquities' and 'archaeological land' are kept so broad. It is thus plain to see even by archaeologist's own discourse that site management processes mirror what Calkins (2012) writes about the extension of foreign-backed commercial agriculture in Sudan, and Calkins and Ille (2014) also note about gold-mining, namely that, "[t]he contracts between the [Sudan government] and the [foreign companies] have alienated rural populations from what they view as their land".[866] Indeed considering what might be called the cultural dispossession described in Chapter 5, site management processes may even be likened to what Castree (2003) describes as the two main steps in the commodification of land. In short, these are to reduce the land to measurable units; and to separate the land from its social context.[867]

Moreover, it seems that the designation of Meroe as part of the 'Island of Meroe' UNESCO World Heritage site and the site management proposals in NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan will intensify the process of dispossession and alienation. Although the proposals to extend the boundaries of Meroe, enclose 'Greater Meroe' with a fence, and install more site guards, have not yet been implemented, they have already provoked feelings of insecurity at a fundamental level among the sedentary Ja'aliyīn.

Such insecurities are less evident among the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists even though, as explained in Chapter 7, NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan would arguably inflict far greater damage to their livelihoods that it would to the Ja'aliyīn's. The relative lack of concern of the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists may be because they have historically been less affected by site-management processes than the Ja'aliyīn sedentary farmers. More likely, it is because they do not know about it and have not been invited to take part in consultations with UNESCO or its representatives. However, there can be no doubt that NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan contains

---

864 ICOMOS Advisory Body Evaluation (1336) 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is 'The Confiscation of the Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National Reserve within this Region and managing it.' The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the nomination file for the UNESCO title was being written.

865 NCAM's Management Plan 2010: 183. They are clearly referring to the phrase, "The limits of archaeological land shall be defined by the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums" (OPA 1999: 13).

866 Calkins and Ille 2014: 52.

867 See also Kopytoff (1986) for a discussion of 'commoditization as process', and Gonzalez (2014) for an argument about how commodification is part of the 'global' eclipsing the 'local'.

potentially inflammatory proposals for the re-location of the pastoralists' settlements between Meroe and the pyramids; their exclusion from grazing lands inside the Greater Meroe site; and the prohibition of their access to Meroe, whose acacia they rely upon for fodder and fuel.

The conclusion this leads to is that the protection of Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids, if not Domat al-Hamadab also, would be achieved by the dispossession of its site-community. At first sight the concept of 'World Heritage' and the principle of protecting and conserving sites of global significance for future generations appear laudable and egalitarian: after all, as Brodie and Renfrew (2005) note, by this token archaeology belongs to everyone as part of a 'common heritage' that represents where we have all come from. However, as the residents in the case-study area feel little ancestral connection to the ancient Nubian sites alongside, and upon which, they live (Chapter 5), and are identified as major 'threats' to the archaeological record (Chapter 7), the implementation of World Heritage status is and will continue to be experienced by the site-communities as an act of appropriation that ignores their day-to-day concerns and interests. The residents of the case-study area trace their ancestry to other sources and see the archaeological sites in their most abstracted state, as part of the land and a resource that they need to exploit in a context of economic scarcity. As Rodriguez had noted about the residents of Kochol, "the land is materially and symbolically valuable as a local communal farm rather than a World Heritage archaeological site or museum."[868] Nor, in fact, do the sites need to be put to active use by their customary owners to have value; the assumption is that the land is there to be used when needed in the present and future plans of site-community households and villages: for them, and unlike archaeologists, there is no 'untouchable heritage': the past is "…meant for use in today's world".[869]

The findings of this study demonstrate, in line with those of Bielawski (1994), Gomes (2006) and Rodriguez (2006), that site management that is mismanaged because it ignores the socio-economic and cultural context of the site-communities does not only cause harm to those communities but can also provoke conflict over what they see as the integrity of their land and its resources. Chapter 7 sought to emphasize that 'Western' attempts to prevent conflict, for example by demarcating archaeological site boundaries with fences, can be misinterpreted in a Sudanese context and can actively do harm. Given the intense economic insecurity in which the site-communities in the case-study area are living, it is perhaps inevitable—and understandable—that if the NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan goes ahead, the archaeological sites will become sites of conflict over resources, no matter what the OPA or Presidential Decrees command.

For example, it seems clear from the evidence collected by the present author from Ja'aliyīn village leaders and residents of New Deraqab that any attempt to incorporate Old Deraqab into the site of Meroe archaeological site will be strongly resisted by the residents of New Deraqab, who continue

868 Rodriguez 2006: 167.
869 Hollowell 2006: 88.

to claim ownership of their former village; the only alternative would seem to be the payment of generous compensation, which is not currently on offer. And, as discussed in Chapter 7, if NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan proposals to fence Greater Meroe and ring it with a buffer zone go ahead, they would be resisted by the Manair and Hassaniyya pastoralists because the proposals would end their access the Meroe acacia, cut them off from their grazing grounds inside the Greater Meroe site, and oblige them to leave their current settlements: "[p]henomena of resistance, even opposition, can thus appear, particularly when the excavations clash with local activities."[870] Indeed, as Salih noted of Sudan that "it is rare to find a plot of land without conflicts"[871] and "…any attempt to [fence off] a piece of land will reverberate and cause disputes."[872]

*

When it comes to archaeology's intertwinedness with land expropriation, two elements of the status quo need questioning and unpacking. The first is with regard to the development of the layers of site protection: the OPA, NCAM, the project directors and UNESCO. The second is with regard to the looming, but seemingly benign, presence of Qatar.

As noted above, the laws and rules that govern the use of archaeological sites are not only somewhat ineffective but harmful to the local context. The question that naturally arises from this scenario is, why do Sudanese institutions design them in such a way? Surely Sudanese professionals would be able to identify and thus avoid the pitfalls of such top-down mechanisms? One response lies, in part, in the historic constitution of the archaeological industry in Sudan and the enduring influence of Western institutions upon it. The laws outlined in the OPA may be explained by the fact that the entire legislative basis of archaeology in Sudan is a product of British archaeologists and administrators working for the Anglo-Egyptian administration in the first half of the 20th Century (above); since 1952 the OPA has been modified but not substantially changed. The query that naturally follows on from this is whether Sudanese archaeology is still 'colonial' in nature?

The OPA's characterization of the site-community residents as the main manageable threats to the sites seems to suggest that it is, particularly as it makes no mention of the fact that the sites also need protecting from the interventions made by archaeologists. For example it was the British that cut through Meroe with the Khartoum to Atbara railway in 1899[873] and the western explorers, antiquarians and archaeologists that did the most damage to the pyramids. The work of multiple institutions at Meroe has also resulted in a radical change of the landscape, as ICOMOS has noted: "…archaeological research activities primarily by foreign scholars since the late 19th Century have

870 Gillot 2010: 14.
871 Salih 1999: 226.
872 Salih 1999: 256.
873 Hinkel 1992: 148.

left extremely large spoil heaps, particularly in the Western Cemetery and the Royal City, which impact on the setting and adversely affect site drainage in some areas."[874]

Despite the Sudanization of senior posts within SAS-NCAM from the 1960s onwards, the influence of Western thought remains strong: a prime mover within NCAM over the last two decades, Salah el-Din Mohammed Ahmed, is French-trained and has been responsible for the applications for UNESCO World Heritage Site status for Jebel Barkal and the Sites of the Napatan Region in 2003 and for the Island of Meroe in 2010. He has also been one of the main brokers of the Qatar-Sudan archaeological alliance (below). The UNESCO Nomination File he co-authored was written with Western colleagues[875] including Welsby, a curator at the British Museum, who has been working in Sudan for over thirty years.[876] Indeed if anything, the UNESCO World Heritage List has "contributed to strengthening the role of foreign experts in the definition and management of archaeological heritage."[877]

To scholars such as Starzman, "the discipline of archaeology is embedded in discursive practices shaped by European colonialism and imperialism," [878] which has given the management and conservation of archaeological sites a contentious heritage. As noted in Chapter 2, the first 'proto-archaeologists' in Sudan arrived under the rubric of colonial enterprise, which was geared towards the acquisition and exploitation of land and resources, including archaeological 'treasures'; "colonial regimes [attached] themselves to antiquity as much as conquest".[879] As ancient objects were taken from pre-colonial and colonial Africa and Middle East they became the 'property' of private individuals and museums, which had a keen interest in the development of techniques to restore and conserve them. Site management practices thus have similar roots, namely in the desire of colonial authorities to 'rescue' archaeological sites from the damaging effects of their natural environment and to 'protect' them within legally-reinforced boundaries with controlled access.[880] It is therefore not insignificant that in Chapter III article 28(b) of the OPA (1999), institutions participating in salvage archaeology "have the right to own a representative portion of their discoveries." As Starzman notes, "[i]n the present-day context of global capitalism", these activities "reveal distinctly neo-colonial

874 ICOMOS' UNESCO Advisory Body Evaluation (1336): 102.

875 The UNESCO Nomination File lists the authors of the document. They are: 'Preparers: Dr Salah Mohamed Ahmed [and] Dr Derek Welsby; Preparer (Consultant): Pr. Henry Cleere; Team of the "Draft" Management Plan: Dr Paul Bidwell, Dr. Nick Hodgson, Mr. Terry Frain [and] Dr. David Sherlock; Management Plan: Dr. Sami el-Masri; Topographical Work: Dr. Mario Santana Quintero [and] Miss Sarah Seranno." (UNESCO Nomination File 2010: 1)

876 Again, this is not a criticism of Dr Welsby, who is actually a very close friend, nor of Dr Ahmed, a long-term colleague. Both have worked tirelessly on behalf of the Sudanese—this is merely part of my assessment of archaeological culture in Sudan. Regarding Hinkel's work at Bejrawiya, we might note that it, too, was inspired by European ideas, specifically those of an Italian architect, de Angelis d'Ossat, who was then associated with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).

877 Gillot 2010: 8.

878 Starzman 2012: 401.

879 Anderson 1991: pg.

880 Again, for holistic treatement of the roots of archaeological thought and the changing archaeological mind, see Trigger 1989.

features".[881] Indeed when seen from the angles described above, archaeology in Sudan seems no different. Therefore archaeologists must accept that this supports archaeology's purported status as 'colonial'.

The presence of Qatar within Sudanese archaeology is also worth questioning and examining further in light of this discussion. Qatar is, after all, not only involved in archaeological site management, being one of the main bodies sponsoring such management processes in the case-study area, but also one of the major states involved in the leasing of land along the Nile Valley that has led to land expropriation and scarcity on such a fraught scale. Qatar thus openly contributes to the dispossession of site-community residents in the case-study area via two paths. The question, then, is, what is actually happening here? And what are the implications of this for archaeologists?

As mentioned above, in 2014[882] the state of Qatar donated $135 million—an unprecedented amount of funding—to archaeological projects in Sudan via their main cultural heritage body, Qatar Museums.[883] The money has since been overseen by the Nubian Archaeological Development Organization (NADO) and its managing body, Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP), both of which are, somewhat ironically, registered in the Registrar of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, under the section of 'Humanitarian Affairs' in the Ministry of the Interior, and subject to the Law of Voluntary and Humanitarian Work. The deeper functions of this donation have not, however, been publically discussed (although see Bradshaw 2015, below). At the time, the Sudanese happily reported that this was "Qatar rain[ing] money" (q*atar garush matar*); archaeologists were similarly delighted because rarely do such sums make their way into the archaeological sphere. According to the Qataris' most recent announcement, they have "rescued" of some of Sudan's most precious archaeological sites;[884] the Goethe Institut has also presented projects such as the Qatari Mission to the Pyramids of Sudan (QMPS) as an unequivocal "success".[885] One newspaper (clearly in the service of the Qatari state) describes how QM has "increased accessibility to the sites for the local population" and that an "updated touristic infrastructure has already been developed in their proximity," because "QSAP was designed with accessibility for the local community and ownership by this population in mind".[886] Recent visits and reports from friends and colleagues on the ground suggest that most of this is rhetoric. The rationale behind such positive German reportage is therefore likely to be because the German Archaeological Institute (DAI) is a major partner of QMPS: it is co-directed by the DAI

881 Starzman 2012: 401.

882 The news of the donation (below) emerged in March 2014, but archaeologists had been aware of and even received money well before this date, apparently as early as 2012. Certainly UCLQ was up and running in Sudan by this date.

883 A number of outlets reported news of the 'donation', such as G. Gibbon, 'Qatar invests $135m in archaeological heritage of Sudan', *Arabianindustry.com*, 24 March 2014; and M-B. Griggs, 'Qatar Gives $135 Million to Sudan for Archaeological Projects', *Smithsonianmag.com*, 27 March 2014.

884 Embassy of Qatar, 'Qatar rescues the pyramids in Sudan with the support of Germany', 9 June 2017.

885 Goethe Institut, 'Press release: Qatar Museums and the German Archaeological Institute present fascinating findings from five years of fieldwork', 3 May 2017.

886 Gulf Times, 'QM shares latest success of landmark Qatar-Sudan archaeological project', 3 September 2017. Quotes from QM's acting chief archaeology officer, Ali al-Kubaisi.

Domat al-Hamadab project director, and several other German scholars are involved in proceedings at the highest level. British, Polish, American and indeed many other multi-national teams also receive funding from QSAP; unilateral silence on the potential political machinations behind the funding is thus not surprising. If archaeologists were—or are—dubious about Qatar's motivations, their suspicion has expediently remained behind closed doors.

In short, and in the opinion of this author, the clear incentive behind Qatar's granting of this funding has been to cement relations and ensure political cooperation between itself and Sudan: this is what Winter (2015) and Kernel and Luke (2015) call 'heritage diplomacy'—a form of Nye's (2004) 'soft power'—at its most obvious. Heritage diplomacy can be seen elsewhere across the globe, notably in China's initiatives along the Silk Road.[887] But what are the benefits for each state in forging such an alliance? And how effective has archaeology been in reaching such an objective?

For Qatar, such a donation provides them with a reliable, and fundamentally malleable, partner to help further its domestic and international interests. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Sudan allows Qatar to lease land and take water to feed and quench its own population; since c. 2013 Qatar has lacked the ability to adequately provide for its citizens from its own resources. A solid Qatari-Sudanese relationship also serves to further Qatar's geopolitical aspirations in the region. Support of Sudan furthers Qatar's goal of undermining President Abdel Fatah Sisi's secular military state in Egypt, whose 2014 overthrow of the Qatari-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi was upsetting for them to say the least. Reports from the same year certainly suggest that Egypt has been concerned that sponsorship of Sudan's heritage industry will somehow dent their own.[888] At the same time, an alliance forged through archaeology also allows Qatar to compete for regional influence with Saudi Arabia's House of Saud who also lease vast tracts of land in the Nile Valley and who, since at least 2015, have enjoyed the support of Sudanese ground troops in its war against 'Houthi' (Shia) 'rebels' in Yemen.[889] Qatar also has a clear investment in the Yemeni war, but has a fundamentally troubled love-hate relationship with Saudi Arabia based, at least in part, upon the (Qatari) Salafist vs. (Saudi) Wahabi world vision. Therefore, while it might seem cynical to disbelieve Qatari rhetoric about caring for cultural heritage,[890] it is seems much more likely that the alliance is

887 See Winter 2016. Similar relationships may emerge between Sudan and Japan ("…we are planning for exhibitions in Qatar, Japan and Korea," said Mr. Ali of the National Corporation for Antiquities. I. Kushkush, 2013. 'Ancient Kingdoms in Land of War', *The New York Times*, 31 March 2013.) Cf. Sudanese Media Centre, 'Sudan: Academic Cooperation between Japan and Sudan', Sudanese Media Centre, 2 October 2017. For the example of Japanese interventions in Jordan, see Kernel and Luke (2015).

888 "Qatar's move to invest $135m (£100m) in projects to develop Sudan's archaeological sites is seen by many in Cairo as an attempt to undermine the struggling tourism sector in Egypt and part of ongoing efforts by the Gulf emirate to discredit Egypt and its leadership." BBC, 'The Qatari princess, Angelina Jolie and the battle of the pyramids', 20 May 2017.

889 G. Cafiero, 'Sudan gets $2.2bn for joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen war', *Al-Monitor*, 23 November 2015.

890 Several things are claimed by QM: that they "delivered long-lasting and positive impact in preserving World Heritage sites and promoting tourism in Sudan" as well as that "As a country, Qatar has a strong commitment and interest in celebrating and preserving cultural history, heritage and traditions and putting people in touch with their past," (Gulf Times, 'QM shares latest success of landmark Qatar-Sudan archaeological project', 3 September 2017).

forged on these bases; if archaeology has anything to do with this scenario in and of itself, it is because Qatar wishes to improve its standing at home and abroad.

For Sudan, Qatar provides an opportunity to generate much-needed revenue from the land and water it leases. As noted in Chapters 4 and 6, the loss of oil revenue following the 2011 split from South Sudan has negatively affected the Sudanese economy, and with military spending taking up to 70% of the national budget,[891] they are in need of filling a considerable financial deficit. Of course Russia, China, and the UAE are also major partners of Sudan (in the gold mining, water, and food and water industries respectively), but they have not been so clearly involved in cultural and heritage diplomacy too.[892] Unlike Saudi Arabia, and indeed unlike Iran (with whom Sudan definitively cut off relations in 2014-15[893]), Qatar and Sudan also share ideologies of political Islam, as Sudan has been run for the past 30 years by a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government. Qatar also acts as a mediator for Sudan's peace process with 'rebel' groups in Darfur[894] and long-desired rapprochement with the West. Although it seems that the UAE ended up being the main broker between the Sudan and the US, this Gulf-facing strategy has paid dividends: in September 2017, the US removed Sudan from the list of countries in the travel ban[895] and eased the sanctions it had held over Sudan for the past 20 years.[896] Such is the importance of Qatar to Sudanese foreign policy that at the time of writing, Sudan was endeavouring to stay neutral in a tussle between Qatar and Saudi Arabia states;[897] that it allowed Qatar to use Sudanese air space when it had been shut off by Saudi Arabia and other pro-Saudi Gulf states was not insignificant.

It is thus possible to see the ways in which archaeology is used as a diplomatic strategy by both Qatar and Sudan in contemporary foreign policy and international relations. In this instance, archaeology helps one state influence the behaviour of another in order to achieve certain (positive, beneficial, 'better') outcomes. This, in turn, has an impact upon archaeology's impact upon site-community residents because it has provided archaeological teams with money that previously would have been untenable, even when armed with the title of 'World Heritage' and the nominal support of UNESCO. Again, this is 'soft power' (Nye 2004) and 'heritage diplomacy' as enticement and

891 Nuba Reports, 'Sudan Now Spending Up to 70% of Its Budget on War', 12 February 2016.

892 See Lane, Kleinitz and Gao (2016) for Sino-African relations with regard to heritage, which basically argues that there is one pre-development rule in China and none in Africa, although it depends on the level of regulation insisted upon by the home country.

893 Reuters, 'As economy crumbles, Sudan ditches Iran for Saudi patronage', 12 January 2016. Al-Monitor, 'Why Sudan wants to stop the 'spread of Shiism', 19 January 2016.

894 See the Doha Document for Peace in Sudan. Also see Gulf Times, 'Bashir lauds Qatar's role in Sudan peace process' 12 September 2016.

895 C. Baynes, 'Donald Trump drops Sudan from US travel ban 'after lobbying by UAE'', *Independent*, 25 September 2017.

896 BBC, 'Sudan sanctions: US lifts most economic restrictions after two decades', 6 October 2017.

897 At the moment a delicate situation for Sudan, between Saudi and Qatar: G. Cafiero, 'Qatar-GCC crisis unsettles Sudan', *Al-Monitor*, 20 June 2017; Middle East Monitor, 'Saudis pressure Sudan's Al-Bashir to boycott Qatar', 3 July 2017; W. Hussein, 'Egypt, Sudan stray further apart over Gulf crisis', *Al-Monitor*, 17 August 2017.

coercion rather than physical force:[898] geopolitical support is the 'string attached' to the archaeological funding.[899] Superficially, the suggestion made earlier in the chapter that World Heritage and Salafism are two opposing global forces, might seem ridiculous: surely Qatar and UNESCO are working towards the same goal? However, when seen in the light of ideology and foreign policy, and when put together with land grabbing, Kernel and Luke's (2015) argument that these policies "reify neo-imperialistic legacies"[900] becomes convincing.

8.1.3.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice

What is abundantly clear from these findings is that, first and foremost, archaeological site management plans cannot be made without consultation with communities about their economic needs: as ICOMOS noted in 2011, "there are sufficient means to control [site management] as long as the antiquities authority (NCAM), the local authorities and local communities hold regular meetings to discuss development plans."[901] A major first step towards being able to understand the perspectives communicated in such meetings is to see land with "a broader integrative view...[that] also includes natural resources: soils, minerals, waters and biodata that the land comprises"[902] and to remember that what might seem like 'disuse' of or 'disconnection' with land cannot be presumed to be so nor used as a justification for displacing people from their land.[903] If alternative solutions to site management plans that damage the livelihoods of site-communities and destroy their social connections to the land cannot be found, they may thus need to be accompanied by fair compensation, the provision of alternative jobs and improvements to the local infrastructure. However, the Sudanese government's record in these areas is poor, which has led to conflict in the past. As Heierland (2011) has written about the nomadic pastoralists living around the monumental Kushite archaeological site of Naga (also part of the Island of Meroe UNESCO site), "the voice and destiny of local people living near the sites is not present at the events [she] studied":[904] Even if they are held, 'consultation meetings' of 'stakeholders' do not guarantee solutions that meet the needs of the site-communities and promises are often seen as lies.[905] As Meskell notes about communities in South Africa, "reparations have not been forthcoming in their lifetimes and there is always the hopeless sense that promises are meant to sustain people and stave off potential conflict."[906]

898 Further study would clarify the extent to which Qatari funding of archaeology involves Cornago's (2013) three diplomatic tracks (official statecraft, unofficial dialogue, grassroots programmes). Also see Goode 2007.
899 Kernel and Luke 2015: 72.
900 Kernel and Luke 2015: 70.
901 ICOMOS Advisory Body Evaluation (1336) 2011: 104.
902 Salih 1999.
903 Galaty 2014.
904 Heierland 2011: Résumé.
905 For critiques of UNESCO also see Deegan 2012; Eriksen 2001; Meskell 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b.
906 Meskell 2007: 398.

Responsibility for resolving these issues clearly resides with the state and especially with NCAM, the body to which the state devolves operational responsibility for the preservation, conservation, management and presentation of the archaeological sites. However, as was noted in Chapter 7, the Sudanese state does not fund NCAM well enough to allow it to provide adequate protection for the archaeological sites. And, in many ways, NCAM and its relationship with the central government can actually prohibit and constrain the work of archeologists on the ground, particularly when it comes to forming relationships of trust (mentioned above). Yet there is no reason why the job of ensuring that site management takes the needs of the site-communities into account should rest solely on the shoulders of archaeologists. Nevertheless, there are ethical reasons for archaeologists to get involved. They are certainly well-placed to play a mediating role between the site-communities among which they work and bodies such as NCAM and UNESCO, and they are, after all, already playing an important economic role in the area through the provision of wage employment (Chapter 6).

However, if archaeologists are to play such a role it is important that they understand the perspective of the site-communities on the economic and social issues that archaeology raises for them (as concluded above). It is clear, for example, that archaeologists have under-appreciated the importance of acacia to the site-communities, especially to the pastoralists, which is highlighted by the characterization of residents as the main 'threat' to archaeological sites, the site management plans themselves if not also by the absence of a discussion about acacia in NCAM's UNESCO Management Plan. A people- and context-centred way of examining the issues would instead aim to look beyond concerns for "the site or structure"[907] and reassess the idea that "cultural identity is literally"—and *only*—"embodied in material objects"[908] to consider how structures and objects exist in relation to the socio-economic concerns of the people that live around them. Indeed some progressive archaeologists have questioned the hierarchy of values behind this imperative to preserve (who, for example, decides which sites are 'worth' protecting?) and asked whether the principle to try to preserve sites is always applicable in non-Western contexts. Mydland and Grahn (2014) as well as Smith (2006) have described how decisions about preservation and conservation are almost exclusively made in alignment with authorized heritage discourse (Chapter 2). For scholars in this camp, the gulf between top-down Western ideas of archaeological preservation (such as those embodied by UNESCO) and indigenous value systems requires new approaches. Mire, for example, argues that a material-centred view of Somalian cultural heritage, including archaeology, may not only be impractical but misguided; she has suggested that archaeologists should "preserve knowledge rather than objects", particularly in resource-scarce contexts.[909] Churchill's comment in 1902, that "…the people [must] starve in order that professors may exult and tourists find some place on which to scratch their names",[910] seems

907 Hinkel 1992: 149.
908 Hollowell 2006.
909 Mire 2006.
910 Quoted in Sandes 1937: 383.

particularly relevant. As Arenas notes for Latin America, "So long as archaeologists and ethnohistorians are concerned exclusively with the recovery of material objects, their research contributes nothing to explanations of the contemporary realities…"[911] Trigger again provides a summary of the present author's opinion:

> [B]ecause they require permission from Sudanese authorities to work in the country, these archaeologists must ponder the consequences for their research of what they say and do to a far greater extent than they ever had to before…Intellectual integrity requires an awareness of the social and political conditions in which archaeology is practiced…[912]

In practical terms such an approach will cost the archaeologists time and money, and require them to review their mandate, putting Western-created (and colonial-inspired) heritage law and ideology on the backburner and learning how to adjust practices in line with Sudanese needs. Currently, the archaeological discipline is based around a number of 'core,' self-reflexive, practices and 'peripheral', optional, practices. Excavation, recording, interpreting and publishing are the core and self-reflexive practices; community outreach, multivocal interpretation and political engagement are very much at the periphery. The present researcher observed that it was uncommon for archaeologists to spend time in the community and those who did were noted for it by the residents; there was certainly no culture of intensive interaction. Again parallels might be raised with oil: speaking of the contestations in Sudan the early 1980s, Warburg concludes,

> …those disputes showed that in tense situations…any decision concerning border regions, especially ones potentially rich…had to be taken only after consultation with the local inhabitants – taking their sensitivities into account – and after careful consideration of the rights and wrongs of the case.[913]

There can be no doubt, however, that getting close to the site-communities is genuinely hard for archaeologists; time 'in the field' and control over their project is what they have worked hard for. Because foreign archaeological field campaigns in Africa and the Middle East usually take place once a year and only last several weeks, the excavators work under extreme time pressure, requiring members of excavation teams to work long hours (15-hour working days are typical). Financial constraints are a constant issue; the research institution is invested because they have given money and logistical help and are expecting a successful write up. As Brodie notes,

> It is easier to attract funding for a project with a recognizable product of intellectual significance (an excavation report) than for associated conservation and educational initiatives that have a less well-defined public utility.[914]

911 Arenas 1995: 58.
912 Trigger 1994: 345.
913 Warburg 1992: 158.
914 Brodie 2010: 266.

And, as Hourmouziadi and Touloumis have argued, there is already a worldwide crisis in the humanities with underpaid graduates and a great deal of "professional uncertainty".[915] There would, therefore, need to be change at an institutional level: academic establishments and funding bodies would have to give financial support for ethnographic projects (such as this one) that would work to understand the economic, social, political and cultural impacts of archaeology, in addition to funding for the 'core' purpose of archaeological investigation.[916] This would herald in a paradigm change, a 'democratization' or, even better a 'decolonization', whereby the archaeologists privilege their relationship with the site-communities as much as they do with the state,[917] and work hard at building trust with site-community residents.[918] Lack of open resistance by site-community residents cannot be presumed to be agreement, nor even of acceptance:

> …outward signs of peasants' quiescence or acceptance of impoverishment, exploitation, and the like cannot be taken at face value…often such appearances are facades hiding different, often contrary views and actions that grow from peasants' discontent and antipathy to how higher status, more powerful people and institutions treat them. Rather than accepting the status quo, peasants often harbour alternative visions, values and beliefs for how resources should be produced, distributed, and used.[919]

Silence is also a topical theme considering archaeologists' lack of open and public discussion about Qatari intervention in Sudanese archaeology. Naturally archaeologists have privately debated the dimensions of the funding: as Shankland observed, "…it is only in informal conversation" that the archaeologists discuss "the political context of the[ir] funding award".[920] Typical justifications include(d): "Someone's got to do it"; "if I don't someone else will"; "there are lots of good things that come from Qatar's money…" They are all correct in some senses: there are no doubt other archaeologists that would lift the baton of any scholar who 'dropped out'; and, as seen in Chapter 6, Qatari money can also trickle down to site-community residents in positive ways. Yet the point remains: no one has publicly questioned the motivations behind the donation, except perhaps the present author.[921] Even then the author's article, published by Middle Eastern online news outlet *Al-Monitor,* was written to purposely end on a positive note to avoid jeopardizing the work of the many archaeologists in receipt of said funding. Simply put, the desire not to rock the boat silences this aspect of the archaeological industry even though archaeologists are actively playing the role of

915 Hourmouziadi and Touloumis 2010: 303.
916 Starzman 2012: 407. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions and constraints (financial as well as administrative) of archaeological fieldwork, see Pollock (2010).
917 Pollock and Bernbeck 2004: 41-44.
918 Gomes 2006: 153; Meskell 2007: 386.
919 Kerkvliet 2009: 233.
920 Shankland 1999: 141.
921 R. Bradshaw, 'Will Qatar's investment in ancient pyramids bring tourists to Sudan?', *Al-Monitor*, 7 December 2015. For example Elbagir correctly notes the tie between antiquities and foreign policy but stops short of criticising Qatar who also pour millions into land grabbing. See Y. Elbagir, Sudan's antiquities are under threat as Gulf crisis rages', *Financial Times*, 10 August 2017.

'unofficial cultural ambassadors' or 'diplomats' in what is, in the opinion of this author, an ethically-charged operation.[922]

Of course there are few instances in which the objectively 'correct' course of action is clear. What is important is that increasingly

> Portraying politics as something we can choose to do or not, as a place or an occupation to go into or not, has the pernicious effect of allowing, even encouraging, anyone who is not a politician or self-consciously engaged in political activity to somehow think s/he is above or beyond politics.[923]

The implications for archaeological practice are therefore to openly recognize that archaeology is "entangled between Sudanese institutions at various levels – local agreements, national laws and global ideas",[924] to talk about them, and to be able to justify the decisions made.[925]

*

Although they have received more archaeological attention than most, Hamadab and Bejrawiya are typical examples of sedentary agricultural villages in Sudan's Nile Valley, most of which are located between the fertile strip of cultivation along the Nile and the desert hinterland, and therefore of site-communities in Sudan more generally, because archaeology is a predominantly Nile-based rural phenomenon. The approach taken here—that is, to go beyond identity to look at the socio-economic impacts of archaeology—and the results presented may very well have bearing and applicability elsewhere in the Nile Valley and indeed across Sudan. Extant literature from Chapter 2 actually suggest that there are many other places across the Middle East where these results find their parallel: the work of Shankland in Turkey, Burtenshaw in Jordan and Gillot in Syria are just three examples of site-communities about which similar things might be said, not to mention Rodriguez and Gomes about Latin America. The thesis—its impacts and implications—therefore has relevance not just for Sudan but the rest of the world.

922 Kernel and Luke 2015: 72.
923 Kerkvliet 2009: 240.
924 Gertel, Calkins and Rottenburg 2014: 8.
925 Winter's 2016 piece on China's heritage diplomacy initiative, 'One Belt, One Road', that aims to build connectivity and cooperation across China itself, Central Asia and the Middle East, is a good example of the in-depth awareness that should be required by practitioners working in the heritage industry.

8.2 Collaborative Archaeologies: A Regional Comparison of Initiatives

The previous sections have highlighted that this study has a number of important implications for the practice of archaeology in Sudan. With regards to the findings about archaeology's ideational impact upon identity, it suggested that:

1. the state is a very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which modern populations connect with archaeology.
2. archaeologists should simultaneously consider if they should stop writing exclusively 'Nubian' history and also distribute their own findings to the local residents in a more meaningful way;
3. site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between the residents and archaeological sites;
4. archaeologists stop assuming that archaeology is of importance to residents in the same ways in which it is important to them; and
5. archaeologists have more egalitarian views of what constitutes 'archaeology' and 'heritage' and to cease conceptualizing the residents' history as 'folklore'.

Archaeologists in Sudan therefore need to amend the culture of knowledge production in two ways: first, they need to invest more in the *production* and serious recording of the archaeologies and knowledges of the local residents, even if this proves tricky in practice; second, they need to *distribute* the archaeologies and knowledges they produce themselves more equally.

Chapter 6, the section on archaeology's economic impact, further showed that

6. there may be a necessity for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad, including rules pertaining to activities to archaeological work such as hiring and employment practices.
7. as employers, archaeologists should be aware of the local and national financial context, including relative salaries, unemployment rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates between social groups.

Finally, Chapter 7 regarding site management and local livelihoods illustrated that

8. archaeological site management plans cannot be made without consultation with communities about their economic needs;
9. what might seem like 'disuse' of or 'disconnection' with land cannot be presumed to be so; and
10. it is important to understand the perspective of the site-communities on the economic and social issues that archaeology raises for them.

Like the implications outlined above, such an approach will cost the archaeologists time and money, and require them to review their mandate in practical terms. More fundamentally, archaeologists need to openly recognize that archaeology is "entangled", and could benefit from talking about these issues in a non-confrontational manner so they can justify decisions they make.

However what has not yet been fully discussed are the collaborative archaeologies that have been initiated by archaeologists and other professionals in response to such findings and that can provide insights into how alternative socio-economic dynamics might be developed. The colonial and neo-colonial structures that have produced such results have been shaped by archaeological practices in Africa and beyond,[926] but are increasingly subject to inspection by archaeologists and other heritage professionals. Such scrutiny has bred forms of 'community'[927] and 'public'[928] archaeology and other collaborative practices that are inclusive of the needs and rights of the relevant stakeholders,[929] publics,[930] and communities;[931] practices that are viewed as tools with which to begin 'decolonizing' the damaging paradigms archaeologists uphold and represent.[932]

The aim of such ventures (here signified by the umbrella term 'collaborative archaeologies') is thus to redress the global economic, social and cultural imbalances, which archaeology has played a part in constructing.[933] However as many others have noted, collaborative archaeologies take many forms and there is considerable heterogeneity in how they are conducted. To understand the theoretical paradigm of collaborative archaeology, it has been useful to ask three questions: 'What should collaborative archaeology be?'; 'What should collaborative archaeology do?'; and, 'How should collaborative archaeologists seek to accomplish their aims?' Answers to these questions help establish some of the many qualities and objectives that collaborative archaeology is perceived to require, as well as the methods necessary to become a 'decolonized' phenomenon.

Qualities: What should collaborative archaeology be?

The philosophy of collaborative archaeology is that it adopts a number of overlapping characteristics and thus engenders a change in the discipline's fundamental nature. These characteristics include, but are not limited to, archaeology becoming:

926 Baharani 1998, Díaz-Andreu 2007.
927 Marshall 2002, Belford 2014.
928 McGimsey 1972, Moshenka 2010.
929 Matthews 2008, for whom 'descendant communities' are a key stakeholder group and thus entitled to be 'co-creators' of the particular contexts in which archaeological knowledges are produced.
930 Moshenka 2010.
931 Atalay 2012; Belford 2014; Straight et al. 2015.
932 Hamilakis 2008 for Greece, Schmidt 2016 for Africa.
933 Smith 1999; Atalay 2006; Hamilakis 2008; Pollock 2010.

- *Interpretive*: Archaeology and archaeologists as providing interpretation not fact, and/or open to, if not directly inclusive of, multivocal interpretations of the same materials;[934]
- *Reflexive*: Writers being aritically self-aware of their own biases and influences in the production of knowledge;[935]
- *Therapeutic:* Mindful of the quality of experience which archaeology can, and should, bring to contemporary society. In this vision, archaeology can act as a "therapeutic service" that gives "spiritual and economic upliftment"[936] and even "ontological security", not only to individuals (Giddens 1991) but also to states (Steele 2008);
- *Relevant:* Connected to contemporary identity, history and culture;[937] rejecting the idea of "assimilating excluded communities into an understanding of traditional definitions" and moving towards practices that "serve a diversity of cultural and historical experiences";[938]
- *Useable:* Providing some tangible insight into modern-day problems, for example "to review the environmental narratives that inform current policy interventions";[939] and,
- *Ethical*: Respectful and sensitive to the experience and knowledge of others; Indeed, as Hamilakis notes, "[a]rchaeological ethics must be politically aware, sensitive to the pain of the other, or they are nothing."[940]

Objectives: What should collaborative archaeology do?

Scholars broadly agree that there are at least two things that a decolonizing collaborative archaeology should seek to do:

a. Empower

For scholars who live and work in developing countries, or even in low-income areas in the West, there has been an increasing feeling that archaeology needs to be used for social action and empowerment[941] above and beyond a veneer of multiculturalism that shrouds the fact that for the communities in question, nothing has really changed.[942] For example, viewing archaeology as a type of 'applied anthropology', Pyburn envisions its future as a positive political-power force, which, using

934 See references above.
935 See references above.
936 Meskell 2005a: 82. Also see Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008 and Little 2009 for archaeology and 'peace'.
937 Atalay 2012; Straight et al. 2015; Selvakumar 2010.
938 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 567 using Waterton and Smith 2010: 11. Waterton and Smith distinguish between 'recognition' and 'misrecognition' of community heritage.
939 Lane 2011: 13. Also see Ranger 1976 (although a historian); Jewsiewicki 1989.
940 Hamilakis 2003: 108. Also see Tilley 1989; Breglia 2006a; Roynane 2008; Meskell 2010.
941 Little and Shackel 2007; Pyrburn 2008; Stottman 2010.
942 See Wallace 1994 and Gnecco 2015.

a Participatory Action Research model, can achieve parity between communities and archaeologists in the ethical production of knowledge.[943] In real terms, such visions imply increased interaction between archaeologists and communities as well as the significant involvement of the latter in project design, from the questions asked, and the methods chosen as site management, to the publication and display of findings. As Mydland and Grahn have noted, this principle has now reached the Council of Europe, two of whose recent conventions emphasized "local participation in decision-making processes related to heritage."[944]

As a consequence, collaborative archaeologies that are truly decolonizing often advocate a reduction in their own right to control in favour of shared control with local communities. With reference to her work with the Parauá in the Amazon, Gomes echoes all of the scholars above when suggesting that "the only solution to conflict of interest between researchers and communities is to facilitate partial control by the latter over access to the past."[945] Of course, this is not easy: in their study of implementing a collaborative archaeology project with the Samburu in Kenya, Straight et al. (2015) show that even projects that are collaborative in conception can be riddled with ethical and political pitfalls when it comes to implementation. Nevertheless, the use of archaeology for social action and the relinquishing of control are widely recognized as important steps in creating a new and improved archaeology.

b. Develop

Site management often involves the building of fences, walls, buildings and signposts, which has had an obvious impact upon the landscape and often disrupted the lives of local communities, e.g. through requisitioning of farmland or blocking of traditional thoroughfares. A key concern for proponents of social archaeology has been to ensure that site-management plans minimally offend and disenfranchise locals, mindful of how, for instance, extraction of mineral resources has caused degradation of environments, destruction of livelihoods, and deterioration of human rights and local identities; Meskell's (2013a, 2013b) comments about UNESCO are typical of this trend.

These concerns have matured over time, and a primary contemporary aim of archaeology, beyond Joyce's principle of 'not doing harm', is pro-actively 'doing good' and even 'developing'. If "[e]conomies are going to continue to develop and communities are going to continue to be confronted with change", then "heritage and archaeology cannot avoid being at the centre of that

943 Pyrburn 2008; Hollowell and Nicholas 2008.
944 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 565, referring to "The Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (the 'Faro convention', which came into force in 2011, and the European Landscape Convention, which came into force in 2004."
945 Gomes 2006: 149; see Layton 1994.

process."[946] Indeed, Shankland believes in the principle that "as well as any ideological influence, excavations, particularly large ones, [should] have a very significant effect on the economy of village communities as they develop, particularly on those less well off."[947] Thus, archaeology's mandate is now seen to include being a critical force for human, rather than short-term economic or abstractly cultural, development: archaeology's future, anywhere, cannot be conceived in isolation from development.

Methods: How should collaborative archaeology be conducted?

In its current paradigm, collaborative archaeology is interdisciplinary, utilizing tools common to a range of disciplines (see Chapters 2 and 3). Most scholars cited in this review have used ethnography, a research method employed most commonly in anthropology and which uses participant observation to gather data. For Lane (2011) and Hamilakis (2008), for example, key tools include critical and reflexive ethnography within the context of an archaeological project (echoing Hodder et al.), and also hybrid methodologies that create alternative histories (echoing Schmidt et al.).

*

The idea of designing projects with such pronounced social elements stretches back as far back as 1972[948] and should therefore be part of archaeology's mainstream; it is certainly an ever-growing discourse. However while there have been notable successes within indigenous archaeology with 'descendant groups' such as Native Americans[949] and Native Australians (also see Chapter 2), as well as more limited but nonetheless pioneering work with African Americans,[950] it is only more recently that the broad field of community archaeology is gaining real traction. As Wylie notes, such a paradigm shift

> has generated responses [from archaeologists] that fall along a continuum, ranging from hostile resistance at one extreme, through grudging compliance with requirements of consent and consultation, to a range of creative, collaborative forms of practice in which control over archaeological goals and products, conduct and authority is redistributed among partners.[951]

Having watched the development of indigenous archaeology go from its beginnings in satisfying descendant communities' 'moral and political concerns' to something 'robustly epistemic', Wylie's frame of analysis is useful when considering such a scale of collaborative practice. Indeed from these responses she has identified three forms of collaborative practices, all of which are theoretically based

946 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014: 5.
947 Shankland 1996: 356.
948 For example McGimsey's *Public Archaeology* (1972).
949 Echo-Hawk 1997; Smith 1999; Atalay 2006, 2012; Colwell 2016.
950 E.g. McDavid 1997, 2002.
951 Wylie 2015: 4.

upon the principles mentioned above, but differ in the level to which archaeologists commit to the various elements of paradigm. The first form of collaborative practice, namely 'syncretic pluralism', frames the archaeologists as having baseline respect for the principles and agreeing with all the ideational criteria of 'collaborative archaeology' (respect, reciprocity, reflexivity and so on) but not actively engaging with it or allowing it to shape their practice. Archaeologists in this group still constitute the majority of practitioners (indeed see below). The second form of collaborative practice is the first of two forms of 'dynamic pluralism' namely 'limited cross-fertilisation', in which some ideas are exchanged from archaeologist to community and vice versa, but ultimately fails to really destabilize the traditional boundaries of interaction and authority. The third form of collaborative practice is what Wylie terms 'epistemic engagement', the second form of dynamic pluralism, and describes projects in which archaeologists and community members take on board and shape one another's epistemologies through processes of shared decision-making. As Derry has suggested, "if the community does not help define the questions, the answers probably will not interest them".[952]

Of course this framework is not the definitive measuring stick for what constitutes a collaborative archaeology: a similar evaluative framework might ask about whether in its current form archaeology is 'colonial' or 'neo-colonial',[953] whether general practices contribute towards 'decolonizing' archaeology, and, increasingly, whether archaeology is a hybrid practice and thus whether it can become a 'post-colonial' discipline.[954] However Wylie's is a useful model for evaluating the range of collaborative archaeologies that exist in the region and will be used to situate Sudan in comparison with some of its neighbours.

952 Derry 1997: 24.

953 Shepherd 2003 and Starzman 2012 certainly see archaeology as part of a colonial structure. Matthews (2008) has also revisited the asymmetrical power dynamic between 'colonist' and 'colonized' to show how it continues to structure relations in developing countries between archaeology's main stakeholders namely government, archaeologists and local communities, with the latter positioned as the weakest party. Lane (2011) also points to Baharani and Schmidt as scholars who, "in spite of the decolonization process", still see archaeology as "the 'stepchild' of imperialism." (Lane 2011: 9; also see Baharani 1998; Schmidt 1995, 2009).

954 Not all scholars agree that archaeology is a colonial or neo-colonial practice; some suggest that archaeology is and/or is becoming a hybrid post-colonial practice. Gillot suggests that such criticism wrongly implies that "archaeology is only a tool of [colonial] domination with no popular basis." (Gillot 2010: 4). Referring to the development of archaeology in Syria in his argument about hybridity, Gillot points to the participation of large numbers of what he calls "the Syrian intellectual and urban elite, as members of archaeological societies and heritage associations" (Gillot 2010: 11) and also to the nationalization of the Syrian Antiquities Service in 1959 as evidence of early local involvement in archaeology. Gillot thus draws upon post-colonial theories which stress the importance of the local population and the mutual influence between Western and Syrian archaeologists, institutions, civil society and communities in all archaeological aspects, even though he acknowledges that most archaeological missions in Syria are foreign. Indeed he asks: If we take into account the local reformulation and appropriation of foreign research, as well as local discourses about the past, why should we not consider 'Syrian' archaeology as a 'hybrid' practice? (Gillot 2010: 15). Hamilakis (2008), too, prefers to conceptualize modern Greek archaeology as the product of a "syncretic process" whose roots lay in "a series of indigenous, alternative, pre-modern archaeologies" rather than in a cultural vacuum. Lane (2011) also takes this perspective when evaluating what he calls the 'useable pasts' approach and the 'indigenous epistemologies' approach (both noted above). While Lane recognizes that there has been a limited take-up of such approaches, he nevertheless suggests that archaeologists working in this milieu adopt a less monolithic view of archaeology's development to consider post-colonial theories that suggest that colonialism was capable of provoking "new, hybrid or creolized forms of culture." (Lane 2011: 9.) For Lane, archaeology is, and has been, participatory, hybrid, independently meaningful and anti-colonial. This aligns with the views of many non-Western scholars who, as Lane (2011) notes, have long aimed to transform archaeology into a practice that can address critical economic and political issues in addition to aiding cultural diversity and integrity.

8.2.1 Sudan

It has already been shown in Chapter 8 that, in the view of this author, there is a lingering colonial framework structuring archaeological practice in Sudan, one which chimes with the neo-colonial practices of the GCC. Furthermore Chapter 2 ('Gaps') showed that little archaeological ethnography takes place in Sudan, and the 'Rationale' for this thesis (also Chapter 2) was itself based upon the lack of conversations surrounding archaeological practice *despite* the significance of the events surrounding dam building. It is thus unsurprising that the same might be said for community-orientated archaeologies in Sudan: they are notably lacking. Even an 'indigenous archaeology' for Nubians has not developed.

There are some important exceptions, of course: several teams have noted the lack of impact archaeologists have had with regards to community outreach and begun providing the residents of the nearby communities using short booklets and/or children's books in Arabic about the history of archaeological sites they work on (booklets can be found detailing the archaeological history of Amara West, Kawa, al-Khandaq, Dangeil, Meroe and Hamadab to name a few, although not all are published in Arabic or have been widely disseminated in the community); other teams have produced children's books (the Amara West mission's book is titled, 'Life in the Heart of Nubia: Abri, Amara East and Ernetta Island', of which 650 were disseminated;"[955] the Mograt Island mission's book is titled, 'Discovering Mograt Island Together', of which 1,000 were disseminated[956]). Other types of educational engagements have also taken place, such as the British Council in the Sudan's Cultural Heritage and Museums Festival, held at the National Museum in Khartoum in 2014 and organized with Dr Mahmoud Suliman Bashir of the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums in Sudan (NCAM). The aim of this festival was to create a more effective learning environment for the museum's school-aged visitors, to train young Sudanese archaeologists in the field of heritage management and the theory behind the museum's role in education, and to highlight to decision-makers the need for the museum to develop a separate education department.[957] The UCLQ community team, which is currently implemented by the present author (see below 'Impacts of this Research'), has also sought to use such tools since the early stages of the project, beginning with a programme of community engagements. These engagements ranged from the team making extended house visits and attending social events to delivering community lectures (given by residents to the archaeologists and vice versa), meetings held in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 in a total of six villages, film-screenings and festivals, building a small information point, distributing DVDs, 1,350 children's books, and generating multi-media output in English and Arabic in open access settings.[958]

955 Fushiya n.d.
956 Tully and Näser 2016; also see Tully 2014 and Tully 2015 for further details.
957 Pers. comm., Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Head of Fieldwork NCAM, July 2016.
958 Humphris and Bradshaw 2017.

Only a few teams have begun collaborative heritage ventures, in which archaeologists are framed as the ones learning. An important exception that as part of their efforts to valorize and promote engagement with local heritage spaces on Mograt Island, Kleinitz and Merlo (2014) used GIS movement-tracking technology and collaborated with local community members to map the island's important mnemonic points. The University of Michigan has also begun a programme of heritage activity at the site of el-Kurru in Northern State, but the details are not clear and not yet clarified or evaluated in a publication.[959] There are no doubt several more instances of such community-focused endeavours currently in operation in Sudan uncited by the present author, perhaps because they are often not termed as such, or are perhaps not considered significant enough in relation to broader research projects to warrant an official title. Lack of publication about endeavours, and lack of open discussion more broadly, also hampers a full audit of 'community archaeologies' in Sudan. The projects above are nevertheless the most well known.

In terms of the implications outlined at the start of this section, the above initiatives that focused upon education and knowledge dissemination go some way to addressing implication number 2, that each project's results need to be disseminated more widely, and show a level of ethical and reflexive muscle which long-term could help empower and develop the communities they work in. The heritage projects go somewhat farther to addressing implication number 5, about reconfiguring the dominant hierarchy of 'heritage' values, and satisfy the criteria of being interpretive, relevant, therapeutic and useable. The individuals making changes now are thus to be applauded: considering archaeology in Sudan is a 100-year-old endeavour, their programmes are positive events that will inevitably precipitate others that can expand upon these foundations.

However, to some people all of these ventures might be interpreted in light of what many might deem to be 'Eurocentric' ideas of 'educating' the local Sudanese residents and 'assimilating' them into Western archaeological ideology via the dissemination of easy-to-read information booklets around the locale, rarely deviating from archaeology's authorized heritage discourse or pushing for a more 'multicultural' approach that valorizes and includes local histories into the academic enquiry (see above). (Such has been the flurry of booklets that one initial project aim had been to record the reception of this method and somehow measure its capacity to increase awareness and understanding of Sudanese archaeology (although initial findings from Dangeil in 2013 and 2014 and Hamadab-Bejrawiya in 2015 did not suggest that they had any tangible impact at that time)). Furthermore, despite the booklets, the core spaces in which archaeologists disseminate their work have yet to the democratized: for the sake of their own professional survival, archaeologists predominantly disseminate their publications (inevitably written in high academic style) through Western-English intellectual platforms.

959 An article by Humphris, Bradshaw and Emberling (f/c) seeks to remedy this.

It therefore remains true that as of 2017, collaborative initiatives by archaeologists have had little take-up in Sudan and are severely limited in their scope and duration: the above list makes it sound as if Sudan is a hive of activity, but relative to the large number of teams working in the country, it is not. Of course current archaeologists are working in spaces where the theory of social archaeology has been normalized and where the theory of decolonizing archaeology is emerging, but the impression of this author is that in Sudan only a few individuals do collaborative archaeology.[960] This puts archaeology in Sudan at the level of what Wylie would call baseline respect and syncretic pluralism with a limited cross-fertillization of ideas; only in a couple of poorly-documented cases does it seem that there is robustly epistemic exchange and even this has not translated into a project in which residents have decision-making power.

8.2.2 Islamic North Africa

A similar situation seems to exist within the immediate region. In the Mediterranean, there are only a handful of 'public' archaeology programmes,[961] and in Turkey, even though the Çatalhöyük project undoubtedly practices the most paradigmatic form of social archaeology in terms of engaging with multivocal interpretations of the site and conducting archaeological ethnographies (see Chapter 2), even this is limited. As Tully concluded in her own critique of the Çatalhöyük project:

> [it] focused on scientific analysis rather than community involvement and is an anthropological study of the archaeology/community relations rather than a programme of collaboration itself…[962]

Furthermore, there is the issue of language. Gillot (2010) credits archaeologists in Syria with "usually try[ing] to learn some Arabic words to communicate with local populations." However, for Shankland, and the present author, it appears that archaeologists rarely speak the language of the country in which they work, instead "cultivating rather a serviceable patois in order to communicate with the workmen and officials."[963] While Shankland does not highlight it as a problem as such, he pointedly notes that the villagers of Küçükköy showed him, a fluent Turkish speaker, things never

960 In 2014, the introduction of QSAP funding did allow and encourage archaeologists the freedom to expand activities (all the teams above used QSAP money to produce their booklets), but this public component was prescribed by NCAM-QSAP as a key aim of each team that was funded: it was not necessarily the initiative of the archaeologists. Thus it does not seem right to overstate the importance of the funding to people's subscription to the moral and intellectual theory of community archaeology or indeed to their subscription to other concepts related to it (e.g. decolonizing archaeology). Again, although it seems to herald institutional change, in Sudan there is a gulf between theoretical acceptance of the idea and taking concrete and long-term steps towards making them real.

961 Hodder and Doughty 2007

962 Tully 2007: 166.

963 Shankland 1996: 351.

before shown to archaeologists because "they would not dream of being so confiding with someone with whom they could not communicate directly."[964] Such linguistic difficulties also hamper the development of collaborative archaeology in these regions.

The same situation seems to exist in Islamic North Africa, including in Egypt and Libya. As attested by a number of scholars, Egyptology has been slow to follow in using collaborative archaeology, and the obsession with (the authorized heritage discourse of) Pharaonic history has not lessened in favour of pursuing more diverse time periods and parts of the country.[965] Critical community museology has proved a somewhat popular focus,[966] providing an insight into how archaeologists might respond to implication 4, about stopping assuming that archaeology is of importance to residents in the same ways in which it is important to them, but overall collaborative projects are limited.

One particular exception is the long-running Community Archaeology Project at Quseir al-Qadim (CAPQ), on Egypt's Red Sea coast, the seven key tenets of which are laid out by Moser et al. (2002) and Tully (2007): 1, Communicating and collaborating with all members of the local community; 2, Providing employment and training for employees and volunteer workers; 3, Systematically delivering public presentations; 4, Conducting interviews and collecting oral histories from community residents; 5, Providing educational resources; 6, Creating a photographic and video archive; and 7, Negotiating the emergence of community controlled merchandising.[967] As Moser et al. described at the time,

> The project is the first of its kind in Egypt, seeking to bring about a change in the way archaeology is conducted in a country where local communities have been systematically excluded both from the process of discovering their past and in the construction of knowledge concerning their heritage.[968]

The CAPQ's scope is admirable and takes into account most of the implications listed for archaeology above (notably 2, 4 and 5). The methodology has inspired, in part, a project about community archaeology and oral histories in the Egyptian Delta,[969] as well as being used as a comparative model for UCLQ's community archaeology programme.[970] However, although education is prioritized on the basis that in her comparison of five community-focused projects in Turkey, the

964 Shankland 1996: 351. Rodriguez also attributes some of the misunderstandings between archaeologists and local communities to "different languages" (in his case Maya, English and Spanish), which created "divergent understandings." (Rodriguez 2006: 165). Rodriguez draws on the work of Sullivan (1989) who wrote about the miscommunication between the Maya of Tusik and an archaeologist at Chichén Itzá and how lack of common language further problematized the "different and almost incommensurable sets of values were being attributed to the same terrain" (Rodriguez 2006: 166).
965 Mitchell 2000, Meskell 2001, Fushiya and De Trafford 2009, Tully 2007.
966 Jones 2004, f/c; Tully 2007, f/c.
967 Tully 2007: 160. Also see Tully 2010.
968 Moser et al. 2002: 221.
969 Lorenzon and Termini 2016.
970 Bradshaw and Humphris f/c.

US and Egypt, providing educational resources accounted for only 13% of activities,[971] it nonetheless limits the extent to which it is 'robustly epistemic' and truly collaborative.

In Libya, a few teams have begun collaborative practices, prompted at least in part by the need to effectively manage archaeological sites threatened by civil war. One multi-national team spent three two-week sessions training six members of the Libyan Department of Archaeology in landscape archaeology, remote sensing and GIS.[972] Together they created a strategy for how to best record and then manage the heritage of the country (in this instance Jebel Nāfusa in north-west Libya). With a focus on landscape archaeology they were able to conceptualize the archaeological sites within what was earlier termed a 'broader integrative view' of land (Salih 1999), thus providing a way in which implication 8, 'archaeological site management plans cannot be made without consultation with communities about their economic needs', might be addressed. With similar collaborations the Libyan Department of Archaeology in place, Biagetti et al. (2013) also surveyed and recorded the Messak region of south-west Libya threatened not only by civil war but also by oil extraction. Biagetti et al. write that their project, "represented an important and coordinated effort — a way of working that is rare in the Sahara".[973]

On one hand, as Nebbia et al. (2016) point out, these two projects are successes in and of themselves because conflict makes working in the field so dangerous. However, training programmes for antiquities service members is common elsewhere, including in Egypt, where Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA) inspectors have long since trained and collaborated with archaeologists,[974] and in Sudan, where there is a rolling attendance of NCAM staff in the British Museum International Training Programme and at other institutions, particularly in Germany and Poland. Moreover the dialogue between foreign teams with their governmental peers hardly represents the full scope of collaborative practice. The same might be said of the project by Biagetti et al.: although their plans were rather more holistic, with the pursuit of a tripartite structure ('knowledge', 'conservation' and 'sustainable development and dissemination', involving "the construction of touristic facilities in the most visited areas, the creation of a documentary, and the organisation of an international conference"[975]), only phase 1, 'knowledge', was completed.

Overall it therefore seems that like archaeology in Sudan, archaeology in the Mediterranean, Turkey, Egypt and Libya is at the level of what Wylie would call baseline respect and syncretic pluralism, only occasionally including cross-fertillization of ideas and dynamic pluralism; it has not yet graduated to the level where paradigmatic interpretive, reflexive, therapeutic, relevant, useable,

971 Tully 2007: 167.
972 Nebbia et al. 2016.
973 Biagetti et al. 2013: 56.
974 See Habachi 1981; Fushiya and De Trafford 2009.
975 Biagetti et al. 2013: 56.

and ethical programmes of collaborative archaeology that empower people and develop communities are being conducted.

In some ways this is understandable because as in the past, archaeologists today are funded to conduct archaeological research, with grants all too often stretched to the limit to discover as much as possible about the past. Time-consuming and logistically-demanding community-related endeavours do not often play a significant role in such projects. Because funding bodies rarely insist upon such endeavours, and because the theory of community engagement is not yet a mandatory part of many archaeological training courses, such programmes remain peripheral and 'additional' to archaeological work, which still revolves primarily around the discovery of the material past.

However, what this means is that, as Mydland and Grahn write about Norway, "the international focus on democratization, participation and involvement has so far had no major influence within the field of…heritage practice or for people in local…communities";[976] "'the new focus' [of] moving from the object to the people is not easily recognizable in the field of practice."[977]

8.2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa

Archaeology elsewhere in Africa, however, serves as an important comparative example because although "the practice of archaeology in Africa has [so far] failed communities within which archaeologists work,"[978] archaeologists tend to embark on community engagement programmes as part of general practice. Indeed community archaeology, heritage work and the direct involvement and training of African archaeologists have a long history,[979] embedded in the practice of ethno-archaeology, studies of indigenous knowledge systems, and the collaborative study of oral traditions and other intangible heritage, examples of which can be drawn from across South Africa,[980] West Africa,[981] and Eastern Africa.[982] Unsurprisingly then, these projects can shed light upon how to address a number of the implications listed at the start of this section but unaddressed by the studies mentioned heretofore.

For example with regards to the findings about archaeology's ideational impact upon identity, it suggested that the state is a very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which modern populations connect with archaeology. For this line of enquiry, Ndlovu's (2016) study of how

976 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 581.
977 Mydland and Grahn 2012: 583.
978 Schmidt and Pikirayi 2016: 19.
979 Schmidt 2014, 2016; McDavid, Rizvi and Smith 2016; Posnansky 2017.
980 Chirikure and Pwiti 2008; Pikirayi 2016. For a critique see Ndlovu 2016.
981 Mayor and Huysecom 2016 re. Mali; Aleru and Adekola 2016 re. West Africa.
982 G. Abungu 2016.

the state constrains community archaeology in South Africa is useful because it demonstrates a keen awareness of state orientation beyond slogans of 'unity in diversity'. Alongside a critical and comparative appreciation of Schlanger's (2016) message to consider the 'nation' as an important archaeological context (mentioned above), such insights provide frameworks for how to understand archaeology and the (post-colonial) nation/state.

A further implication of the section about archaeology's ideational impact upon identity is that site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between the residents and archaeological sites. Here, too, African approaches to archaeology can provide insight because while they may be descended from more colonial-style anthropologies of African belief systems, studies of oral traditions[983] and perceptions of the past[984] have come to be used in the search for sensitively conceived but 'robustly epistemic' studies of how archaeological and historical landscapes might otherwise be conceived. A good example of this might be the studies of archaeological and ancestral intertwinedness which are ongoing in Southern Ethiopia,[985] long term ethno-historical research in Kenya[986] or grassroots locally-conceived heritage research from Tanzania.[987]

Finally, Chapter 7 regarding site management and local livelihoods illustrated that what might seem like 'disuse' of or 'disconnection' with land cannot be presumed to be so; and that it is important to understand the perspective of the site-communities on the economic and social issues that archaeology raises for them; such has been the aim of Mehari and Ryano (2016) who study the slow appropriation of land in Tanzania. Successful remedies to such situations have also been forthcoming, for example from G. Abungu (2016) who demonstrates the importance of dialogue and openness as a counterweight to misunderstandings between land users, and also from P. O. Abungu (2016, in Kenya) who presents the same results from collaborations between government institutions, researchers and communities.

This is not to say that collaborative archaeologies in Africa have reached the height: Schmidt (2016) is one of many who continue to critique archaeology in Africa. Alongside him stands Meskell, and her argument against those that claim it, that "hiring local workers as labourers is hardly tantamount to an innovative collaborative venture, in fact it is strongly reminiscent of colonial practice"[988] and that the politicized nature of South African archaeology was "generally considered [to be] an obstruction to [her] colleagues."[989] Nevertheless, insights drawn from community-oriented archaeology in Africa might profitably be used to develop alternative socio-economic dynamics in

983 Mbunwe-Samba 1994, Raharijaona 1994.
984 Nwana 1994.
985 Arthur et al. 2017.
986 P. O. Abungu 2016, Kusimba 2017.
987 Schmidt 2010, 2017.
988 Meskell 2007: 389-90.
989 Meskell 2007: 391. Gomes, too, noted that it was only the occasional archaeologist colleague who was willing to collaborate (Gomes 2006: 153).

other regions, such as Sudan. In particular, the principle of 'epistemic engagement' needs unpacking more as it has been in sub-Saharan Africa.[990]

A final word must thus go to the implications this thesis has but are not covered by community archaeology projects, to the knowledge of this author. The first regards the implication that archaeologists should cease writing exclusively 'Nubian' history (or in broader terms, should stop writing ethnicity into the archaeological record); the second and third regard Chapter 6, the section on archaeology's economic impact, which further showed that there may be a necessity for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad, including rules pertaining to activities to archaeological work such as hiring and employment practices. This thesis therefore stands on its own as a text in which such recommendations are made and which have been addressed, at least to some extent, by the author (see below).

8.3 Further Lines of Enquiry

Chapter 8 has sought to provide a clear summary and analysis of the main findings of the research project, their implications for the state archaeological authorities and the foreign missions. Such a wide-ranging study inevitably throws up a number of questions that would benefit from further examination. Although this is clearly nor an exhaustive list, some ideas are presented here. Several research areas suggest themselves, but the most salient are those regarding identity and those regarding economics.

8.3.1 Identity

The first profitable enquiry could certainly go into the data from Hamadab-Bejrawiya in increasing depth, for example regarding the different statuses of the respondents, for instance looking acutely at the difference in attitudes between men and women; old and young; intelligentsia and non-intelligentsia. These are all backgrounds from which the archaeological phenomenon can be viewed and thus experienced differently. Indeed while the present study has attempted to understand the general attitudes of the farming and pastoral residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya towards archaeology, there is plenty of evidence to suggest even more nuance. For example, the few members of the

990 This is somewhat ironic because in her (albeit limited) comparison of five community-focused projects in Turkey, the US and Egypt, Tully (2007) found that "[m]ost community projects focus on interviews and oral history" as well as "communication and collaboration" (Tully 2007: 166).

intelligentsia this author conversed with suggests their ‘disconnection’ with archaeology is compounded by a conceptual problem with ancient Nubia’s link to Egypt; Hamza al-Ja’ali mentioned thinking that pre-Islamic Sudanese history was nothing more than a “tail” of Egyptian history. This certainly echoes part of the problem on a state level (see the discussion about Qatar, above, for example), and may help to explain why many residents in Khartoum (but not in the case-study area) consistently asked whether Sudan’s pyramids are older than Egypt’s. Analyzing the link between respondents’ ages and the changes made to the national curriculum between 1970 and the present could thus offer prime lines of investigation, as could a comparative study between the attitudes of those living in urban Khartoum and rural Sudan. Indeed further linking of different factors to outcomes—beyond the considerable influence of the state and its imagery and ideology, the failure of nation and weakness of state, as well as the different modes of living—would provide many additional lines of enquiry.

Second, this author would propose to do a comparative analysis between data collected in Hamadab-Bejrawiya and data gathered elsewhere, for example in 2013-14 in Sai Island and Dangeil (Chapter 3). The first line of enquiry could compare the ways in which archaeology impacts processes of identity construction in ‘local’ contexts, for example in Dangeil compared with Hamadab-Bejrawiya. This would no doubt yield interesting results, particularly as the areas share certain characteristics: both are predominantly farming communities situated in the Nile Valley; both are in River Nile State and are thus governed by the same state administration (though Dangeil sits in Berber Province and Hamadab-Bejrawiya in Shendi Province); and both lie in the heartland of the ‘non-Nubian’ Ja’aliyīn kinship group. A second line of enquiry could compare testimony from Dangeil and Sai Island, using the frameworks laid out in the thesis. Initial reflections suggest that this comparison could strengthen the arguments laid out in Chapter 5: Sai Island is inhabited by Mahas-speaking Nubian Sukōt residents, and unlike the Ja’aliyīn in Dangeil (and Hamadab-Bejrawiya) do self-identify as ‘Nubian’; they take full ownership of archaeology’s ‘Nubian’ authorized heritage discourse (even if their formal knowledge of it is largely lacking). Of course other sites in the Nile Valley may be considered, too, to become something of a comparative ethnographic survey; many of the sites in the Dongola region would also be ideal places to examine archaeology’s impact upon processes of identity construction because it is the region in which residents are ‘formally’ identified as ‘Nubian’ Danagla, but, as a rural stronghold of many government members, also play a large role in upholding the current regime’s Arab-Muslim image (see Chapter 4 and 5). Dongola also has some incredible monumental Christian remains, such as churches and cathedrals, so the impact of this would also be interesting to pursue.

A more transnational (third) perspective of this question might take into account any extant data about the Nūba, another example of an ‘indigenous descendant community’ in Sudan, who inhabit the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State, well outside the boundaries of ‘ancient Nubia’. According

to some reports, the Nūba see the 'ancient Nubian' archaeological sites as part of their heritage, for example tracing the history of their wrestling competitions back to 'ancient Nubia', whose wrestlers are depicted on Egyptian Pharaonic reliefs.[991] The Nūba also speak a variety of Nubian, in their case Hill Nubian, which, like Nile Nubian, descends from Old Nubian. However, Hill Nubian, like Nile Nubian, is not related to the language likely spoken in 'ancient Nubia'. Considering what has been noted above about South Sudan, an even broader approach could incorporate a comparative study there.

The concept of 'descent' is, of course, fluid, and while most 'descendant communities' are indigenous to their claimed 'ancestral lands', some are not. The group of trans-continental scholars of the Africanist movement, such as Cheikh Anta Diop, have long claimed links between West Africa and 'ancient Egypt' and 'ancient Nubia', asserting that the histories of these civilizations have been dislocated from their African context and erroneously inserted into the Middle East or, even worse, to Europe.[992] At the height of the Africanist movement in the 1980s its members stressed the roles of Egypt and Sudan within intra-African cultural events, exchange and relations. While the movement has had little impact in Sudan, it would nevertheless be of great interest and import to add a fourth line of enquiry to understand how these claims cohere or clash with those of other 'descendant' communities.

Finally, a slightly different approach could be taken to understanding the ways in which archaeology impacts processes of identity construction in local, regional, transnational and international contexts that seeks instead to utilize the masses of extant data already available. For example the data gathered by this author in Cairo in 2014 from the Nubian Research Projects Collection at the Social Research Centre at the American University in Cairo could also add a historic dimension to this examination and a fifth line of enquiry. The NRPC collection is made up of six distinct series and contain data gathered by archaeologists and anthropologists during the Aswan dam displacement processes in the 1960-70s. It consists of the interview transcripts of the SRC Nubian Ethnological Survey ('Series 1') as well as the reports and administrative records from the Nubian resettlement programme ('Series 2'). This archival research is of great relevance to the arguments in this thesis, particularly as a distinct 'Nubian' identity is said by scholars such as Poeschke (1996) to have emerged at precisely this time. Considerable archives also exist at the offices of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS) at the British Museum in London, the National Records Office in Khartoum, and the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham (see Ward 2016) could also provide historic data to add to this thesis.

991 H. Kuka, 'Preserving cultural heritage: Nuba Wrestling in Yida Camp', *The Niles,* 6 March 2013. Also see Haynes 1992, above.

992 Diop and Cook 1989.

8.3.2 Economics

Turning now to further studies of archaeology's economic impact, a sixth further line of enquiry could expand the quantitative examination presented in Chapter 6 through the inclusion of revenues generated from archaeological resources that are not restricted to the formal economy. As shown in Chapter 2, for example, the 'looting' and sale of antiquities can constitute a major part of a locale's *informal* economy; that Chapter 6 does not take into account the economic impact of archaeology upon the informal economy via practices such as 'subsistence digging' (Staley 1993) and other forms of 'undocumented excavation' (Hollowell-Zimmer 2002, Hollowell 2006) that occurs in the area and which is undertaken with economic aims in mind, is a major limitation of the method presented (although see Chapter 7 for the non-commercial uses of archaeological materials for construction). Indeed the present author hastens to add that this is not to say that the existence of subsistence digging was not fully apparent; it certainly was: Chapter 7 presents a list of thefts in recent years, and archaeological literature written by project directors as well as by the authors of the NCAM World Heritage Nomination File do note that unauthorized excavations have taken place. One archaeological project director (outside the case-study area) even confided to the present author that they preferred the site-community residents not to know the details of the nearby burials because they had 'learned' that different types of burials could hold objects of different worth. In the example given by her, Kerma burials were known by residents to be more 'well-stocked' than Christian burials, which were in turn richer than Muslim burials. This is, in fact, very reminiscent of Hollowell and Wilk's (1995) finding that, out of 84 archaeological projects under examination, it was those that incorporated educationally-focused community outreach programmes that reported the highest incidences of unauthorized digging. Encounters with diggers themselves, usually in the context of them asking for advice about the commercial sale of objects, have also been a common part of this author's experience. At the same time, other residents expressed exasperation that there is little government control of 'looting' despite the presence of site guards and policemen; the site guards and members of the Tourism Police also spoke of the ineffective measures taken by NCAM to combat 'looting' in the area. (These measures seem to consist of fines of "100, maybe 200 [SDG]" for those who try to sell objects and small rewards for those who hand objects in.) One archaeologist interviewed for this study (whose testimony is otherwise not included) was of the opinion that the Sudanese are so dedicated to the concept of hospitality that they will not ask archaeologists (their guests) for a higher share in archaeological 'profits', and are thus forced to 'loot' in order to gain some sense of what Brodie (2010) would presumably refer to as 'economic justice'.

An economic study could also be taken further in a seventh way, through the inclusion of interviews with other stakeholder groups, particularly with the directors of the projects described here plus other international and Sudanese archaeologists, although the interviews undertaken by this

author and which have not been included in this thesis[993] suggest that while some are, practitioners in Sudan are generally not willing to scrutinize and iteratively improve their practices (see Chapters 2 and 3). Indeed, Chapter 7 could have been augmented several times over if permission had been given by the DAI Domat al-Hamadab and DAI Royal Baths team project directors for the present author to use data pertaining to their projects. Both project directors have in recent years fenced off considerable tracts of land, and the impacts of these initiatives have not gone unnoticed. Furthermore, and as mentioned above, communities affected by dam building projects have often perceived archaeologists to be complicit in government agendas. The interviews this author did with engaged anthropologists and anti-dam activists in 2013[994] would also be fruitful if this economic angle were to be explored more. Looking at economics from the perspective of 'global' ideas in 'local' contexts, interviews with archaeologists working at Jebel Barkal, Sudan's other UNESCO World Heritage Site, could provide good transnational comparative material against any that was forthcoming from Meroe. Equally, interviews with archaeologists who have worked on sites over the years would provide interesting data about how their motivations, activities and plans changed across time, but about long-term hiring practices and the economics thereof. Like the sites in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, Sai Island has multi-period sites of great ancient importance (recent research has confirmed its place in the gold mining trade in the Late Bronze Age, and it has a large Meroitic pyramid cemetery), and international and Sudanese teams have been conducting fieldwork here since the 1950s. This would nicely allow the dynamics of change over time to be explored, and might very well be compared with developments at Dangeil, where archaeologists have been coming for just over 15 years.

*

A final intriguing and, in all likelihood, prudent line of inquiry would be to turn the focus of this research on its head, to address the question: how do site-communities impact archaeologists and archaeology? While some sections of this research address the likely impact of, for instance, site guards on the decision making of project directors, including hiring and employment practices, there is a great deal to be learned from the role often played by site-community residents in influencing both archaeology and archaeologists. Rather than merely reviewing the impact of action such as mobilization in favour or against certain projects, research into the outcome of long-term interaction between site-communities and archaeologists, in terms of impacting the approaches of the latter, will likely be fruitful.

993 Interviews and conversations with: Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Rihab Khider and Mohammed Saad, NCAM archaeologists (November 2013); Shahid Halfaween, a graduate trainee with NCAM (November 2013); Tim Kendall, an American archaeologist at Jebel Barkal (November 2013); Fatma Keshk, an Egyptian archaeologist at Sai Island (January 2014); a group of PhD students at Sai Island (January 2014); plus the anonymized university lecturer and NCAM inspector whose testimonies were briefly included but not expanded upon in the thesis.

994 Interviews and conversations with: Hamza Uwais and Geili Farah of the Anti Dal-Kajbar Dams Committee (August 2013); Nick Hildyard, the CEO of Corner House (August 2013), with Natalia Chan, Coordinator of the Sudan Associate Parliamentary Group (September 2013); and with anthropologists Nicholas Hopkins (October 2013), Kurt Beck (May 2015), Karin Willemse (May 2015) and Tag Elkhazin (November 2013).

8.4 The Impacts of this Research

Before this thesis ends, it seems reasonable to speak briefly about some of the positive impacts this research has had so far. By the time of writing (spring 2017), a number had already become apparent:

1. As discussed in Chapter 8, once the low rate of wages became apparent to the author and thence to the project director, they were raised. Although it arguably did not go far enough, this is not an insignificant event and can safely be said to be the direct outcome of this research (taken for Chapter 6) and which addresses the implication that as employers, archaeologists should be aware of the local and national financial context, including relative salaries, unemployment rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates between social groups.

2. Since late 2015, the knowledge gathered in the course of this research has been applied in a practical setting through the work the present author does for UCLQ's community engagement programme. One concrete example of this has been that the author has been to advise the project director about things such as the need to hire women. The winter 2015 season thus saw the first hiring of a woman by the team;

3. Through the translation work done with Hana Ahmed, Basil Kamal Bushra and Omer Sharif I learned about the lack of support for students and began training them. As part of this I knew that there was also a lack of conferences for students in Sudan and decided to run a student-led conference in Khartoum (which happened on 28th-29th December 2015). Thanks to sponsorship by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the British Museum, an event was also held for practitioners in London in May 2016. Thematically, the conferences were also designed to provide critical material on 'Nubian Living Heritage'; an idea that again sprung directly from this research.

However, arguably the most impactful elements of this research are the frameworks that have been used regarding the analysis of archaeology's ideational, economic and social impacts on site-communities: the need for a keen understanding of national political rhetoric and the role played by the nation (ideology) and state (economics) in contextually framing archaeology's impact (Chapter 5); the importance of marrying qualitative and quantitative data to arrive at a nuanced understanding of economic impact, as well as forging understanding of the relevant socio-economic and political context, identifying reasonable and realistic ways to measure the impact of archaeological employment within that context; and, perhaps most importantly, prudently situating that impact within the framework of the ongoing socio-economic and political processes in which archaeological work takes place.

REFERENCES

BOOKS, BOOK CHAPTERS AND JOURNAL ARTICLES

ABDALLA, A. H., 1987. 'Demographic and Socio-Economic Factors affecting the Participation of Family Labour in the Rahad Scheme' in M. A. Mohamed-Salih (ed.) *Family Life in Sudan*: 58-72.

ABDALLA, G. A., 2013. *The Influence of Financial Relations on Sustaining Rural Livelihood in Sudan: Reflecting the Significance of Social Capital in the Village Al Dagag, North Kordofan State*, Spektrum Berlin Series on Society, Economy and Politics in Developing Countries 108. Berlin: Lit. Available from: http://www.lit-verlag.de/isbn/3-643-90403-4. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

ABD AL-RAHIM, M., 1971. 'Arabism, Africanism and Self-Identification in the Sudan' in Y. F. Hasan (ed.) *Sudan in Africa*. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press: 228-39.

ABUNGU, G., 2016. 'Walking the Long Path to Partnership: Archaeology and Communities in Eastern Africa' in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York: Routledge: 46-70.

ABUNGU, P. O., 2016. 'Heritage, Memories and Community Development: The case of Shimoni Slave Caves Site, Kenya' in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York: Routledge: 91-112.

ABUSHARAF, R.M., 2002. *Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America, Anthropology of contemporary issues*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

ADAMS, R., and PREISS, J., 1960. (eds.), *Human Organization Research: Field Relations and Techniques*. Homewodd, IL: Dorsey.

ADAMS, W. Y., 1977. *Nubia: Corridor to Africa*. London: Allen Lane.

ADAMS, W. Y., 2007. ‘A century of archaeological salvage, 1907-2007’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 11: 48-56.

ADAR, K. G., 2001. ‘Ethno-religious Nationalism in Sudan: The Enduring Constraint on the Policy of National Identity’ in S. Bekker, M. Dodds and M. M. Khosha (eds.) *Shifting African Identities.* Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council: 81-114.

ADNAN, S., 2007. ‘Departures from Everyday Resistance and Flexible Strategies of Domination: The Making and Unmaking of a Poor Peasant Mobilization in Bangladesh’ in *Journal of Agrarian Change* 7 (2): 183-224.

AHMED, E. A., 2012. ‘Prevalent Agricultural Credit Systems in River Nile State of Sudan’ in *Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics* 4 (12): 322-330.

AHMED, E. M., and AMMAR, A., 2015. ‘Islamic Microfinance in Sudanese Perspective’ in *Journal of Business and Financial Affairs* 4 (3): 149-154.

AHMED, E., SULAIMAN, J., and MOHD, S., 2012. ‘Economics of Farm Resource Utilization in River Nile State of Northern Sudan’ in *Resources and Environment* 2 (6): 248-252.

ALAVI, H., 1973. ‘Peasants, Classes and Primordial Loyalties’ in *Journal of Peasant Studies* 1 (1): 22-62.

ALLISON, C., 2001. *The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan*. London: Curzon.

AL-SHAHI, A., and MOORE, F. C. T., 1978. *Wisdom from the Nile*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

ALERU, J. O., and ADEKOLA, K., 2016. ‘Perspective on Heritage, Local Community and Archaeological Engagements in Parts of Northern Yorubaland, Nigeria’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 181-204.

ANDERSON, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

ANDERSON, M. B., 1999. *Do no harm: how aid can support peace--or war*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

APPADURAI, A., 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

APPADURAI, A., 1995. 'The Production of Locality' in R. Fardon (ed.) *Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge*. New York: Routledge: 204-225.

APPADURAI, A., 2001. 'The globalization of archaeology and heritage: A discussion with Arjun Appadurai' in *Journal of Social Archaeology* 1(1): 35-49.

ARDENER, S., 1964. 'The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations' in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 94 (2): 201–29.

ARENAS, I. V., 1995. 'The perception of history and archaeology in Latin America: a theoretical approach' in P. R. Schmidt and T. C. Patterson (eds.) *Making Alternative Histories: The Practice of Archaeology and History in non-Western Settings.* Seattle: School of American Research Press: 47-67.

ARKELL, A. J., 1961. *A history of the Sudan. From the earliest times to 1821*, 2nd ed. London: Athlone Press.

ARTHUR, K. W., TOCHA, Y. E., CURTIS, M. C., LAKEW, B., and ARTHUR, J. W., 2017. 'Seniority through ancestral landscapes: Community archaeology in the highlands of Southern Ethiopia' in *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage* 4(2): 101-114.

ASCH, M., 2004. 'Political theory and the rights of indigenous peoples' in *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 29: 150-2.

ASKOURI, A., 2004a. 'The Merowe Dam: Controversy and displacement in Sudan' in *Forced Migration Review* 22: 56–7.

ASKOURI, A., 2004b. 'A Culture Drowned: Sudan Dam Will Submerge Historically Rich Area, Destroy Nile communities' in *World Rivers Review* 19 (2): 8–9, 15.

ASKOURI, A., 2008. 'Civil Society Initiative in Africa' in D. G. Guerrero and F. Manji (eds.) *China's New Role in Africa and the South. A Search for a New Perspective*. Oxford: Fahamu: 151–6.

ATALAY, S., 2006. 'Indigenous archaeology as decolonizing practice' in *American Indian Quarterly* 30: 280-310.

ATALAY, S., 2012. *Community-Based Archaeology: Research with, by, and for Indigenous and Local Communities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

BABIKER, A. S., 2010. 'The Contribution of Archeology to the Sudanese Heritage' in W. Godlewski and A. Lajtar (eds.) *Between the Cataracts: PAM Supplement Series 2.2./2*. Warsaw: Warsaw University Press: 31-34.

BABIKER, M., 2011. 'Mobile Pastoralism and Land Grabbing in Sudan: Impacts and Responses' in *Papers Presented at the International Conference on the Future of Pastoralism*, Addis Ababa, March 2011, organised by the Future Agricultures Consortium, University of Sussex, and Feinstein International Centre.

BAHARANI, Z. 1998. 'Conjuring Mesopotamia: Imaginative Geography and a World Past' in L. Meskell (ed.) *Archaeology Under Fire. Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*. London, New York: Routledge: 159–174.

BAKER, C. D., 1984. 'The search for adultness: membership work in adolescent-adult talk' in *Human Studies* 7: 301-23.

BARTU, A., 2000. 'Where is Çatalhöyük? Multiple sites in the construction of an archaeological site' in Hodder, I. (ed.) *Towards a Reflexive Method in Archaeology: The example at Çatalhöyük*. Cambridge: MacDonald Institute Monographs: 101-9.

BASU, P., and ZETTERSTROM-SHARP, J., 2015. 'Complicating Culture for Development: Negotiating 'Dysfunctional Heritage' in Sierra Leone' in P. Basu and W. Modest (eds.) *Museums, Heritage and International Development*. London: Routledge: 56-82.

BATES, M. and PALMER, M., 1981. *The NILE course for the Sudan*. London: Longman.

BAUD, M., 2008. ‘The Meroitic Royal city of Muweis: first steps into an urban settlement of riverine Upper Nubia’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 12: 52-63.

BECK, K., 1998. ‘Tribesmen, Townsmen and the Struggle over Proper Lifestyle in Northern Kordofan’ in E. Stiansen and M. Kevane (eds.) *Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral Incorporation and Social Transformation in Islamic Africa*. Leiden: Brill: 250-79.

BECK, K., 1999. ‘Escaping from Narrow Confines—Returning to Tight Communities: Manasir Labour Migration from the Area of the Fourth Nile Cataract’ in H. P. Hahm and G. Spittler (eds.) *Afrika und die Globalisierung*. Hamburg: Lit: 201-11.

BECK, K., 2017. ‘Technological Dramas on the Road: The ‘Artery of the North Highway’ in the Sudan’ in K. Beck, G. Klaeger and M. Stasik (eds.) *The Making of the African Road.* Leiden: Brill: 241-273.

BECKER, H. S., and GEER, B., 1960. ‘Participant Observation: the analysis of qualitative field data’ in R. Adams and J. Preiss (eds.), *Human Organization Research: Field Relations and Techniques.* Homewodd, IL: Dorsey: 267-89.

BEKKER, S. B., DODDS, M., and KHOSA, M. M., 2001. *Shifting African Identities*. Human Sciences Research Council: Pretoria.

BELFORD, P., 2014. ‘Sustainability in Community Archaeology’ in *Online Journal in Public Archaeology* SV 1: 21-44.

BERNBECK, R., 2008. ‘Structural Violence in Archaeology’ in *Archaeologies* 4 (3): 390-413.

BERNBECK, R., and POLLOCK, S., 2004. ‘The Political Economy of Archaeological Practice and the Production of Heritage in the Middle East’ in L. Meskell and R. W. Preucel (eds.) *A Companion to Social Archaeology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing: 335-352.

BESHIR, M. O., 1974. *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan*. London: Rex Collings.

BIAGETTI, S., CANCELLIERI, E., CREMASCHI, M., GAUTHIER, C., GAUTHIER, Y., ZERBONI, A., and GALLINARO, M. 2013. 'The 'Messak Project': Archaeological research for cultural heritage management in SW Libya' in *Journal of African Archaeology* 11(1): 55-74.

BIELAWSKI, E., 1994 'Dual perceptions of the past: Archaeology and Inuit Culture' in R. Layton (ed.) *Conflict in the Archaeology of Living Traditions*. London Routledge: 228-36.

BŁAŻYŃSKI, A., 2003. '*Shulukh*: 'Facial Scarification in the Nile Valley—Origins and Function' in *Gdańsk Archaeological Museum African Reports* 2: 33-41.

BODDY, J. P., 1989. *Wombs and Alien Spirits: Women, Men and The Zār Cult In Northern Sudan*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

BONNET, C., and VALBELLE, D., 2008. *The Nubian Pharaohs: Black Kings on the Nile*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

BOYTE, H. C., 2010. *Everyday Politics: Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

BOYTNER, R., DODD, L. S. and PARKER, B. J., 2010. (eds.) *Controlling the Past, Owning the Future: The Political Uses of Archaeology in the Middle East*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press

BOYTNER, R., 2014. 'Do Good, Do Research: The Impact of Archaeological Field Schools on Local Economies' in *Public Archaeology* 13: 262–277.

BRADSHAW, R., and HUMPHRIS, J., f/c. 'From Community Engagement to Community Archaeology: A(nother) Case Study from Sudan' in *Journal of Social Archaeology*.

BRAUN, V., and CLARKE, V., 2006. 'Using thematic analysis in psychology' in *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3 (2): 77-101.

BREASTED, J. H., 1908. 'The Monuments of Sudanese Nubia: Report of the Work of the Egyptian Expedition, Season of 1906-'07*'* reprinted from A. J. Reinach, 1909 'The Monuments of Sudanese Nubia' in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*: 474-476.

BREGLIA, L., 2006b. *Monumental ambivalence: the politics of heritage*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

BRODIE, N., 2010. 'Archaeological looting and economic justice' in P.M. Messenger and G.S. Smith (eds.) *Cultural Heritage Management, Policies and Issues in Global Perspective*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida: 261-77.

BRODIE, N., and RENFREW, C., 2005. 'Looting and the world's archaeological heritage: The inadequate response' in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34: 343-361.

BROOKS, P., 2012. *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

BRUCE, J., 1790. *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, in the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773.* Edinburgh: G.G.J. and J. Robinson.

BUDGE, E. A. W. 1907. *The Egyptian Sûdân: Its History and Monuments, Vols. 1 and 2*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd.

BURTENSHAW, P., 2014. 'Mind the Gap: Cultural and Economic Values in Archaeology' in *Public Archaeology* 13 (1–3): 48-58.

BURCKHARDT, J. L., 1819. *Travels in Nubia*. London: John Murray.

CAILLIAUD, F., 1826. *Voyage à Méroé. au Fleuve Blanc, au-delà de Fâzoql dans le midi du royaume de Sennâr, à Syouah et dans cinq autres oasis, fait dans les années 1819, 1820, 1821 et 1822. Vol 1.* Paris: Imprimerie Royale.

CALKINS, S., 2012. 'Agricultural Encroachment in Wadi Mukabrab Area: Policies of Recompense, Differentiation and 'Tribal' Belonging' in C. Kleinitz and C. Näser (eds.) *Nihna nās al-bahar—We are the People of the River: Ethnographic Research in the Fourth Nile Cataract Region, Sudan* in *Meroitica* 26. Wiesbaden: Harassowitz: 229-251.

CALKINS, S., and ILLE, E., 2014. ‘Territories of Gold Mining: International Investments and Artisanal Extraction in Sudan’ in J. Gertel, R. Rottenburg and S. Calkins (eds.) *Disrupting Territories: Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan*. Suffolk: Boydell and Brewer: 52-76.

CARMEN, J. 2005. ‘Good Citizens and Sound Economics: The Trajectory of Archaeology in Britain from ‘Heritage’ to ‘Resource’’ in C. Mathers, T. Darvill, and B. Little (eds.) *Heritage of Value, Archaeology of Renown: Reshaping Archaeological Assessment and Significance*. Gainsville, Florida: University Press of Florida: 43–57.

CARRUTHERS, M., 2008. *The Book of memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CASEY, E. S., 1997. *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*. A Centennial Book. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CASTAÑEDA, Q. E., 2008. ‘The ‘ethnographic turn’ in archaeology: research positioning and reflexivity in ethnographic archaeologies’ in Q. Castañeda, and C. Matthews (eds.) *Ethnographic Archaeologies: Reflections on Stakeholders and Archaeological Practices*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 25–61.

CASTELLS, M., 1997. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

CASTREE, N., 2003. ‘Commodifying What Nature?’ in *Progress in Human Geography* 27 (3): 273-297.

CHEN, F., and KORINEK, K., 2010. ‘Family Life Course Traditions and Rural Household Economies during China's Market Reform’ in *Demography* 47 (4): 963-987.

CHINCHILLA, M. O., 1998. ‘Archaeology and nationalism in Guatemala at the time of independence’ in *Antiquity 72 (276):* 376.

CHIRIKURE, S., and PWITI, G., 2008. 'Community Involvement in Archaeology and Cultural Heritage Management: An Assessment from Case Studies in Southern Africa and Elsewhere’ in *Current Anthropology* 49(3):467-485.

COBEN, L. S., 2014. ‘Sustainable Preservation: Creating Entrepreneurs, Opportunities, and Measurable Results’ in *Public Archaeology* 13(1–3): 278-287.

COLLA, E., 2007. *Conflicted Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian modernity*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

COLLIER, D., and MAHON, J., 1993. ‘Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis’ in *The American Political Science Review* 87(4): 845-855.

COLWELL, C., 2016. ‘Collaborative Archaeologies and Descendant Communities’ in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 45 (1): 113–27.

CORBLUTH, J., 1979. *The NILE course for the Sudan: Students' book 4*. London: Longman.

CORNAGO, N. 2013. *Plural diplomacies: normative predicaments and functional imperatives*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

COURBIN, P., 1988. *What Is Archaeology? An Essay on the Nature of Archaeological Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Trans. P. Bahn)

CRAWFORD, O. G. S., 1953, *Castles and Churches in the Middle Nile Region.* Khartoum: Service.

CROWFOOT, J.W., and GRIFFITH, F.L., 1911. *The Island of Meroe and Meroitic Inscriptions: Pt. 1. Soba to Dangeil*. London: Archaeological Survey of Egypt 19.

CUNNISON, I. G., 1971. ‘Classification by Genealogy: A Problem of the Baqqara Belt’ in Y. F. Hasan (ed.) *Sudan in Africa*. Khartoum: 186-96.

DARVILL, T., 1994. ‘Value Systems and the archaeological resource’ in *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 1 (1): 52-64.

DARVILL, T., 2007. ‘Research Frameworks for World Heritage Sites and the Conceptualization of Archaeological Knowledge’ in *World Archaeology* 39 (3): 436-457.

DAVIES, B., HUGHES, A. and GUDMUNDSDOTTIR, M., 2008. ‘Can You Give Me Respect?" Experiences of the Urban Poor on a Dedicated AIDS Nursing Home Unit’ in *Journal of the Association of Nurses in Aids Care* 19 (5): 342-356.

DE ANGELIS D’OSSAT, G., 1982. *Guide to the Methodical Study of Monuments and Causes of Their Deterioration, rev. 2nd ed*. Rome: ICCROM.

DE SIMONE, C. M., 2008. ‘The Nubian salvage campaign and the Fourth Cataract rescue: Two experiences in comparison’ in B. Gratien (ed.) *Actes de la 4e Conference Internationale sur l’Archeologie de la 4e Cataracte du Nil. Supplement CRIPEL* 7: 225–30

DE SIMONE, C. M., 2014. *Nubia and Nubians: The ‘museumizations’ of a culture*. Leiden: Leiden University. (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis.)

DEEGAN, N. 2012. ‘The local-global nexus in the politics of World Heritage: space for community development?’ in M.-T. Albert, M. Richon, M. J. Viñals and A. Witcomb (eds.) *Community Development through World Heritage*: Paris: World Heritage Papers no. 31, UNESCO: 77-83.

DENG, F. M., 1995. *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

DENG, F. M., 2004. *Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modern Sudan*. Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance and Abolition. New Haven: Yale University.

DERRY, L. 1997. ‘Pre-emancipation archaeology: does it play a role in Selma, Alabama? In the Realm of Politics: Prospects for Public Participation in African-American and Plantation Archaeology’ in *Historical Archaeology* 31 (3): 18-26.

DIACHENKO, A., 2016. 'Archaeology and the nation state. The case of eastern Europe' in *Archaeological Dialogues* 23 (1): 3-10.

DÍAZ-ANDREU, M. 2007. *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology. Nationalism, Colonialism and the Past*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DÍAZ-ANDREU, M. and CHAMPION, T., 1995, 'Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe: An Introduction' in M. Díaz-Andreu and T. Champion (eds.) *Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe*. London: University College London Press.

DIOP, C.A., and COOK, M., 1989. *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press.

DIRAR, H. A., 1993. *The Indigenous Fermented Foods of the Sudan: A Study in African Food and Nutrition*. Egham: CAB International.

DOUGHTY, L., and HODDER, I., 2007. 'Introduction' in I. Hodder and L. Doughty (eds.) *Mediterranean Prehistoric Heritage: Training, Education and Management.* Cambridge: MacDonald Institute for Archaeological Research: 1-7.

DOUGLAS, M., 2014. 'Evaluating Çatalhöyük: Economic and Ethnographic Approaches to Understanding the Impact of Cultural Heritage' in I. Hodder (eds.) *Integrating Çatalhöyük. Themes from the 2000-2008 Season*s. Ankara: British Institute at Ankara.

DREWETT, P., 2012. *Field Archaeology: An Introduction*. Taylor & Francis.

DRZEWIECKI, M., and MALIÑSKI, P., 2013. 'Jawgul: A Village between Towers' in *Sudan & Nubia* 17: 101-108.

DUNHAM, D., 1957. *The Royal Cemeteries of Kush 4: Royal Tombs at Meroë and Barkal*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts Press.

DUNHAM, D., 1963. *The Royal Cemeteries of Kush V: The West and South Cemeteries at Meroë*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts Press.

ECHO-HAWK, R., 1997. 'Forging a New Ancient History for Native America' in N. Swidler, K. E. Dongoske, R. Anyon and A. S. Downer (eds.) *Native Americans and Archaeologists: Stepping Stones to Common Ground.* Walnut Creek, California: Altamira Press: 88-102.

EDGEWORTH, M., (ed.) 2006a. *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

EDGEWORTH, M., 2006b. ‘Preface’ in M. Edgeworth (ed.) *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

EDGEWORTH, M., 2006c. ‘Multiple Origins, Development and Potential of Ethnographies of Archaeology’ in M. Edgeworth (ed.) *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 1-20.

EDWARDS, R., 1998. ‘A critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research process’ in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24 (2): 197-208.

EDWARDS, D. N., 2001. ‘Review – R. Morkot 2000. The Black Pharaohs: Egypt’s Nubian Rulers’, in *Sudan & Nubia* 5: 104-105.

EDWARDS, D. N., 2003. ‘History, Archaeology and Nubian identities’ in P. Lane and A. Reid (eds.) *African Historical Archaeologies*. New York: Plenum: 33-58.

EDWARDS, D. N., 2004. *The Nubian Past: An Archaeology of the Sudan*. London-New York: Taylor & Francis.

EGEMI, O., 2006. ‘Land Tenure in Sudan: Challenges to Livelihood Security and Social Peace’ in G. el-Din el-Tayeb with B.N. Nimir and B.A. El-Hassan (eds.) *Land Issues and Peace in Sudan*. Khartoum: Sudanese Environment Conservation Society: 15-27.

EIDE, P., and ALLEN, C. B. 2005. ‘Recruiting transcultural qualitative research participants: A conceptual model’ in *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 4 (2): 44-56.

ELAMIN, Y.M., 1999. ‘Archaeology and Modern Sudanese Cultural Identity’ in *African Archaeological Review* 16: 1–3.

EL-BASHIR, A. E., 1987. ‘Whither Sudan? A Moderate, Democratic, Secular Alternative’ in F. Deng and P. Gifford (eds.) *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*. Washington DC: Wilson Centre Press: 155-63.

El-DIN EL-TAYEB, G. with NIMIR, B. N. and EL-HASSAN, B. A. (eds.), 2006. *Land Issues and Peace in Sudan*. Khartoum: Sudanese Environment Conservation Society.

ELZEIN, I. S., 2000. 'The Archaeology of the Early Islamic Period in the Republic of Sudan' in *Sudan & Nubia* 4: 32-36.

ELZEIN, I. S., 2010. 'Qasr Wad Nimeiri and its Qubbas' in *Sudan & Nubia* 14: 91-95.

ELMQVIST, B., 2006. *Livelihood diversification and land use change in the Sahel: an interdisciplinary analysis of gum arabic in Sudan*. Lund: Apelsin Publishing.

ELNUR, I., 2012. *Contested Sudan: The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction*. London: Routledge.

EMERY, W. B., 1948. *Nubian Treasure*. London: Methuen.

ENGLISH, G. B., 1822. *A Narrative of the Expedition to Dongola and Sennaar*. London.

ERIKSEN, E., 2001. 'Between universalism and relativism: A critique of the UNESCO concepts of culture' in J. Cowan, M. B. Dembour and R. Wilson (eds.) *Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 127-48.

EZE-UZOMAKA, P. I. 2000. *Museums, Archaeologists and Indigenous People: Archaeology and the Public in Nigeria*. Oxford: BAR International Series 904.

FABIAN, J., 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

FAIRCLOUGH, N., 2003. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.

FERLINI, G., 1838. *Relation historique des fouilles opérées dans la Nubie par le Docteur Ferlini: suivie d'un catalogue des objets qu'il a trouvés dans l'une des 47 pyramides aux environs de l'ancienne ville de Méroé*. Salviucci.

FERNEA, R. A., 1984. 'Nubians' in R. V. Weekes (ed.) *Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, Vol. 2*. Westport: Greenwood Press: 559-65.

FEUCHTWANG, S. and ROWLANDS, M., 2010, ‘Re-evaluating the long term: civilisation and temporalities’ in D. Garrow and T. Yarrow (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Understanding Similarity: Exploring Difference.* Oxford: Oxbow Books: 117-136.

FISHER, M. M., 2012. *Ancient Nubia: African Kingdoms on the Nile*. Cairo; New York: American University in Cairo Press.

FOTIADIS, M., 2010. ‘There is a Blue Elephant in the Room: From State Institutions to Citizen Indifference’ in A. Stroulia and S. Buck Sutton (eds.) *Archaeology in Situ: Sites, Archaeology and Communities in Greece*. Landham, MD: Lexington Books: 447-456.

FOUCAULT, M., 1977. *Discipline and Punish.* New York: Vintage. (Trans. A. Sheridan)

FOWLER, P., 1987. ‘Uses of the Past: Archaeology in the Service of the State’ in *American Antiquity* 52 (2): 229-248.

FUSHIYA, T., and DE TRAFFORD, A., 2009. 'From Site to Society: From a Garbage Dumping Place to a Local Heritage Site’ in F. A. Hassan, L. S. Owens and A. De Trafford (eds.) *Managing Egypt's cultural heritage : proceedings of the first Egyptian Cultural Heritage Organisation Conference on Egyptian cultural heritage management.* London: Golden House Pulications: 38-59.

GALATY, J. G., 2014. ‘‘Unused’ Land and Unfulfilled Promises: Justifications for Displacing Communities in East Africa’ in *Nomadic Peoples* 18 (1): 80-93.

GAMAL, A., 1998. ‘Deconstructing Nubia: Kajabar damns entire ancient culture’ in *World Rivers Review* 13 (5): 6–7, 11.

GAMAL, A., 1998. ‘Kajbar and Nubian Lands: History, Case for Culture and Struggle’ Available at: http://probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Kajbar_Dam.pdf (Last accessed: 10 August 2015).

GARDINER, A. H., 1957. *Egyptian Grammar: Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphs, 3rd Ed.*. Oxford: Griffith Institute.

GARSTANG, J., SAYCE, A.H. and GRIFFITH, F. Ll., 1911. *Meroë: The City of the Ethiopians*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

GARSTANG, J., PHYTIAN, W. J. and SAYCE, A. H., 1914. 'Fifth Interim Report on the Excavations at Meroe in Ethiopia' in *Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* 7: 1-24.

GEERTZ, C., 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books Classics.

GERTEL, J., CALKINS, S., and ROTTENBURG, R., 2014. 'Disrupting Territories: Commodification and its Consequences' in J. Gertel, R. Rottenburg and S. Calkins (eds.) *Disrupting Territories: Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan*. Suffolk: Boydell and Brewer: 1-30.

GIBBONS, M., LIMOGES, C., NOWOTNY, .H, SCHWARTZMAN, S., SCOTT, P. and TROW, M., 1994. *The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies*. London: Sage.

GIDDENS, A., 1991. *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

GILLOT, L., 2010. 'Towards a Socio-Political History of Archaeology in the Middle East: The Development of Archaeological Practice and Its Impacts on Local Communities in Syria' in *Bulletin of the History of Archaeology* 20 (1): 4-16.

GLUCKMAN, M., 2007. 'Social beliefs and individual Thinking in Tribal Society' in R. A. Manners and D. Kaplan (eds.) *Anthropological Theory*. Transaction Publishers: 453-464.

GNECCO, C., 2015. 'An Entanglement of Sorts: Archaeology, Ethics, Praxis, Multiculturalism' in C. Gnecco, D. Lippert (eds.) *Ethics and Archaeological Praxis*. *Ethical Archaeologies: The Politics of Social Justice, vol 1*. New York: Springer.

GOMES, D. M. C., 2006. 'Amazonian Archaeology and Local Identities' in M. Edgeworth (ed.) *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 148-160.

GONZALEZ, P.A., 2014. ‘From a given to a construct: Heritage as a commons’ in *Cultural Studies* 28(3): 359-90.

GOODE, J. F., 2007. *Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

GOSDEN, C., 2002. *Anthropology and Archaeology: a Changing Relationship*. London: Routledge.

GOULD, P. G., and BURTENSHAW, P., 2014. ‘Archaeology and Economic Development’ in *Public Archaeology* 13 (1–3): 3-9.

GRAVES-BROWN, P., JONES, S. and GAMBLE. C., 1996. *Cultural Identity and Archaeology: The Construction of European Communities*. London: Routledge.

GREENLAW, J. P., 1995. *The coral buildings of Suakin: Islamic architecture, planning, design and domestic arrangements in a red sea port*. London: Wiley.

GRIFFITH, F., I. J., 1929. ‘Scenes from a Destroyed Temple at Napata’ in *Journal of Egyptian Archeology* 15 (1/2): 26-28.

GRIGOR, T., 2005. ‘Cultivat(ing) Modernities: The Society for National Heritage, Political Propaganda and Public Architecture in Twentieth-Century Iran’. (Doctoral Thesis. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

GRZYMSKI, K., 2005. ‘Meroe, the Capital of Kush: Old Problems and New Discoveries’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 9: 47–58.

GRZYMSKI, K., and GRZYMSKA, I., 2008. ‘Excavations in Palace M750 at Meroe’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 12: 47–51.

GWADO-AYOKER, K., 1986, ‘Interpreting the South’ in M. Abdel-Rahim et al. (eds.) *Sudan since Independence: studies of the political development since 1956.* Aldershot: Gower: 155-9.

HABACHI, L., 1981. 'Collaboration of Egyptian Egyptologists with foreign expedition in facing problems threatening the Pharaonic monuments' in N. Grimal (ed.) *Prospection et Sauvegarde des Antiquities de l'Egypte*. Cairo: IFAO: 87-90.

HABU, J., FAWCETT, C., and MATSUNAGA, J. M., 2008. *Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist Archaeologies*. New York: Springer.

HADIDI, H. E., 2017. *Zār: Spirit Possession, Music, and Healing Rituals in Egypt*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

HAFSAAS-TSAKOS, H., 2011. 'Ethical implications of salvage archaeology and dam building: The clash between archaeologists and local people in Dar al-Manasir, Sudan' in *Journal of Social Archaeology* 11 (1): 49–76.

HAJER, M., 1993. 'Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain' in F. Fischer and J. Forrester (eds.) *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. Durham, UK: Duke University Press: 43-76.

HALE, S., 1973. *Nubians: A Study in Ethnic Identity*. Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, Sudan Research Unit.

HALE, S., 1979. 'The ethnic identity of Sudanese Nubians' in *Meroitica 5*: 165-72.

HALL, E., 1991. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-definition through Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

HAMILAKIS, Y., 2008. 'Decolonizing Greek Archaeology: Indigenous Archaeologies, Modernist Archaeology and the Post-colonial Critique' in D. Damaskos and D. Plantzos (eds.) *A Singular Antiquity, Archaeology and Hellenic Identity in Twentieth-Century Greece.* Athens: Benaki Museum: 273–284.

HAMILAKIS, Y. 2011. 'Archaeological Ethnography: A Multi-temporal Meeting Ground for Archaeology and Anthropology' in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 399-414.

HAMILAKIS, Y. 2012. ‘Are we Postcolonial Yet? Tales from the Battlefield’ in *Archaeologies* 8 (1): 67-76.

HAMILAKIS, Y., and ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, A., 2009. “What is Archaeological Ethnography?’ in *Public Archaeology: Archaeological Ethnographies* 8 (2–3): 65-87.

HAMILAKIS, Y., and DUKE, P., 2016. *Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics*. New York: Routledge.

HANN, C., 2012. ‘Big Revolutions: Two Small Disciplines, and Socialism’ in D. Shankland (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Past, Present and Future*. London: Berg: 19-40.

HÄNSCH, V., 2012. ‘Chronology of a Displacement: The Drowning of the Manâsîr People’ in *Meroitica* 26: Berlin: Akademie-Verlag: 179-228.

HASAN, Y.F., 1967. *The Arabs and the Sudan: from the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

HASAN, Y, F., 1971. ‘External Islamic Influences and Progress of Islamisation in the Eastern Sudan Between the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Centuries’ in Y. F. Hasan (ed.) *Sudan in Africa*. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.

HASSAN, F. A. 1998. 'Memorabilia: archaeological materiality and national identity in Egypt' in L. Meskell (ed.) *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*. London: Routledge: 200-216.

HASHIM, M. J., 2007. ‘The Policies of De-Nubianization in Egypt and Sudan: an Ancient People on the Brink of Extinction’ in *Respect: Sudanese Journal for Human Rights’ Culture and Issues of Cultural Diversity* 6: 1-27. Available at: http://mobile.sudan-forall.org/sections/ihtiram/pages/ihtiram_issue6/pdf_files/muhammad-Jalaal-Haashim.pdf (Last accessed 12 September 2013.)

HAYNES, J. L., 1992. *Nubia: Ancient Kingdoms of Africa*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts.

HEATH, D.B., 1973. ‘Economic Aspects of Commercial Archaeology in Costa Rica’ in *American Antiquity* 38: 259-265.

HEIERLAND, I, D., 2009. ‘Archaeological Park or ‘Disneyland’? Conflicting Interests on Heritage at Naqa in Sudan’ in *Égypte/Monde Arabe* 2009/1222*: 355-80.*

HENNINGS, J., WILLIAMS, J. and HAQUE, B. N., 1996. ‘Exploring the health needs of Bangladeshi women: A case study in using qualitative research methods’ in *Health Education Journal* 55: 11– 23.

HENTSCHEL, J., 1998. *Distinguishing between Types of Data and Methods of Collecting Them*. Washington, DC: World Bank

HERITAGE, J., 1984. *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity.

HERODOTUS, 2015. *The Histories*. London; New York: Everyman’s Library (trans. G. Rawlinson).

HERZFELD, M., 1996. ‘Monumental Indifference?’ in *Archaeological Dialogues* 3: 120-3.

HIGUERAS, A., 1995. ‘Archaeological research in Peru: its contribution to national identity and to the Peruvian public’ in *Journal of Steward Anthropological Society* 23: 391-4.

HILDYARD, N., 2008. ‘Neutral? Against what? Bystanders and human rights abuses: The case of Merowe Dam’ in *Sudan Studies* 37: 19-38.

HINKEL, F. W., 1992. ‘Preservation and Restoration of Monuments: Causes of Deterioration and Measures for Protection’ *Nubian Studies* 1: 147-192.

HINKEL, F. W., 2000. ‘The Royal Pyramids of Meroe, Architecture, Construction and Reconstruction of a Sacred Landscape’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 4: 11-26.

HINKEL, F. W., and SIEVERTSEN, U., 2002. ‘Die Royal City von Meroe und die representative Profanarchitektur’ *Kusch, The Archeological Map of the Sudan, Suppl. IV*. Berlin: 65-71.

HLADIK, J., 1999a. ‘The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Notion of Military Necessity’ in *International Review of the Red Cross 81*: 621.

HLADIK, J., 1999b. ‘Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’ in *International Journal of Cultural Property* 526.

HOBSBAWM, E., 1992. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HOBSBAWM, E., and RANGER, T., 2012. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HODDER, I., 1991. ‘Interpretive Archaeology and Its Role’ in *American Antiquity* 56 (1): 7-18.

HODDER, I., 1998. ‘The past and passion and play: Çatalhoyuk as a site of conflict in the construction of multiple pasts’ in L. Meskell (eds.) *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*. London: Routledge: 124-39.

HODDER, I., 2008a. ‘Multivocality and Social Archaeology’ in J. Habu, C. Fawcett and J. M. Matsunaga (eds.) *Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist Archaeologies*. New York: Springer: 196-200.

HODDER, I., 2008b, ‘The ‘Social’ in Archaeological Theory: An Historical and Contemporary Perspective’ in L. Meskell and R. W. Preucel (eds.) *A Companion to Social Archaeology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell: 23-42.

HODDER, I., 2012. *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships Between Humans and Things*. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.

HODDER, I., and BERGGREN, A., 2005. *At the trowel’s edge: an introduction to reflexive field practice in archaeology*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

HODDER, I., and HUTSON, S., 2003. *Reading the Past: Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HOFHEINZ, A., 1992. 'From Faki to Duktor: Changing Attitudes Towards Tradition Among Sudanese Rural Intellectuals' in *Conference Papers, Second International Sudan Studies Conference, Vol. 3*. Durham: University of Durham: 96-106.

HOLLOWELL, J., 2006. 'Moral Arguments on Subsistence Digging', in C. Scarre and G. Scarre (eds.), *The Ethics of Archaeology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 69-93.

HOLLOWELL-ZIMMER, J., 2002. 'The Legal Market in Archaeological Materials from Alaska's Bering Strait' in *Revista De Arqueología Americana* 21: 7-32.

HOLLOWELL, J. and NICHOLAS, G., 2008. 'A Critical Assessment of Ethnography in Archaeology' in Q. Castañeda, and C. Matthews (eds.) *Ethnographic Archaeologies: Reflections on Stakeholders and Archaeological Practices*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 63-94.

HOLT, P. M., 1958. *The Mahdist State: 1881-1989*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

HOLT, P. M., 1961. *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

HOPKINS, N. S., and MEHANNA, S. R., 2010. *Nubian Encounters: The Story of the Nubian Ethnological Survey 1961-1964*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

HOSKINS, G. A., 1835. *Travels in Ethiopia above the Second Cataract*. London.

HOURMOUZIADI, A., and TOULOUMIS, K., 2010. '"Between Mud and Poetry": Archaeology in the Local Market' in A. Stroulia and S. Buck Sutton (eds.) *Archaeology in Situ: Sites, Archaeology and Communities in Greece*. Landham, MD: Lexington Books: 301-330.

HUMPHRIS, J., 2014. 'Post-Meroitic Iron Production: initial results and interpretations' in *Sudan and Nubia* 18: 121-130.

HUMPHRIS, J., BRADSHAW, R., 2017. ‘Understanding the ‘Community’ before ‘Community Archaeology’: A Case Study from Sudan’ in *Journal of Community Archaeology and Heritage* 4 (3): 203-217.

HUMPHRIS, J., BRADSHAW, R., and EMBERLING, G., f/c. ’Archaeologists and Archaeology in Sudanese communities: Roles and Impacts’ in: G. Emberling (ed.*) The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Nubia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

HUMPHRIS, J. and CAREY, C., 2016. ‘New methods for investigating slag heaps: Integrating geoprospection, excavation and quantitative methods at Meroe, Sudan’ in *Journal of Archaeological Science* 70: 132-144.

HURREIZ, S. H., 1974. *Ja’aliyyin Folktales: An Interplay of African, Arabian and Islamic Elements*. Indiana African Series, Vol. 8. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications.

IBRAHIM, A. A., 1988. ‘Breaking the Pen of Harold MacMichael: The Ja'aliyyin Identity Revisited’ in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21 (2): 217-231.

IDRIS, A. H., 2005. *Conflict and politics of identity in Sudan*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

INGOLD, T., 2010. ‘No More Ancient; No More Human: The Future Past of Archaeology and Anthropology’ in D. Garrow and T. Yarrow (eds.) 2010. *Archaeology and Anthropology: Understanding Similarity: Exploring Difference.* Oxford: Oxbow Books: 77-89.

JACKSON, H. C., 1926. ‘A Trek in Abu Hamed District’ in *Sudan Notes and Records* 9 (2): 1-35.

JACOBS, J. and PORTER, B. 2009. ‘Excavating Turāth: Documenting Local and National Heritage Discourses in Jordan’ in L. Mortensen and J. Hollowell (eds.) *Archaeologies and Ethnographies: Iterations of ‘Heritage’ and the Archaeological Past*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press: 71–88.

JAKOB, T. and ALI, M. K. M., 2011. ‘Sudan’ in N. Marquez-Grant and L. Fibiger (eds.) *The Routledge handbook of archaeological human remains and legislation: An international guide to laws and practice in the excavation and treatment of archaeological human remains*. New York: Routledge. 513-23.

JAMES, P., 2006. *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In*. London: Sage Publications.

JAMESON, J. H. Jr, (ed.) 1997. *Presenting Archaeology to the Public: Digging for Truths*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira.

JENKINS, R., 1996. *Social Identity, Key ideas*. London: Routledge.

JEWSIEWICKI, B. 1989. 'African historical studies: academic knowledge as 'usable past' and radical scholarship' in *African Studies Review* 32: 1-76.

JONES, A., 2004. *Egypt, communities and the museum as muse: new perspectives on representing Egyptian heritage*. Unpublished Masters dissertation, University of Southampton.

JONES, A., f/c. *Retelling the past of Egypt? Incorporating Egyptian narratives into museum displays of Egyptian archaeology in the United Kingdom*. Doctoral thesis at the University of Southampton.

JOYCE, R. A., 2002. 'Academic freedom, stewardship, and cultural heritage: Weighing the interests of stakeholders in crafting repatriation approaches' in C. Fforde, J. Hubert and P. Turnball (eds.) *The dead and their possessions*. London: Routledge: 99-107.

KANKPEYENG, B.W., INSOLL, T., and MACLEAN, R., 2009. 'The tension between communities, development, and archaeological heritage preservation: The case study of Tengzug cultural landscape, Ghana' in *Heritage Management* 2 (2): 177-97.

KENNENNI, L., and VAN DER MAARL, E., 1990. 'Population ecology of *Acacia tortilis* in the semi-arid region of Sudan' in *Journal of Vegetation Science* 1: 419-424.

KENNEDY, J. G., 1977. *Struggle for change in a Nubian community: an individual in society and history*. California: Mayfield Publishing Company.

KENNEDY, J. G., 2005. *Nubian Ceremonial Life: Studies in Islamic syncretism and cultural change*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

KERKVLIET, B. J. T., 2009. ‘Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours)’ in *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36 (1): 227-243.

KERNAL, M. M., and LUKE, C., 2015. ‘Civil Societies? Heritage Diplomacy and Neo-Colonialism’ in L. Meskell (ed.) *Global Heritage: A Reader*: 70-93.

KEVANE, M., 2008. ‘Official representations of the Nation: Comparing the postage stamps of Sudan and Burkina Faso’ in *African Studies Quarterly: The online journal for African Studies* 10(1): 71-94. Available at: http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Kevane-Vol10Issue1.pdf (Last accessed 6 May 2013).

KHEIR, H. M., KUMAR, S., and CROSS A.R., 1991. ‘Female circumcision: attitudes and practices in Sudan’ in *Proceedings of the Demographic and Health Surveys World Conference, Washington, DC, Aug. 5-7, 1991*, Columbia, MD: IRD/Macro International: 1697-1717.

KINNVALL, C. 2006. *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security*. New York: Routledge.

KLAMER, A., 2014. ‘The Values of Archaeological and Heritage Sites’ in *Public Archaeology* 13(1-3): 59-70.

KLEINITZ, C., and MERLO, S., 2014. ‘Towards a collaborative exploration of community heritage in archaeological salvage contexts: Participatory mapping on Mograt Island, Sudan’ in *Der Antike Sudan. Mitteilungen der Sudanarchäologischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin* 25: 161-175.

KLEINITZ, C., and NÄSER, C., 2011. ‘The loss of innocence: political and ethical dimensions of the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project at the Fourth Nile Cataract (Sudan)’ in *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 13 (2-3): 253-280.

KLEINITZ, C., and NÄSER, C., (eds.) 2012. ‘Nihna Nas al-Bahar, We are the People of the River: Ethnographic Research in the Fourth Nile Cataract Region, Sudan’. *Meroitica* 26, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

KLEINITZ, C., and NÄSER, C., 2013. ‘Archaeology, development and conflict: a case study from the African continent’ in *Archaeologies* 9 (1): 162-191.

KOHL. P. L., 1998. ‘Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Constructions of Nations and the Reconstructions of the Remote Past’ in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27: 223-46.

KOHL, P. L., and FAWCETT, C., 1995. ‘Archaeology in the service of the state: theoretical considerations’ in P. L. Kohl and C. Fawcett (eds.) *Nationalism, politics, and the practice of archaeology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 3-18.

KOMEY, G., 2014. ‘Sedentary-Nomadic Relations in a Shared Territory: Post-Conflict Dynamics in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan’ in J. Gertel, R. Rottenburg and S. Calkins (eds.) *Disrupting Territories: Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan*. Boydell and Brewer: 121-151.

KOPYTOFF, I., 1986. ‘The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process’ in A. Appadurai (ed.) *The Social Life of Things: commodities in perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 64-91.

KURCZ, M., 2002. ‘The ‘living saints’ and their graves: Domed Tombs of northern Sudan in the context of religion, social life and local architecture traditions’ in *Africana Bulletin* 50: 249-264.

KUSIMBA, C. M., 2009. ‘Practicing postcolonial archaeology in eastern Africa from the United States’ in P. R. Schmidt (ed.) *Postcolonial Archaeologies in Africa.* Sante Fe, NM: School of American Research Press: 57-75.

KUSIMBA, C. M., 2017. 'Community archaeology and heritage in coastal and Western Kenya’ in *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage* 4(3): 218-228.

LAFRENZ SAMUELS, K., 2008. ‘Value and Significance in Archaeology’ in *Archaeological Dialogues* 15 (1): 71-97.

LANE, P. J., 1998. ‘Indigenous or autochthonous? Establishing a role for archaeology in the negotiation of Basarwa identity’ in S. Saugestad (eds.) *Indigenous Peoples in Modern Nation-States*. Tromsø: University of Tromsø: 38-46.

LANE, P. J., 2006. ‘Household Assemblages, Lifecycles and the Remembrance of Things Past among the Dogon of Mali’ in *South African Archaeological Bulletin* 61: 40-56.

LANE, P. J., 2011. 'Possibilities for a Postcolonial Archaeology in Sub-Saharan Africa: Indigenous and Usable Pasts' in *Postcolonial Archaeologies* 43 (1): 7–25.

LANE, P. J., KLEINITZ, C., and GAO, Y., 2016. 'Global Frictions, Archaeological Heritage and Chinese Construction in Africa' in T. Hodos (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Archaeology and Globalization*. New York: Taylor & Francis: 139-156.

LARGE, D., 2011. 'The International Presence in Sudan' in J. Willis et al. (eds.) *The Sudan Handbook*. Suffolk: James Currey Ltd.: 164-177.

LARSON, F., 2009. *An infinity of things: how Sir Henry Wellcome collected the world*. Oxford University Press.

LEAVY, P., 2011. *Oral History: Understanding Qualitative Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LEPSIUS, C. R., 1853. *Letter from Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Peninsula of Sinai*. (Trans. L. and J. B. Horner)

LESCH, M., 1998. *The Sudan – Contested National Identities*. Oxford: James Currey Ltd.

LETURCQ, J-G., 2011. 'Heritage-making and Policies of Identity in the 'Post-conflict Reconstruction' of Sudan' in *Égypte/Monde Arabe* 2009/1222: 295-328.

LEWIS, B., 1991. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

LIAMPUTTONG, P., 2010. *Performing Qualitative Cross-Cultural Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LILLEY, I., 2000. *Native Title and the Transformation of Archaeology in the Postcolonial World*. Sydney: University of Sydney Press.

LITTLE, B. J., 2009. 'What Can Archaeology Do for Justice, Peace, Community, and the Earth?' in *Historical Archaeology* 43 (4): 115-119.

LITTLE, B. J., and SHACKEL, P. A., 2014. *Archaeology, Heritage, and Civic Engagement*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

LOOSLEY, E., 2005. 'Archaeology and Cultural Belonging in Contemporary Syria: The Value of Archaeology to Religious Minorities' in *World Archaeology* 37 (4): 589-596.

LORENZON, M., and TERMINI, I., 2016. 'Common Ground: Community Archaeology in Egypt, Interaction Between Population and Cultural Heritage' in *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage* 3 (3): 183-199.

LORIMER, F. C. S., 1936. 'The Megadhib of El Damer' in *Sudan Notes and Records* 19 (2): 335-341.

LOWENTHAL, D., 1985. *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LOWIE, R. H., 1915. 'Oral Tradition and History' in *American Anthropologist* 17 (3): 597-599.

LUTHER, M. H., and PANAYOTIS, P., 2004. *Hellenisation, Empire and Globalisation: Lessons from Antiquity*. Norway: Vanias Publications.

LYOTARD, J. F. et al., 1977. *Performance in postmodern culture.* Madison: University of Wisconsin.

M'BOW, M, A-M., 1992. 'Opening Speech' in A. Irele (eds.) *African Education and Identity: Proceedings of the 5th Session of the International Congress of African Studies, held at Ibadan, Dec. 1985*. London: Hans Zell Publishers: 1-14.

MACMICHAEL, H. A., 1922. *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan and Some Account of the People who Preceded Them and of the Tribes Inhabiting Dárfūr*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MALIÑSKI, P., 2014. 'Some Remarks on the Role of Volcanic Craters in the Traditional Economy of the Manasir Tribe of the Bayuda Desert' in *Gdańsk Archaeological Museum African Reports* 11: 79-88.

MALLOWAN, M. E. L., 1977. *Mallowan's Memoirs: Agatha and the Archaeologist*. London: Harper Collins.

MALWAL, B., 1981. *People and Power in Sudan*. London: Ithaca Press.

MALWAL, B., 1991. 'Sudan and Nation-Statehood' in *Sudan: Environment and People: Second International Sudan Studies Conference papers, Vol. 1*. Durham: University of Durham: 176-186.

MANSHURAT II., 1963. *Manshurat al-imam al-mahdi, Vol. 2*. Khartoum: idarat al-mahfouzat.

MARCHANT, R., and LANE, P., 2014. 'Past Perspectives for the Future: Foundations for Sustainable Development in East Africa' in *Journal of Archaeological Science* 51: 12-21.

MARCUS, G. E., and FISCHER, M. M. J., 1986. *Anthropology as cultural critique: an experimental moment in the human sciences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MARSHALL, Y., 2002. 'What is community archaeology?' in *World Archaeology* 34 (2): 211-219.

MASON, J., 2002. *Qualitative Researching*. London: SAGE.

MATERO, F., FONG, K. L., DEL BONO, E., GOODMAN, M., KOPELSON, E., MCVEY, L., SLOOP, J., and TURTON C., 1998. 'Archaeological site conservation and management: An appraisal of recent trends' in *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 2: 129-142.

MATSUA, D., 1998. 'The Ethics of Archaeology, Subsistence Digging, and Artifact Looting in Latin America: Point, Muted Counterpoint' in *International Journal of Cultural Property* 7: 89-97.

MATSUDA, D., 2005. 'Subsistence Diggers' in K. F. Gibbon (ed.) *Who Owns the Past?* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press: 255-68.

MATTHEWS, C., 2008. 'The Location of Archaeology' in Q. Castañeda, and C. Matthews (eds.) *Ethnographic Archaeologies: Reflections on Stakeholders and Archaeological Practices*. AltaMira Press, Lanham MD: 157-182.

MATTINGLY, D. J., 2011. *Imperialism, power, and identity: experiencing the Roman Empire*. Woodstock: Princeton University Press.

MAYO, D. N. N., 1994. ‘The British Southern Policy in Sudan: An Inquiry into the Closed District Ordinances (1914-1946)’ in *Northeast African Studies* 1 (2-3): 165-185.

MAYOR, A., and HUYSECOM, E., 2016. 'Cultural Pathways to Development Among Communities: The Cultural Banks in Mali’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 153-181.

MBUNWE-SAMBA, P., 1994. 'Oral tradition and the African Past’ in R. Layton (ed.) *Who Needs the Past?: Indigenous Values and Archaeology*. London and New York, Routledge: 105-119.

McANANY, P. A., and PARKS, S., 2012. ‘Casualties of Heritage Distancing’ in *Current Anthropology* 53 (1): 80-107.

McCLANAHAN, A., 2006. ‘Histories, Identity and Ownership: An Ethnographic Case Study in Archaeological Heritage Management in the Orkney Islands’ in M. Edgeworth (ed.) *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Worlds of Archaeology Series. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 126-136.

McDAVID, C., 1997. ‘Descendants, decisions, and power: the public interpretation of the archaeology of the Levi Jordan Plantation’ in *Historical Archaeology* 31: 114-31.

McDAVID, C., 2002. ‘Archaeologies that Hurt: Descendants that Matter: A Pragmatic Approach to Collaboration in the Public Interpretation of African-American Archaeology’ in *World Archaeology* 34(2):303-14.

McDAVID, C., RIZVI, U., and SMITH, L., 2016. 'Community Archaeology and Heritage in Africa: Conversations inspired by a workshop’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 250-270.

McGIMSEY, C., 1972. *Public Archaeology*. New York: Seminar Press.

McGREGOR, A., 2011. ‘Palaces in the Mountains: An Introduction to the Archaeological Heritage of the Sultanate of Darfur’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 15: 129-141.

McINTOSH, R. J., 1996. ‘Just Say Shame: excising the rot of cultural genocide’ in P. R. Schmidt and R. J. McIntosh (eds.) *Plundering Africa’s Past*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 45-62.

MEHARI, G. A., and RYANO, K. P., 2016. 'Maasai People and Oldupai (Olduvai) Gorge: Looking for Sustainable People-Centred Approaches and Practices’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 21-46.

MERLAN, F., 2009. ‘Indigeneity: Global and Local’ in *Current Anthropology* 50(3): 303-33.

MESKELL, L., 1999. *Archaeologies of Social Life: Age, Sex, Class et cetera in ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Blackwell.

MESKELL, L., 2001. ‘The practice and politics of archaeology in Egypt’ in A.-M. Cantwell, E. Friedlander and M. L. Tram (eds.) *Ethics and Anthropology: Facing Future Issues in Human Biology, Globalism and Cultural Property*. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: 146-69.

MESKELL, L., 2002a. *Private life in New Kingdom Egypt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

MEKSELL, L., 2002b. ‘Negative Heritage and Past Mastering in Archaeology’ in *Anthropological Quarterly* 75: 557–574.

MESKELL, L., 2002c. ‘The Intersections of Identity and Politics in Archaeology’ in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 279–301.

MESKELL, L., 2005a. ‘Archaeological Ethnography: Conversations around Kruger National Park’ in *Archaeologies* 1(1): 81-100.

MESKELL, L., 2005b. *Archaeologies of Materiality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

MESKELL, L., 2007. ‘Falling walls and mending fences: archaeological ethnography in the Limpopo’ in *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33: 383–400.

MESKELL, L., 2011. ‘From Paris to Pontdrift: UNESCO Meetings, Mapungubwe and Mining’ in *South African Archaeological Bulletin* 66 (194): 149–56.

MESKELL, L., 2012. ‘The Rush to Inscribe: Reflections on the 35th Session of the World Heritage Committee, UNESCO Paris, 2011’ in *Journal of Field Archaeology* 37 (2): 145–51.

MESKELL, L., 2012. ‘Archaeological Ethnography: Materiality, Heritage and Hybrid Methodologies’ in D. Shankland (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Past, Present and Future*. London: Berg: 133-45.

MESKELL, L., 2013a. ‘UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40’ in *Current Anthropology* 54 (4): 483-94.

MESKELL, L. 2013b. ‘UNESCO and the Fate of the World Heritage Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts (WHIPCOE)’ in *International Journal of Cultural Property* 20 (2): 155-174.

MESKELL, L., and SCHEERMEYER, C. 2008. ‘Heritage as Therapy: Set Pieces in a New South Africa’ in *Journal of Material Culture*: 153-174.

MESSING, S., 1958. ‘Group Therapy and Social Status in the Zār Cult of Ethiopia’ in *American Anthropologist* 60 (6): 1120-1126.

METZ, H. C., 1992. ‘Education’ in H. C. Metz (ed.) *Sudan: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available from: http://countrystudies.us/sudan. (Last accessed: 15 June 2015)

MILLER, D., 2008. ‘The uses of value’ in *GEOFORUM* 39 (3): 1122 - 1132.

MIRE, S., 2007. ‘Preserving Knowledge, Not Objects: A Somali Perspective for Heritage Management and Archaeological Research’ in *African Archaeological Review* 24 (3/4): 49-71.

MIRZA, M., 1998. ’Same voices, same lives? Revisiting black feminist standpoint epistemology’ in *Researching Racism in Education: Politics, Theory and Practice:* 79-94.

MITCHELL, T. 2000. 'Making the nation: the politics of heritage in Egypt' in N. A. Sayyid (ed.) *Consuming tradition, manufacturing heritage. Global norms and urban forms in the age of tourism*. London: Routledge.

MOERMAN, M., 1974. 'Accomplishing Ethnicity' in R. Turner (ed.) *Ethnomethodology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin: 54-68.

MOHAMMED, A. A. and WELSBY D., 2011. 'Early States on the Nile' in J. Willis et al. (eds.) *The Sudan Handbook*. Suffolk: James Currey Ltd.

MORKOT, R., 2000. *The Black Pharaohs: Egypt's Nubian Rulers*. London: Rubicon Press.

MOSER, S., GLAZIER, D., PHILIPS, J., EL NMER, L., MOUSA, M., AIESH, R., RICHARDSON, S., CONNER, A., and SEYMOUR, M., 2002. 'Transforming Archaeology through Practice: Strategies for Collaborative Archaeology and the Community Archaeology Project at Quseir, Egypt' in *World Archaeology* 34(2): 220-248.

MOSER, S., 2007. 'On Disciplinary Culture: Archaeology as Fieldwork and Its Gendered Associations' in *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory* 14 (3): 235-263.

MOSHENSKA, G., 2010. 'What is Public Archaeology?' in *Present Pasts* 1 (1).

MURRAY, T., and EVANS, C., 2008. *Histories of Archaeology: A Reader in the History of Archaeology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MUSA, F. M., 2010. 'Transference of Kingship from the Anag to the Fung in the Sennar Kingdom' in W. Godlewski, W. and A. Lajtar (eds.) *Between the Cataracts: PAM Supplement Series 2.2./2*. Warsaw: Warsaw University Press: 35-38.

MYDLAND, L., and GRAHN, W., 2012. 'Identifying heritage values in local communities' in *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 18:6: 564-587.

NÄSER, C., and KLEINITZ, C., 2012. 'The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: a case study on the politicisation of archaeology and its consequences from northern Sudan' in C. Kleinitz and C.

Näser (eds.) *Nihna nas al-bahar – We are the people of the river: Ethnographic Research in the Fourth Nile Cataract Region (Sudan)* in *Meroitica* 26, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz: 269-304.

NASR, A. A., 1980. 'Popular Islam in al-Tayyib Salih' in *Journal of African Literature* 11: 88-104.

NEBBIA, M., LEONE, A., BOCKMANN, R., HDDAD, M., ABDOULI, H., MASOUD, A. M., ELKENDI, N., HAMOUD, H., ADAM, S., and KHATAB, M. N. 2016. 'Developing a Collaborative Strategy to Manage and Preserve Cultural Heritage During the Libyan Conflict: The Case of the Gebel Nāfusa' in *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory* 23(4): 971-988.

NEUGEBOREN, R., and JACOBSON, M., 2001. *Writing Economics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

NEUMAN, W. L., 2007. *Basics of Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Pearson Education

NEWTON, K., and VAN DETH, J. W., 2010. *Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world, 2nd ed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NDLOVU, N., 2016. 'Old Archaeology Camouflaged as New and Inclusive? South African Community Archaeology in the 21st Century' in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 136-153.

NIEZEN, R., 2003. *The origins of indigenism: Human rights and the politics of identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

NILAN, P., 2002. `Dangerous fieldwork re-examined: the question of researcher subject position' in *Qualitative Research* 2: 363–386.

NWANA, E., 1994. 'The past as perceived by the Bali Nyonga people of Cameroon' in R. Layton (ed.) *Who Needs the Past?: Indigenous Values and Archaeology*. London and New York, Routledge: 180-188.

NYE, J. S., 2004. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

O' COLLINS, R., 1992. 'The Society and its Environment' in *Sudan: A Country Study* in H.C. Metz, (ed.) Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at: http://countrystudies.us/sudan/ (Last accessed: 15 June 2015)

O'FAHEY, R. S., 1994. *Arabic Literature of Africa: Vol. I, The Writings of Eastern Sudanic Africa to c. 1900*. Leiden: Brill.

OLAND, M., 2012. 'Public and Postcolonial Practices in Latin American Archaeology: Engaging With Non-Descendant Communities in Northern Belize' in *Chungara: Revista De Antropología Chilena* 44 (3): 467–74.

OPDYCKE, S., 2010. 'John Lowell' *American National Biography* (from Oxford University Press). Available from: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ers&AN=88824635&site=eds-live.

OSMAN, A. M. S., 1992. 'The Folklore of Archaeological Sites: A Case Study from Nawri in Third Cataract region' in J. Sterner and N. David (eds.) *An African Commitment: Papers in Honour of Peter Lewis Shinnie*. Calgary: 31-35.

OSMAN, A., 2003. 'Space, Place and Meaning in Northern Riverain Sudan: Focus on the Determinants of House Form and Layout' presented at 31st IAHS World Congress on Housing, June 23-27, 2003, Montreal, Canada.

OXBY, C., 1999. 'A Review of African Ethno-Astronomy: With Particular Reference to Saharan Livestock-Keepers' in *La Ricerca Folklorica* 40: 55-64.

PARKS, S., McANANY, P. A., and MURATA, S., 2006. 'The Conservation of Maya Cultural Heritage: Searching for Solutions in a Troubled Region' in *Journal of Field Archaeology* 31(4): 425-432.

PARKS, S., 2010. 'The collision of heritage and economy at Uxbenká, Belize' in *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 16(6): 434-448.

PATTERSON, T. C., 1994. ‘Social Archaeology in Latin America: An Appreciation’ in *American Antiquity 59* (3): 531-537.

PEKKINEN, J., 2009. *Sudanese Elites: How the Riverain Groups Achieved Political Dominance and their Impact on the Sudanese State*. African Studies Program Paper: 1-33. Available at: http://www.learningace.com/doc/1035921/8efc6f21223aed76d0c8532fde8118/jennifer-pekkinen-program-paper (Last accessed 20 March 2015)

PIKIRAYI, I., 2016. 'Archaeology, Local Knowledge and Tradition: The Quest for Relevant Approaches to the Study and Use of the Past in Southern Africa’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 112-136.

PLENDERLEITH, H. J., 1968. ‘Problems in the preservation of monuments’ in *The Conservation of Cultural Property*, Museums and Monuments XI, Paris, (UNESCO): 124-34.

POESCHKE, R., 1996. *Nubians in Egypt and Sudan: Constraints and Coping Strategies*. (Doctoral Thesis. Bielefeld: Bielefeld Studies on the Sociology of Development)

POLLOCK, S., 2010. ‘Decolonizing Archaeology: Political Economy and Archaeological Practice in the Middle East’ in R. Boytner, L. Swartz Dodd and B. Parker (eds.), *Controlling the Past, Owning the Future: The Political Uses of Archaeology in the Middle East*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press: 196-216.

POPA, C. 2016. 'The significant past and insignificant archaeologists. Who informs the public about their ‘national’ past? The case of Romania’ in *Archaeological Dialogues* 23(1): 28-39.

POSNANSKY, D., 2017. 'Archaeology and the local community in Africa: A retrospective’ in *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage* 4(2): 77-84.

POULIN, M, 2007. ‘Sex, money and premarital relationships in southern Malawi’ in *Social Science & Medicine* 65: 2383-93

PYBURN, K. A., 2008. ‘The Pageantry of Archaeology’ in in Q. Castañeda, and C. Matthews (eds.) *Ethnographic Archaeologies: Reflections on Stakeholders and Archaeological Practices*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 139-156.

RABINOW, P., 2003. *Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment.* London: Princeton University Press.

RAHARIJAONA, V., 1994. 'Archaeology and oral traditions in the Mitongoa-Andrainjato area (Betsileo region of Madagascar)’ in R. Layton (ed.) *Who Needs the Past?: Indigenous Values and Archaeology*. London and New York, Routledge: 189-194.

RANGER, T. O. 1976. ‘Towards a usable past’ in C. Fyfe (ed.) *African Studies since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson*. London: Longman: 17–30.

RATHJE, W., SHANKS, M., and WITMORE, C. (eds.) 2013. *Archaeology in the Making: Conversations through a Discipline*. London: Routledge.

REHFISCH, F., 1972. ‘A Rotating Credit Association in the Three Towns’ in I. G. Cunnison, W. James and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.) *Essays in Sudan Ethnography: Presented to Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard*. London: C. Hurst: 189-200.

REID, D. M., 1997. ‘Nationalizing the Pharaonic past: Egyptology, imperialism and nationalism, 1922–1952’ in J. Jankowski and I. Gershoni (eds.) *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press: 127-49.

REID, D. M., 2002. *Whose Pharaohs: Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.

REID, A. M. and LANE, P., 2003, ‘African Historical Archaeologies: An Introductory Consideration of Scope and Potential’ in A. M. Reid and P. Lane (eds.) *African Historical Archaeologies*. New York; London: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers: 1-32.

REISNER, G. A., 1918. *Outline of the Ancient History of the Sudan*. Cairo: Printing-Office of the French Institute of Oriental Archaeology.

REISNER, G. A., 1923. ‘The Meroitic Kingdom of Ethiopia’ in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 9, 157–160.

REISNER, G. A., 1923. *The Pyramids of Meroe and the Candaces of Ethiopia*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts.

RENFREW, C., and BAHN, P., 2008. *Archaeology: Theories, Methods and Practice 5th Edition*. London: Thames & Hudson.

RIEDEL, A., BASHIR, M. S., WOLF, P., MOHAMED, M. B., and KLEINITZ, C., 2017. ‘The Qatari Mission for the Pyramids of Sudan – Archaeological Investigation, Conservation and Site Management at Meroe 2015/2016’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 20: 62-74.

ROBIN, C., and ROTHSCHILD, N.A., 2002. ‘Archaeological Ethnographies: Social Dynamics of Outdoor Space’ in *Journal of Social Archaeology* 2 (2):159-173.

RODRIGUEZ, T., 2006. ‘Conjunctures in the Making of an Ancient Maya Archaeological Site’ in M. Edgeworth (eds.) *Ethnographies of Archaeological Practice: Cultural Encounters, Material Transformations*. Lanham MD: AltaMira Press: 161-172.

ROEDER, P.G., 2007. *Where nation-states come from: Institutional change in the age of nationalism*. Princeton, NJ.

RONE, J., 1999. *Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Rights Causes*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

RONE, J., and OWSLEY, B., 1996. *Behind the red line: political repression in Sudan*. Human Rights Watch: New York.

ROSE, J. C., and BURKE, D. L., 2004. ‘Making Money from Buried Treasure’ in *Culture without Context* 14: 4-8.

ROSEBERRY, W. 1989. *Anthropologies and histories: essays in culture, history, and political economy*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

RONAYNE, M., 2006. ‘Archaeology against cultural destruction: The case of the Ilısu dam in Southeast Turkey’ in *Public Archaeology* 5 (4): 223-36.

RONAYNE, M., 2008. ‘Commitment, Objectivity and Accountability to Communities: Priorities for 21st Century archaeology’ in *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 10 (4): 367-81.

ROUNTREE, K., 2007. ‘Archaeologists and Goddess Feminists at Çatalhöyük: An Experiment in Multivocality’ in *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 23 (2): 7-26.

RUNGER, M., 1987. *Land Law and Land Use Control in Western Sudan*. London and Atlantic Highlands NJ: Ithaca Press.

RUPPERT, H., 1998. ‘Identity Change as a Result of the Migration of Population Groups in the Sudan’ in F. N. Ibrahim and H. Ruppert (eds.) *Rural-Urban Migration and Identity Change: Case Study from the Sudan*. Bayreuth: Bayreuther Geowissenschaftliche Arbetiten 11: 5-13.

RYLE, J., 2011. ‘Peoples and Cultures of Two Sudans’ in J. Willis et al. (eds.) *The Sudan Handbook*. Suffolk: James Currey Ltd: 31-43.

SACKS, H., JEFFERSON, G., and SCHEGLOFF, E. A., (eds.) 1995. *Harvey Sacks: Lectures on Conversation*. Oxford: Blackwell.

SAFWAT, K. M., 1991. ‘The Sudanese State: From Pristine to Modern’ in *Sudan: Environment and People: Second International Sudan Studies Conference papers*. Durham: University of Durham: 187-190.

SAID, E., 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.

SALIH, M. M. A., 1990. ‘Government Policy and Options in Pastoral Development in the Sudan’ in *Nomadic Peoples* 25/27: 65-78.

SALIH, M. M. A., 1999. *The Manasir of Northern Sudan: land and people: a riverine society and resource scarcity*. R. Köppe: Köln.

SALMON, J., 2005. 'Field Research in a Securitised Area: The State and Information in Sudan' in *Pylovocia SOAS Journal of Graduate Research* 1. Available at: https://www.soas.ac.uk/research/rsa/journalofgraduateresearch/editon1/file58317.pdf (Last accessed: 10 June 2013)

SANDES, E. W. C., 1937. *The Royal Engineers in Egypt and the Sudan*. Chatham.

SATZINGER, H., 2010. 'Old Nubian—Black African language of the most ancient attestation' in W. Godlewski and A. Lajtar (eds.) *Between the Cataracts: PAM Supplement Series 2.2./2*. Warsaw: Warsaw University Press: 747-75.

SÄVE-SÖDERBERGH, T., 1987. *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*. London: Thames and Hudson.

SAYCE, A. H., 1912. 'Second Interim Report on Excavations at Meroe in Ethiopia, Part II – the Historical Results' in *Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* 4: 53-65.

SEGOBYE, A. K., 2009. 'Between *indigene* and citizen: locating the politics of the past in postcolonial southern Africa' in P. R. Schmidt (eds.) *Postcolonial Archaeologies in Africa*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press: 163–76.

SELVAKUMAR, V., 2010. 'The use and relevance of archaeology in the post-modern world: views from India' in *World Archaeology* 43: 468–80.

SCHEPER-HUGHES, N., 1995. The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology' in *Current Anthropology* 36(3): 409-440.

SCHIFF-GIROGINI, M., 1958. 'Soleb' in *KUSH* 6: 82-98.

SCHLANGER, N., 2016. ''If not for you': The nation state as an archaeological context' in *Archaeological Dialogues* 23(1): 48-70.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 1995. 'Using archaeology to re-make history in Africa' in P. R. Schmidt and T. C. Patterson (eds.) *Making Alternative Histories: The Practice of Archaeology and History in non-Western Settings.* Sante Fe, NM: School of American Research Press: 119-47.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 2009. ‘What is postcolonial about archaeologies in Africa?’ in P. R. Schmidt (eds.) *Postcolonial Archaeologies in Africa*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press: 1-20.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 2010. 'Trauma and Social Memory in northwestern Tanzania: Organic, Spontaneous community collaboration’ in *Journal of Social Archaeology* 10(2): 255-279.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 2014. 'Rediscovering Community Archaeology in Africa and Reframing its Practice’ in *Journal of Community Archaeology and Heritage* 1(1): 38-57.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 2016. 'Collaborative Archaeology and Heritage in Africa: Views from the Trench and Beyond’ in P. R. Schmidt and I. Pikirayi (eds.) *Community archaeology and heritage in Africa: decolonizing practice*. London and New York, Routledge: 70-91.

SCHMIDT, P. R., 2017. 'Contests between heritage and history in Tanganyika/Tanzania: Insights arising from community-based heritage research’ in *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage* 4 (2): 85-100.

SCHMIDT, P. R., and PATTERSON, T. C., 1995. *Making Alternative Histories: The Practice of Archaeology and History in non-Western Settings.* Seattle: School of American Research Press.

SCUDDER, T., 1993. ‘Development-induced Relocation and Refugee Studies: 37 Years of Change and Continuity among Zambia's Gwembe Tonga’ in *Journal of Refugee Studies* 6 (2): 123-152.

SHAKED, H., 1978. *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi: A Historical Study of Kitāb sa'ādat al-mustahdī bi-sīrat al-Imām al-Mahdī*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.

SHANKLAND, D., 1996. ‘The Anthropology of an Archaeological Presence’ in I. Hodder (eds.) *On the Surface: The Re-Opening of Çatalhöyük*. Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research: 349-57.

SHANKLAND, D., 1999. ‘Integrating the Past: Folklore, Mounds and People at Çatalhöyük’ in A. Gazin-Schwartz and C. Holtorf (eds.) *Archaeology and Folklore*. London: Routledge: 139-57.

SHANKS, M., 2012. *The Archaeological Imagination*. Walnut Creek, CA: Le Coast Press.

SHANKS, M., and WITMORE, C., 2013. 'Archaeology: an ecology of practices' in W. Rathje, M. Shanks and C. Witmore (eds.) *Archaeology in the Making: Conversations through a Discipline*. London: Routledge: 380-98.

SHEPHERD, N., 2003. 'When the Hand that Holds the Trowel is Black...: Disciplinary Practices of Self Representation and the Issue of 'Native' Labour in Archaeology' in *Journal of Social Archaeology* 3(3): 334-52.

SHIBEIKA, M., 1959. *The Independent Sudan*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons.

SHINNIE, M., (eds.) 1958. *Linant de Bellefond's 'Journal d'un voyage Méroé dans les années 1821 et 1822'*. Khartoum.

SHINNIE, P. L., 1967. *Meroe: A Civilisation of the Sudan*. London: Thames & Hudson.

SHINNIE, P. L., 1981. 'Changing Attitudes towards the Past' in *Africa Today* 28 (2): 25-32.

SHINNIE, P. L., 1984. 'Excavations at Meroe 1974-76' in *Meroitica* 7: 498-504.

SHINNIE, P. L., and ANDERSON, J. R., 2004. *The Capital of Kush 2: Meroë Excavations 1973-1984. Meroitica* 20.

SHINNIE, P. L., and BRADLEY, R., 1980. '*The Capital of Kush 1: Meroe Excavations, 1965-1972' in Meroitica* 4. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

SHNIRELMAN, V., 1995. 'From internationalism to nationalism: forgotten pages of Soviet archaeology in the 1930s and 1940s' in P. Kohl and C. Fawcett (eds.) *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 120-138.

SIDAHMED, A. S., and SIDAHMED, A., 2005. *Sudan. Contemporary Middle East Series*. London; New York: Routledge.

SILBERMAN, N. A., 1989. *Between Past and Present: Archaeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

SILVERMAN, D., 1989. ‘Six Rules of Qualitative Research: A Post-Romantic Argument’ in *Symbolic Interaction* 12 (2): 215-230.

SILVERMAN, D., 2001. *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*. London: SAGE Publications.

SLOMAN, J., 2000. *Economics*. Financial Times: Prentice Hall.

SMITH, A. D., 1991. *National identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

SMITH, L, T., 1999. ‘Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples: the Navajho as indigenous descendants’. New York: Zed Books.

SMITH, L, 2006. *Uses of heritage*. New York: Routledge.

SMITH, L, and WATERTON, E., 2009. *Heritage, Communities and Archaeology*. London: Duckworth.

SMITH, S. T., 2003. *Wretched Kush: Ethnic Identities and Boundaries in Egypt’s Nubian Empire*. New York: Routledge.

SOJA, E. W., 1996. *Thirdspace: journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and-imagined places*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.

SOUVATZI, S., 2012. ‘Space, Place and Architecture: A Major Meeting Point Between Social Archaeology and Anthropology?’ in D. Shankland (ed.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Past, Present and Future*. London: Berg: 173-96.

SPAULDING, J., 1988. ‘The Business of Slavery in the Central Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1910-1930’ in *African Economic History* 17: 23-44.

SPIVAK, G. C., 1988. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in G. C. Spivak, C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 271-313.

STALEY, D. P., 1993. ‘St. Lawrence Island’s Subsistence Diggers: A New Perspective on Human Effects on Archaeological Sites’ in *Journal of Field Archaeology* 20: 347-55.

STAPF, B., 2004. 'Developing education strategies and support materials for children’ in H. Moffat and V. Willard (eds.) *Museum and gallery education. A manual of good practice*. Oxford: Altamira Press.

STARZMAN, M. T., 2012. ‘Archaeological fieldwork in the Middle East: Academic Agendas, Labour Politics and Neo-Colonialism’ in S. J. van der Linde and M. H. van de Dries, N. Schlanger and C. G. Slappendel (eds.) *European Archaeology Abroad: Global Settings, Comparative Perspectives*. Leiden: Sidestone Press: 401-415.

STEELE, C., 2008 ‘Archaeology and the forensic investigation of recent mass graves: Ethical issues for a new practice of archaeology’ in *Archaeologies* 4 (3): 414-428.

STRAIGHT, B., LANE, P. J., HILTON, C. E. and LETUA, M., 2015. ‘It was *maendeleo* that removed them’: disturbing burials and reciprocal knowledge production in a context of collaborative archaeology’ in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 21: 391-418.

STONE, P. G., and MACKENZIE, R., 1990. *The Excluded past: Archaeology in education*. London: Unwin Hyman.

STOTTMAN, M. J., 2010. *Archaeologists as Activists: Can Archaeologists Change the World?* University of Alabama Press.

STRATHERN, M., 1995. *Shifting Contexts: Transformations of Anthropological Knowledge*. London; New York: Routledge.

SULIEMAN, H. M., and ELAGIB, N. A., 2012. ‘Implications of climate, land-use and land-cover changes for pastoralism in eastern Sudan’ in *Journal of Arid Environments* 85: 132–141.

SULIEMAN M, H., 2013. ‘Land grabbing along livestock migration routes in Gadarif State, Sudan’ in *The Land Deal Politics Initiative*. Available at: http://www.hlrn.org/~hlrnnew/img/documents/LandgrabbingPI19Sulieman.pdf. (Last accessed 13 December 2016.)

SULLIVAN, S., 2008. ‘More Unconsidered Trifles? Aboriginal and Archaeological Heritage Values: Integration and Disjunctive in Cultural Heritage Management Practice’ in *Australian Archaeology* 67: 107-16.

TAHA, M. E., ELDWWARI, R. A., and BEKELE, T. 2014. ‘Role of some Cultural Aspects in Forest Resources Utilization and Conservation in Sheikan Locality, North Kordofan State, Sudan’ in *University of Kordofan Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Studies* 1(2): 39-59.

TAYLOR, B., 1854. *Journey to Central Africa*. New York G.P. Putnam & Co.

TEMPLE, B., 1997. ‘Watch your tongue: Issues in translation and cross-cultural research’ in *Sociology 31* (3): 607-18.

TESCH. P., 2007. ‘The Sultan Ali Dinar Museum, el-Fasher. A window on Darfur’s history’ in *Sudan & Nubia* 11: 119-121.

THOMAS, J., 2010. ‘Commentary: Walls and Bridges’ in D. Garrow and T. Yarrow (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Understanding Similarity: Exploring Difference.* Oxford: Oxbow Books: 179-84.

THROSBY, D., 2000. *Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TILLEY, C. Y., 1994. *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths, and Monuments*. Oxford: Berg.

TILLEY, C. Y., 2006. *Handbook of Material Culture*. London: SAGE.

TILLEY, C. Y., 2010. *Interpreting Landscapes: Geologies, Topographies, Identities; Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology 3*. Walnut Creek: Taylor and Francis.

TOOR, I., and NASAR, A., 2004. ‘Zakat as a Social Safety Net: Exploring the Impact on Household Welfare in Pakistan’ in *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 42 (1/2): 87-102.

TÖRÖK, L., 1995. *Meroe: six studies on the cultural identity of an ancient African state*. Budapest: Chaire d'égyptologie de l'Université Eötvös Loránd.

TÖRÖK, L., 1997. *The Kingdom of Kush: A handbook of the Napatan-Meroitic civilization*. Leiden: Brill.

TÖRÖK, L., 2002. *The Image of the Ordered World in Ancient Nubian Art: The Construction of the Kushite Mind, 800 BC-300 AD*. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

TÖRÖK, L., 2009. *Between Two Worlds: The Frontier Region between Ancient Nubia and Egypt, 3700 BC-AD 500*. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

TÖRÖK, L., 2014. *Herodotus in Nubia*. Leiden: Brill.

TÖRÖK, L., HOFMAN, I., and NAGY, I., 1997. *Meroe City, an Ancient African Capital: John Garstang's Excavations in the Sudan. Vol. 1*. London: The Egypt Exploration Society.

TRÉMEAUX, P., 1858. *Voyages au Soudan Orientale*. Paris: Borain & Droz. Cairo: Al Fatima Printing House. (Trans. R. A. Lobban Jr., T. N'Dem and B. Chupin.)

TRIGGER, B. G., 1984. 'Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist' in *Man* 19 (3): 355–370.

TRIGGER, B. G., 1989. *A History of Archaeological Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TRIGGER, B. G., 1994. 'Paradigms in Nubian Archaeology' in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 27 (2): 323-345.

TRILSBACH, A., 1983. 'Hydrology and Water Supply in the White Nile Province of The Sudan: modifications and problems' in *Swansea Geography* 20: 58-65.

TRIMINGHAM, J. S., 1965. *Islam in the Sudan*. London: Frank Cass.

THOMAS, J., 2010. 'Commentary: Walls and Bridges' in D. Garrow and T. Yarrow (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Understanding Similarity: Exploring Difference.* Oxford: Oxbow Books: 179-84.

THOMAS, J., 2012. ‘Archaeology, Anthropology and Material Things’ in D. Shankland (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Past, Present and Future*. London: Berg: 219-232.

TULLY, G., f/c. *Archaeology and community museology: Ancient Egyptian ‘daily life’ scenes in museums*. Doctoral thesis at the University of Southampton.

TULLY, G., 2007. ‘Community Archaeology: General Methods and Standards of Practice’ in *Public Archaeology* 6 (3): 155-187.

TULLY, G., 2010. ‘Ten Years On: The Community Archaeology Project Quseir, Egypt’ *in Proceedings of the 7th Conference for Archaeology and Education*. University of Barcelona.

TULLY, G., 2014. ‘Community Archaeology on Mograt Island: Sharing Spaces, Understanding Sites’ in *MittSAG, Der Antike Sudan* 25: 1-6.

TULLY, G., 2015. ‘Community Archaeology in Sudan: Discovering Mograt Island Together’ in *MittSAG, Der Antike Sudan* 26: 201-204.

TULLY, G., and NÄSER, C., 2016. *Discovering Mograt Island Together*. Humboldt University Press.

TURKU, H., 2017. *The Destruction of Cultural Property as a Weapon of war: ISIS in Syria and Iraq*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

UMBADDA, S., 2014. ‘Agricultural Investment through Land Grabbing in Sudan’ in J. Gertel, R. Rottenburg and S. Calkins (eds.) *Disrupting Territories: Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan*. Suffolk: Boydell and Brewer: 31-51.

USICK, P., 2002. *Adventures in Egypt and Nubia: the travels of William John Bankes (1786-1855).* London: The British Museum Press.

VERHOEVEN, H., 2015. *Water, civilization and power in Sudan: the political economy of military-Islamist state-building*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

VERHOEVEN, M., 1999. *An Archaeological Ethnography of a Neolithic Community: Space, Place and Social Relations in the Burnt Village at Tell Sabi Abyad, Syria*. Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Instanbul.

VIORST, M., 1995. 'Fundamentalism in Power: Sudan's Islamic Experiment' in *Foreign Affairs* 74 (3): 45-58.

WADDINGTON, G., and HANBURY, B., 1822. *Journal of a Visit to Some Parts of Ethiopia*. London: John Murray.

WAIT, G., and ALTSCHUL, J.H., 2014. 'Cultural Heritage Management and Economic Development Programmes: Perspectives from Desert Fringes Where IGOs and NGOs Have No Locus' in *Public Archaeology* 13: 151-163.

WALKER, S., 1995. *Greek and Roman Portraits*. London: The British Museum Press.

WALKER, C., and CARR, N., 2013. *Tourism and Archaeology: Sustainable Meeting Grounds*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.

WALLACE, M., 1994. 'The Search for the "Good Enough" Mammy: Multiculturalism, Popular Culture and Psychoanalysis' in D. T. Goldberg (ed.) *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell: 259-68.

WALSH, R. P. D., HULME, M., and CAMPBELL, M. D., 1988. 'Recent Rainfall Changes and Their Impact on Hydrology and Water Supply in the Semi-Arid Zone of the Sudan' in *The Geographical Journal* 154 (2): 181-197.

WARBURG, G., 1992. *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*. London: C. Hurst.

WARD, C., 2016. 'Durham University's Sudan Archive – An overlooked resource in current archaeological research?' in *Sudan & Nubia* 20: 170-178.

WASSERMAN, S., and FAUST, K., 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WATERBURY, J., 1979. *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

WATERTON, E. and SMITH, L., 2010. 'The Recognition and Misrecognition of Community Heritage' in *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 16 (1–2): 4-16.

WATKINS, J., 2000. *Indigenous Archaeologies*. Walnut Creek CA: AltaMira.

WATKINS, J., 2003. 'Archaeological ethics and American Indians' in L. Zimmerman, K. Vitelli and J. Hollowell-Zimmer (eds.) *Ethical issues in archaeology*. Oxford, UK: Altamira: 57-69.

WATSON, P. J., 1979. *Archaeological Ethnography in western Iran*. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press.

WATSON, P. J., 1999. 'The Lessons of Sipán: Archaeologists and Huaqueros' in *Culture without Context* 4:15–20.

WELSBY, D. A. and DANIELS, C. M., 1991. *Soba: Archaeological Research at a medieval capital on the Blue Nile*. London: BIEA Memoir No. 12.

WELSBY, D. A., 1996. *The Kingdom of Kush: The Napatan and Meroitic Empires*. London: The British Museum Press.

WELSBY, D. A. 2002. *The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia : Pagans, Christians and Muslims along the Middle Nile*. London: The British Museum Press.

WELSBY, D. A., 2008. 'Dams on the Nile: from Aswan to the Fourth Cataract' in *Sudan Studies* 37: 5-19.

WENDT, A., 1992. 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics' in *International Organization* 46 (2): 391-425.

WESCHENFELDER, P., 2014. *Ethnoarchaeological Research in Hamadab and its eastern hinterland up to Umm Shedida, with its links to Kassala and the Red Sea, conducted in March*

2014: A resume of interviews, site descriptions, and personal research notes, including the research report. (Unpublished report).

WHITT, L. A., 1998. 'Cultural Imperialism and the Marketing of Native America' in *Mihesuah:* 139-171.

WILEY, J. N., 1992. *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

WILLIS, J., 2011. 'The Ambitions of the State' in J. Willis et al. (eds.) *The Sudan Handbook*. Suffolk: James Currey Ltd: 54-63.

WINTER, T., 2015. 'Heritage diplomacy' in *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21 (10): 997-1015.

WOLF, S., HOF, C., and ONASCH, H-U. 2008. 'Investigations in the So-Called Royal Baths at Meroe in 2000, 2004 and 2005. A Preliminary Report' in *KUSH* 19: 101-115.

WOLF, S., and ONASCH, H-U. 2003. 'Investigations in the So-Called Royal Baths at Meroe in 1999' in *KUSH* 18: 191-203.

WOLF, S., ONASH, H-U., KERE ARCHITECTURE, 2016. 'A new protectice shelter for the Royal Baths at Meroe (Sudan)'. Available at: https://www.dainst.org/documents/10180/15360/Brosch%C3%BCre+Schutzbau+Meroe+englisch/4e62fd4a-e9ee-40b3-b110-730c6fbc2f58.

WOLF, P., NOWOTNICK, U., and HOF, C., 2008. 'Hamadab: Insights into Development and Lifestyles of a Meroitic Urban Settlement' in M. H. Zach (eds.) *The Kushite World: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference for Meroitic Studies, Vienna 1-4th September 2008*. Vienna: Verein der Förderer der Sudanforschung: 123-140.

WOLF, P., NOWOTNICK, U., and WÖß, F., 2014. 'Meroitic Hamadab—a century after its discovery' in *Sudan & Nubia* 18: 104-120.

WOLF, P., 2015. 'The Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project – The Meroitic Town of Hamadab and the Palaeo-Environment of the Meroe Region' in *Sudan & Nubia* 19: 115-131.

WOODWARD, P., 1991. *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

WYLIE, A. 2015. 'A plurality of pluralisms: Collaborative practice in archaeology' in F. Padovani, A. Richardson and J. Y. Tsou (eds.) *Objectivity in Science New Perspectives from Science and Technology Studies.* Springer International Publishing: 189-210.

YALOURI, E., 2010. 'Between the local and the global: the Athenian Acropolis as both national and world monument' in A. Stroulia and S. Buck Sutton (eds.) *Archaeology in Situ: Sites, Archaeology and Communities in Greece*. Landham, MD: Lexington Books: 131-59.

YARROW, T., 2010. 'Not knowing as knowledge: questioning asymmetry between archaeology and anthropology' in D. Garrow and T. Yarrow (eds.) *Archaeology and Anthropology: Understanding Similarity: Exploring Difference.* Oakville, CT: Oxbow Books: 13-27.

YEH, E. T., 2007. 'Tibetan indigeneity: translations, resemblances, and uptake in M. De la Cadena and O. Starn (eds.) *Indigenous Experience Today*. Oxford: Berg: 69-97.

ZABEK, M., 2005. 'The Role of Environmental Factors in the Pre-Islamic Beliefs and Customs of the Shaiqiya, Sudan' in *The Gdansk Archaeological Museum African Reports* 3: 285-288.

ZIMMERMAN, L. J., 2001. 'Usurping Native American Voice' in, T. Bray (ed.) *The Future of the Past: Archaeologists, Native Americans, and Repatriation*. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.: 196-184.

ZIMMERMAN, L. J., 2008, 'Real People or Reconstructed People? Ethnocritical Archaeology, Ethnography, and Community Building' in Q. Castañeda, and C. Matthews (eds.) *Ethnographic Archaeologies: Reflections on Stakeholders and Archaeological Practices*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press: 183-204.

REPORTS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCUMENTS ETC.

ARKELL, A. J., 1939. *Report for the Year 1939 of the Antiquities Service and Museums in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*. Khartoum: Sudan Government.

ARKELL, A. J., 1946. *Report on the Antiquities Service and Museums 1946*. Khartoum: Sudan Government.

BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, 2014. *BTI 2014 – Sudan Country Report*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (CBS), 2009. 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census - 2008: Priority Results. Khartoum, Sudan. Available at: http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/4216/download/55706. (Last accessed: 15 January 2015)

CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (CBS), 2010. *Key findings: National Baseline Household Survey 2009: Northern Sudan*. Khartoum: Central Bureau of Statistics.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (CBS), 2010. *National Baseline Household Survey*. Statistical Report No. 3/2010, 12. Khartoum: Central Bureau of Statistics.

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (CPA), 2005. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c0377872.html (last accessed 14 September 2015).

DOHA DOCUMENT FOR PEACE IN DARFUR (DDPD), 2011. Available at: https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ddpd_english.pdf (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

El-MASRI, S., 2010, *Management Plan of a Proposed World Heritage Site / Meroe (Begraweya) – Naqa – Musawwarat es-Sufra* in D. Welsby and S. A. Ahmed (eds.) *The Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe / UNESCO Nomination File (1336): World Heritage Centre.* NCAM: Khartoum: 65-81. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/nominations/1336.pdf (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR PRESERVING THE MIDDLE NILE SOURCE, 2012. 'Petition to Stop the Dams in Sudan' in *The African Archaeological Review* 29(1): 1-5.

GOODWIN, H., and NIZETTE, P., 2001. *An Assessment of the Economic Development Potential for*

a Northern Tourism Circuit. Available from: http://www.haroldgoodwin.info/resources/Peru%20Scoping.ppt.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW), 2014. *We Stood, They Opened Fire: Killings and Arrests by Sudan's Security Forces During the September Protests*. London: Human Rights Watch. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0414_ForUpload.pdf (Last accessed 10 June 2016).

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS (ICOM), 2000. *Proposal for a Charter of Principles for Museums and Cultural Tourism*. Available at: http://icom.museum/tourism_engl.html. (Last accessed: 10 December 2015).

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MONUMENTS AND SITES (ICOMOS), 1999. *8th Draft of the International Cultural Tourism Charter: Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance*. Available at: http://www.icomos.org/charters/Engl.%20Cultural%20Tourism%20Charter.doc (Last accessed 5 April 2016).

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MONUMENTS AND SITES (ICOMOS), 2011. *Island of Meroe (Sudan): Advisory Body Evaluation No. 1336*. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/152412 (Last accessed: 10 December 2015).

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), 2013. Country Report No. 13/318: *Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13318.pdf. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), 2014. Country Report No. 14/364: *Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and Second Review under Staff Monitored Program—Debt Sustainability Analysis*. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2014/dsacr14364.pdf. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), 2011. Migration in Sudan: A Country Profile 2011. Khartoum: IOM. Available at: http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mpsudan_18nov2013_final.pdf (Last accessed: 10 October 2014)

MARTINI, M., 2011. Corruption and anti-corruption in Sudan. Oslo: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre/ Transparency International. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/342_Corruption_and_anti-corruption_in_Sudan.pdf. (Last accessed: 15 January 2016)

NILE BASIN INITIATIVE. 2012. 'Agriculture, Food Security, and Livelihoods in the Nile Basin' in *State of the River Nile Basin 2012*: 121-62. Available at: http://sob.nilebasin.org/pdf/Chapter_5_agriculture.pdf (Last accessed: 11 December 2014).

SOIL CONSERVATION COMMITTEE (SCC), 1944. *Report of the Soil Conservation Committee*. Khartoum: Sudan Government.

SUDAN, 1997. *Labour Act*, Act No. 20. Compiled, edited and translated by R. Makkawi and H. Emam, 1999. (32 pages.) Available at: http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/Sudan/Legislation/Labour%20Act%201997.pdf. (Last accessed 13 December 2016.)

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2015. *World Statistics Pocketbook Series 39.* New York: United Nations. Available at: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publications/pocketbook/files/world-stats-pocketbook-2015.pdf. (Last accessed: 17 May 2016.)

UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2006. *Nomads' Settlement in Sudan: Experiences, Lessons and Future Action (Study 1)*. Available at: http://www.sd.undp.org/content/dam/sudan/docs/NOMADS%20SETTLEMENT%20IN%20SUDAN.pdf?download. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2014. *Human Development Report (HDI)* Mar., 2014. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2015a. 'About Sudan' in *United Nations Country Team in Sudan*. Available from: http://www.undp.org/content/unct/sudan/en/home/about.html. (Last accessed: 29 October 2016.)

UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2015b. 'Our Work' in *United Nations Country Team in Sudan*. Available from: http://www.undp.org/content/unct/sudan/en/home/our-work/development-cooperation/ (Last accessed: 29 October 2016.)

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 1972. *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*. Paris: UNESCO.

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 2004. Decision: 7 EXT BUR 2.2 / International Assistance Requests. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/6613/. (Last accessed: 15 December 2016)

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). 2011. 'Maps: Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe - inscribed property' Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1336/documents/. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 2011. *Decision: 35COM 8B.22 / Cultural Properties - Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe (Sudan)* Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/?www.unesco.org/fr/prospective=&id_decision=4293&. (Last accessed: 5 December 2016)

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 2011. *Decision: 36COM 8B.65 / Statements of Outstanding Universal Value of the twelve properties inscribed at the 35th session of the World Heritage Committee.* Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1336/documents/. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 2012. *Population Dynamics in Sudan*. Available at: http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/filemanager/files/sudan/facts/population_fact_sheet_final1.pdf. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2016. World Tourism Organization Annual Report 2015. Madrid: UNWTO Available at: http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/pdf/annual_report_2015_lr.pdf (Last accessed: April 10 2016)

VON GREBMER, K., HEADEY, C., BÉNÉ, L., Haddad, T., OLOFI NBIYI, D. WIESMANN, H., FRITSCHEL, S., Yin, Y., YOHANNES, C., Foley, VON OPPELN, C. and ISELI, B., 2013. *2013*

Global Hunger Index: The Challenge of Hunger: Building Resilience to Achieve Food and Nutrition Security. Bonn, Washington, D.C. and Dublin: Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Concern Worldwide. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/9780896299511. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

WELSBY, D. and AHMED, S. A., (eds.) 2010. *The Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe / UNESCO Nomination File (1336)*. Khartoum: NCAM. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/nominations/1336.pdf (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

WILLIAMS, B., n/d. 'Appeal to Stop the Destruction of Nubia'. Available at: http://www.iae-egyptology.org/uploads/Appeal%20Nubia.pdf.

WORLD BANK, 1980. *Staff Appraisal Report – Sudan – New Halfa Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (Report No. 2608a-SU)*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/165851468133779960/pdf/multi-page.pdf. (Last accessed: 15 September 2015)

WORLD BANK, 2010. *Social Dimensions of Large-scale Acquisitions of Land Rights. Sudan draft inception report*. Khartoum: World Bank.

WORLD BANK, 2011. *A Poverty Profile for the Northern States of Sudan by the World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region*, May 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-1348760177420/a-poverty-profile-for-the-northern-states-of-sudan-may-2011.pdf (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

WORLD BANK, 2014. *Study on internally displaced population, gender and livelihoods in Kassala State, Eastern Sudan*. Logica: working paper series. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/811521468304482455/Study-on-internally-displaced-population-gender-and-livelihoods-in-Kassala-State-Eastern-Sudan (Last accessed: May 18 2016).

WORLD BANK, 2015a. *Sudan Country Economic Memorandum: Realizing the Potential for Diversified Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank: Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/25262. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

WORLD BANK, 2015b. *Doing Business Economy Profile 2016: Sudan*. Washington DC: World Bank. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23386. (Last accessed 11 December 2016.)

WORLD BANK, 2017. *Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)*. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=2015&locations=SD&start=2009&view=chart. (Last accessed 4 February 2017.)

WORLD COMMISION ON DAMS, 2000. *Dams and Development. A New Framework for Decision-making*. London: Earthscan. Available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/the-world-commission-on-dams.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), 1995. *Female Genital Mutilation: Report of a WHO Technical Working Group*. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/63602/1/WHO_FRH_WHD_96.10.pdf.

VIDEOS

President Omar al-Bashir's Speech on Austerity Measures on September 22, 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6sIJemkuhU (Last accessed 21 May 2017).

HÄNSCH, V., 2009. *Sifinja: The Iron Bride*. Sudan/Germany.

WEBSITES

AMARA WEST, PROJECT WEBSITE. Available from: https://britishmuseumamarawestblog.wordpress.com/category/community-engagement/. Cf. *Life in the Heart of Nubia: Abri, Amara East and Ernetta Island*, a children's book by T. Fushiya.

BRITISH INSTITUTE IN EASTERN AFRICA (BIEA). Available at: http://www.biea.ac.uk/.

DAMS IMPLEMENTATION UNIT (DIU). Available at: http://merowedam.gov.sd/en/payments.html.

EMBASSY OF QATAR, 2017. ‘Qatar rescues the pyramids in Sudan with the support of Germany’, 9 June 2017. Available at: http://botschaft-katar.de/en/qatar-rescues-the-pyramids-in-sudan-with-the-support-of-germany/. (Last accessed 6 November 2016.)

GOETHE INSTITUT, 2017. ‘Press release: Qatar Museums and the German Archaeological Institute present fascinating findings from five years of fieldwork’, 3 May 2017. Available at: https://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf129/pr_dai_english1.pdf. (Last accessed 6 November 2016.)

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (US Department of the Interior). Available at: https://www.nps.gov/nagpra/mandates/25usc3001etseq.htm. (Regarding McMANAMON, F., 2000. ‘The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)’)

NUBIA PROJECT. Available at: https://www.nubiaproject.org.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR NUBIAN STUDIES (ISNS). Available at: https://nubianstudiessociety.wordpress.com/.

PRESERVE THE MIDDLE NILE. Available at: https://preservethemiddlenile.wordpress.com/.

QATAR-SUDAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL PROJECT (QSAP). Available at: http://www.qsap.org.qa/en/.

SOCIETY FOR AFRICANIST ARCHAEOLOGISTS (SAfA). Available at: http://safa.rice.edu/.

SAVE NUBIA. Available at: http://www.savenubia.org.

SUSTAINABLE PRESERVATION INITIATIVE. Available at: www.sustainablepreservation.org/sanjosedemoro.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES. (Regarding translation and transliteration guidelines.) Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=cbjm20&page=instructions& (Last accessed 15 June 2017).

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES. (Regarding translation and transliteration guidelines.) Available from: https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES_Translation_and_Transliteration_Guide.htm (Last accessed 15 June 2017).

WIKILEAKS. Available at: https://wikileaks.org. (The section referred to in the thesis can be found at: "U.S./Sudanese Relations: In a Long War, No Quick Victories", 26 January 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KHARTOUM118_a.html.)

NEWS ARTICLES

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 'Sudan farmers protest government 'land grab'', *Agence France Presse*, 1 April 2011 Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/18387 (Last accessed 10 December 2015).

AL-MONITOR, 'Why Sudan wants to stop the 'spread of Shiism', Al-Monitor, 19 January 2016. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/sudan-saudi-yemen-war-iran-relations-broken.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

AMPIM, M., 'Save Nubia, or 5,000 years of African history will be lost', *San Francisco Bay View*, 4 September 2012. Available at: http://sfbayview.com/2012/save-nubia-or-5000-years-of-african-history-will-be-lost/ (Last accessed 29 November 2014).

ARABIAN BUSINESS, 'Saudi Arabia boosts Sudan agriculture investment, says minister', *Arabian Business*, 7 December 2010. Available at: http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-arabia-boosts-sudan-agriculture-investment-says-minister--366138.html (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

BBC, 'The Qatari princess, Angelina Jolie and the battle of the pyramids', 20 May 2017. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39972853 (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

BBC, 'Sudan sanctions: US lifts most economic restrictions after two decades', 6 October 2017. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41531855 (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

BAYNES, C., ‘Donald Trump drops Sudan from US travel ban ‘after lobbying by UAE’’, *Independent*, 25 September 2017. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-us-travel-ban-sudan-uae-lobbying-united-arab-emirates-president-a7965386.html (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

BRADSHAW, R., ‘Will Qatar’s investment in ancient pyramids bring tourists to Sudan?’, *Al-Monitor*, 7 December 2015. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/sudan-pyramids-qatar-museums-excavations.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

CAFIERO, G., ‘Sudan gets $2.2bn for joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen war’, *Al-Monitor*, 23 November 2015. Available at: www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

CAFIERO, G., ‘Qatar-GCC crisis unsettles Sudan’, *Al-Monitor*, 20 June 2017. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/qatar-gcc-crisis-sudan-saudi-arabia-economic-support.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

COURIER ACP-EU, ‘Sudan’s cultural heritage: a new challenge to preserve the country’s rich past’, *The Courier no. 189, November/December 2001*. [EU Commission - Working Document]: 75-76. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier189/en/en_075.pdf (Last accessed 12 September 2015).

ELBAGIR, Y., ‘Sudan’s antiquities are under threat as Gulf crisis rages’, *Financial Times*, 10 August 2017. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ca543f5e-2c29-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

EVANS-PRITCHARD, B., ‘Agriculture Sudan: Can local investors beat foreign investment?’, *IPS News Agency*, 18 December 2008. Available at: http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/12/agriculture-sudan-can-local-investors-beat-foreign-investment/ (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

GARBER, K., ‘As food crisis worsens, some nations are desperate for arable land’, *US News and World Report*, 12 June 2008. Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/2380 (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

GRAIN, ‘Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab there is a water grab’, *GRAIN Reports*, 11 June 2012. Available at: https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4516-squeezing-africa-dry-behind-every-land-grab-is-a-water-grab (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

GIBBON, G., ‘Qatar invests $135m in archaeological heritage of Sudan’, *Arabianindustry.com*, 24 March 2014. Available at: http://www.arabianindustry.com/construction/news/2014/mar/24/qatar-funds-sudanese-archaeology-to-tune-of-135mn-4641884/ (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

GRIGGS, M-B., ‘Qatar Gives $135 Million to Sudan for Archaeological Projects’, *Smithsonianmag.com*, 27 March 2014. Available at: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/qatar-gives-135-million-sudan-archaeological-projects-180950292/ (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

GULF TIMES, ‘QM shares latest success of landmark Qatar-Sudan archaeological project’, 3 September 2017. Available at: http://www.gulf-times.com/story/562488/QM-shares-latest-success-of-landmark-Qatar-Sudan-a (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

GULF TIMES, ‘Bashir lauds Qatar’s role in Sudan peace process’, 12 September 2016. Available at: http://www.gulf-times.com/story/512621/Bashir-lauds-Qatar-s-role-in-Sudan-peace-process (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

GUNN, M., ‘Sudan Gold Mine Disaster Kills at Least 60 People, Official Says’, *Bloomberg*, 2 May 2013. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/sudan-gold-mine-disaster-kills-at-least-60-people-official-says.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

HUSSEIN, W., ‘Egypt, Sudan stray further apart over Gulf crisis’, Al-Monitor, 17 August 2017. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/egypt-africa-oppose-qatar-sudan-relations.html (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

JOPSON, B. and ENGLAND, A., ‘Sudan woos investors to put $1bn in farming’, *Financial Times*, 11 August 2008. Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/2448 (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

KAWACH, N., ‘Farm projects in fertile Arab nations can cut GCC gap’, *Emirates Business 24/7*, 28 May 2008. Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/2367 (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

KINGSLEY, P., ‘Death and dissent in Sudan as anger spreads to middle classes’, *Guardian,* 10 October 2013. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/death-dissent-sudan-anger-middle-classes (Last accessed 21 May 2017).

KUKA, H., ‘Preserving cultural heritage: Nuba Wrestling in Yida Camp’, *The Niles,* 6 March 2013. Available at: http://www.theniles.org/en/articles/society/1729/ (Last accessed 13 December 2016).

KUSHKUSH, I., ‘Ancient Kingdoms in Land of War’, *The New York Times,* 31 March 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/world/africa/in-sudan-archaeologists-unearth-ancient-kingdoms.html?mcubz=1 (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

LACEY, M., ‘A Race to Save Sudan’s Past from Progress’, *The New York Times*, 30 May 2005. Available at:http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/30/world/africa/a-race-to-save-sudans-past-from-progress.html (Last accessed 16 April 2016).

MARTELL, P., ‘*A song for south Sudan: Writing a new national anthem’, BBC World News,* 12 January 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12164171 (Last accessed 6 May 2013).

MARTELLI, S. ‘In Sudan’s breadbasket, a revolution is waiting to happen’, *Agence France Presse,* 5 July 2011. Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/18895 (Last accessed 12 February 2015).

MIDDLE EAST MONITOR, ‘Saudis pressure Sudan’s Al-Bashir to boycott Qatar’, 3 July 2017. Available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170703-saudis-pressure-sudans-al-bashir-to-boycott-qatar/ (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

MORRISON, D., ‘Four Killed over Nile Dam Project that Threatens Nubian Towns’, *National Geographic News*, 15 June 2007. Available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/070615-sudan-nubian.html (Last accessed 15 January 2016).

NUBA REPORTS, ‘Sudan Now Spending Up to 70% of Its Budget on War’, 12 February 2016. Available at: http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/02/sudan-spending-much-its-budget-war-2016/125913/ (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

PADGETT, T., ‘Walking on Ancestral Gods: Using Mayan Ruins for Patios and Pigstys’, *News-week*, 9 October 1989.

REUTERS, ‘Sudan police teargas protesters in Khartoum – witnesses’, *Reuters News Agency*, 12 June 2015. Available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFL5N0YY3D520150612 (Last accessed 12 November 2015).

REUTERS, ‘As economy crumbles, Sudan ditches Iran for Saudi patronage’, *Reuters News Agency*, 12 January 2016. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/sudan-saudi-diplomacy/as-economy-crumbles-sudan-ditches-iran-for-saudi-patronage-idUSL8N14V2WV20160112 (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

REUTERS, ‘UPDATE 1-Sudanese pound falls sharply against dollar on black market’, *Reuters News Agency*, 12 April 2016. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/sudan-currency-idUSL5N17F35A (Last accessed 10 January 2017).

REUTERS, ‘Sudan offers its citizens broad incentive to sell dollars to banks’, *Reuters News Agency*, 5 November 2016. Available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL8N1D6089 (Last accessed 10 February 2017).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘Beshir says new dam will help reduce poverty in Sudan’, 20 March 2005. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article8634 (Last accessed 15 April 2016).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘Sudan’s Merowe requests to stop excavating reservoir area’, 27 February 2007. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20457 (Last accessed 13 March 2015).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘Sudan archeology flourishes before the flood’, 19 March 2007. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20843 (Last accessed 18 December 2017).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘Sudanese militia kill three people in Merowe Dam area’, 23 April 2007. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article15209 (Last accessed 20 November 2015).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘Hundreds of farmers stage demonstrations in central Sudan’, 11 May 2011. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article38856 (Last accessed 10 March 2016).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘US dollar losing ground to Sudanese pound on black market: traders’, 16 March 2013. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45843 (Last accessed 15 April 2016).

SUDAN TRIBUNE, ‘U.S. dollar inches up against Sudanese pound on black market’, 20 February 2017. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61692 (Last accessed 15 April 2017).

SUDANESE MEDIA CENTRE, ‘Sudan: Academic Cooperation between Japan and Sudan’, 2 October 2017. Available at: http://smc.sd/en/sudan-academic-cooperation-japan-sudan/ (Last accessed 6 November 2017).

TAHA, S. M., ‘Saudi investments in Sudan poised to exceed SR48.7bn’, *Arab News*, 26 August 2014. Available at: http://www.arabnews.com/economy/news/620751 (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

WINTER, T., ‘One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: Cultural Diplomacy and the Silk Road’, *The Diplomat*, 30 March 2016. Available at: https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/one-belt-one-road-one-heritage-cultural-diplomacy-and-the-silk-road/ (Last accessed 8 November 2017).

YOUSEF, D. K., ‘Al Ghurair to seal 99-year farmland lease in Sudan’, *Gulf News*, 20 February 2012. Available at: http://farmlandgrab.org/20053 (Last accessed 15 December 2016).

Appendix 1

Site-Community Profile Sheet

(created November 2013)

REGION

VILLAGE

NEIGHBOURHOODS

Geographical setting (sights, sounds, smells, landmarks)

Available Services (education, transport, water, electricity)

Socio-Political Hierarchy (who is powerful, why, where does the power come from)

Domestic Organisation (who lives where, why)

The Archaeological Site/s (its physical nature, its location, use, visitors)

Professions and Livelihoods (who does what, where, for how long, with whom)

Visibility of the State (signs of threat or security provided by state apparatus)

Sources of Cohesion and Conflict (who argues over what, and what reconciles them)

Appendix 2

Interview Questions for UCLQ Excavation Employees

(created February 2015)

Demographic Information

Name	Age
Gabīla	Marital status
Residence/s	Household size/s
No. of dependents	Education

General Employment

Employees' other jobs

Wages received from other jobs

Household's sources of income

Archaeological Employment

Previous archaeological employment

Seasons worked with UCL Qatar

Hired by/through

Previous seasons' salary (total/if known)

Relatives in archaeological employment (if any)

Wages spent on

Opinion of archaeological employment

Questions?

Appendix 3

Respondents' Profile Sheet

(created November 2013)

SITE: VILLAGE:

Name of interviewer/s

Name of interviewee Pseudonym

Date and place of interview/conversation

Age / approx. date born

Kinship group (gabila)

Parents / spouse / children

Livelihood / basic economic situation

Language/s spoken

Religion / specific tradition

Place of residence (past and present)

No. of years education / where / studied what / highest grade attained / reading and writing

Questions posed to the interviewers

Appendix 4

Post-Interview Notes Sheet

(created November 2013)

Interview arrangements

e.g. time of day / specific details

Interview location, setting and dynamic

e.g. the way in which the individual behaves; who else is there; sensory impressions (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, textures); activities going on in background and who is doing them

Reflections on methods used

e.g. what questions worked and which did not work; why

Summary of content

e.g. specific words, phrases, insider language, have meanings emerged through talk and action; understandings change over time

Reflections on account

Reflections on emerging themes

e.g. are there any shared sets of assumptions and practices throughout the community; how did people grapple with uncertainty. Think: WHEN, WHERE and according to WHOM?

To follow up / questions for future interviews

Additional information

Appendix 5

Historical Timeline: 'Ancient Nubia'

Compiled from: EDWARDS, D., 2004, *The Nubian Past* London: Taylor & Francis; WELSBY, D.A., 1996. *The Kingdom of Kush* London: British Museum Press; WELSBY, D.A., 2002. *The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia* London: British Museum Press.

5th Millennium BCE: Prehistory

There is archaeological evidence of settled cultures in this area from at least 5000 BCE. In the 3rd millennium BCE a powerful state grew up between the Second and Fifth Cataracts of the Middle Nile, with its capital near the modern town of Kerma some 20km south of the Third Cataract. The state was based on the control of trade between the Lower Nile and central Africa and on the extraction of high-quality building stone, copper and gold. Welsby has suggested that this state might usefully be thought of as the 'First' Kingdom of Kush.

16th Century BCE: An Egyptian Colony

Protected by the Nile Cataracts, especially the sequence of rapids above the Second Cataract, Kerma preserved its independence until the 16th Century BCE when the expansionist pharaohs of Egypt's New Kingdom overthrew it and turned it into an Egyptian colony ruled from Napata just below the Fourth Cataract near the modern town of Kareima. As an Egyptian possession Kush was governed by an Egyptian official, the 'Viceroy of Kush'.

9th Century BCE: The (Second) Kingdom of Kush

Egyptian control weakened with the disintegration of the New Kingdom around 1070 BCE and by the 9th Century BCE Kush had again become an independent state, known to archaeologists as the 'Kingdom of Kush' or, as Welsby would prefer it, "the Second Kingdom of Kush". Kushite history is conventionally divided into two; a Napatan period from the 9th to the 4th Centuries BCE, when the royal cemeteries were near Napata; and a Meroitic period from the 4th Century BCE to the 4th Century CE, when the royal cemeteries were in the region of Meroe near the Fifth Cataract. It is not clear when the capital of Kush moved from Napata to Meroe and scholars of the period differ over the cultural significance of the move of the royal cemeteries. Welsby argues that "The history of Kush is a continuum and it is not desirable arbitrarily to divide it into periods", but Edwards argues that "[t]he differences between Napatan and Meroitic culture are often much more marked than the similarities [and that] continuing to use this fundamental division seems unavoidable, and indeed essential".

8th Century BCE: Kushite Rule in Egypt

In c.760 BCE, while Egypt was suffering from political instability, King Kashta ("the Kushite") extended Kushite control north to Thebes; and in around 727 BCE Kashta's successors Piye and Shabaqo, posing as the protectors of the ancient gods of Egypt, brought the whole of Egypt under Kushite control, established Egypt's 25th Dynasty, adopted the titles of pharaoh and moved the

Kushite capital to Thebes. However, the Kushite pharaohs came into conflict on their north-eastern frontiers with the expanding Assyrian empire, who invaded Egypt in 671 BCE and whose Egyptian vassals had driven the Kushites out of Egypt by 654 BCE. For the next five centuries Kush was subject to periodic invasion by successive rulers of Egypt, Persian, Ptolemaic and Roman.

7th Century BCE: The Apogee and Decline of Meroitic Kush

Meroitic Kush controlled an area from the First Cataract in the north to well below the Sixth Cataract in the south (roughly from modern Aswan to Khartoum) a distance of over 1,000km. Its economy was based on agriculture, trade along the Nile and to and from the Red Sea and gold mining. It also had a significant iron industry. The exchange of people, products and ideas from north to south and east to west made Meroitic Kush one of the most significant zones of interaction between sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean and the Near East during the early Iron Age.

According to Welsby, Egyptian was used by the Meroites as their "religious, diplomatic and administrative language" but their own Kushite language was "already of considerable antiquity and certainly not derived from Egyptian". The Meroites worshipped Egyptian gods but also some of their own; and they buried their rulers in pyramids. The Meroitic period was a time of significant artistic and stylistic development; the evidence for this ranges from elite expressions and idealized renderings such as those found in the pyramid chapels at Napata and Meroe to the funerary goods found inside the graves of female commoners who lived near the Sixth Cataract at Botri, which almost always include arrowheads and other pieces of weaponry. Together with the now well-known existence of Nubian Queens this suggests that social roles were not necessarily gendered in the way that might be expected. Finds such as these have made the Meroitic period appear to be a paradigmatic example of an independent ancient African state that existed, and played a pivotal role, within a broad international community.

Meroitic Kush reached its apogee in the 1st and 2nd Centuries CE. The evidence is scanty and ambiguous but its slow decline and eventual fall was probably the result of a number of interrelated factors. The economic strength of the kingdom appears to have weakened as the trade down the Nile between central Africa and Egypt, which had brought Kush great wealth, was steadily supplanted by sea-borne trade through the Red Sea.

The weakened Kushite state appears to have faced growing faced aggression from groups, possibly nomadic, including the Noba, from the west of the Nile and the Blemmyes from the eastern desert. According to Welsby the literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that by the late 4th Century CE the Kushites had lost control of Lower Nubia where the Noba and the Blemmyes fought one another for power. Some historians have suggested that the end of the Kingdom of Kush was marked by the destruction of Meroe c.350 CE during an invasion by the rising Ethiopian kingdom of Axum to the south-east. However, Welsby says that the archaeological record suggests that the Kushite state fizzled out more slowly after fragmenting into a number of political units in which some Kushite traditions persisted into the 5th Century CE or even later.

6th Century CE: The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia

By the early 6th Century CE three kingdoms had emerged to replace Meroitic Kush; Nobadia, which extended from the First to the Third Cataracts with its capital at Pachoras near modern Faras; Makuria, which extended from the Third Cataract to somewhere between the Fifth and the Sixth Cataracts with

its capital at Old Dongola; and Alwa, which extended from Makuria well to the south of the confluence of the Blue and White Niles with its capital at Soba near modern Khartoum. Alwa was probably the richest and most powerful of the Christian kingdoms but is the one about which the least is known.

The three kingdoms seem to have been strongly influenced by Byzantine traditions flowing south from Egypt and in the mid-6th Century CE following the arrival of missionaries from Byzantium the kingdoms converted to Christianity. Welsby regards this event as "the most radical cultural change experienced by the dwellers along the Middle Nile since the first arrival of the Egyptians millennia before". Christian churches were established along the Nile and ancient temples converted for the new religion.

The Arabs who conquered Egypt in 639-641 CE made an unsuccessful attempt to extend their rule south of Aswan in 642. In 651-652 CE another invading Arab army was held up at Old Dongola by the determined resistance of Makuria (which had by then absorbed the kingdom of Nobadia) and the two sides signed a treaty of non-aggression and non-intervention known as the *baqt* (from the Latin pactum). The *baqt* also called for an exchange of goods, essentially of slaves from Makuria and wheat, barley and cloth from Egypt, which took place annually at Philae near the First Cataract, on the border between Egypt and Makuria. The *baqt* allowed for the free movement of Makurians and Muslims in each other's country but forbade them to settle. Despite periodic infractions by both sides the *baqt* remained in force for over 600 years.

Appendix 6

Historical Timeline: Medieval to Modern Sudan

Compiled from: HOLT, P. M., 1961. *A Modern History of Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; WELSBY, D.A., 2002. *The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia*. London: British Museum Press; WARBURG, G., 1992. *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*. Series in Islam and Society in Africa, Hurst.

9th Century CE: The Arab Incursions

Despite the ban on Arab-Muslim settlement south of the First Cataract contained in the *baqt*, the peace treaty signed between the Arabs and Makuria c. 650 CE, Arab-Muslim groups, many of them nomadic, began to enter northern Makuria from the 9th Century CE onwards. The presence of Arabs and Muslims in the Christian kingdoms also increased with the arrival of increasing numbers of Arab-Muslim merchants and holy men. The decline of Makuria's power in the 14th Century opened up the country to increased immigration of Arab-Muslim groups from Egypt, and smaller numbers from the Arabian Peninsula, which speeded up the Arabization and Islamization of the country. The adoption of Islam by the Funj Sultanate of Sennar, which overran Alwa and Makuria in the early 16th Century institutionalized the link between Islam and power. Sudan became part of the 'land of Islam' (*dār al-Islam*), in which Islamic law is in full force. Christianity had probably disappeared by the mid-16th Century.

By the late 13th Century, then, the Makurian state had begun to decline amid dynastic infighting. By the mid-14th century the kingdom appears to have fractured into a number of small states, which were unable to prevent the incursion of nomadic Arab tribes, such as the Juhanya. These incursions caused widespread disorder and a further weakening of central authority. The Makurian capital, Old Dongola, was abandoned in 1365 and power passed into the hands of Arab leaders. Political power in the region appears to have remained dispersed until the early 16th Century when the recently established Funj Sultanate of Sennar expanded north as far as the First Cataract. However, in 1550 the Ottoman Turks, who had seized Egypt from the Mamelukes in 1517, pushed the Funj back to the Third Cataract, where a fortified border was established that held until 1821.

Geographical distance meant that Alwa did not suffer military attack from Muslim Egypt. However, like Makuria, Alwa was subject to frequent incursions by Arab-Muslim nomads and seems to have "declined into a condition where it could be snuffed out without opposition". The kingdom appears to have fractured into a number of tribal chieftaincies. According to Holt there is some evidence to support the Arab tradition that Soba, Alwa's capital, and its surrounding territories were seized in the mid- to late-15th Century by Arabs led by 'Abdallah Jamma', the eponymous ancestor of the Abdallab tribe.

16th Century CE: The Funj Sultanate of Sennar

However, in c. 1504 Soba was taken by 'Amara Dunqas, the leader of the Funj, a non-Arab, non-Muslim group of uncertain origin, possibly from what is now South Sudan or from the upper Blue Nile. The Funj established their capital at Sennar on the Blue Nile some 150km south-east of modern Khartoum. According to Holt, the Sultan and the aristocracy converted to Islam in 1523 following

"considerable Muslim missionary work". The power of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar was based on a large standing army of armoured cavalry and infantry, the former drawn from the military aristocracy, with which they impose their rule over the tribal chieftaincies as far north as the First Cataract and west into Kordofan. However, as described above, in 1550 the Funj were pushed back to the Third Cataract by an invasion of Ottoman Turks. The Sultan's economic power was based upon his control of trade in gold and slaves, but by the 18th Century the Sultan's monopoly was being eroded by the growth of a wealthy Arab merchant class. Arab tribes played a prominent role in the Funj Sultanate, notably the Abdallab, some of whose chiefs "ruled as hereditary, and virtually autonomous, princes of the Arabs" of the Gezira and the region around the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. Indeed, the Funj state steadily fragmented into what Holt calls "a succession of tribal chieftaincies strung out along the banks of the river [Nile]" including those of the Ja'aliyin, whose capital was at Shendi.

19th Century CE: The Turkiya

In 1821 an army sent by the autonomous Ottoman viceroy, or Khedive, of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, and commanded by his son Ismail Pasha, invaded the territories still nominally subject to the Funj Sultanate. These lands were collectively referred to by the Ottomans as 'Sudan,' from the Arabic *bilad al-sudan* or 'country of the blacks'. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha wanted to strengthen his position in Egypt by extinguishing a potentially dangerous enclave of Mamelukes, who had been proscribed in Egypt in Old Dongola; subduing the troublesome Shagiyya tribal confederation; reviving trade along the Middle Nile that had been damaged by political disorder; increasing the trade in slaves in order to assemble a slave army; and building his economic power by seizing the region's gold mines. After minor resistance from the Shagiyya the Turco-Egyptian army progressed up the Nile accepting the submission of local rulers, including those of the Ja'aliyin, and of the last Funj Sultan, Badi VI. In 1821 Muhammad 'Ali Pasha sent an expedition to conquer the Sultanate of Darfur, but this was not successful. Attempts by the new rulers to impose heavy taxes led to a revolt in the central regions led by the Ja'aliyin under Mek (king) Nimr, and the Abdellab, which spread after Ismail Pasha was killed when his headquarters in Shendi were burned down by the rebels. The revolt was brutally suppressed, partly with the help of tribes such as the Shagiyya.

The invasion of 1820-21 left the Turco-Egyptians in control of Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan, the territories running south from the Second Cataract to the Ethiopian border, which form the core of the modern Sudanese state. Khartoum, at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, was established as the administrative capital and the Taka region was added in 1840. In 1841 the Ottoman Sultan issued a decree (*firman*) granting Mohammed 'Ali Pasha dominion over the "States of Nubia, Darfur and Kordofan and Sennar". Khedive Isma'il incorporated the Red Sea coast (Suakin) in 1865 and annexed the southern half of Darfur in the 1870s. In an effort to stamp out the slave trade he also sought to control the upper reaches of the Nile in what is now South Sudan. Turco-Egyptian Sudan was thus created by Turco-Egyptian empire-builders out of several earlier political entities. It was a much bigger entity than ancient Kush, the medieval Christian kingdoms, or the Funj Sultanate and included a large number of groups with different languages, cultures, ethnicities, livelihoods and religions.

The early years of Turco-Egyptian rule, which the Sudanese call the 'Turkiya,' were marked by efforts to revive the economy, which had been badly damaged by disruptions caused during the invasion. There were some efforts to improve agriculture with the first large-scale irrigation schemes. Turco-Egyptian Sudan was ruled from Khartoum by a governor-general (*hakamdar*) while governors (*mudir*) ruled over the provinces, which were themselves divided into districts known as *qisms* in rural Sudan and *khatt* in the towns.

Late 19th Century: The Mahdiya

However, mismanagement, corruption and harsh taxation caused periodic outbreaks of unrest almost immediately. Attempts by the government to suppress the slave trade, which had been prohibited by the Ottoman Sultan in 1857 at the request of the Western powers, resulted in widespread support in Sudan for the uprising led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdallah, a religious ascetic from Dongola who declared himself to be the Mahdi ('leader chosen by God') to purge Islam of its faults, whose coming was widely proclaimed in Sudan at that time. Muhammad Ahmad declared jihad against the Turco-Egyptian authorities in 1881 and inaugurated what the Sudanese call the Mahdist period, or Mahdiya. He managed to forge an alliance that included most (but not all) of the Arab tribes and most religious orders. The breadth of this alliance has led some Sudanese to see him as Sudan's first nationalist leader. He led his followers, the Ansar, on a successful military campaign that began with the conquest of Kordofan in 1883 and spread gradually to other parts of the country, restoring the slave trade, denouncing wealth and luxury and imposing shari'a. In 1885 the Mahdi's forces took Khartoum, but within six months he was dead. After a power struggle among the Mahdi's senior followers Abdellahi ibn Muhammad, an Arab from the Baqqara gabila, emerged victorious and assumed the title of *khalifa* (successor).

The severity of the Khalifa's rule, in which millions are believed to have died from war, persecution, famine and disease, aroused opposition from the population. The favour that he showed to the Baqqara, a tribe of Arabic-speaking cattle nomads, who monopolised senior positions, angered other members of the Ansar. Between 1887 and 1893 the khalifa's armies launched invasions of Ethiopia, Egypt, Equatoria and Eritrea but were repulsed. In 1896 the British who had occupied Egypt in 1882, ostensibly to support Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq against a revolt led by the army leader 'Urabi Pasha, decided to put an end to the instability in Sudan and to secure the country for themselves before the French or the Belgians did so. A military expedition under General Herbert Kitchener was launched from Egypt in 1896 and ended with the decisive defeat of the Khalifa's forces at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. The Khalifa escaped and managed to re-assemble the remnants of his forces in Kordofan; however, he was killed in a final battle at Umm Diwaykarat.

20th Century: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (the 'Omadiya')

The Khedive expected that Egypt and Sudan would be re-united as in the time before the Mahdiya, but the British were opposed to the resumption of Egyptian domination of Sudan. The Condominium Agreement of 1899 between the British and the Khedivate established joint sovereignty over Sudan with a governor-general appointed by Egypt on Britain's recommendation. Holt argues that in reality, however, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was run as a British colony. In its early years the government had to put down a number of petty revolts and pacify parts of the country. It also had to define Sudan's frontiers, especially where they bordered Ethiopia and French and Belgian colonies in the Upper Nile and Equatoria (the Condominium Agreement had set the boundary between Sudan and Egypt at the 22nd parallel). In 1916 the government suppressed the Sultanate of Darfur and annexed it to Sudan.

The Anglo-Egyptian government abolished the old Turco-Egyptian administration and divided the country into provinces each headed by a British governor (*mudir*) and districts each run by a British district commissioner (*omda*) assisted by a subordinate Egyptian (later Sudanese) district officer. The term omda gave the 58-year Condominium its Sudanese name of the 'Omadiya'. The Anglo-Egyptian government introduced a new code of law (which separated civil law from shari'a) and a system of courts similar to those in British India, with a high court and provincial and district courts. It reformed

the education system to ensure a supply of literate administrators and technicians and land ownership. The government improved the infrastructure, extending the telegraph and rail lines, founding Port Sudan and building dams to provide water for the large-scale production of cotton in the Gezira for export.

After the First World War an explosion of militant Egyptian nationalism fuelled by resentment over increasing British influence in government and trade led to Britain recognising Egyptian independence in 1922 and the accession of the Egyptian Sultan, Fuad, as King (the title of Khedive had been suppressed in 1914 after the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany and Egypt became a British Protectorate). Egyptian nationalists, and some Sudanese nationalists, called for Sudan to be united with Egypt in a single independent state, which Britain continued to oppose. The assassination of the Governor General of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, in Cairo in 1924 brought things to a head. Field Marshal Viscount Allenby, the British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, decided to separate Sudanese and Egyptian institutions. Egyptians serving in the Sudanese army were ordered to leave Sudan, and the locally-manned Sudan Defence Force was set up. Soon afterwards Egyptians serving in the Sudan civil service were also ordered out. Egypt's role in the administration of the condominium became negligible. From the late 1920s the British ruled indirectly through native leaders such as emirs and sheikhs of tribes, districts and villages, under the supervision of an omda. From 1924 the British ran Sudan as two entities, the Arab-Muslim north and the animist and Christian south, which was largely closed to Arab-Muslim northerners and where Christian missionaries operated schools that produced English-speaking recruits for the civil service. The British administration discouraged the spread of Islam and sought to re-vitalise African customs and tribal life, in preparation for the region's eventual integration with British East Africa.

Early 20th Century: The Growth of Sudanese Nationalism

It is likely that Egyptian independence stimulated the growth of nationalist sentiment in Sudan. One of Sudan's first nationalist groups, the White Flag League, founded by army officers, organised demonstrations in Khartoum and some of its supporters in the army mounted a short-lived mutiny in 1924. The Sudanese nationalist movements that emerged in the 1930s were dominated by Arab-Muslims from the north who saw Sudan as an Arab-Muslim state. However, they were deeply divided for reasons of personal ambition and also over whether Sudan should seek independence or union with Egypt. Of the two leading nationalist groups the Ansar favoured independence and the Khatmiya favoured union. The Ansar and other moderate nationalists went on to form the Umma Party; and the Khatmiya and other radical nationalists formed the Ashigga, which was later re-named the National Unionist Party (NUP).

The Egyptian revolution of July 1952 had important consequences for Sudan. The revolutionaries, led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, deposed King Farouq, abolished the constitutional monarchy and established a republic. They also aimed to end British occupation of Egypt and British rule in Sudan. However, they understood that the British would not leave Sudan unless Egypt also abandoned its own claim to the country. Thus, in 1953, Egypt and Britain signed an agreement guaranteeing Sudan's self-determination and a period of transition from British rule began. Parliamentary elections held at the end of 1953 were won by the NUP, with the Umma in second place, and NUP leader Ismail al-Azhari became prime minister. The 'Sudanization' of the administration and army was speeded up in readiness for independence, British forces were evacuated by November 1955 and on January 1st 1956 Sudan became an independent sovereign state with a government led by the NUP and al-Azhari.

1956: Sudanese Independence

However, the NUP's monopolisation of power and the exclusion of the Umma and other opposition groups led to widespread dissatisfaction with the NUP government. In 1958, amid a growing economic crisis, the NUP negotiated a coalition with the Umma, but it was not allowed to function. The civilian government was overthrown in a military coup led by Major General Ibrahim Abboud. Parliament was dissolved, political parties were banned, demonstrations prohibited and the press controlled.. The stability brought by the military regime allowed the economy to improve and in 1965, after seven years in power, Abboud stepped down in favour of a civilian coalition of the NUP and the Umma under Prime Minister Mohammad Ahmad Mahjoub. However, factionalism, economic stagnation and conflict, especially between the government and non-Arab groups in south Sudan, led to a second military coup in 1969 led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri.

1969: Military Rule

Nimeiri abolished parliament, outlawed political parties, jailed hundreds of politicians and ruled through a Revolutionary Command Council. Nimeiri initially pursued pan-Arab and socialist policies, but after he was briefly ousted by a communist-led coup in 1971 he became friendlier towards the West. In 1972 he signed the Addis Ababa Agreement which granted autonomy to the south and ended the civil war there. Under Nimeiri the economy became more open and loans were taken out to mechanise agriculture, boost production of export crops such as cotton and sugar, and search for oil. However, in the 1970s commodity prices fell and debt-servicing costs rose and a financial crisis followed. Sudan was obliged to sign a structural adjustment programme with the IMF in 1978 in return for substantial loans. In the late 1970s Nimeiri moved towards Islamism and in 1983 he imposed *shari'a* throughout the country, precipitating the renewal of the civil war in the south. In 1985 Nimeiri was overthrown by his defence minister and Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma, formed a coalition of the Umma, the DUP and the National Islamic Front, a radical Islamist party led by Hassan al-Turabi. Al-Mahdi's weak leadership led to an army coup in 1989 led by Omar al-Bashir.

1989: Sudan as an Islamic State

Once again political parties and associations were suspended, politicians jailed, the army purged and independent newspapers closed. For the next ten years the radical Islamist ideas of al-Turabi and the NIF dominated government policy and there was a ruthless top-down Islamisation of the state, army, economy and education system. In 1993 al-Bashir made himself president with dictatorial powers. Sudan became a police state where Islamist policies were enforced by Islamist militias. Radical Islamist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were invited into the country, leading the US to label Sudan a sponsor of terrorism. But by 1999 al-Bashir wanted to dilute al-Turabi's radical policies and expelled him from the government. In October 2005, al-Bashir negotiated an end to the civil war in the south, where a referendum vote in favour of self-determination eventually led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. However, al-Bashir also presided over the bloody repression by the army and Arab militias (known as the Janjaweed) of a rebellion in Darfur, which started in 2003 as a result of economic and political marginalization of the non-Arab Fur. According to human rights groups the conflict in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of 200,000-400,000 people, mostly civilians, and the displacement of over 2.5m. The ICC has indicted al-Bashir of crimes against humanity in Darfur and has issued two international arrest warrants, both of which have been rejected by the Sudanese government.

Appendix 7

The Histories of the *Gabāīl* in Hamadab and Bejrawiya

Compiled from: BJØRKELO, A., 1989. *Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821-1885*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; HÄNSCH, V., 2012. 'Chronology of a Displacement: The Drowning of the Manâsîr People' in *Meroitica* 26: 179-228; HASAN, Y, F., 1967. *The Arabs and the Sudan*. Edinburgh University Press; HILLELSON, S. 1935. *Sudan Arabic Texts* (Cambridge 1935, p. 172-203) and HILLELSON, S. 1923. 'Tabaqāt Wad Dayf Allah: Studies in the Lives of Scholars and Saints' in *Sudan Notes and Records* VI: 191-230; HOLT, P. M., 1961. *A Modern History of Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; INNES, N. McL., 1930. 'The Monasir Country' in *Sudan Notes and Records* 14: 185-191; MacMICHAEL, H.A., 1922. A History of the Arabs in the Sudan. The University Press; MALIÑSKI, P., 2014. 'Some Remarks on the Role of Volcanic Craters in the Traditional Economy of the Manasir Tribe of the Bayuda Desert' in *Gdansk Archaeological Museum African Reports* 11: 79-88; MANGER, L. O., (ed.) 1984. *Trade and Traders in the Sudan*. Bergen: University of Bergen; REID, J. A. 1930. 'Some Notes on the Tribes of the White Nile Province' in *Sudan Notes and Records* 13: 149-209; SPAULDING, J., 1988. 'The Business of Slavery in the Central Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1910-1930 in African Economic History 17: 23-44; WARBURG, G., 1992. *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*. Series in Islam and Society in Africa, Hurst.

N.B. This account is intended to be read in conjunction with Appendix 1, the Historical Timeline of Sudan, and with Chapter 5.

<u>The Ja'aliyin and Manâsîr</u>

There are four tribes (*gabāīl*) in the case-study area, the Ja'aliyin, the Manâsîr, the Hassaniya and the Fadniya. The Ja'aliyin are a group of Arabic–speaking Muslim gabaayil who traditionally occupied the Nile valley from the Fourth to the Sixth Cataracts. They include the Ja'aliyin 'proper' and the Mirafab, the Rubatab and the Manâsîr. The Ja'aliyin 'proper' have traditionally occupied the Nile valley from the Sixth Cataract downstream to the confluence with the Atbara; the Ja'aliyin of Hamadab and Bejrawiya in the case-study area are part of this group. From the Atbara to the Fifth Cataract is the traditional homeland, or *dār*, of the Mirafab; from the Fifth Cataract to Abu Hamad is the *dār* of the Rubatab; and beyond Abu Hamad to the Fourth Cataract is the *dār* of the Manâsîr, which is another of the four *gabāīl* found in the case-study area.

All of the Ja'aliyin claim to descend from 'Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Mohammed, through a probably mythical individual named Ibrahim Ja'al; the Manâsîr say that they take their name from a certain Mansur, who they claim to be one of Ibrahim Ja'al's descendants.

Today the Ja'aliyin *gabāīl* are mostly settled farmers (*awlad al-bahr*) but some are still nomadic (*awlad al-balad*) or semi-nomadic, migrating around the Butana, the great plain that lies between the Nile and the Atbara, or the Bayuda, the volcanic desert enclosed by the great bend of the Nile. For example, while the Manâsîr al-Nil are settled farmers, the Manâsîr al-Badiyah have traditionally grazed the northern Bayuda desert.

The Ja'aliyin were first recorded as a distinct group in the 16th Century during a period of acceleration in the otherwise slow process of Arabization and Islamization of the Nile valley's formerly non-Arab Christian population. It was at this time that they came under the rule of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar, which was established in 1504 and which converted to Islam in 1523. Under the Funj, and until the coming of the Turco-Egyptians in 1821, the Ja'aliyin formed a tribal kingdom ruled by a king (*mek*), whose capital was at Shendi. At this time historians at the Funj court, often religious leaders (*fakis*), began to compile histories and genealogies (*nisbas*) and many *gabāīl* genealogies date from this time.

Groups like the Ja'aliyin wanted to validate their links to Arab and Islamic figures and historians such as Wad Dayf Allah compiled, erroneously tracing their genealogy back to Abbas in his *Tabaqāt*, written around 1700 CE. The references to the Ja'aliyin in the writings of Wad Dayf Allah were a source of pride for Ja'aliyin respondents in the case-study area.

During the centuries after the establishment of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar the Ja'aliyin were Nile-based farmers and long-distance traders (*jallaba*). The routes taken by the jallaba ran from the Shendi Reach north and south along the Nile to Egypt and Bahr al-Ghazal respectively; west to Kordofan and Darfur; and east to the Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa. Shendi became an important trading centre and the jallaba became rich from expeditions to the Nuba Mountains in Kordofan and the upper Nile for slaves to sell or to use as labourers on their farms. The Manâsîr have a similar background as farmers and traders, although their dār was further north than that of the Ja'aliyin and not as well positioned for slave–trading expeditions to the south. Nevertheless, the extant literature tells us that in the 18th and 19th Centuries the Manâsîr meks wielded significant regional power.

By the late 18th Century the Funj Sultanate had broken down and power was fragmented among tribal leaders including the mek of the Ja'aliyin and the mek of the Manâsîr. When the Ottoman viceroy (khedive) of Egypt, Mohammad Ali Pasha, sent his army to invade Sudan in 1821 the Ja'aliyin were among the most powerful *gabāīl* on the Middle Nile. The Ja'aliyin chief, Mek Nimr, initially accepted Turco-Egyptian overlordship and was confirmed in power. However, when the Turco-Egyptians tried to monopolise the slave trade and introduced punitive taxation the Ja'aliyin revolted and massacred the Turco-Egyptian garrison at Shendi; the Khedive's son, Ismail, was burned to death when his headquarters went up in flames. In retaliation, the Ottomans sacked Ja'aliyin towns including Shendi, ed-Damer and Matamma prompting many jallaba to leave the Shendi Reach for a time. Nevertheless by the 1840s the jallaba were flourishing again and many Ja'aliyin and Manâsîr were employed in the Turco-Egyptian administration. One prominent Ja'ali slave trader, Zubeir Rahma Mansour, who was based in Bahr al-Ghazal, annexed Darfur on the Khedive's behalf. The Ja'aliyin did well under the period of Turco-Egyptian rule, which the Sudanese call the 'Turkiya'.

In the late 19th Century the Ja'aliyin and Manâsîr jallaba opposed attempts by the Turco-Egyptian rulers of Egypt and Sudan to restrict the slave trade, which the British were putting pressure on them to do. The Ja'aliyin and Manâsîr farms relied on slave labour and the jallaba on the trade in slaves. When a Dongolawi Sufi of the Sammaniya order, Muhammad Ahmad ibn 'Abdallah, the Sudanese leader later known as the Mahdi ('leader chosen by God') launched his campaign against Turco-Egyptian rule in 1881 most Ja'aliyin gave him their support, and it was Ja'aliyin resistance that held up the British relief column sent to rescue General Charles Gordon from Khartoum in 1885.

After the Mahdi's death the Ja'aliyin turned against his successor, Khalifa Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, who concentrated power among members of his own gabila, the Baqqara. When an Anglo-Egyptian army under General Herbert Kitchener began the re-conquest of Sudan in 1896, the Ja'aliyin resisted an attempt by the Khalifa's forces to occupy the strategic Ja'aliyin town of Matamma; the Khalifa's army sacked Matamma and killed thousands of Ja'aliyin including many women and children. The Ja'aliyin subsequently supported Kitchener's advance on the Khalifa's base in Omdurman, which brought the Mahdiya to an end.

As they had done under the Ottomans, the Ja'aliyin joined the ranks of the Anglo-Egyptian bureaucracy, especially after Egyptians were removed from the system in 1915. Many Ja'aliyin passed through the colonial education system and provided the bedrock of the Sudanese literate class. They were also prominent in the first waves of Sudanese nationalism that were dominated by a northern-based elite, specifically the literate riverine Arab Muslims such as the Ja'aliyin.

In 1901, Hamadab and Bejrawiya were registered as part of the district of Greater Kabushiya, centred on the town of Kabushiya, which was run by a British district commissioner (*omda*) assisted by a

subordinate Egyptian (later Sudanese) district officer. Greater Kabushiya included thirty-six tribal sheikhdoms from Jebel Umm Ali to Demagarai (a town just south of el-Hassa). Under the 'native administration' the British ruled through the tribal chiefs, whose authority was formalised in ordinances of 1922 and 1927. When Sudan became independent in 1956 lines of power were so entrenched that the same tribal families tended to retain their positions of authority.

The way in which leading Ja'aliyin families inherited power from the Turco-Egyptian period to the present day can be illustrated by an example from the case-study area. Mohammed Elamin Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Ba'ashom the maternal grandfather of Hamza al-Ja'ali, one of the key respondents for this study, was a sheikh under the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian administrations and omda from 1921 until 1935. He lived in Hamadab and was invested with a great deal of regional power, being in charge, amongst other things, of the allocation of agricultural lands. Hamza al-Ja'ali, a property mogul, is a former Head of the Hamadab Village Committee and all-round spokesman for the people of Hamadab and a very influential figure in the area. Even if they are currently not post-holders and are no longer officially invested with decision-making or legislative power, Ja'aliyin families are powerful until this day, often in their traditional roles of dispute adjudicator, merchant and money-lender. Although census figures are unreliable they may number 3m-4m today, most of whom live in towns, including Khartoum.

The Manâsîr in the case-study area are pastoralists (Manâsîr al-Badiyah) who have been displaced from their ancestral dār over the past 50 years because of the drying up of the Bayuda Desert. Sedentary Manâsîr, the Manâsîr al-Nil were also displaced when their land was flooded by the Merowe Dam in 2007-8. Hänsch, who spent a long time with the Manâsîr al-Nil during their displacement, explains that when plans for the dam were first announced in 1983/4 there was no protest from the Manâsîr al-Nil; Hänsch puts this down to their mistaken belief that the government had other priorities and that the dam would never be built. Nor was their much reaction from them when construction started in mid-2003. However, in December 2005, when Chinese construction workers began to erect electricity pylons on land belonging to the Manâsîr al-Badiyah and confiscate the desert wells, the Manâsîr al-Badiyah launched mass protests, which prompted similar protests from the Manâsîr al-Nil. The intimidation and arrests of protestors in 2007 and the government's shooting of protestors at Kajbar in 2008, caused the Manâsîr al-Nil to turn from acquiescent pro-government citizens to staunch opponents. As Maliński puts it: the "Manâsîr had to abandon their lands, inhabited by their ancestors for many generations, and [have] been resettled in culturally foreign regions, living in enclaves among other tribes". Today, according to Hänsch, "[t]he political power of the Manâsîr [and] their range of influence in the central government, is extremely limited".

The Hassaniya and Fadniyya

The other two *gabāīl* in the case study area, the Hassaniya and Fadniya, are among the many tribes that belong to the large and complex Juhayna group, who also claim Arab descent. According to Holt, "In Sudanese genealogical usage the term Juhayna is practically a comprehensive term for all tribes claiming Arab descent but not asserting a Ja'ali-'Abbasi origin." The Juhayna of Sudan also claim descent from 'Abbas, the Prophet's uncle, but in their case through an eponymous ancestor Abdulla el-Juhani. They claim kinship with a tribe of the same name in Saudi Arabia, members of which migrated to Egypt after the Arab conquest. In addition to the Hassaniya and Fadniya the Juhayna also include the Shukriyah and Kababish camel-nomads who live in the southern Butana and in the desert north of Kordofan respectively; the Baqqara cattle-nomads of southern Kordofan and Darfur; and other assorted groups. Holt notes that the nomadic Juhayna "played a leading role in the [Arab] break-through into Nubia [from Egypt] in the fourteenth century, and there has been a tendency for elements of varied (and even non-Arab) origins to link themselves with this successful tribe."

Nevertheless, the histories of the Hassaniya and Fadniya are less clear than those of the Ja'aliyin. There are brief references in travellers' accounts to the Hassaniya and Fadniya as pastoralists who caused problems for settled communities. Otherwise they are barely mentioned in the historical record until the early 20th Century, when the Anglo-Egyptian government recorded the Hassaniya's dār in White Nile state south of Khartoum and the Fadniya's *dār* in the Gezira between the White and Blue Niles.

Like most Juhayna the Hassaniya and Fadniya were originally nomadic pastoralists. Spaulding notes that their traditional pastures were extensive and contained good quality level land that "was comparatively abundant and not dependent upon mechanical irrigation; it was held under communal forms of tenure and rarely encumbered." Although pastoralists' rights were in theory, protected by the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance of 1922, they were denied by the Anglo-Egyptian government of legal title to their extensive traditional dārs, which they considered to be theirs by virtue of customary use over a long period of time. However, it was on their land that the British focused their efforts to develop large-scale irrigated commercial farming, particularly of cotton, which was accompanied by large-scale dam-building. The Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile was inaugurated in 1925 and the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile south of Khartoum in 1937; the latter caused flooding for about 200 miles upstream. The Hassaniya and Fadniya were therefore among the first groups in Sudan to be displaced by dam building and large-scale commercial agriculture. However, unlike the Ja'aliyin they were had little political influence; they were not well-placed in the administration and played little role in the nationalist movements.

Warburg shows that the public and private agricultural schemes that were inaugurated in Gezira and While Nile States reduced the pasture available to the nomadic Hassaniya and Fadniya. As cotton cultivation gained ground and towns at Kosti, Kurmuk, Jebelain and Renk developed, there was an increasing tendency for them to settle along the river as semi-nomads. Like many others they also began to turn away from pastoralism to wage labour following the mechanisation of commercial agriculture. Spaulding estimates that the Hassaniya were over a century behind the Ja'aliyin in terms of this process:

> The ensuing commoditization of agricultural production in the lands along the White Nile south of Khartoum began to generate social transformations that resembled those characteristic of eighteenth century society in the irrigated north; for example, the early twentieth-century "big men" of the Hassaniya…ventured into the business of grain speculation, thus converting older forms of power over their inferiors into that of bourgeois creditors.

However, those Hassaniya and Fadniya who have maintained a nomadic was of life have found their pastures increasingly squeezed by the extension of commercial agriculture, and have moved away from their traditional dārs to other parts of Sudan, some of them to the case-study area of Hamadab and Bejrawiya. There, as noted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, they have come up against the long-established Ja'aliyin.

Appendix 8

Kindergarten Administrative Booklet (excerpt)

The 'interim calendar card' for kindergarten children by the Minister of Education and Knowledge in River Nile State. Publication date unknown, but collected by the author in 2013.

River Nile State - Minister of Education & Knowledge
Administration of pre-school education
Interim calendar card for children

Province:……Locality:……
Kindergarten…… Name of child……

m	Area Calendar	Goal or demand growth	The first period			The second period			The third period		
			always	some-times	rarely	always	some-times	rarely	always	some-times	rarely
1	Religious morality	1/ calls to God when he eats and drinks and at the start of each piece of work 2/ knows that God is God, knows the Prophet Mohammed and his book, the Quran 3/ knows salutations and response (peace, mercy and blessings of God) 4/ exercises some *duaa*'s (supplications) and Islamic morals 5/ praises God when eating and drinking, sneezing at each event 6/uses their right hand 7/ knows that God calls when you sleep and wake up 8/ is honest in word and deed 9/ recites the holy Quran and listens to him 10/ has knowledge of *wudhu* (washing rites) 11/ has knowledge of prayer and reverence 12/ has knowledge of religious rites (fast, pilgrim) 13/ has reverence in worship 14/ knows the [Prophet's] biography									
Total											

m	Area calendar	Goal or demand growth	The first period			The second period			The third period		
			always	some-times	rarely	always	some-times	rarely	always	some-times	rarely
2	Social growth	1/ can pick up good social customs 2/ has an ability to command 3/ has respect for the rights to get others involved 4/ accepts order and discipline 5/ uses courtesies and is courteousness (uses polite expressions and 'please's) 6/ has the inclination to visit family and friends 7/ has the ability of initiative and perseverance 8/ comes up with own diet 9/ collaborates with others 10/ accepts others									
Total											

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

ولاية نهر النيل – وزارة التربية والتعليم والمعارف

ادارة التعليم قبل المدرسي

بطاقة التقويم المرحلي للطفل

محافظة :..... محلية:.....

روضة :..... اسم الطفل:.....

م	مجال التقويم	الهدف او مطلب النمو	الفترة الأولى			الفترة الثانية			الفترة الثالثة		
			دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً	دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً	دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً
1	الديني والخلقي	1/ ان يسمي الله عند الأكل والشرب وعند بداية كل عمل									
		2/ان يعرف ان الله ربه وان محمد (ﷺ) نبيه وان القرآن كتابه									
		3/ أن يعرف التحية وردها السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته)									
		4/ ان يمارس بعض الأدعية والآداب الاسلامية									
		5/ ان يحمد الله عند الأكل والشرب والعطس وعند كل حالة									
		6/ ان يستخدم يده اليمنى									
		7/ ان يدعو الله عند النوم والاستيقاظ									
		8/ الصدق والأمانة في القول والفعل									
		9/ ان يستمتع لتلاوة القرآن الكريم والاستماع له									
		10/ معرفته بالوضوء									
		11/ معرفته بالصلاة والخشوع فيها									
		12/ معرفته بالشعائر الدينية (صوم/حج)									
		13/ الخشوع في الشعائر الدينية									
		14/ معرفته بالسيرة النبوية									
	المجموع										

م	مجال التقويم	الهدف او مطلب النمو	الفترة الأولى			الفترة الثانية			الفترة الثالثة		
			دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً	دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً	دائماً	أحياناً	نادراً
2	النمو الاجتماعي	1/ التشابه للعادات الاجتماعية الحسنة									
		2/ قدرته على القيادة									
		3/ احترامه لحقوق الاخرين									
		4/ تقبله للنظام والإنضباط									
		5/ استخدامه لعبارات المجاملة والتهذيب									
		6/ ميله لزيارة الأهل والأصحاب									
		7/ مقدرته على المبادرة والمثابرة									
		8/ تجاوبه مع من يكبره سناً									
		9/ تعاونه مع الاخرين									
		10/ تقبل الاخرين له									
	المجموع										

Appendix 9

Year 7 School Textbook (excerpt)

The contents page of the school textbook for Year 7 students, written in 2008 by the Institute of Education (referred to here by the Institute's location in Bakht al-Rudah).

(In the Name of Allah)

The Ministry of Public Education

The National Centre for Curriculums and Educational research

Bahkt al-Rudah [2008]

We and the Islamic world

Grade Seven

[not shown in photos below]

Introduction *—PAGE 3—*

Appendix 10

The Invention of 'Ancient Nubia'

10.1 (below) Extract from HAYNES, J. L., 1992. *Nubia: Ancient Kingdoms of Africa*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts given in De Simone (2014) as Annex 1 (pp. 272-3).

ANNEX I

Surviving aspects of Nubian cultures (Joyce L. Haynes: 1992)

"Nubians were among the most sophisticated and artistic peoples of the ancient world. Thanks to recent excavations and expanded interest in the history of Africa, we now are beginning to understand the everyday life of this ancient African civilization.

Many aspects of ancient Nubian cultures survive today, unchanged for more than thirty-five centuries, in southern Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and perhaps beyond [...] Pottery very similar in decoration and manufacture to ancient types is still made and can be purchased in village markets of these countries. Today, Nubians created beds and stools in much the same way as those found in the graves at Kerma were made. Even now, in remote parts of the eastern Sudan, peple use wooden pillows similar to ancient headrests. Modern-day Nubians wear leather sandals identical to those found in ancient graves.

Nubians still commonly place square amulets, similar in shape to ancient Kushite and Egyptian types, around their necks for protection against disease and misfortune. Today, the amulets are small leather pouches containing folded papers with quotations that are often from the sacred Islamic texts of the Koran. Ancient Kushites adorned themselves with gold jewelry; modern-day Nubians continue the tradition; likewise, some hairstyles have scarcely changed, as can be seen by comparing the ancient and modern methods of plaiting. Today, small children frequently have their heads shaved except for certain tufts, which area allowed to grow long, just as can be seen in ancient paintings.

From the markings on small, pottery female figurines, we know that some of the C Group women elaborately decorated their bodies with tattoos and patterns of scars. Many peoples of Nubia, the Sudan, and most of Equatorial Africa today continue the custom of adorning their faces with a series of distinctive permanent scars. Tattoos and scars may indicate social statusor signify rites of passage. The arrangements of the scars varies from one group to another and may also serve as an identifying mark of one's tribal origin or affiliation. Many modern-day Sudanese wear facial scars identical to those that can be seen on Nubians represented in ancient Kushite, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman art. Some hairstyles of today are similar to those of the past.

One hallmark of both ancient and contemporary Nubian cattle herds is the presence of select oxen with artificially deformed horns. Today, these animals are seen primarily among the southern Sudanese, who keep them as pets and as objects of intense respect. Typically, the right horn grows naturally on these animals, while the left horn has been cut and forced to grow downward. Oxen with horns deformed in this way can be seen frequently in prehistoric Nubian rock drawings. Later, they appear in Egyptian art in scenes of Nubian war booty. Texts identify them as 'oxen of the finest quality from Kush'. In Kushite art, later still, the same types of cattle appear in scenes illustrating Kushite war spoils that have been taken from the southern tribes. The Kushites themselves are represented owing cattle with both horns symmetrically deformed - just like the animals of the modern -day Shilluk people, who are now centered along the White Nile south of Khartoum.

Many features of the ancient Nubian burial customs have disappeared owing to the influences of centuries of exposure to the religions of the ancient Egypt, Christianity, and Islam. However, a number of familiar features have remained remarkably unchanged. Although funerary beds are no longer placed in graves, Nubian are still carried on them in procession to their graves. Nubians are no longer buried with grave goods; however, food and water jars are still left at the foot of the graves after burial. This allows relatives to make offering to the spirit of the deceased as was done more three thousand years ago in Kerma, both today and in ancient times, grave mounds are covered with a surface of hundreds, some time thousands, of smooth, white desert "pebbles. The ancient meaning of these stones is not known; however today, each stone left of the grave represent a prayer that has been said for the deceased.

Another noteworthy characteristic of Nubian culture that has survived is the popularity of the sport of wrestling. In Egyptian art Nubians are depicted as champion wrestlers and are frequently shown performing. Today, in the southern Sudan, among the people in the Nuba hills, wrestling is the primary sport of men. They gather annually to compete in great wrestling festivals. The winner becomes the man most likely to win a bride."

10.2 (below) Extract from DE SIMONE, C. M., 2014. *Nubia and Nubians: the 'Museumizations' of a Culture*. Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University, Annex VII (pp. 285-6) entitled 'Table of Nubian artifacts displayed at Sudan National Museum which are still in use in modern Nubian society'.

ANNEX VII

Table of Nubian artifacts displayed at Sudan National Museum which are still in use in modern Nubian society

Kerma civilization

Artifact No.	Material	Emulated Modern Nubian artifact	Object Description	Label information
15943	Polished pottery	Similar to the contemporary *Daade*, pottery bowl one of the kitchen utensils in Nubia	Cylindrical decorated bowl (Diameter about 60-70 cm)	Polished pot from Abusir (North of Sudan)
N/A	Ceramic pot	Similar to the contemporary *Borma*, jar used for alcoholic drinks by Nuba tribes on the Dilling Mountains. The difference between the two objects is that *Borma* has only 3 spouts	A five –spouted jar made of ceramic	Ceramic pot with five spouts
21711	Pottery	Similar to the modern Nubian *Fukkee* used in the Northern Sudan as water pot. The *Fukkee* is much bigger in size	Small water pot with metallic holder	Small water pot, Serra West

Kerma civilization

Artifact No.	Material	Emulated Modern Nubian artifact	Object Description	Label information
15943	Polished pottery	Similar to the contemporary *Daade*, pottery bowl one of the kitchen utensils in Nubia	Cylindrical decorated bowl (Diameter about 60-70 cm)	Polished pot from Abusir (North of Sudan)
N/A	Ceramic pot	Similar to the contemporary *Borma*, jar used for alcoholic drinks by Nuba tribes on the Dilling Mountains. The difference between the two objects is that *Borma* has only 3 spouts	A five –spouted jar made of ceramic	Ceramic pot with five spouts
21711	Pottery	Similar to the modern Nubian *Fukkee* used in the Northern Sudan as water pot. The *Fukkee* is much bigger in size	Small water pot with metallic holder	Small water pot, Serra West

Domestic tools

Artifact No.	Material	Emulated Modern Nubian artifact	Object Description	Label information
N/A	Pottery	Similar to the contemporary *Fukke*, water pot found in Nubian	Water pot of medium size	Label is not available
N/A	Pottery	Similar to the contemporary *koos*, a dish used for food in Nubia	Small dishes	Label is not available
N/A	Pottery	Similar to the modern Nubian *Diidee* used as cooking pot in Nubia	Pot	Label is not available

2. Personal ornaments

Artifact No.	Material	Emulated Modern Nubian artifact	Object Description	Label information
N/A	Beads and copper	Similar to the contemporary *gumurin alli*, local necklace used by women in Nubia	Variety of necklaces made of beads inter-threaded with some round pieces of copper	Label is not available

Objects used in daily life work

Artifact No.	Material	Emulated Modern Nubian artifact	Object Description	Label Information
N/A	Leather	Similar to the contemporary *dir*, local shoes used in Nubia	A pair of shoes made of feather	Label is not available
N/A	Pottery	Similar to the contemporary *gufaad*, a local pot used in Nubia to burn herbs	Small hemispherical pot	Label is not available
N/A	Strings	Similar to the contemporary *karkaree*, a fishing net used in Nubian	Striped string net	Label is not available
N/A	Wood, metal	Similar to the contemporary *koshir*, a sturdy needle used in Nubia for making nets, mats and fastening sacks	Big metallic needle with wooden handle	Label is not available
N/A	Pottery	Similar to the contemporary *daadi*, cooking bowl used in Nubian	Cylindrical handle-less pot	Label is not available